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Abstract 
 
The thesis explores the strategic choices made by automotive manufacturers in 
developing and deploying technology that is discontinuous and potentially disruptive. It 
studies the deployment of seat belts, airbags, hybrid vehicles and fuel cell electric 
vehicles, drawing on product deployment histories, patents and the opinions of industry 
experts. The thesis identifies two fundamental strategies called depth and breadth and 
shows how the different manufacturers’ approach to these four technologies is arrayed 
along a continuum between these two choices. 
 
The thesis contributes to the theory of the technology-based firm which focuses on the 
management of scale, scope, time and space by making operational the idea of scope 
with depth and breadth. It also explicitly links the theory to the literature on co-
evolution and dynamic capabilities and adds to the understanding of the co-evolutionary 
dynamics at play in the automotive industry by applying the idea of technological 
pathways to the technologies under study. This discussion yields some potentially 
interesting insight for practitioners. 
 
The thesis also reviews the literature concerning the potential changes to automotive 
power train technology and adds to it by using the theory of the technology-based firm 
as well as environmental literature and the non market strategy lens in order to develop 
a nonbiased view of the state of development of fuel cell and hybrid technology. 
 
Finally, the thesis provides a rigorous review of the use of patents in management 
science over the last 50 years and makes one of the first attempts in the academic 
literature to study patents using a patent mapping tool to help make sense of the large 
amounts of data available in line with the new ideas concerning the importance of 
developing visualisation techniques in data intensive scientific enquiry.  
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Suppliers Term used to describe firms which make components, 
modules or systems which are then integrated into the 
vehicle by the OEMs 
NOTATION 
 
The thesis employs a number of terms which are well known within the context of the 
automotive industry but which might not be as familiar to a wider readership, as 
follows: 
 
Airbag Inflatable device that protects vehicle occupants in the 
event of a crash 
Battery Electric Vehicle Electric vehicle which uses a large group of batteries as 
its primary source of energy storage 
Cars and Light Trucks Industry term for passenger vehicles which includes 
pickup trucks and sports utility vehicles (SUVs) 
CARB Abbreviation for the California Air and Resources Board, 
responsible for air quality in California 
Component Discrete part or group of parts later incorporated into a 
motor vehicle 
Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle Electric vehicle which uses a fuel cell to generate 
electricity on demand from liquid or gaseous feed stock 
GM Abbreviation for General Motors Corporation 
Hybrid Electric Vehicle Vehicle which has both electric and internal combustion 
propulsion systems 
ICE Abbreviation for internal combustion engine 
Mild hybrid Hybrid vehicle which relies primarily on its internal 
combustion engine 
Module Group of components that is delivered as a unit to the 
vehicle assembly plant 
NHTSA Abbreviation for the National Highway Traffic and Safety 
Administration, which regulates motor vehicles in the 
U.S. 
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer, used to refer to the 
vehicle manufacturers. The thesis tends to use the term 
manufacturers. 
Pretensioner Pyrotechnic device which tightens a seat belt in the first 
moments of a collision 
Power Train The set of technologies used to store and convert energy 
and apply it to the wheels 
Range Extender Term coined by General Motors for a hybrid design in 
which an internal combustion engine acts as an electricity 
generator 
Seat Belt System of webbing which holds a vehicle occupant in 
place in the event of a collision or sudden stop 
System Group of components which together play a function in 
the vehicle 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Explore how companies approach the development of different technologies  
1.1 Background and the Research Question 
 
Industry, government and academia are interested in the potential of very new 
technology which is often called radical, disruptive or discontinuous. There are a 
number of theoretical constructs which discuss the phenomena and retroactive case 
studies which document the emergence of new technology and explore in which cases 
such new technology caused disruption. There is, however, an important gap in the 
literature on how firms behave during what Tidd et al. (1997) referred to as the 
implementation phase of innovation in light of technology which is discontinuous and 
recognized as potentially disruptive. 
 
The automotive industry has been the focus of intensive academic scrutiny over the last 
50 years and has been a source for theoretical development and insights for practice in a 
number of areas including operations, new product development, and supplier 
relationships, to name some of the key areas of research. The area of potentially 
disruptive or discontinuous innovation is, however, less researched in the automotive 
context although there is a growing body of knowledge dealing with different aspects of 
the potential for change in automotive power train technology. 
 
While there are several theories of the firm in the literature, Granstrand (1998) 
introduces the theory of the technology-based firm for those cases where technology 
and technological change have a substantial impact on firms which have an asset base 
that is heavily dependent on technology. In Granstrand’s view, other existing theories 
do not sufficiently explain the co-evolutionary nature of technological development and 
diversification in modern multi-national and multi-product firms. 
 
The thesis uses the automotive context and Granstrand’s theory of the technology-based 
firm to contribute to filling the gap identified above and explore the choices in 
technology strategy (Ford, 1988) pursued by different vehicle manufacturers in the face 
of such discontinuous and potentially disruptive technologies. 
 
 The research question is: What strategies do automotive companies follow with 
respect to the investigation and deployment of discontinuous technologies?  
 
Within the broader research question, the thesis pursues two sub-objectives: 
2. Assess how different companies develop the same technologies  
 
1.2 Main Findings  
 
The thesis explores how four automotive manufacturers introduced new technology by 
looking at four different technological innovations. By looking at four vehicle 
manufacturers and four technologies, the thesis develops eight complementary case 
studies based on data from technology deployment, U.S. patents, and the opinions of 
industry experts. 
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The case studies show that the manufacturer’s strategies appear to array themselves 
along a spectrum the thesis refers to as “depth” and “breadth”. This thesis applies the 
terms depth and breadth to the development and deployment of new technologies at the 
system level in cars and light trucks and defines them in Sub-section 6.2.2 in the 
following way: A broad strategy is defined as pursuing a number of parallel projects 
looking at different aspects of the new technology and/or seeking to implement the 
technology in a wide variety of applications. A deep technological strategy, on the other 
hand, is defined as focusing efforts on developing the technology in a single or limited 
number of applications prior to a potential or eventual roll out across the product line. 
 
The concepts of depth and breadth have been used by other researchers to look at a 
firm’s technological asset base (Prencipe, 2000; Wang and von Tunzelmann, 2000; 
Brusoni et al., 2005) and similar concepts have been looked at in the literature of 
automotive product development (Nobeoka and Cusumano, 1997). The contribution of 
the thesis is to apply the concepts to the development and deployment strategy for 
incorporating new technology into current products and contributing to the idea of 
managing scope which is one of the central aspects of Granstrand’s (1998) theory of the 
technology-based firm. The thesis also finds that the deployment pattern seen appears to 
match the patent pattern in many cases and puts forward a construct in Sub-section 6.2.4 
linking the deployment pattern of new technology and each firm’s cumulative patent 
pattern in the technology.  
 
Using these ideas, the thesis answers the research question by finding heterogeneity in 
the response of the different vehicle manufacturers for the different technologies and 
identifies factors related to the firms themselves and also the technologies which 
partially explain those differences. With respect to the technologies, the thesis applies 
Geels and Schot’s (2007) technological pathways to the technologies and finds that the 
pathways can be combined with the ideas of depth and breadth to first develop a clear 
idea of the strategies employed and also give indications for practice in terms of what 
could be done in the face of discontinuous change adding to literature dealing with 
similar issues reviewed in Sub-section 2.2.1. 
 
In addition to the contribution to Granstrand’s idea of scope mentioned above, the thesis 
discusses three possible additions to the theory of the technology-based firm. The first 
addition is to explicitly link the theory of the technology-based firm with the co-
evolutionary perspective and the multi-level perspective. The primary reason that 
Granstrand puts forward a new theory of the firm is that he feels that others theories do 
not adequately capture the co-evolutionary process between firms which develop 
technology and the environment in which those firms operate and compete, and if one 
were to link these three literatures, which have largely been separate, there might be 
much which can be applied from one stream to another, thus enriching all three. 
 
The second addition is to link the theory to the dynamic capabilities literature of Teece 
et al. (1997) which deals with many of the same concepts, and appears to only differ 
from the theory of the technology-based firm in that Teece at al. and subsequent 
researchers use the model to identify capabilities which change over time in light of a 
changing environment but do not emphasize the other side of the co-evolutionary 
process. 
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The importance of linking these literatures lies in opening up an avenue to further 
develop the theory of the technology-based firm and breaking into what Granstrand 
(1998) calls the “dark box” (p.486) of management. 
 
The third addition is to tighten the definition of what is and what is not a technology-
based firm. Granstrand’s definition of a technology-based firm is actually quite broad 
and could be applied to many if not most firms in today’s’ technologically advanced 
economy, and if, as suggested, literature from other perspectives can be used to 
complement the theory of the technology-based firm, a tighter definition could be useful 
in determining which studies are applicable and which are not. The thesis proposes 
three tests for the application of the theory which are further developed in Section 6.4: 
 
1. That the firm must compete in a socio-technological regime which possesses the 
five properties of a co-evolutionary system (Lewin and Volberda, 1999). 
2. That the firm in question has the requisite level of influence to affect its 
environment at the niche, regime or landscape level.  
3. That the firm is primarily concerned with the development of technological 
artefacts or services, as opposed to marketing concepts, retail networks, etc.   
 
In terms of method, the thesis uses an innovative text mapping tool to make sense of the 
patent data echoing Jim Gray’s (2009) idea of the importance of visualization in data-
intensive science, which he referred to as the fourth paradigm of scientific endeavour. 
While these tools are commonly used in practice (Blanchard, 2007) this thesis appears 
to be one of the first uses of the tools to inform management science and should be 
considered an early exploration of their potential.  
 
Finally, the thesis suggests that using the theory of the technology-based firm as well as 
Baron’s (1995) non-market strategy concept and Reinhardt’s (2005) framework on how 
it pays to be green yields additional insight to that provided by institutional theory (Van 
den Hoed, 2004) in describing the evolution of fuel cell vehicles. Considering all the 
major automotive manufacturers as technology-based firms explains the heterogeneity 
in a more compelling way because it places technology and management at the centre, 
rather than at the periphery, of how the firm behaves. The combination of these 
perspectives appears to explain General Motor’s apparent commitment to fuel cell 
electric vehicles as well as Toyota’s apparently parallel commitment to hybrids and fuel 
cells, as well as Ford’s choice to push for hybrids and Nissan’s apparent choice to 
pursue neither one of the technologies. 
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1.3 Thesis Content 
 
Table 1.1 shows the thesis content by chapter and makes explicit the purpose of each 
chapter.  
 
Chapter Contents Purpose 
1. Introduction • Background 
• Research question 
• Main findings 
• Thesis content 
To clearly situate the thesis in the 
field of discontinuous innovation and 
the automotive industry, highlight 
findings and explain content  
2. Literature 
Review 
• Literature review process 
• Literature concerning 
discontinuous and disruptive 
technology, the automotive 
industry, and the theory of 
the technology-based firm 
• Literature using patents 
Review the literature review process, 
identify the gap in the literature that 
the thesis contributes to filling, as 
well as look deeply at the use of 
patents in management science 
3. Research 
Methodology 
• Philosophy & epistemology 
• Method 
• Site selection 
• Sources of data 
Explain the philosophical and 
methodological choices made and 
highlight the limitations inherent in 
the approach taken 
4. Industry 
Context 
• Socio-technological model 
of the automotive industry 
• Examples of co-
evolutionary dynamics 
Establish the context for the research  
in a rigorous way to clarify case 
study limitations and avoid research 
bias 
5. Case Studies • Company case studies 
• Technology case studies 
Show the empirical findings of the 
case studies 
6. Discussion • Development of the 
concepts of depth and 
breadth 
• Discussion of the 
implications of depth and 
breadth for the thesis 
• Discussion of theory 
• Discussion of alternative 
power train technology 
Put forward ideas of depth and 
breadth and perform cross case 
analysis using the concepts as well as 
discussing their implications for 
theory and practice as well as 
commenting on the evolution of 
alternative power train technology. 
7. Conclusions • Contribution to knowledge 
• Limitations 
• Further research 
State the contribution to knowledge 
made by the thesis as well as discuss 
its overall limitations and make 
suggestions for future research 
 
Table 1.1 Thesis Content 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to place the thesis within a framework of existing 
management theory and methodology and to show those gaps in the literature which the 
thesis attempts to fill. According to Hart (1998), making a new contribution is not only 
“dependent upon knowledge of the subject” but also “requires a spirit of adventure” 
(Hart, 1998, p. 21). Section 2.2 will capture that spirit by briefly discussing the literature 
review process which has occurred in specific phases over the last six years. Eisenhardt 
discusses the importance of considering a “broad range of literature” (Eisenhardt, 1989, 
p. 544) and the researcher did just that prior to arriving at the specific literature in which 
to contribute. 
 
Section 2.3 will explore the literature to which the thesis contributes. As discussed in 
Section 1.1, there is a gap in the literature that discusses how vehicle manufacturers in 
particular and firms in general deploy discontinuous and potentially disruptive 
technology, and this section will show the existence of that gap by looking at the 
literature focused on disruptive and discontinuous technology, the automotive literature 
dealing with such technologies, and Grandstand’s (1998) theory of the technology-
based firm. Other literatures which are used in the thesis will be introduced and 
reviewed as needed. 
 
Section 2.4 will go into detail on the history of using patents in management research 
and show how patent analysis has informed management science over time. The key 
finding of Section 2.4 is that the development of digital tools has tremendously 
increased the power of patent analysis over the years yet brings new challenges 
including the need for visualization of the vast amounts of data. The role of Section 2.4 
is primarily methodological and Chapter 3, which deals with the research methodology, 
will draw on the discussion of advantages and limitations to using patents and go past 
the normal litany of limitations and address some of the limitations inherent in using 
powerful digital databases and mapping tools. 
 
2.2. The literature review process and methodology 
 
More than a single activity, the literature review for the thesis was conducted in a series 
of six discrete phases in which different threads in the literature were read, analyzed and 
considered for use in the research. Hart (1998) presents a very clear and methodical 
flow chart of the literature search in which the researcher starts by choosing a topic and 
then focuses in on the topic through a combination of mapping and bibliographic 
analysis at finer and finer levels of detail. Tranfield et al. (2003) put forward the idea of 
the systematic literature review which entails looking for the connection between 
different literatures using key words and digital search tools such as ABI Proquest, 
Science Direct, Ebsco, etc. The thesis employed both concepts but did not experience 
the kind of step-by-step clarity implied by Hart (1998) but instead went through an 
iterative process during which different literatures were looked at in-depth, and even the 
same body of literature was reviewed at different times, as shown in Table 2.1. 
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Period Focus Application to thesis 
Winter 
2004 
Long terms strategy, 
disruptive technologies, 
energy availability & 
climate change 
Initial context developed and focus on 
heterogeneity of response by automotive 
manufacturers identified.  
Summer 
2004 
Automotive, fuel cells, 
strategy, and innovation 
A number of potential lenses identified as 
possible avenues of research. 
Spring 
2007 
Strategy and innovation (2) Lewin and Volberda’s (1999) five 
properties of a co-evolutionary system used 
to analyze context and gap identified in 
innovation literature.  
Summer 
2008 
Depth and breadth, the 
theory of the technology-
based firm, the use of 
patents in management 
research 
Focus of contribution changed to the theory 
of the technology-based firm. The analysis 
of the use of patents used to identify limits 
to using patents. 
Summer 
2009 
Multi-level perspective and 
technology pathways 
 
Geels’ (2002) socio-technical model used 
in developing context and Geels and 
Schot’s (2007) technology pathways 
adopted for technology case studies. 
Winter 
2010 
Automotive (2),  fuel cells 
in automotive (2), 
innovation (2) 
Gap identified in automotive literature and 
overall tone of review made more critical 
with fewer concepts discussed in greater 
depth. 
Table 2.1 Discrete phases in the literature review 
 
Much of the impetus for these different phases of the literature review was feedback 
received during the Cranfield Review Process, which is designed to focus research 
efforts and assure that a researcher is making progress in line with the guidelines 
established by the School of Management, in this case for part-time PhD. students. 
(http://www.som.cranfield.ac.uk/som) The Viva also gave additional guidance and 
prompted an additional phase of the review. For the thesis, these reviews were 
conducted as shown in Table 2.2. 
 
Review Month, Year 
1st Review October, 2004 
Addendum to 1st Review December. 2004 
2nd Review July, 2007 
3rd Review  September, 2008 
Viva March, 2010 
 
Table 2.2 Review process timetable 
 
This initial selection of literature was used to define the context of the research but was 
later not only refined but repeated in each of the iterations shown in Table 2.1. The first 
literature review, for example, found 1,743 journal articles by using the Proquest 
database and the 31 sets of key words shown in Appendix J. 
Comment [A1]: figure 2.1 doesn't seem 
to exist 
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In the summer of 2004, the focus was sharpened and a search was made of the literature 
on disruptive technology in automotive, the application of fuel cells to transportation 
and the larger fields of strategy and innovation in order to explore different potential 
lenses which could be used in the research and are shown in Table 3.1. Part of this work 
was to look at the International Motor Vehicle Program as a possible source of 
applicable research, an example of which can be found in Steinemann (1999). In the 
Spring of 2007, the literature search was focused again and the fields of strategy and 
innovation were explored in more depth using citation searching and mapping 
techniques (Hart, 1998) to establish a chronological timeline in both literatures and to 
identify two broad threads in research into disruptive technology (Bower and 
Christensen, 1995) and discontinuous innovation (Abernathy and Clark, 1985, Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986) as well as looking at Pavitt’s (1984) technological trajectories as a 
possibly important framework for the thesis. This effort also led to a deeper look at the 
co-evolutionary perspective (Lewin and Volberda, 1999).  
 
In the summer of 2008, a fifth review of the literature was conducted along two parallel 
tracks. One track had to do with the use of the concepts of depth and breadth by other 
researchers which led to the identification of Granstrand’s (1998) theory of the 
technology-based firm as a potential area in which to make a contribution, and the other 
with the use of patents in management science which is shown in Section 2.4. In the 
summer of 2009 the literature review focused on looking deeply at the multi-level 
perspective (Rip and Kemp, 1998) and Geels and Schot’s (2007) technology pathways 
were identified as a potentially more robust framework for use at the product and 
component strategy level than Pavitt’s (1984, 1997) trajectories which were done at the 
firm level. Finally, the literature review was expanded again by looking at the literature 
on automotive and fuel cells for a second time and also deepening the discussion of the 
two streams of innovation literature adding a more critical tone to the review while 
focussing on the intersection of the innovation literature and the automotive literature, 
shown in Figure 2.1, in which a gap had been identified and which is discussed in 
Section 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.1 Locus of contribution 
Innovation 
Literature Automotive Literature 
Gap Identified 
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o Definitions 
2.3 Gaps in the literature 
 
As stated in Section 1.1, there is an important gap in the literature in looking at how 
firms deploy technology which is recognized as discontinuous and potentially 
disruptive, but in fact has not yet demonstrated that potential. This can be seen in both 
the innovation literature and that dealing with the automotive industry and potential 
changes to power train technology in the years ahead. 
 
Sub-section 2.3.1 will review the innovation literature dealing with discontinuity and 
disruption by discussing several of the different definitions in use, exploring two major 
threads in the literature, and highlighting the relatively limited amount of literature 
which explores what companies ought to do in the face of such change. Sub-section 
2.3.2 will look at the literature concerned with innovation in the automotive industry in 
general and that concerned with the transition to alternatives to the internal combustion 
engine in particular. Sub-section 2.3.3 will focus on Granstrand’s (1998) concept of the 
technology-based firm and suggest that it could be expanded upon to inform the debate 
on what to do in the face of technological change of the type discussed in Sub-sections 
2.3.1 and 2.3.2. Finally Sub-section 2.3.4 will summarize Section 2.3 and define the gap 
the thesis intends to address. 
 
2.3.1 Technological innovation and technology strategy 
 
There is an extensive literature dealing with innovation and the development of new 
technology which covers a wide range of topics, approaches, and theoretical 
frameworks. Essentially, the literature deals with three basic questions: what to do, how 
to do it, and how to classify different technology related activities.  
 
 
In the literature, different researchers use different words to describe similar types of 
technological innovation, and sometimes use the same words to mean different things. 
This is also true in dealing with the type of technology of interest, i.e., those 
technological developments that present a true break with the past and can sometimes 
cause profound change or disruption in an industry (Garcia and Calantone, 2002; Noke, 
2006; Daneels, 2004) 
 
Garcia and Calantone (2002) look deeply at the marketing literature as well as the 
innovation literature identifying 15 constructs and 51 scale items in 21 empirical studies 
which seek to explore discontinuous and innovative technologies. In their view, the lack 
of common definitions and proliferation of typologies has led to a degree of theoretical 
confusion in the academic literature and this confusion has made it more difficult for the 
academic community to have as much of an impact on practice as could be possible. In 
their view the empirical studies are also confusing as they can be found at both the 
macro and micro levels of analysis, deal with technological and market discontinuities, 
explore single and multiple factors, and use categorical and continuous scales to 
evaluate levels of innovativeness and other measures. 
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Garcia and Calantone use the 1991 OECD definition of innovation as “an iterative 
process initiated by the perception of a new market and /or new service opportunity for 
a technology-based invention which leads to development, production, and marketing 
tasks striving for the commercial success of the invention” (Garcia and Calantone, 
2002, p. 112). At issue is the definition of inventiveness which they understand as 
meaning newness and thus brings the question of new to whom i.e. the world, the firm, 
the consumer, etc. For Garcia and Calantone (2002) then, inventiveness is a measure of 
potential for discontinuity. What is striking is that after critiquing the proliferation of 
concepts concerning innovation, Garcia and Calantone go on to present an additional 
framework distinguishing between incremental, what they call really new, and radical 
based on whether a specific innovation represents discontinuity in the technology, 
market or both.  
 
Noke (2006) resists the temptation to develop yet another framework but touches on the 
same theme that the proliferation of definitions, themes and frameworks is a hindrance 
to the development of theory and conducting meaningful empirical work. In her view, 
the proliferation of concepts is understandable because of the large number of academic 
disciplines involved and she attempts to tease out the common themes in different 
streams of research. For Noke, the difference between radical and discontinuous 
technologies has to do with whether or not a new technological paradigm is part of the 
development and in her view the creation of a new paradigm is central to what she 
called radical technology. Discontinuous innovation is often the result of an innovation 
being applied to a completely new field but without the introduction of a new 
technological paradigm. Such innovation does require a paradigm shift in the minds of 
the people involved in developing and introducing the technology but not in the 
technology as such. 
 
Noke (2006) then looks at disruptive technologies and makes three observations. In the 
first place the appropriate unit of analysis for considering disruption is primarily the 
end-user or customer who, due to changing perception of value, will choose the new 
technology over the old; the resulting industry disruption is an effect of this shift. A 
second point is that disruption is context specific and that industry incumbents become 
disrupted when caught off guard or are surprised by the shift in perceived value. The 
third point is that there does appear to be some debate in the literature as to the pace of 
such disruption; changes in values might happen slowly or quickly, again depending on 
the context. 
 
What appears to be the general consensus across these different streams of research, and 
which will be highlighted in the discussion of Bower and Christensen (1995) and later 
papers, is that discontinuous innovation might lead to disruption depending on the 
response by industry players, and that disruption is, like beauty, in the in the eye of the 
beholder (or in this case the disrupted players in an industry). For the purposes of the 
thesis Daneels’ (2004) definition will be used which states that “A disruptive 
technology is a technology that changes the basis of competition by changing the 
performance metrics by which firms compete” (p. 249). 
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o Two views of significant technological change 
 
According to Pisano (2006), there are two distinct threads of research dealing with why 
leading firms fail to survive profound technological change. Pisano calls these threads 
the supply view and demand view, as the first has to do with what firms can offer and 
the second what customers ask for.  
 
The first of these threads can be traced back to Schumpeter (1961) who argued that 
periods of evolutionary technological development were punctuated by waves of 
revolutionary technology change. Abernathy and Clark (1985) felt that research had not 
managed to provide frameworks useful for practice, and put forward four types of 
innovative activity based on the transilience concept in which architectural change 
would be the most impactful as it would have a profound impact on both technologies 
and markets. Tushman and Anderson (1986) set out to prove the concept empirically by 
looking at data from the airline, cement and semi-conductor industries. Tushman and 
Anderson then went on to classify discontinuous technologies in terms of competence 
destroying and competence enhancing, meaning the degree to which the core 
competences that incumbent players enjoyed prior to the technology’s introduction were 
destroyed or sustained by that introduction. The main findings of Tushman and 
Anderson’s study are that the competence destroying discontinuities create higher 
degrees of overall uncertainty in a particular industry and also that one can observe 
greater environmental munificence or growth potential after such discontinuities occur. 
 
A second thread which attempts to explain the failure of incumbents was presented by 
Bower and Christensen (1995) and Christensen and Bower (1996). Drawing on the 
resource allocation literature of Bower (1970) and Burgelman (1983), as well as the 
concept of resource dependence as espoused by Pfeiffer and Salancik (1978), they show 
why it is that large successful firms are not able to deal with certain kinds of 
technological change. Christensen and Bower argue that the resource allocation process 
of well managed firms is beholden to developing products and services which appeal 
directly to their largest and most profitable customers. 
 
According to Bower and Christensen (1995), when new technology comes out which is 
not explicitly requested by those customers, it is difficult to get adequate resources to 
pursue the technology inside successful organisations. Such technology often 
underperforms the existing technology, according to key performance metrics, while 
offering some other benefit which the market does not yet value. The engineers who 
developed the ideas often become frustrated and join new ventures which then begin to 
build expertise by supplying niche markets which do value some aspect of the new 
technology’s performance such as smaller size, lower cost, etc. Over time, the new 
technology improves and eventually becomes good enough for widespread market 
acceptance on the key performance attributes. At the same time the previously unvalued 
attributes which do favour the new technology become more important and it eventually 
becomes the new dominant design (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975) or technological 
paradigm (Dosi, 1982). 
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Daneels (2004) sees merit in disruptive technology but argues that much work remains 
to be done to refine and develop the concepts. In his view there are five areas in which 
the theory needs further development and thus recommends further research. First, 
Daneels (2004) feels that the concept lacks rigorous definition and, besides offering the 
definition cited above, Daneels suggests that researchers look at the different types of 
technological change, the role of industry or market structure of a specific sector, how 
disruption can be measured and how to know when the process is complete. Second, 
Daneels asks “how can a disruptive technology be spotted in its early stages?” (Daneels, 
2004, p. 248) and suggests research which will help develop predictive tools to make ex 
ante predictions and form the basis for managerial prescriptions for incumbents and 
new entrants alike. Third, Daneels recognizes how the theory explains why some 
incumbents fail to survive disruption but feels that significantly more work is needed to 
understand why others survive and even prosper during such a process. Fourth, 
recognizing the central role of the customer in the theory, Daneels suggests more 
research on how being customer oriented can help a firm survive disruption or, as 
argued by Bower and Christensen (1995), such a customer orientation actually leads to 
a firm being disrupted. In his view, a deep enough understanding of customer needs will 
allow a firm to invest in the features that customers might need but not even 
acknowledge and thus avoid disruption. Finally Daneels finds the idea of creating a 
spin-off to deal with new potential disruption worthwhile but again feels that much 
research and theoretical development is required to put this idea fully into operation. 
 
In his account of Firestone’s failure to switch to radial tyres, Sull (1999) actually 
supports both points of view although that does not appear to be his intent. When radial 
tyres were first brought into the market by a foreign firm looking to gain U.S. market 
share, Firestone and Goodyear both downplayed the new technology and pushed the 
belted bias tyre which was closer to their own technical competences and could be made 
in their existing plants. In Tushman and Anderson’s terminology, the radial tyre was a 
competence-destroying technology, and Firestone and Goodyear resisted it in favour of 
their own competence-enhancing technological improvement. In 1972, Ford and 
Chrysler reportedly demanded that Firestone begin supplying them with radials and the 
company responded in record time, seemingly proving Christensen’s basic thesis. 
Although the launch of Firestone’s radials had serious quality problems, the company 
did eventually sort them out and retained a large portion of their customers’ business. 
One way to read Sull’s account is that Firestone’s corporate crisis and later sale to 
Goodrich was not caused by its inability to acquire the skills needed to successfully 
manufacture radials but by its inability to close its outdated bias tyre plants and 
undertake what Teece et al. (1997) call the reconfiguration of the business required. 
 
Both explanations discuss the potential of new technology to alter competition in a 
specific industry and the difficulties leading firms have in dealing with such technology. 
Another similar factor between the two threads mentioned above is that most of their 
examples and case studies look backward to show how a technology caused an industry 
to change. Both threads, however offer little advice as to what firms can do in the face 
of technologies which offer the potential of such change besides concluding that the 
best way around the problem is to have semi-autonomous units work on the new 
technology while the rest of the organisation does what it needs to do to incrementally 
improve existing technology. 
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While the theoretical foundation for both threads is well developed and continues to 
evolve in the discussions mentioned above, there still appears to be a gap in providing 
guidance to managers who find themselves at the edge of what might become disruptive 
or architectural change, and perhaps the most interesting aspect of looking at 
technological change from a practitioner’s perspective is to be able to help firms decide 
what to do about it, before it is too late. One could argue that an important difference 
between Tushman and Anderson’s (1988) view and that of Christensen and Bower 
(1996) lies in the causal explanation of incumbent firms’ difficulty in embracing the 
new technology and the implications of the explanation for practice. For Tushman and 
Anderson it is the fact that the new technology requires a different set of competences to 
that possessed by incumbent firms. They blame organisational inertia on the apparent 
inability of such firms to acquire the needed capabilities. Christensen and Bower, 
however, offer examples of firms learning to cope with radical technology as long as 
there is clear interest on the part of their most important customers. If one’s interest is to 
judge whether a specific technology were to become disruptive, then the different 
approaches would lead to very different constructs. Following Tushman and Anderson, 
one would look at the capabilities needed to develop, manufacture and market the new 
technology and compare them with those of the incumbents to determine if the 
technology was competence enhancing or competence destroying. Following 
Christensen’s model, the key would be to look to the market and compare the 
performance attributes of the new technology with the present needs of key customers. 
 
o What to do? 
 
Within the innovation literature there appear to be four non-exclusive sets of ideas about 
what to do in the case of potential change. These appear to be: separate the organization 
into two parts, invest at the niche level for new technologies, develop a technology 
strategy which will guide investments and actions, and finally re-orient the innovation 
process itself. 
 
 1. Ambidextrous Organisation 
 
The idea of separating the organization into two parts is best articulated in Tushman and  
O’Reilly’s (1996) concept of the ambidextrous organisation which can make 
incremental improvements to existing technology for its most important customers and 
customer segments while also exploring revolutionary technologies in new and existing 
markets. Tushman and O’Reilly’s focus is more on how to cope with the fact of 
disruptive change rather than the mechanics which cause it, and their ideas come from a 
series of case studies of firms which appear to have been successful in pursuing both 
aims simultaneously. At the heart of the ambidextrous concept is the idea that there are 
two, very different tasks facing management characterized by exploiting a firm’s current 
resources and exploring new ones. Mirow et al. (2008) maintain that the concept goes 
back to March and Simon (1958). Benner and Tushman (2003) highlight some of the 
challenges that such an organization faces, while leadership is identified by several 
researchers as being critical to managing such an organization (Ben Mahmoud-Jovini et 
al., 2007; Jansen et al. 2008). 
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While there is a growing amount of empirical data based on different surveys to support 
the ambidextrous concept (He and Wong, 2004, Jensen et al 2006), Birkinshaw and 
Gibson (2004) challenge the idea that it is necessary to create autonomous units to 
achieve ambidexterity and that the right sort of individuals can, in fact, be ambidextrous 
in a single unit if they are sufficiently aligned with each other and focused on 
adaptation. For Birkinshaw and Gibson (2004) one must therefore distinguish between 
structural ambidexterity and contextual ambidexterity. An interesting point made by 
Jansen et al. (2008) is that at the senior management level there will have to be a 
management team acting in an ambidextrous manner even if there is structural 
ambidexterity below them, and that their success as a team is dependent on the degree 
of shared vision, social integration and contingent rewards across the management team. 
 
 1. Niche development and the multi-level perspective 
 
Kemp et al. (1998) argues for strategic niche management in order to foster the 
replacement of current technology regimes, such as the internal combustion engine, by a 
more sustainable one based on fuel cells or electric vehicles. Key to the strategic niche 
concept is a deep understanding of all the barriers to such technology breaking through 
to the mainstream. For Kemp et al., the technology paradigm (Dosi, 1982) concept is 
incomplete because it does not take into account how changes in the economic and 
social environment impact on the research agenda of firms. Their definition, based on 
their analysis of the barriers mentioned above, is that a technology regime is “the whole 
complex of scientific knowledge, engineering practices, production process 
technologies, skills and procedures, and institutions and infrastructures that make up the 
totality of a technology” (Kemp et al., 1998, p. 182). One of the four common threads 
that Kemp et al. see in regime shifts is the importance of specialised applications where 
the technology is encouraged to flourish before its acceptance in the mainstream, and 
they cite Schot (1998), who has developed a list of such shifts which started in niche 
applications including radio, aircraft, computers and even clocks which were first 
developed for monasteries.  
 
This thread of the literature is referred to as the multi-level perspective (Geels, 2002) 
and is based on the idea that firms exist in three nested levels defined as niches, socio 
technical regimes and a broader socio-technical landscape. Geels and Schot (2007) cite 
Berkhout et al. (2004) and Smith et al. (2005) as criticizing the perspective on the 
grounds that the three levels of analysis were hard to define empirically, that the 
perspective neglects agency theory, and that there was too much emphasis on niche 
markets as the source of novelty. On the first point Geels and Schot argue that the 
importance of the three levels is their nested characteristic and that researchers could, in 
fact, define the levels wherever they were the most useful. While the overall landscape 
remains the same, one could establish regimes at whatever level made the most sense 
and build niches within those regimes. The idea is to first establish the empirical level 
and then operationalize the multi-level perspective. On the second point, Geels and 
Schot make reference to DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) Organisational fields idea and 
stress that both regime and niche level in the framework can be considered 
organisational fields, where all the actors involved in a technological application could 
be included in an analysis. The fundamental difference between regimes and niches is 
size and technological definition. 
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By invoking the organisational fields idea, Geels and Schot insist that agency is very 
much at the heart of the different actions by the actors at each level, and argue that the 
criticism has more to do with the misinterpretation of the diagrams used to explain the 
construct than its theoretical solidity. On the last issue of the perspective having a niche 
bias, Geels and Schot look to Suarez and Oliva’s (2005) typology of environments as 
being applicable to the socio-technical landscapes discussed in the multi-level 
perspective. Van Driel and Schot (2005) had already defined three types of landscape 
changes but, by adapting Suarez and Oliva’s typology, they are able to clearly define 
four paths of technological transition which deepen the multi-level Perspective and limit 
the observed niche bias. 
 
 3. Technology strategy 
 
Ford (1988) defines technology strategy as “policies, plans, and procedures for 
acquiring knowledge and ability, managing that knowledge and ability within the 
company and exploiting them for profit” (Ford, 1988, p. 85), and there is a growing 
body of literature which looks at technology at either the corporate, or business unit 
level (Adler, 1989) and uses definitions similar to Ford’s. Davenport et al. (2003), for 
example, use Soloman’s (2001) definition of technology strategy: “Technology strategy 
encompasses the acquisition, management, and exploitation of technological knowledge 
and resources by the organization to achieve its business and technological goals” 
(Davenport et al., 2003, p. 483). The major distinction to Ford’s definition is breaking 
down the activities of firms into acquisition, management and exploitation, as the 
literature dealing with technology strategy often focuses on one of these three aspects. 
Davenport el al, (2003) offer a long list of different ways of acquiring technology and 
references researchers who looked at different aspects such as in-house R&D, working 
with lead customers, and a large number of external sources and focused on networks 
and alliances as a particular area of interest for them. In terms of exploitation, their 
focus is on protecting competitive advantage and they cite three possible paths to do 
that including: the protection of intellectual property, achieving technological lock-in, 
and the idea of continuous innovation or staying ahead of the competition. What is less 
well developed is the idea of management which includes resource allocation and  
human resources management and “is inherently a part of the management of all of a 
firm’s resources” (Davenport el al., 2003, p. 484). To this rather open-ended idea is 
added that of nurturing technological competences and capabilities. 
 
There is a large body of literature which focuses on different aspects of a firm’s 
technology strategy and all appear to take a relatively high-level view (Zahra, 1996; 
Zahra and Bogner, 2000;; Ryan, 1996; Hatfield et al., 2001). The contribution of such 
research is mainly to either develop generic technology strategies or list internal and 
external factors which technology strategies need to deal with, one of which is the 
degree of dynamism or technological uncertainty in the environment. Spital and 
Bickford (1992) built upon the elements of technology strategy put forward by 
Maidique and Patch (1978) and Burgelman and Rosenbloom (1989) to develop their 
own set of five aspects of a technology strategy including the selection of technologies, 
level of depth or competence in each one, the breadth or scope to be considered, sources 
of technological development and level of investment.  
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Zahra (1996) suggested that the technology strategy needs to be aligned with the firm’s 
environment and put forward three environmental factors to look at including 
dynamism, hostility, and heterogeneity, and this idea is further developed in Zahra and 
Bogner (2000) in which dynamism is defined as the rate and level of 
continuity/discontinuity in the environment, while hostility or competitive intensity is 
separated into two categories of price on the one hand and service and quality on the 
other. For Zahra and Bogner (2000) a firm’s technology strategy needs to be developed 
along five elements including its radicality, intensity of product upgrades, level of 
research and development spending, use of external sourcing and protection of 
intellectual property. Hatfield et al. (2001), in contrast, suggest that firms choose 
between four basic technology strategies which include waiting and entering at a later 
time, entering via joint venture or an alliance, seeking a leadership position by pursuing 
technological leadership, or hedging by investing in competing technologies 
simultaneously. Finally, Ryan (1996) offers a different set of choices framed as being 
first to market, second to market, pursuing cost leadership, or market segmentation 
developing different solutions for different segments. As can be seen in these examples, 
there are as many classifications of technology strategy as there are researchers and the 
term appears to be so widely used as to lose meaning. 
 
 4. Routines for discontinuous innovation 
 
The fourth thread concerning what to do can be found in a series of research projects 
such as the Discontinuous Innovation Forum (Bessant and Tsekouras, 2001) which 
brought together 28 firms to develop exploratory case studies concerning how they were 
managing technological and market discontinuities, as well as others which included 
executive workshops and extensive interviews with practitioners. Phillips et al. (2006) 
gives partial findings of the first research project which highlights three aspects of 
dealing with discontinuous innovation beyond the normal best practice which is derived 
from the product development literature and also reviewed at length in Phillips et al. 
(2006). To summarize this thread in the literature, the researchers found three areas of 
critical import when dealing with discontinuous change: the need to look beyond a 
firm’s existing technologies and markets in its scanning routines, a heightened 
importance of personal leadership first by project champions and most critically by 
Senior Management in obtaining resources for such projects, and finally the need to go 
outside an organization itself in order to bring such projects to fruition. This last theme 
can be done through different types of supplier relations which are further explored in 
Phillips et al. (2005) and in the development of networks (Birkinshaw et al., 2007, 
Bessant el at. 2008). Beyond these three specific areas, however, this thread indicates 
that, in order to be successful, firms must first recognize that discontinuities represent a 
special challenge, and that much of the improvement achieved by applying best practice 
to new product development has to be re-examined, and complementary or potentially 
incongruent practices adopted in order to be successful in discontinuous change.  
 
Comment [A2]: please check - text 
states "four" but only lists three 
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o Gap in the innovation literature  
 
Sub-section 2.3.1 has focused on the literature dealing with discontinuous, radical and 
disruptive innovation and found that, despite some differences in definitions and 
semantics, there is a clear consensus that profound change is part of the business 
landscape and dealing with it is of increasing interest to theory and practice. Much of 
the theoretical work is focused on understanding and classifying such change and less 
attention has been given to working out what to do in the face of discontinuous change 
which has the potential to cause disruption. The four threads identified which do deal 
with what to do are the idea of creating a separate unit to deal with such change, focus 
on niche markets, explicitly identify new technologies in an overarching technology 
strategy and in developing new routines to deal with disruptive innovation, including 
different ways of working with suppliers and even going beyond the supplier paradigm 
to create networks of firms which can work together to manage discontinuities. 
 
Tidd et al. (1997) lay out a simplified five stage model of the innovation process which 
starts with scanning the environment, strategically selecting what to search for, 
resourcing a specific option, implementing its development, and finally reflecting and 
learning from experience. In discussing the research available on discontinuous 
innovation (DI), Phillips et al. (2006, p.193) write “Although there is growing research 
interest in the field, there is still relatively little guidance on the nature of generic 
routines for DI, nor how to configure them for particular circumstances”. In looking at 
the fourth stage of Tidd et al.’s (1997) model, implementation, there is even less 
research available. Implementation is the stage at which a firm has decided to do 
something and committed a certain amount of resources to the effort but still needs to 
develop specific programs to develop and introduce the technology to the market. Noke 
(2006) discusses only early prototyping (Mascitelli, 2000) as a specific routine or 
process for this phase, and Phillips et al. (2006) only identify working actively with 
users on co-evolution of innovation (Von Hippel, 1988; Prahalad, 2004) and building 
parallel resource networks (Leifer et al., 2000) in this area.  
 
The thesis will address this gap by looking specifically at the issue of technology 
deployment, or the choice of where to introduce a new technology as part of the 
implementation phase in Tidd et al.’s (1997) model. 
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2.3.2 Disruptive technology in the automotive industry 
 
The automotive industry has been the focus of intensive academic scrutiny for more 
than 50 years (Drucker, 1946) and has been a source for theoretical development and 
insights for practice in a number of areas including operations, new product 
development, and the relationship between vehicle manufacturers and their suppliers. 
The Machine that Changed the World by Womak et al. (1990) is widely considered the 
definitive text on lean manufacturing and overall, the industry has been a rich source of 
literature on operations. The literature concerning new product development has also 
used the industry as a context, and examples can be found in Beaume et al. (2009), 
Clark (1989), Clark and Fujimoto (1990,1991), Cosumano and Nobeoka (1992, 1997), 
and Kohn (2006). Other researchers including Kamath and Liker (1990), Lamming 
(1993), and Lettice et al. (2010) looked at supplier relationships. 
 
o Systematic review 
 
With respect to innovation, Fine and Raff (2001) classify management research in the 
industry into innovation dealing with product, process and organization.. The area of 
potentially disruptive or discontinuous innovation is however, less researched in the 
automotive context, although there is a growing body of knowledge dealing with 
different aspects of the potential for change in automotive power train technology. As 
discussed by Daneels (2004) and explored in depth in Sub-section 2.3.1, the terms 
technology and innovation are combined with the words discontinuous, disruptive and 
radical, with different and sometimes similar meanings in the literature. Thus a search 
was made combining these words with “automotive” using three different search 
engines; the results are shown in Table 2.3 and show that, while there are hundreds of 
papers dealing with innovation and technology, only 21 papers were found dealing with 
discontinuous/radical/disruptive technology/innovation, of which 6 are duplicates and 8 
of 15 are directly concerned with alternative power trains. 
 
Search string (“automotive” AND) ABI Proquest* EBSCO Business 
Source Premier** 
Science Direct*** 
“technology” 1,266 1,802 63 
“innovation” 280 398 28 
“disruptive technology” 1 0 2 
“disruptive innovation” 2 1 0 
“discontinuous technology” 0 0 0 
“discontinuous innovation” 0 2 0 
“radical technology” 0 0 1 
“radical innovation” 5 7 0 
*     Scholarly journals; citation & abstract 
**   Peer review; all fields 
*** Journal articles; business and management; abstract, title, and key words 
 
Table 2.3 Automotive search string results 
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Author (s) Year Context 
Aggeri et al. 2009 EV’s 
Griffa  2008 Sensors 
Barkenbus 2009 EV’s 
Vojak and Chambers 2004 Technology roadmapping 
Ebrahimi and Holford 2009 Honda 
Van den Hoed  2005 FCV’s 
Van den Hoed and Vergrat 2005 FCV’s 
Ben Mahmoud-Jovini and Caruc-Dubol 2008 Power train innovation in supplier 
Beaume and Midler 2009 EV’s 
Canzler and Knie 2009 EV’s and FCV’s in China 
Howell  2003 General Motors R&D 
Chanaron 1998 EV’s 
Tan and Perrons 2009 Toyota and globalization 
Story et al. 2008 FCV’s 
Stevens and Swogger 2009 Dow Chemical 
 
Table 2.4 Results of key word search in automotive literature 
 
Table 2.4 shows the 15 papers found which served as a starting point for an updated 
review of the literature dealing with the potential changes in automotive power train 
technology. What the bibliographic analysis shows is that there is a growing body of 
work in this area, and also that power train technology appears to be a relevant 
choice for studying potentially disruptive technology in automotive. Another 
possible choice could have been automotive telematics which Lenfle (2008) 
describes as being extremely innovative as neither technology or customer needs are 
fully understood at this time but do not appear to offer the same potential for 
disruption as power train technology and was not found during the systematic 
literature review shown in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4. 
 
Expanding on the initial papers identified above, the review identified a total of 29 
articles. Although a technology-oriented typology was considered which would look 
for articles focused on battery electric vehicles, hybrid vehicles, fuel cell vehicles, 
etc., it was felt that organizing the review using a topical typology would provide 
more insight and this typology is shown below and developed  in Table 2.5. 
 
Papers were grouped around the main purpose or theme of the paper as follows: 
 
- History / Current Status 
- In-Depth Modelling 
- Technical Performance  
- Supplier Involvement 
- Clearly Favourable 
- Clearly Sceptical 
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Topic Focus Papers reviewed 
History / 
Current 
Status 
Reviews history or current status 
of alternative technology 
vehicles 
o Ahman, 2006 
o Collantes & Sperling 2008 
o Coup 1999 
o Frenken et al., 2004 
o Harborne et al., 2007 
o Kemp et al, 1998 
o Mikkola, 2001 
o Schot et al., 1994 
o Steinemann, 1999 
o Van den Hoed, 2005, 2007 
In-Depth 
Modelling 
Uses advanced mathematical 
models to predict economic and 
environmental impact of the 
adoption of alternative 
technology vehicles 
o Crabb and Johnson, 2010 
o Karplus et al., 2009 
o Kosugi et al., 2005 
o Schwoon, 2006 
o Struben and Sterman (2008) 
Technical 
Performance  
Looks at performance 
characteristics of competing 
technologies 
o Weis et al. 2003 
 
Supplier 
Involvement 
Explores supplier involvement 
in alternative technology 
vehicles  
o McGrath, 1999 
o Story et al. 2008 
o Williander, 2006 
Clearly 
Favourable 
Endeavours to demonstrate the 
benefits of making a transition to 
alternative technology vehicles 
often arguing for one or another 
of the potential technologies. 
o Avadikyan and Llerena, 2010 
o Barkenbus, 2009 
o Canzler and Knie, 2009 
o Fournier, 2009 
o Hekkert and v.d. Hoed, 2004 
o Johnston et al., 2005 
o Suurs et al. 2010 
o Zapata and Nieuwenhuis, 2010 
Clearly 
Sceptical 
Articulates rationale against the 
transition 
o Carle et al., 2005 
o Seidel et al., 2005 
 
Table 2.5 Typology of papers dealing with alternative power train technology 
 
What is striking about the literature found is that there appears to be no literature 
discussing what the vehicle manufacturers ought to be doing about the technology in 
terms of concrete recommendations based on sound academic theory. This gap 
reinforces that found in Sub-section 2.3.1 in which studies looking ex ante at potentially 
disruptive technologies are very rare and, while a number of studies refer to what 
different vehicle manufacturers are doing, they tend to fall into the typology shown in 
Table 2.5 and not deal explicitly with the heterogeneity of response by different 
manufactures in an attempt to inform practice and build theory in support of that 
recommendation. The following will describe the literature using the typology and then 
return to this apparent gap. 
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o History / Current Status 
 
What is common in the papers classified in this category is that they attempt to 
summarize either what has happened or is happening in the area of alternative power 
train technologies and make an effort to remain neutral in terms of what is likely to 
happen. As part of the International Motor Vehicle Program, Steinemann (1999) 
described the state of fuel cell technology for automotive applications looking at the 
vehicle manufactures research and development approaches; the technical 
characteristics of fuel cells and their advantages and disadvantages, the history of fuel 
cell technology; early adopters such as Ballard and its eventual partners Daimler-Benz, 
and Ford, later entrants such as Toyota, General Motors, and Honda; patent counts by 
company; supply chain issues; and the challenges for the technology looking ahead. For 
Steinemann, the central challenge of the technology for the automotive industry is that 
the “The core knowledge required for the development of fuel cells is grounded in the 
electrochemistry of hydrogen and the electrocatalysis of hydrocarbon fuels, representing 
science that is fundamentally different from the experience acquired over decades of 
intensive research and development on internal combustion engines” (Steinemann, 
1999, p.24). Steinemann’s work is frequently cited in the fuel cell literature and, in fact, 
his list of advantages and disadvantages is more or less repeated in most studies 
concerned with fuel cells. 
 
Collantes and Sperling (2008), for example, perform a detailed stakeholder analysis and 
use it to document the emergence of the zero emission vehicle mandate imposed by 
CARB in 1990 and make the point that the mandate was driven by a desire to reduce 
pollution and not to reduce oil consumption or greenhouse gas emissions. Ahman 
(2006) takes a systems approach to look at the evolution of policy in Japan and is useful 
in developing a non-market context with which to better understand Coup’s (1999) 
account of Toyota’s commitment to alternative technology vehicles which in his view, 
was focused on the three goals of reducing pollution, the use of imported oil and 
greenhouse gases. Schot et al. (1994), contrasts the evolution of the California 
legislation with that of the Netherlands in support of natural gas as an automotive fuel, 
while Kemp et al. used a similar approach to look at the importance of developing 
electric vehicles in niche applications. Suurs et al. (2010) looked at the Netherlands case 
16 years later and the clear conclusion that can be drawn from this thread is the critical 
role that government policy and intervention has in stimulating the investment in 
alternative power train technology. A similar point is made by Harborne et al. (2007) in 
their survey of the development of fuel cell buses which currently require pro-active 
government support due to the very high cost disadvantage that the buses have 
compared with conventional buses. 
 
Mikkola (2001) also looks deeply at cost in its portfolio analysis of competing battery 
technologies for battery electric and hybrid vehicles. The portfolio analysis technique 
plots the different technologies on a two by two grid which considers competitive 
advantage and benefit to customer, and the fundamental issue for Mikkola is the life 
cycle cost of batteries as well as other issues such as energy density, re-charging 
infrastructure, re-charge compatibility, and the difficulty in predicting how customers 
will react. 
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Van den Hoed (2005) looks at patent counts for different vehicle manufacturers for 
battery electric, hybrid electric, and fuel cell electric vehicles over time and shows how 
hybrids and fuel cells displaced battery electric as the favoured option of the industry. 
Van den Hoed argues that there is simply too much effort going into fuel cells to 
dismiss it as “window dressing” but that fuel cell “optimists” are probably also 
overstating the readiness of the technology for the market. Frenken et al. (2004) looked 
at cumulative patents in the industry and measured the entropy of the patenting activity 
in order to determine the degree to which the industry had locked in on a dominant 
design. The concern expressed by the authors was that suboptimal lock-in could occur 
for non-technical and non-market reasons, and the study appears to find that the 
industry is still in the process of trying out new approaches and that lock-in has not yet 
occurred. Van den Hoed (2007) confirms Frenken et al.’s assertion that the preferred 
alternative to the internal combustion engine is not yet clear and again uses patent 
counts as proof that the emphasis has gone back and forth between the competing 
technologies. Van den Hoed also identifies five change factors that in his view have 
been driving the evolution of these technologies including new entrants such as Ballard 
in fuel cells, external shocks such as the ZEV mandate, the performance of the different 
technologies, market changes, and industry competition. What van den Hoed or the 
other researchers in this category do not do is try to forecast the future technologies. 
 
o In-Depth Modelling 
 
Studies which do attempt to look ahead use modelling techniques to explore different 
aspects of the potential such as technical performance of the different alternative 
technologies, government and fiscal policy, and consumer response. Crabb and Johnson 
(2010) develop a positive correlation between the rise in fuel prices and patenting 
activity by the vehicle manufacturers in what they call automotive energy efficient 
patents in which is included both improvements to internal combustion engine 
technology as well as its alternatives. Karplus et al. (2009), on the other hand, use the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s econometric model, EPPA, to look at the 
potential of plug-in hybrid technology in the United States in contrast with second 
generation biofuels, and finds that in all scenarios the largest impact on hybrid adoption 
will be seen if and only if the country adopts a nationwide limit on CO2 emissions. In 
their study, this factor has a much larger impact than other parameters such as gasoline 
and electricity cost, vehicle mark-up, hybrid usage factor, and even the availability of 
competitive, carbon neutral biofuels. Kosugi et al. (2005) assumed that Japan would 
impose this type of countrywide CO2 limit and found that, in that scenario, fuel cell 
vehicles would enjoy the highest economic investment of the different automotive 
technologies. Schwoon (2006) also found that government policy was the major driver 
for a change to fuel cell vehicles finding that tax incentives would drive faster 
penetration of the technology than massive infrastructure projects.  
 
Struben and Sterman (2008) developed a behavioural, dynamic model to explore 
diffusion rates of the different alternative vehicle technologies and introduced the 
concept of willingness to consider as the key driver of such diffusion. In their model it 
will take anywhere from 20 to 50 years for consumers to consider alternatives to the 
internal combustion engine depending on issues such as technical parity, vehicle life 
and the critical importance of word-of-mouth communication. 
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o Supplier Involvement 
 
A separate thread of research in the area of alternative technology vehicles has to do 
with the supply chain implications and particularly the potentially unique implications 
that the new technologies have for classic supplier relationships in the automotive 
industry. As discussed, much work has been done on supplier relationships and the 
basic question is what is different in the case of battery electric, hybrids and fuel cell 
technology. McGrath (1999) looks at the level of battery suppliers and uses 
morphological analysis to conclude that incumbent firms had overwhelmingly 
supported incremental innovation as opposed to more radical innovation in battery 
chemistry during the 1990s. Williander (2006) and Story et al. (2008) both make the 
point that broader networks are required to enable profound technological change than 
traditional OEM-supplier relationships and that only by involving additional actors such 
as government, infrastructure and fuel providers, etc., in focused efforts can such 
change be achieved. 
 
o Technical Performance  
 
Due to the fact that the systematic review was confined to management literature, 
papers dealing with purely technical issues were not identified, although there is a vast 
literature dealing with the performance and cost trade-offs associated with the different 
alternatives to internal combustion engines as well as deeper studies looking at variants 
within each alternative as well as the very large field of advanced diesel and gasoline 
engines. As these studies are often referenced by the other papers discussed in this 
review; Weis et al. (2003) was included as an example. The paper is an update to an 
earlier study by the same authors and looks at hybrid electric, fuel cell vehicles, natural 
gas vehicles and internal combustion engine vehicles in terms of current technology and 
the authors’ best estimates of where the technology will be in ten years’ time. This 
study, like all such studies, makes assumptions about the evolution of the different 
technologies as well as exogenous factors such as fuel prices, and attempts to construct 
what is called a well-to-wheel analysis in order to take into account all aspects of the 
production and supply of fuel and the vehicles themselves in addition to usage in order 
to measure the impact of each technology on greenhouse gas emissions. Based on their 
assumptions, Weis et al. (2003) find that fuel cells and advanced internal combustion 
will have similar greenhouse gas emissions mainly because of the assumption, common 
in the literature, that the hydrogen for fuel cells will be produced by reforming natural 
gas at filling stations and that the resulting carbon will not be sequestered. Weis et al. 
did find that hybrid vehicles have the potential to lower emissions of greenhouse gasses 
by 37-62% over the next 20 years but these figures are highly sensitive to their 
assumptions about the source of electricity production. 
 
Studies such as that by Weis et al. (2003) illustrate that the debate about the benefits of 
the different technologies in environmental and economic terms are highly sensitive to 
assumptions about the rate of technological development and the source of different 
fuels and energy sources. In clearer language, it appears that one can find evidence 
supporting different points of view within the technical literature due to the uncertain 
nature of the technological developments and exogenous factors which will determine 
the actual merit of the different technologies. 
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o Clearly Favourable 
 
Building on the point mentioned above, there appears to be a large body of literature 
which is clearly favourable to one or other of the alternatives to the internal combustion 
engine. Avadikyan and Llerena (2010) applied a real options approach to hybrid 
vehicles from the vehicle manufacturer’s perspective. Taking into account that adoption 
will depend on the price premium with respect to internal combustion technology, fuel 
efficiency when corrected for the usage factor, and the short and long-term 
competitiveness of hybrid technology with advanced diesel engines and battery electric 
vehicles, they uncovered four possible justifications for investment in the technology 
despite the uncertainties. For Avadikyan and Llerena, vehicle manufacturers should 
invest in hybrid vehicles in parallel with their continuing investment in internal 
combustion engine technology in order to hedge against long-term risks, limit such risks 
by acting sequentially, invest in hybrid technology in order to diversify their technical 
asset base, or develop vehicle platforms with built-in flexibility. 
 
Several studies go further than Avadikyan and Llerena, which at least attempts to argue 
rationally in favour of investments in hybrid vehicles and presents the transition to 
alternative technology vehicles as a fait accompli, an imperative or both. Barkenbus 
(2009) for example, starts with the assertion that “a transition to electric vehicles is 
underway” and that the transition is “inevitable” (p. 399). The paper provides a solid 
review of development in hybrid vehicles and the CO2 savings offered by electric 
vehicles in general and also lists potential developments such as neighbourhood electric 
vehicles, the possibility of low-priced Chinese and Indian imports and the Better Place 
experiments in Israel and Denmark as evidence of the transition. Canzler and Knie 
(2009) offer an equally unambiguous assessment asserting that the “era of cheap oil is 
over” (p. 892) and list a number of initiatives in China which in their view indicate that 
China will leapfrog the internal combustion engine and build a hydrogen infrastructure. 
Fournier (2009) takes a similar tone maintaining that the status quo “cannot continue” 
(p. 75) and, after reviewing different estimates which indicate that there might be as 
many as 2 billion cars on the road by 2050, argue that the only solution is second 
generation biofuels. Johnston et al. state that “pollution is threatening life on earth” (p. 
569) and come to the conclusion that hydrogen offers the most commercially viable 
option after looking at both advantages and challenges as well as reviewing progress 
being made in Iceland, Canada, California, Japan and Germany.  
 
What these studies have in common is the adoption of what Lomborg (2001) refers to as 
the litany or accepted vision of a world in serious ecological trouble which he maintains 
is not consistent with a broad view of the scientific evidence. One problem with these 
papers is that they accept this vision of the world without any apparent objectivity or 
balance. The ideas that we are running out of oil or that climate change will endanger 
life on earth are quite popular but in the first place are not necessarily proven and even 
if one does accept that climate change is a fact it is not at all clear that the governments 
around the world or even in the west will take the political action required to stop it. 
The other problem with these studies is that they tend to favour one of the competing 
technological options stressing its advantages and contrasting them with the 
disadvantages of others without necessarily presenting a balanced view. 
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Hekkert and Van den Hoed (2004) present a somewhat more rigorous look at hybrid 
vehicles and fuel cells using Jacobson and Johnson’s (2000) technology systems 
framework to look at different vehicle power trains, and show how the implementation 
of hybrid technology requires substantially less disruption to the different forces making 
up the technology systems of conventional internal combustion engines than fuel cell 
electric vehicles; thus explaining their later success. Zapata and Nieuwenhuis also 
classify the Toyota Prius as incremental as they do Brazil’s development of Ethanol as 
an automotive fuel and consider fuel cells to be a radical innovation accepting Daneels’ 
(2004) assertion that disruption can only be discussed ex post. 
 
o Clearly Sceptical 
 
In contrast to the clearly positive papers, there are others which argue against the 
adoption of alternative fuel vehicles. Cable et al. (2005) apply Porter’s (1980) five 
forces model to fuel cell vehicles and come to the conclusion that the cost of the 
technology is simply too high. Seidel (2005) takes a similar view and adds the relatively 
short system life of current generation fuel cell stacks and the lack of infrastructure as 
reasons why the technology will not make it. These studies come across as mirror 
images of the favourable studies, and what is striking is the apparent lack of true debate 
on the assumptions, technological and social trends, and competitive dynamics that will 
actually affect the evolution of the different alternatives in both of these groups of 
papers. 
 
o Gap in the automotive literature 
 
This review has endeavoured to look at the literature concerning the automotive 
industry which deals with discontinuous, radical, or disruptive change as opposed to 
more well-researched areas such as operations, new product development and supplier 
management which are well covered by management research. What was found was a 
limited but growing body of literature specifically dealing with the potential transition 
in power train technology away from the internal combustion engine running on 
petroleum distillates to alternative fuels and what are often called alternative technology 
vehicles mainly concerning battery electric vehicles, hybrid vehicles, plug-in hybrids 
and fuel cell vehicles. 
 
This literature was reviewed and a typology presented of it grouping papers into those 
dealing with in historical analysis, in-depth modelling, technical performance, supplier 
involvement, and almost partisan research which appears to take an either favourable or 
sceptical view of the transition. What was not found in the literature were studies which 
attempted to look deeply at the heterogeneity of response by the different vehicle 
manufacturers in terms of technological deployment or which were focused on the 
larger issue of what strategic alternatives can be found for vehicle manufacturers when 
looking ex ante at potentially disruptive technology. Van den Hoed’s assertion that the 
fact that several manufacturers are making significant efforts proves they are serious 
about fuel cells appears disingenuous given the relative size of these overall 
development activities of the companies involved and does not explain why some 
manufactures made significantly more efforts than others. 
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2.3.3 The technology-based firm 
 
A relatively recent thread in the innovation literature looks at how there appears to be a 
connection between a firm’s technological position and the degree of diversification it 
has across product groups and geographies (Granstrand et al. 1997, Gambardella and 
Torrisi 1998, Suzuki and Kodama 2004, Brusoni et al. 2005). A firm’s technological 
position is often actually broader than the products and services it actually offers 
(Granstrand et al. 1997) and is not necessarily reduced by its decision to outsource 
production of key components (Prencipe, 2000). 
 
In related work, Granstrand (1998) puts forward the theory of the technology-based firm 
in which technology and technological change have a substantial impact on a firm and 
in which its asset base (both tangible and intangible) is heavily dependent on 
technology. Building on Granstrand and Sjölander (1990), Granstrand reviews the way 
other theories of the firm have dealt with the role of technology and management and 
finds that they do not sufficiently explain the co-evolutionary nature of technological 
development and diversification in modern multinational and multiproduct firms. He 
rejects neo-classical economics because it limits technology to a factor input and, as a 
part of the mechanistic production function, loses the full scope of how technology can 
affect a firm’s position and its evolutionary nature. For Granstrand, agency theory 
considers technology as just another source of asymmetries rather than a protagonist. He 
feels that the evolutionary perspective as espoused by Nelson and Winter (1977) places 
technology in the role of “randomiser” or “variety generator”, thus losing the critical 
role of management in shaping its direction. In terms of the resource-based view, 
Granstrand did not review the dynamic capabilities framework (Teece et al. 1997) 
discussed above but felt that the resource-based view sees both technology and 
management as a particular competence without treating them in any special way.  
 
For Granstrand, technology and management are the key resources around which 
technology-based firms are built, and thus the central aspect of his theory of the firm. 
Granstrand highlights the importance of management in the technology-based firm and 
says that it must exploit four types of economies that are inherent in technological 
capabilities: scale, scope, time and space. What he does not do, however, is go into what 
he refers to as the “big dark box” of practice (p. 486) nor does he try to unpack the 
processes that go into managing such firms beyond the four aspects mentioned above. 
Granstrand, for example, offers an explanation for one process of diversification which 
he calls “first pull then push”. The idea is that customer requirements and/or 
technological innovation stimulate a firm to incorporate new technology into one of its 
products or services. Later, as the firm acquires competence in the new technology, it 
might find opportunities to use it in new areas; this results in technology-led product 
diversification. Here again, he does not explain how managers ought to do this. 
 
The theory of the technology-based firm is compelling as far as it goes but falls short of 
laying out a framework which can assist in working out the most appropriate response 
to discontinuous and potentially disruptive technology. As the theory does acknowledge 
the co-evolutionary nature of firms’ actions and a technology’s developments it would 
appear that codifying the set of available responses would be of great value and the 
thesis endeavours to begin to address this gap. 
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 2.3.4 Conclusions  
 
This section has shown that there is an important gap in the literature in looking at how 
firms deploy technology which is recognized as discontinuous and potentially 
disruptive, but which has not yet demonstrated that potential. This can be seen in both 
the innovation literature and that dealing with the automotive industry and potential 
changes to power train technology in the years ahead. 
 
Sub-section 2.3.1 reviewed the innovation literature dealing with discontinuity and 
disruption by discussing several of the different definitions in use, explored two major 
threads in the literature and the relatively limited amount of literature which examines 
what companies ought to do in the face of such change, and showed that Tidd et al.’s 
fourth phase in their simplified process of implementation receives even less coverage. 
Sub-section 2.3.2 looked at the literature concerned with the transition to alternatives to 
the internal combustion engine in the automotive industry and developed a typology for 
that literature which demonstrated that there was very little research done concerning 
the heterogeneity of response by the different vehicle manufacturers in terms of 
technological deployment. Finally the thesis reviewed Granstrand’s (1998) concept of 
the technology-based firm and suggests that it could be expanded upon to fill this gap. 
 
 27 
Understanding a firm’s technological developments by looking at its pattern of patents 
is well established in the literature and has been done since the 1960’s (Shmookler, 
1966; Pavitt, 1982). Basberg (1987) refers to Schmookler as the Father of modern 
patent research, and explains how he used patents to argue that inventive activity is 
endogenously determined by economic variables such as economic growth. Griliches 
(1990) believes him to be the first researcher to try to link productivity growth to 
innovative activity by using patents. Unfortunately, with the limitations he faced, 
Schmookler was not able to prove the link. 
 
In Griliches’ view, Schmookler`s work was limited by the lack of data on R&D 
expenditures back in the 50’s and 60’s and that, over time, Schmookler narrowed his 
view of inventive activity excluding both research and development and focusing only 
on the application of technology. In this view, patents became an input indicator of 
innovation rather than an output indicator but even that assertion, according to 
Griliches, was of paramount importance. 
 
Another thread of this early work was done by economists who were dealing with 
Schumpeter’s (1961) assertion that large firms would do more research and 
development (R&D) than smaller firms and thus would come to dominate specific 
markets. Scherer (1965) in fact found a reverse correlation between firm size and 
patents produced and concluded that Schumpeter’s assertion was invalid.  
2.4 The use of patents in management science  
 
Management researchers interested in the way that firms bring new technologies to 
market have often come up against a number of problems in obtaining reliable empirical 
data from the firms they are studying. 
 
Often detailed data on projects, budgets, achievements, etc., are scattered across firms 
and difficult to assemble in one place. Other problems have to do with access, since 
much of a firms’ competitive advantage is often linked to its technological edge and 
many firms are reluctant to share such data (if they actually had it in the first place) with 
outsiders. A third set of problems is the sheer volume of information that one would 
need in order to do any kind of industry-level analysis if it was required to go into each 
firm’s detailed technological activities. 
 
For these reasons a number of researchers have turned to patent data as a surrogate 
source of information from which a number of indications about technological activity 
can be drawn. Such use of patents dates back to Schmookler (1953), and, over the last 
50 years, a number of researchers have taken advantage of patents for a broad range of 
theory-building work. 
 
This section will develop a brief history of the use of patents in management research, 
discuss the reasons for using patents as well as their limitations, and review part of the 
extensive literature available with the goal of developing a typology of the use of 
patents in management science and informing the methodology of the thesis.  
 
2.4.1 A History of Using Patents in Management Research 
 
Comment [A3]: please check – it seems 
that this should read “understanding” but 
“understating” may be your intention..? 
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Soete (1978) found that, in some industries such as office equipment, chemicals, and 
personal products, Schumpeter’s assertion was valid while in others it was not and in 
still others the data did not indicate either way. Part of his argument was that earlier 
studies including Scherer’s were deeply flawed by relying on available data and using 
sales as a measure of size. In his view the total number of employees was a better metric 
of firm size, and R&D spending, as measured by Business Week, was a better measure 
of innovative activity.  
 
Pavitt (1982) compared patent statistics with even more robust research and 
development spending statistics and found that patents do “underestimate innovative 
activity in large firms, and that R&D statistics do so in small firms” (p.33). He put 
forward four factors that explain the differences, including innovative behaviour, 
different degrees of specialisation, and variations across sectors and institutional factors 
in particular cases such as aerospace and defence. Perhaps the most important 
contribution of Pavitt is to correctly point out that patents only show one aspect of the 
larger innovative process, and, citing Schumpeter, he distinguished between innovation 
and invention. Patents are, in Pavitt’s terms, only one way to protect innovations and 
obtain better rents from them but there are others such as keeping industrial secrets, 
leveraging market strength, imposing standards, or building on technological leadership 
and leaving competitors behind. 
 
Scherer (1983) went deeper into the relationship between R&D spending and patenting 
and explored the concept of propensity to patent by looking for differences in the 
relationship across industry groups. He first established eight industry groups and then 
attempted regression analysis in 124 different industry categories seeking a clear 
relationship. Scherer not only confirms the relationship between overall spending and 
patent output but determines that the relationship or number of patents per million 
dollars of R&D spending is, in fact, fairly constant within a specific industry. 
 
Griliches (1990) provides a fairly comprehensive review of the patent work done up to 
1990 and uses the Knowledge Production Function, first introduced by Griliches and 
Pakes (1984), to classify the different research themes then going on in different parts of 
the academic world.  
 
The Knowledge Production Function focuses on the net accretion of economically 
valuable knowledge or innovative output, and constructs a highly simplified model to 
explain what kind of inputs go into it and what kind of outputs come out. Essentially, 
R&D efforts drive the creation of such knowledge although there is a term to include 
other sources of innovation. Knowledge creation drives patent application and grants, 
with another term to provide for other sources of patentable ideas. Such accumulation of 
knowledge should then produce a set of outcomes such as growth, productivity, market 
capitalisation, etc. These in turn are affected by the accumulation of knowledge as well 
as other factors which Griliches and Pakes divide into measurable variables and random 
variables. What Griliches does in his survey is to classify the different streams of 
research into the different relationships between these variables. In this way he captures, 
for example, the work mentioned above in linking R&D expenditure to patent counts as 
well as other streams linking patents to different outcomes such as productivity growth, 
market capitalisation, etc. 
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For Griliches, patent research has been pursuing the “dream of getting hold of an output 
indicator of innovative activity” since the 1950’s and goes back and forth across two 
questions: what aspects of economic activity do patents measure, and what would we 
like them to measure? 
 
After a comprehensive review of dozens of papers, Griliches arrives at five conclusions. 
First, he felt that the larger issues of whether patents are an input or an output indicator 
and their link to the larger questions of productivity and economic growth were still 
open at the time of his writing. Second, he found a strong relationship between patents 
and R&D spending when done at the “cross-sectional” dimension or industry or cluster 
of industries level. Third, the propensity to patent is similar within an industry for firms 
of significant size. Fourth, the idea that smaller firms patent more is, in Griliches’ view, 
a methodological artefact and he believes this question is, at best, still open. Finally 
Griliches concluded that time series of analysis at the firm level have not demonstrated 
consistent results and he feels there is too much noise in the data for meaningful 
conclusions. 
 
Griliches concludes that “in the absence of detailed R&D data, the much more plentiful 
patent data can be used as an indicator of both input and output” and that “nothing else 
even comes close” (Griliches, 1990, p.1702) for the purposes of analysing technical 
change. At the same time he maintains that only in large numbers can they really say 
anything at all since each one is so different from the rest. 
 
2.4.2 Advantages and limitations in the use of patents 
 
In many ways, patents are used in researching innovation simply because many 
researchers agree with Griliches’ assessment (Schiffel and Kitti 1978, Soete, 1987, 
Pavitt, 1984). These and other researchers discuss five reasons to use patents to inform 
management research. In the first place, patents are thought to be one of the best tools 
available to researchers considering the barriers to access, confidentiality and other 
methodological problems when trying to research in-depth the way companies bring out 
new technology (Pavitt 1982, 1988, Ernst, 1998). Second, patents offer a huge amount 
of rich data and allow for analysis by country, industry, company, technology, etc. They 
are also ubiquitous as they are used in most parts of the world. Third, the availability 
and the richness of patent data have increased remarkably with the advent of digital 
databases and powerful software. Trippe (2002) coined the term “patent informatics” to 
describe a whole set of methodologies and capabilities which the new digital databases 
and computer algorithms allow. The fourth reason to use patents is that they have a 
degree of both official validity and commercial value. While patent offices differ in 
different countries, at least there is a theoretically independent and objective assessment 
of each and every patent, and many researchers have cited patenting costs and renewal 
rates as a metric of their economic value. (Griliches, 1990) The fifth major advantage is 
that, while one could argue with what types of control variables are needed, there is a 
clear link between patent activities and innovation since one simply cannot win patents 
without some innovative idea.  
 
In the literature there are three problems or problem areas stated again and again 
(Schiffel and Kitti 1978, Soete, 1987, Pavitt, 1985, Griliches, 1990).  
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The first problem is that not all inventions are patentable and much gets left out. The 
second issue is that not all inventions are patented, and propensity to patent varies by 
sector, company and even country and culture. Propensity to patent tries to get at how 
much of a firm’s inventive activity is actually patented, and most findings correlate well 
at the industry level since, in a given sector, other sources of protecting rents vis-à-vis 
patents are often similar. Automotive, for example, is normally found to have a low 
propensity to patent (Arundel and Kabla, 1998). The third group of problems is that 
patents differ in “quality”, meaning that they cover different aspects of innovative 
activity, have different value and are done in different legal systems with varying grant 
rates in each country. 
 
2.4.3 Fifty years of research policy 
 
A search on any of the most popular academic search sites for “patents” in title and 
abstract will produce literally thousands of papers. Starting with the most heavily cited 
works using patents, the journals in which those papers had appeared were looked at to 
understand the relative weight of each journal in the overall body of literature. Table 2.6 
gives the results of this analysis and gives the total number of papers with patents in 
title and abstract in World Patent Information, Research Policy, Technovation, and the 
European Economic Review. 
 
Journal Title (Search Engine)  Nº Papers 
World Patent Information (Science Direct) 1,923 
Research Policy (Science Direct) 237 
Technovation (Science Direct) 74 
European Economic Review (ABI Pro-Quest) 19 
 
Table 2.6 Papers with “patents” in title, abstract and key words in leading journals 
 
While having the largest number of papers, World Patent Information has as its primary 
focus “to provide a worldwide forum for the exchange of information between people 
working professionally in the field of Industrial Property information and 
documentation and to promote the widest possible use of the associated literature”. It is 
not focused on management research using patents but on the patent system itself.  
 
Research Policy is “a multi-disciplinary journal devoted to the policy and management 
problems posed by innovation, R&D, technology and science, and related activities 
concerned with the acquisition of knowledge (learning) and its exploitation” and it was 
thought that papers in it would be more directly linked to management science. In 
addition to the number of papers and focus discussed above, Research Policy has 
published many of the seminal papers in this field and was edited for many years by one 
of its most prolific and important researchers. 
 
Research Policy is also considered by most leading academics in the field to be the 
leading journal, and the late Keith Pavitt as one of the strongest researchers whose 
multiyear partnership with Parimal Patel produced some of the cornerstones of the field. 
According to Meyers et al. (2004), Pavitt was “both a shaper of, and a bridge between, 
science and technology policy and bibliometric analysis.” 
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Using Science Direct and searching in Research Policy, a search was conducted for 
papers using the word “patents” in title, abstract and keywords. The result gave 237 hits 
on June 22 2008. Another search engine, Pro-Quest, only found 211 since it only goes 
back as far as 1981. These positive hits were then sorted into four categories including: 
papers using patents to inform management science, papers with only tangential use of 
patents or primarily about public policy or university management, papers about patents 
themselves or the patent system, and references which were in fact not papers at all. 
 
Classification of papers Nº Papers 
Papers using patents to inform management science 134 
Tangential use / public policy or university management 50 
About patents themselves or the patent system 48 
Not papers  5 
Total 237 
 
Table 2.7 Papers with “patents” in title, abstract and key words in Research Policy 
 
The 5 items which were not papers turned out to be a book review, an erratum, a letter, 
and two references which did appear in Research Policy. The other two categories were 
taken out of the review in order to focus on how management researchers use patents to 
inform management science echoing Griliches’ (1990) review. The resulting list of 134 
papers using patents was then compared to the 92 papers that had been found in an 
initial visual inspection of the Journal’s table of contents, and 3 papers which had not 
come up using Science Direct (Pavitt and Patel, 1984, 1987; Prencipe, 1997) were then 
added to the sample. The results were a total of 137 papers. These papers were then 
classified by citation count, again using Science Direct. While one can argue whether 
Science Direct is complete, it does at least account well for references from Research 
Policy and Technovation and, since the same search engine was used for all papers, it 
gave a consistent reference point. 
 
2.4.4 A typology of uses of patents 
 
In the papers examined, researchers chose to look at different units of analysis. A 
typology was thus created in order to classify the patents in terms of the scope of the 
research’s analysis as shown in Table 2.8 Within the sample of 137 papers, it was 
possible to classify 134 using the typology as 3 were literature reviews or otherwise did 
not fit into the typology. Table 2.8 also shows how the level of analysis has changed 
over the last fifty years and this phenomenon will be discussed in the next section which 
goes through the review in each of the categories outlined below. 
 
 Global  Country Regional Industry Firm Technology Product Inventor 
1970’s 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1980’s 6 3 0 5 1 1 0 3 
1990’s 6 0 2 7 8 3 2 3 
2000’s 13 4 8 4 28 8 0 16 
Total 26 8 10 17 37 12 2 22 
 
Table 2.8 Time Series of Papers using patents by category 
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2.4.5 Review of papers using the scope of analysis typography 
  
In the 1960’s, patents were used mainly to look at global comparisons and perhaps the 
national or industry level of analysis. In the last 10 years or so there has been a sharp 
increase in work done at the firm and technology level, and in just the last few years 
there have been a number of very insightful papers focused at the inventor level. Over 
time, it appears that the databases and tools have improved and researchers have thus 
been able to use patents to inform issues concerned with increasingly finer levels of 
analysis, resulting in more papers than ever before concerned with looking deeper into 
issues at the firm level and looking at the inventor level, for example, during the last 8 
years. What follows are examples of some of the earliest and most frequently cited 
papers in the review organised by the typology introduced above. A full listing of the 
papers included in the review and the number of citations each one received using 
Science Direct is included in Appendix A. 
 
o Global level 
 
In this typology, the global level is the research that compares the amount and quality of 
innovation in different countries and regions. An early example of this kind of research 
was done by Schiffel and Kitti (1978) who examined the apparent rise in foreign 
patenting in the Unites States looking at 8 countries over the time period 1963-1974. 
They concluded that there was a higher amount of innovation going on in general and 
that these trends explained the increase rather than a loss of competitiveness in the U.S. 
Schiffel and Kitti decided to focus on patents awarded to foreign firms in the U.S. as a 
way to get around the inherent variability of the different patent laws and rigor in 
different countries and proved the reliability of patents as an output indicator by finding 
a remarkably robust correlation with R&D spending at the aggregate, country level.  
 
This idea of using U.S. patent data by other countries has been used by many 
researchers over the years (Soete, 1987; Tong and Frame, 1994; Furman et al., 2002) 
because of the reliability and stability of the U.S. patent office, the quality and depth of 
the data it provides, and the idea that firms will take the trouble to patent in the U.S. 
whenever the idea or invention is important enough.  
 
In 1987 different papers published by Soete, Patel and Pavitt, and Fagerberg stand out 
as representing different streams of research looking at comparisons across different 
countries and regions and using patents as a primary source of data. 
 
Soete (1987) was interested in explaining trade patterns and sought empirical evidence 
to prove that Factor Production Theory was inadequate. He was looking for an output 
indicator of technological innovation which he could then use to examine the link 
between technological innovation and national competitiveness. One of Soete’s findings 
was that smaller countries seem to have a stronger technological output in terms of 
patents than larger countries. This idea is that it is similar to findings by Scherer (1983) 
when comparing firms. Soete’s correlations get weaker when he drops down to the 
industry level and, while he does find a “close relationship” between technological 
performance and export performance for many industries, he also demonstrates that 
more data is needed. 
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Examples of Soete’s mixed data include his findings on the aircraft industry and also on 
motorcycles and bicycles. He shows that while the United States has a very robust 
aircraft export sector, its technological position in aircraft is not so strong. Germany 
suffers from the opposite situation with a relatively strong situation in aircraft patents 
and not much of an export business. The U.K. had a more balanced situation with a 
significant technological position and strong exports in aircraft. In motorcycles and 
bicycles Japan had a low technological position but a thriving export sector, while the 
UK, Germany and France all had strong technological positions and relatively weak 
exports. 
 
What Soete was using to determine a country’s technological position was what he 
called “Revealed Technological Advantage” (RTA), defined as a particular country’s 
share of the total U.S. patents in a given sector with the country’s total share of U.S. 
patents. Thus, if a country had a higher share in a particular sector than their average 
share across all sectors, it would indicate some degree of technical specialisation. 
 
Patel and Pavitt (1987) were trying to answer the question of whether Europe was 
falling behind Japan and the U.S. in the race for developing new technology, and used 
patents as one of a number of indicators including R&D expenditures. They also used 
Soete’s RTA but did so using a more robust data set and at the aggregate level of 
Europe rather than at the country level, and also over three different time periods. What 
they found was that the data was stable over time and that, overall, Japan was more 
specialised. While their overall finding that Europe was not behind (or least not too far) 
is interesting, what was perhaps more striking was that they considered R&D spending 
and patents as indicators of innovative activity in its broadest sense and that “Their 
attribution to any one part of the process has no empirical foundation, nor has the 
assumption that patents are an intermediate “output” of R&D activities” (p. 62). 
 
Fagerberg (1987) looked at data from 25 countries in his attempt to show that economic 
variables such as GDP per capita correlated with technological measures such as R&D 
spending or patent counts. As in the other papers discussed, the purpose of this global 
level research is to explain broad economic theory and properly account for innovation. 
The role of patents is generally as an output measure for that innovation. Over the next 
few years other authors pursued work in a similar direction including the following: 
 
Archibugi and Pianta (1992) did a study with similar goals to Soete’s and confirmed his 
assertion that smaller countries specialised more. One contribution of Archibugi and 
Pianta was to go a bit deeper into the “black box” and use the front page citations, done 
by the patent office, to add a quality or value factor to the analysis. Their idea was that 
patents which are cited more often must have a higher value and that the citations done 
by the patent office were more objective than those done by the patent authors 
themselves. They also looked at home country patents, looked at two time series, and 
did the analysis using both the 41 SIC codes and the 31 IPC codes. 
 
Tong and Frame (1994) used claims instead of simply counting patents and looked at 
Japan, West Germany, the U.S., U.K. and France at three different time periods and 
determined that the apparent increase in innovation in Japan (Frame and Narin, 1990) 
was not, in fact, correct when looking deeper into what the patents were actually about. 
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Malerba and Orsenigo (1996, 1999) went deeper into the question of looking for 
technological differences between countries in an effort to find empirical evidence to 
support the two Schumpeterian ideas of technological regimes, referred to as 
Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II. Using 49 different classes and patents 
from 6 countries over time they were able to confirm what Schumpeter referred to as 
some technologies such as mechanical techniques which go through a “widening” 
process with new entrants joining and others such as chemicals and electronics which 
go through a “deepening” or concentration process. Malerba and Orsenigo confirmed 
that such different technology regimes do not only exist, but were also robust across 
countries with several explainable exceptions. The exceptions led them to look deeper 
into country-level explanations of what was going on. 
 
Varsakelis (2001) follows in this tradition of using the patent data to develop an all-
encompassing theory which explains how a country becomes innovative. He uses 50 
countries and finds “that national culture, patent protection, and the degree of openness 
of an economy are determinants of the R&D intensity”. 
 
In a very similar vein, Furman, et al. (2002) introduce what they call a measure of 
National Innovative Capacity, taking into account a series of parameters and correlating 
them to R&D effectiveness, or patents produced per R&D expenditure. Furman et al. 
come to similar conclusions as Varsakelis; i.e., that patent protection, the openness of a 
country’s economy, etc., all lead to a higher level of innovation. Perhaps what is 
additional in Furman et al. is to take into account the presence of industry clusters in the 
framework. This model was then applied by Hu and Mathews (2005) to five additional 
countries in East Asia. 
 
Cohen et al. (2002) performed a detailed comparison between the U.S. and Japan, based 
on a survey sent to manufacturing companies which attempted to get at national 
differences between the two countries. Their overall findings were that Japanese 
companies appeared to give more weight to patents as a mechanism to appropriate 
returns on their inventive activity and as a source for monitoring rivals’ activities. 
Cohen et al. is also an example of research where the focus of analysis is nominally at 
the level of global comparison but also provides insight at the country level as well, in 
this case Japan and the U.S. 
 
o Country and regional level 
 
At the country level it is important to highlight that, because of their size, the U.S. and 
Japan are often looked at as analogous to the European region as a whole and a number 
of studies are done at either the country level or the regional level with similar purposes 
and similar methodologies. Although this difference in scope has the potential to blur 
the different categories in the typology, it was decided to stay with the national level for 
the purposes of the review. 
 
Looking at Table 2.4, there are far fewer studies done at the country level than the 
comparative studies covered above, and that might mean that there is either less 
research going on or that the editors of Research Policy simply feel that such research 
has additional outlets. 
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Basberg (1983) challenged Soete by looking at Norway’s patents in the U.S. and her 
exports and called attention to the fact that they have little to do with one another. While 
it’s true that there are some patents connected to its offshore oil infrastructure, 
Norway’s exports are normally not technologically intensive and therefore require few, 
if any, patents. In terms of methodology, Basberg was able to take advantage of 
Norway’s relatively small size to look deeply into the sectors under study and even the 
firms involved to back up his analysis. 
 
Bosworth (1984) looked at U.K. patents by foreigners and foreign patents by U.K. firms 
in an attempt to understand international technology transfer, and looked at fifty data 
points taken from 1974 to test his mathematical construct. 
 
Two papers published in 2001 by Hicks et al. (2001) and Trajtenberg (2001) are 
examples of researchers going well past simple patent counts in order to add depth to 
their analyses. Diana Hicks and her colleagues (2001) looked into U.S. patents to look 
at how healthcare and information systems were becoming more and more important, 
and also how the locus of innovative activity was moving to the west coast of the U.S., 
amongst other trends. Hicks et al. use a commercial database which tracks corporate 
ownership structures, thus allowing researchers to drill down to the corporate entity 
when analyzing patents and, using this tool, they were able to show how smaller, 
innovative firms, largely located on the west coast of the U.S., played such an important 
role in the innovation in information technology and healthcare. 
 
Trajtenberg (2001) uses Israeli patents in the U.S. over 30 years as a way to better 
understand the development of the Israeli high-tech economy, and uses the 
methodology developed in Trajtenberg et al. (1997) which looks at the “detailed 
information contained in patents and in patent citations” to go beyond patent counts and 
get at their importance, generality and originality as a way of answering the 
fundamental question of patent quality. 
 
Looking at the time series of papers in this category in Table 2.4, one can observe no 
papers published at the country level during the 1990’s. One interpretation is that such 
research required the emergence of digital databases and associated bibliographic tools 
in order to obtain the kind of meaningful results found by Basberg with his knowledge 
of the Norwegian economy or Bosworth with his relatively narrow data set. 
 
Using more information in patents and digital databases giving a finer level of data than 
ever before, researchers have also been able to go inside countries to the regional level. 
One of the most compelling examples of this work was done by Acs et al. (2002). Acs 
et al. set out to test whether patents provided a reliable measure of innovative activity at 
the level of 125 American cities. They compared patents with literature-based 
innovation output measures which focused on the new product sections of trade and 
technical journals, and applied Griliches’ (1990) Knowledge Production Function at 
what is called the Metropolitan Statistical Area and came up with robust results. Zitt et 
al. (1999) undertook a similar analysis in the European Union, looking at the 
correlations between patent counts, publications measured by citations, GDP and R&D 
expenditure at the level of the 15 EU countries at that time, and also further 
subdivisions into 175 sub-regions and even 416 separate regions. 
 36 
Other studies at the regional level include those by Noyons et al. (1998), who looked at 
the Flemish region in Belgium, and Zucker et al. (2007), who did a similar analysis 
using publications and patents on the spread of nanotechnology across the United States 
looking at the United States divided into 179 regions. 
 
What makes all of this research possible is again, the development of powerful digital 
databases and analytical tools. Zucker et al., for instance, used a database called 
“nanobank” which provided the raw data for most of their analysis. Indeed, looking at 
Table 2.4, there were no papers published using patents at the regional level in Research 
Policy in the 70’s and 80’s and only two in the 90’s. It is only recently that the data and 
tools have been available, enabling researchers to drill down to this level of patent 
analysis. Interest in the topic, of course, goes back many years but it is only recently 
that patents have been able to contribute at the empirical level. 
 
o Cluster & sector level 
 
Going past the country and regional level, researchers have also been interested in 
looking at industrial sectors or groups of such sectors often called clusters.  
 
The first paper published by Research Policy which used patents as a primary source of 
data was Reekie (1973). Without the benefit of any digital technology, Reekie looked at 
all patents made in London from 1900 to 1966 in the pharmaceutical sector. By looking 
at one sector in particular he felt that he would control for the propensity to patent and 
was sure that, in pharmaceuticals, firms would patent whatever they could. He also felt 
that the U.K. market was important enough that even foreign companies would patent 
their inventions in the critical U.K. market. This is much like Soete (1987) and Patel 
and Pavitt (1987). Later using foreign patents in the U.S., Reekie maintains that, before 
1935, doctors only used 6 medicines and that the number of different drugs grew 
exponentially after the introduction of penicillin in 1940, streptomycin in 1943 and 
antibiotics in 1949. Using patents as a complement to market share data and other 
measures, he was also able to show the evolving picture of multinationals in the 
industry and the eclipse of the U.K.-based companies in the industry. 
 
Over the years, the chemical and pharmaceutical industries have repeatedly been used 
as a context with which to study patents, and patents used as a tool to look deeply into 
the industries themselves. This is largely due to the fact that, in study after study, both 
sectors were found to have a very high propensity to patent, which makes sense if one 
thinks about the possibility of reverse engineering virtually any chemical compound and 
the stakes at play in owning the next breakthrough drug or pesticide (Arundel and 
Kabla, 1998). Examples of such research include Palda and Pazderka (1982), 
Achilladelis et al. (1987, 1990), and Arora (1997). 
 
Achilladelis et al. (1987, 1990) looked at the pesticide industry. In their first paper they 
undertook to develop a history of the industry from 1930 to 1980 to and contrast the 
historical record with new product introductions and patent counts to look at the 
fundamental dynamics of innovation in a specific industry. Their main finding was 
further explored in the second paper which highlights the role that radical innovation 
plays in driving company profitability and technological change. 
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Arora (1997) did a study similar to Reekie, but with vastly superior tools and focused 
on the European chemical industry. Using patents, he was able to highlight the trend 
toward technological licensing in the industry after World War II and identify a 
relatively new group of industry participants dedicated to R&D and the dissemination of 
knowledge based on business models focused on licensing rather than production. The 
idea of looking at the industry level goes back to the very first researchers who began 
using patents, such as Pavitt (1982) and Scherer (1983), who found that metrics such as 
R&D effectiveness, as measured by number of patents produced per unit spending of 
R&D, showed robust results at the industry level. 
 
Palda and Pazderka (1982) made a similar finding in looking across Canadian industry, 
demonstrating that robust results for R&D effectiveness are only possible at the industry 
level. Kondo (1999) found that, in Japan, an industry level analysis also showed robust 
results in terms of the time lag between R&D investment and patenting. 
 
Arundel and Kabla (1998) went deeper into the differences across industries in their 
analysis of two parallel surveys done in France and the Netherlands. By looking at the 
responses of hundreds of Europe’s largest firms, they were able to drill deeply into the 
issue of propensity to patent and were able to weight patents by the kind of revenue they 
provide. Consistent with earlier work, they found that firms in different sectors had 
different levels of propensity to patent new products, but were also able to observe that 
process innovation was more heterogeneous across their samples and no such 
correlation was found at the industry level. 
 
Jaffe (1989) reasoned, much as Pavitt (1984) had done in his paper on technology 
trajectories, that there are logical technological clusters that are more important than 
industry groups; he grouped the 328 U.S. patent classes into 49 groups and then took 
500 companies over two time periods to determine 21 statistical clusters in which he felt 
there were enough technological links to perform robust analysis. Part of Jaffe’s interest 
was to explore the so-called “spillover effects” which would indicate that there is 
transference of innovative ideas from one place to another through social networks.  
 
The role of patents and other factors in the dissemination of knowledge is a common 
theme of research at this level of contextual analysis and can also be seen in Kumaresan 
and Miyazaki (1999) and Bekkers et al. (2002). The context for Bekkers et al. (2002) 
was the Global System for Mobile (GSM) industry and the role that patents played in 
developing the licensing model that is the basis for the industry, much as Arora had 
done for the chemical business. 
 
Malerba and Orsenigo (1996) sorted the industrial patent codes provided by the 
European Patent Office into 49 classes for firms in 6 countries and were looking to link 
patenting activities to patterns in firms’ entry into and exit from specific industries and 
countries. While their country level data was significant, its primary contribution was to 
determine that some industries are more turbulent than others in the sense of having 
higher degrees of entry and exit and less persistence in innovation by the firms in those 
industries. In some cases their data proves somewhat counterintuitive, with sectors such 
as multimedia systems and computers located in the stable industry group and 
agriculture and furniture located in the turbulent group. 
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From the point of view of the impact of digital databases and bibliographic research 
tools, the researchers looking at the industry level have clearly benefitted in much the 
same way as they have at other levels of contextual analysis. What is different at the 
industry level is however, that there has always been industry-level data provided by the 
different patent offices and, in fact, much of the early work in the field involved sorting 
through those industry codes and discussing to which degree they made sense or 
confused things further. For researchers interested in the sector level, it appears that 
digital databases and tools have made their lives fundamentally easier but have not 
changed the nature of what can be done with patents to inform innovation theory at that 
contextual level. 
 
o Firm level 
 
Many researchers have used patents to look at the firm and its innovation process. 
Although no papers were published in Research Policy at the firm level in the 70’s, and 
only 5 % of the papers using patents were at this level in the 80’s, 28% and 35% of all 
papers have been at this level during the 90’s and from 2000-2007, respectively. There 
are, however, many papers placed into other categories which use firm-level data. These 
papers, such as Malerba and Orsenigo (1996), discussed above, use firm-level data to 
find patterns at the industry, country, or global level rather than look at the creation of 
knowledge or innovation in the firm. 
 
As the volume of work at the firm level is so large in the sample, it was necessary to 
identify seven distinct threads including, R&D effectiveness, the role of in-house R&D, 
innovative persistence, the link between business and technological innovation, 
collaboration between firms, the internationalization of R&D, and the particular 
dynamics of start-ups and the so-called high-tech sector. 
 
1. R&D effectiveness 
 
In most of the work reviewed so far, the level of context is at the country or industry 
level and propensity to patent is found as a statistically relevant variable when looking 
across large numbers of firms. At the firm level, however, propensity to patent falls 
within the overall idea of how effective a firm’s R&D activities are and to what degree a 
firm uses patenting as a strategy for appropriating value from its intellectual capital. 
 
Ernst (1998), for example, looked at 25 Japanese and European electronics companies 
and did two things to get at his analysis of the different “strategies” for patenting at the 
firm level. One was to develop a measure of patent quality by looking at citations and 
other factors, and the other was to break out the R from R&D. Ernst is an advocate of 
corporate research and hoped to prove that it is a good idea. While his definition of 
quality might be questioned, his work is a good example of firm-level analysis as he 
shows different companies behaving differently. Some firms patent only a few high-
quality patents, while others patent everything they can. What is very interesting about 
Ernst’s work is that, while at the aggregate level the propensity to patent is fairly 
uniform in a given industry confirming earlier work; his data gives a heterogeneous 
result at the firm level. 
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Other papers also dealt with this theme. Frumau (1992) was one of the first studies to 
use bibliometric tools at this level of analysis and treated both patents and articles as an 
output indicator. Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999) used the Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS) done in 1992 which gives hard data on new product introduction and thus 
attempted to separate out the effectiveness of firms’ R&D activities from their decision 
to patent in the hope of getting a better measure of propensity to patent much as 
Arundel and Kabla (1998) did at a broader level of analysis. Blind et al. (2006) also 
looked deeply at why firms patent and, using data from Germany, tried to explore the 
increasing use of licensing as a rationale for the apparent upsurge in patenting observed 
in the 90’s and early years of the new millennium. 
 
2. The role of in-house R&D 
 
Gambardella (1992) was interested in looking at the ability of firms to exploit publicly 
available information and in his study of 14 large pharmaceutical firms in the U.S. was 
able to determine that firms with large in-house R&D capabilities were able to generate 
more patents based on publicly available science. This research required going past 
simple patent counts and looking at the citations in the patents to establish the kind of 
research the patents were based on. Beneito (2006) developed a very sophisticated set of 
algorithms to measure not only radical new technology but also incremental 
improvements, and found in her research on Spanish companies that in-house research 
capabilities appeared better at radical innovation while contracted R&D was more 
effective at incremental improvements. 
 
3. Innovative persistence 
 
Geroski et al. (1997) took two different databases concerning U.K. firms: one with 
patents awarded in the U.S. and another with product innovation with overlapping 
timeframes to explore to what degree firms which are very innovative tend to remain 
persistently innovative. Their surprising results were that very few firms were 
innovative by these definitions over any length of time and the expected correlation that 
the most innovative firms at one time would remain innovative simply did not hold. 
 
Cefis and Orsenigo (2001) however, did find evidence of persistence in looking at data 
from 6 different European countries when they compared patent applications to the 
European patent office. Their idea was that applications, not patent awards, are a better 
indication of innovative activity and did find evidence of persistence. 
 
Roper and Hewlett-Dundas (2008) went even deeper in their analysis of persistence in 
firms in Northern Ireland and used survey data to find evidence of persistence, 
especially in process improvements at the plant level. 
 
4. The link between business and technological innovation  
 
The most cited paper in this debate in the sample was Gambardella and Torrisi (1998), 
who looked at a panel of U.S. and European electronics companies and found that the 
most successful companies simultaneously focused their business activities while 
keeping their innovation activities as measured by patents rather diverse. 
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Additional research in this area includes Breschi et al (2003), Suzuki and Kodama 
(2004), Garcia-Vega (2006), Rodriguez-Duarte et al (2007), and Quintana-Garcia and 
Benavides-Velasco (2008) and Ernst (2001). The question all of them are trying to 
answer in one way or another is whether business diversification leads to greater 
innovation, or does innovation, and the diversification of innovative activities, lead to 
opening up opportunities to diversify the business.  
 
5. Collaboration between firms 
 
The most widely cited paper was Mowery et al (1998), which looked for and found a 
relationship between technology overlap and partner selection, as defined by patent 
awards, and was able to show that this overlap increased over time after two firms 
started working together; supporting the idea that collaboration would increase the 
capabilities of both sides. Additional research in this area includes Santangelo (2000), 
Bas and Sierra (2002), and Katila and Mang (2003). 
 
6. The internationalization of R&D 
 
Two papers which were frequently cited and focused on looking at firms which did 
R&D activities outside their home market are Belderbos (2001) and Kumar (2001). 
While Belderbos (2001) tried to find a correlation between doing research abroad and 
obtaining more innovation as measured by patents, Kumar (2001) looked at where firms 
would endeavour to do their R&D. Bas and Sierra (2002) then postulated different 
strategies which matched their empirical findings and also found substantive differences 
between Japanese and Western firms. In all cases, patents were able to inform the 
research since the location of the original innovation is well documented as well as the 
corporate affiliation of the research centre. 
 
Additional research concerning the internationalisation of R&D include Bergek and 
Berggren (2004), Iwasa and Odagiri (2004), Mariani (2004), and Singh (2008).  
 
Singh (2008) is a good example of the level of complexity which is possible with 
modern databases, and he was able to dig deeply into the “black box” of patents to come 
up with statistically significant evidence that shows that geographically-distributed 
R&D actually has a negative correlation with R&D effectiveness. He also found that 
when such distributed R&D was effective it did produce patents of higher value (using 
his definitions and algorithms). 
 
7. Start-ups and high-tech sectors 
 
Relatively new research by Mann and Sager (2007) looked at software start-ups and 
determined that having a patent has a positive impact on the firm’s ability to raise 
capital and make it through successive rounds of financing. Other research which 
focused on small firms and start-ups in sectors such as software, nanotechnology and 
biotech include Hicks and Hedge (2005), Avenel et al. (2007), Rothaermel and Thursby 
(2007), and Coad and Rao (2008). 
o  
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o Technology Level 
 
While some researchers dug into the “black box” of patents to inform research into the 
way innovation occurs at the firm level, others were more interested in the way 
innovation disseminates across technologies. Some of this research clearly transcends 
the boundaries of the firm. In any case, research at the technology level using patents 
has also taken off relatively recently with the advent of more sophisticated databases 
and tools with which to study them. 
 
One such study was Patel and Pavitt’s (1994), in which they used exclusively U.S. 
patent data to confirm Mowery and Rosenberg’s (1989) historical explanation of the 
development of technology in the U.S. during the twentieth century. Patel and Pavitt 
endeavoured to affirm the continuing importance of mechanical technologies in 
innovative activities despite the emergence of chemical engineering and electronics, and 
the patent data showed that fully 40% of new innovations were consistently based on 
mechanical and other traditional technologies as opposed to newer science-based 
technologies. The study produced robust evidence of the advantage of looking at patent 
data rather than aggregate R&D spending, and being able to drill down to the 
technology level and firm level. 
 
Lanjouw and Mody (1996) stay firmly in the “black box” tradition and use patents as 
empirical evidence that rising concern about pollution control led to increased 
innovation on pollution control technologies. They re-enter the “technology push and 
market pull” debate and land squarely in the market pull camp. Nameroff et al. (2004) 
do a similar study looking at so-called “green chemistry”. What is interesting about 
their research is the need to dig a bit deeper into the patents themselves in order to 
separate out the “green” patents from total chemical patents. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, Von Wartburg (2005) looked at 4-stroke internal 
combustion engine technology using multi-stage citation analysis for both U.S. and 
European patents, and he develops algorithms and control variables which get at the 
economic value added of specific patents based on the number of citations received in a 
fairly complex network model. 
 
Tijssen and Korevaar (1997) looked at the development of catalysis chemistry in the 
Netherlands as a way of getting at the informal organisations across inventors by using 
bibliographic techniques on patent citations. Murray (2002) looked at tissue engineering 
in the Netherlands to explore the idea that new technology is often found in both papers 
and patents, and used bibliometric tools to look for these patent-paper pairings and then 
to investigate the social network dynamics that were producing these innovations. 
 
As researchers such as Murray (2002), Von Wartburg (2005) and Tijssen and Korevaar 
(1997) dug deeper and deeper into the evolution of the technology and explored 
networks of institutions, companies, and scientists, they naturally found themselves 
getting closer to the inventor level which will be covered in more detail below. 
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o Product & Product Category Level 
 
There are only two papers in the sample of 134 papers which use patents at the product 
or product category level of analysis; Penan (1996) with 5 citations and Prencipe (1997) 
with 8 using the Science Direct database. 
 
Penan (1996) was interested in competing strategies in the field of Alzheimer's disease 
therapy and went deeply into the network of researchers and companies in order to work 
out the apparent strategies of the different firms. To do this he used co-citation analysis 
of papers and patent co-word analysis. 
 
Andrea Prencipe’s work closely examined Rolls Royce and the way it works at the 
technological level and is discussed in Section 2.3. His early work was at the subsystem 
level in jet engines and, in his 1997 paper, he uses patents as a proxy for understanding 
the actual technological profile of Rolls Royce. Prencipe’s point is that complex 
technological development requires deep technical know-how, and that traditional core 
competence theory is not enough. What is interesting is that, to reach this conclusion, 
Prencipe had to go deeply into the technology and the patents and look at 14 product 
and process technologies in order to develop a technology map for which to do his 
patent analysis. 
 
o Inventor Level 
 
There were six papers published in the first 28 years of Research Policy which used 
patents to inform research at the inventor level and 16 in the last 7 and a half years 
indicating either increased interest in the field or perhaps the opening up of this area in 
line with the availability of increasingly powerful tools and techniques.  
 
Sirilli (1984) started the thread in a paper in which he interviewed inventors in order to 
gain their perspectives on innovation and the relevant inputs and outputs such as 
research papers and patents. Noyons et al. (1994) looked at Flemish inventors in laser 
technology, and was one of the first researchers to look at the link between papers and 
patents using bibliographic techniques. Tijssen (2001, 2002) and Balconi et al. (2004) 
built on Noyons’ ideas and used increasingly powerful bibliometric tools to go deeper 
and deeper into the social networks in which the inventors work.  
 
Narin and Breitzman (1995) were on a slightly different track and looked at research 
scientists. They found that the number of patents per scientist followed the same inverse 
square distribution as found originally by Lotka in the 1920’s. If, for example, 100 
researchers each had 1 patent, the number of patents per researcher would drop off 
rather quickly with only 25 having two patents, 11 having three, 6 having four, and so 
on. 
 
Researchers now look at inventors’ career progressions (Dietz and Bozeman, 2005), 
where they live (Bettencourt and Strumsky, 2007) and where they work (Furukawa and 
Goto, 2006), and have done similar studies in different countries and in different 
technological areas, including tennis rackets (Dahlin, et al. 2004). 
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2.4.6 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this section was to review the history of management research which 
used patents as empirical data. Besides highlighting the fact that is well covered by 
other researchers that patents are a useful source of data when looking at innovation and 
the innovative process, the section developed a typology which makes it easier to 
classify based on the contextual nature of the research and the level of analysis. 
 
Five conclusions come out of the survey: 
 
1) In over 50 years of working with Patents (35 in Research Policy), researchers 
still find them a powerful tool across a widening spectrum of contexts and 
academic frameworks or lenses. 
 
2) The level of contextual analysis has increased over time as more complete 
digital databases have become available to researchers and they have mastered 
more powerful analytical tools which can be used with the data. 
 
3) Some contextual areas appear to be understudied such as product or product 
category level while others such as the inventor level are quite fashionable. 
 
4) As the level of research goes deeper and deeper into the nature of the firm, the 
inherent advantages and limitations in the use of patents become even more 
critical to manage and increasing triangulation becomes necessary. 
 
5) At the highly granular level made possible by the use of digital tools, the volume 
of information becomes exponentially large and there is a growing need of tools 
with which to be able to process that information. 
 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
 
This Chapter presents the literature review done for the thesis by first outlining the 
literature review process which is best described as an iterative one and covered a 
number of different literatures over a number of years. The chapter then goes on to look 
at the literature dealing with discontinuous and potentially disruptive technology 
discussing definitions and semantic debates, two major threads in this literature and the 
relatively limited research which looks at what firms do in the face of such change from 
either a theoretical or empirical perspective and no research directly dealing with 
technology deployment per se. The thesis then looks at the automotive literature dealing 
with one group of such technologies and finds that while there is much being written 
about the context, the issue of how to deploy is receiving little attention. In search of a 
theoretical perspective, the thesis reviews Granstrand’s theory of the technology-based 
firm and finds it falls short of covering this issue of technology deployment. Having 
identified a gap in the literature the thesis goes on to review management research using 
patents in order to develop a typology of such research and thus inform the method for 
the research which is partially based on using patent data. While not germane to the 
identification of the major area for the thesis’ contribution, this section is included in the 
review as the thesis does not make a contribution to method. 
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The purpose of Chapter 3 is to explain in detail the research methodology used in the 
thesis and discuss the rationale for choosing it as well as highlighting its limitations. 
 
Section 3.2 will briefly review three different philosophical approaches to the social 
sciences and show why the thesis adopts Bhaskar’s (1975) Critical Realist Perspective, 
discuss the epistemological implications of that choice, and also why case studies were 
chosen as the research strategy applying Eisenhardt’s (1989) ideas using case studies to 
develop theory.  
 
Section 3.3 will go into the method itself describing the overall process used in arriving 
at the final research design, show how the thesis maps onto Eisenhardt’s (1989) 
roadmap for developing case studies, discuss how the thesis will combine data from 
four sources to complete case studies for each of the manufacturers as well as each of 
the technologies under study, and finally present the a priori construct concerning 
technological deployment strategy that was used to guide the methodological choices in 
the thesis and which will be later refined in Chapter 6. 
 
Section 3.4 will discuss the four companies and technologies selected and explain the 
logic behind this sample selection.  Section 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 will discuss the sources of 
empirical data for the thesis and the limitations of each data set. Section 3.5 will discuss 
the patent data as well as the mapping software applied to it. Section 3.6 will discuss 
sources used for the deployment data and Section 3.7 and Section 3.8 will discuss the 
interviews conducted with Industry experts and the use of the researcher’s prior 
knowledge respectively. Section 3.9 will present a summary to Chapter 3 and place the 
thesis within the context of the research using patents presented in Chapter 2.3. 
 
3.2 Philosophy of science, epistemology and method 
 
According to Blaikie (1993), research needs to be clear in terms of its ontology, 
epistemology and method.  
 
3.2.1 Philosophy of science and epistemology 
 
According to Blaklie “over the past thirty years, the social sciences have been plagued 
by theoretical and methodological controversies” (Blaklie, 1993, p.1) and it seems that 
these controversies have continued. This section will summarize three different 
positions within that controversy and look at the advantages and disadvantages of each 
according to the researcher’s viewpoint in the interest of explaining the choices made 
for the research in terms of ontology and epistemology. These choices will therefore 
drive the method chosen as there are many ways of looking at the research question 
formulated Section 1.1. To simplify a very complex set of debates and discussions there 
are two broad camps in the social sciences which Blaklie refers to as Positivism and 
Interpretivism. These will be explored as will Critical Realism (Bhaskar, 1975). 
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o Positivism 
 
The positivist approach applies the positivist philosophy developed for the physical 
sciences to social science and is concerned with looking for causal relationships 
between observable phenomena. One important aspect of what Blaklie calls the 
“standard view” (Blaklie, 1993, p.16) of positivism is confidence in the scientific 
method and another is the idea that through the application of that method humanity 
will eventually be able to know the underlying laws which determine how the world 
works both in the physical world and the social sphere. 
 
In management science, or the application of social sciences to the field of human 
organization concerned with business (as opposed to family life, social organizations, 
etc.) the positivist view has become very popular and even dominant in a number of 
universities and academic journals. A positivist world view and an empiricist 
epistemology would, in terms of method lead a researcher to posit a relationship 
between different phenomena and then develop a construct which links them together. 
Next the researcher will look for empirical data concerning the different components of 
the construct and then show through statistical analysis whether the construct is robust 
after controlling for exogenous factors and measuring the confidence level one can have 
in the findings. There are three aspects which make the positivist view deeply 
compelling. First, a positivist formulation has the potential to offer a prescriptive 
solution to problems facing practice. Second, the empiricist approach is conceptually 
straightforward even though it can lead to much methodological and mathematical 
complexity. Third, since much of the early management research was done using 
methodologies which fit into this epistemology and ontology, a body of knowledge has 
reached critical mass to which contribution can be made using methods for which there 
is precedent and pursuing lines of enquiry which have been opened. 
 
For the researcher the positivist approach has an important disadvantage in addition to 
the philosophical objections cited by Blaklie and that has to do with the time lag 
inherent in such research which decreases its usefulness for practice. Management 
research in the positivist tradition will typically look at attempting to correlate some 
aspect of management such as early supplier involvement in new product development 
with some process or output indicator in an effort to determine the degree to which such 
activity will improve the process by a measurable amount. While such research is quite 
important for the development of theory and to add to the understanding of the 
phenomena, it is only possible when there is a statistically significant sample of 
instances when such an idea is applied which can be empirically compared to others 
where it is not applied. The dissemination of such ideas takes time and only when there 
is a sufficient sample available can such research be done. Research also takes time to 
complete and publish and the entire process suffers a significant time lag from the first 
time the new idea is tried out until publication of the research results. From a 
practitioner point of view however, the advantages and disadvantages of the approach 
might be well known with the result that such research is found not to be of interest to 
many practitioners although they might apply the methods in question. 
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o Interpretivism 
 
Interpretivism, on the other hand, argues that the social sphere is fundamentally 
different than the physical world due to human interaction and therefore needs a 
fundamentally different epistemological approach. According to Blaklie (1993), who 
quotes Weber extensively, Interpretivism is an attempt to apply objective measurements 
to fundamentally subjective material and goes beyond the Negativist view which 
maintains that since everything is subjective there is little point in attempting 
generalizations. For the researcher, the attraction of Interpretivism is that it allows for 
great flexibility in method and encourages introspection and an exploration of the 
attitudes of social actors involved in a given phenomena. That people do not behave in a 
strictly predictable fashion, as would be maintained by a strict positivist, and that 
rationality is bounded is intuitively evident and the interpretivist tradition encourages 
the exploration of what lies outside of those boundaries. Blaklie (1993) gives a list of 
seven criticisms of Interpretivism many of which have to do with the challenge in 
recognizing that the way people think about things is not only part of what is being 
studied in the social sciences but also affects the study itself if one adopts an 
interpretive world view. From a strictly practical viewpoint, the researcher feels that 
very interpretive research with methods such as employing grounded theory and action 
research is difficult to accomplish. Section 3.1 will discuss the evolution of the design 
of the research during which the development of grounded theory with an interpretivist 
philosophy was considered and rejected. 
 
o Critical realist ontology 
 
The critical realist perspective was chosen for the research based on Bhaskar’s original 
text (1975) and Blaikie’s (1993) critique and review. Bhaskar takes a rational approach 
which can be considered as providing a pragmatic answer to the positivist-interpretivist 
debate (Benton, 1981). Bhaskar (1975) distinguishes between three levels of reality: the 
empirical that we can see and measure; the actual, events going on regardless of 
whether we can detect them with our present level of tools and understanding; and the 
real, the fundamental structures and mechanisms which produce these events. The 
approach encourages the search for causal relationships in open systems and thus 
responds, to a degree, to the recent history of both the physical and social sciences. In 
some of its most advanced disciplines, even the physical sciences are coming to 
understand that there are limits to the scientific method and what appeared to be 
fundamental laws to one generation of scientists are revealed to only being rough 
approximations and models to another as the quest for knowledge goes further and 
further, such as in the field of particle physics. Blaklie (1993) cites Benton (1981) in his 
examples of natural sciences such as evolutionary biology which also work in open 
systems and maintains that the differences between the natural sciences and social 
sciences ought to be methodological, not epistemological. While the purpose of this 
section is not to summarise Bhaskar or go into depth on the current debates in the 
critical realist tradition, the key idea relevant to this research is that we often cannot 
know in advance the rules and laws governing phenomena and will probably never 
uncover them all. The best science can hope for is to strive to understand phenomena 
and continually update its approximation of the underlying laws or, as Bhaskar called it, 
the real. 
 47 
As explained by Blaikie (1993), realist epistemology is about building models of real 
mechanisms “such that if they were to exist and act in the postulated way, they would 
account for the phenomena being examined”. In terms of the difficulties and 
disadvantages of Positivism and Interpretivism mentioned above, Critical Realism 
allows for the investigation of ideas before they are clearly part of the empirical fabric 
of the world and thus might still be interesting to practice while at the same time goes 
beyond the relativist idea and allows for reaching concrete conclusions on cause and 
effect at least at the approximate level. 
 
3.2.2 Research strategy 
 
As outlined in Section 1.1 the thesis is interested in understanding how firms respond to 
potentially disruptive or discontinuous technologies in terms of research & development 
and new product deployment and is focused on the context of the automotive industry. 
The thesis is thus built around the idea that managers in firms make an implicit or 
explicit strategic decision about how to deploy new technology and that identifying 
different patterns of that choice could help fill a gap in the literature which is discussed 
at length in Chapter 2.  
 
o Retroductive approach 
 
Within the critical realist tradition, Blaklie quotes Bhaskar (1975) as arguing for a 
retroductive research strategy and outlining three broad steps in performing such 
science. The idea is to first observe a phenomenon. Next an attempt is made to explain 
the phenomenon by postulating the existence of an overarching mechanism. Finally the 
researcher looks for evidence of the existence of the mechanism. What is elegant about 
the process is that it can be repeated for infinitely deeper levels of explanation. 
 
In the first place such an approach fits better with the critical realist ontology than the 
classic inductive and deductive approaches to scientific inquiry. The inductive approach 
of the kind argued for by Durkheim (1964) is, according to Blaklie “now rejected by 
most natural and social scientists” (Blaklie, 1993, p. 140), and rejected for this research 
amongst other reasons because it requires the researcher to discard all pre-conceived 
ideas – something which was not felt to be either possible or useful for the research. The 
deductive approach as developed by Popper (1959) and summarized by Blaklie (1993, 
p.145) requires setting up a hypothesis as the central research question and then 
developing a set of propositions that can be logically derived from the hypothesis. 
These propositions can then be proven false or not and if not then the original 
hypothesis can be said to be corroborated although never quite proven to be true. Of the 
five criticisms levelled against the deductive approach by Blaklie (1993 p. 150-155), the 
one most compelling for the research is the question of where the hypothesis comes 
from. While potentially powerful for confirming existing theory or expanding on it, the 
approach appears destined to fail in developing fundamentally new ideas. 
 
The advantage of the retroductive approach mentioned above is that one can start with a 
rough idea which is perhaps the fruit of an insight and then develop it into theory using 
the process. One of the differences between a retroductive approach and an inductive 
approach is the level of this starting point. 
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o Using case studies to build theory 
 
In her seminal essay, Eisenhardt (1989) builds on earlier work by Yin (1984), Glaser 
and Straus (1967) and others to develop a roadmap for using case studies in order to 
build theory. While Eisenhardt positions her work as an inductive method, she does 
explicitly discuss the use of using a priori constructs as a possibility and in terms of 
Blaikie’s definitions discussed above, the use of such a priori constructs would position 
such work as retroductive. 
 
Yin defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates contemporary 
phenomena within its real life context especially when the boundaries between 
phenomena and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 1994, p.13). Both Yin (1994) and 
Eisenhardt (1989) place great emphasis on the selection of the research question as it 
will drive the selection of the research strategy in general and the site selection and data 
collection methods for case study research if it is chosen. 
 
As stated in Section 1.1 the research question for the thesis is What strategies do 
automotive companies follow with respect to the investigation and deployment of 
discontinuous technologies? In the case of the automotive industry in general as well as 
the particular potential transition to new power train technologies discussed in Section 
1.1, the context is quite important and the boundaries between it and the larger issue of 
how firms approach potential disruptive or discontinuous technology is not evident. 
 
For Eisenhardt “the case study is a research strategy which focuses on understanding the 
dynamics present in single settings”, “can involve either single or multiple cases”, and 
“typically combine data collection methods” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 534) and appear to be 
a sound approach to shedding light on the question above. As discussed in Section 1.1, 
the thesis pursues two sub-objectives within the broader research question: 
 
Objective 1  Explore how companies approach the development of different 
technologies, for example, looking at the existence of path dependency in 
terms of technology strategy 
 
Objective 2  Assess how different companies develop the same technologies, for 
example, looking for homogeneity or heterogeneity in terms of strategic 
response. 
 
For these objectives, the development of case studies also appears to be a sound choice 
and in this case, the idea of developing multiple case studies from the same data set as 
done by Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988) showed promise. The final reason for 
choosing the case study method was that the researcher did have an a priori idea of 
what the answer to the research question might be and the case study approach, together 
with Eisenhardt’s (1989) roadmap offered the possibility of exploring that construct 
while at the same time avoiding bias and assuring that the research would be robust in 
the sense of establishing internal validity and potentially developing good theory which 
Eisenhardt (1989) cites Pfeffer (1982) as defining as parsimonious, testable and 
logically coherent. 
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3.3. Method 
 
The PhD. Process has been a journey of discovery for the researcher and in order to 
highlight the choices made in the research design, the following section will briefly 
cover the key points along that journey prior to discussing the research program itself 
and the a priori construct used in its design. 
 
3.3.1 Thesis development 
 
The starting point for the thesis was the apparent heterogeneity in the major vehicle 
manufacturers’ response to the potentially profound changes to automotive power train 
technology that began to gather momentum towards the end of the 1990s due to 
concerns about air quality, environmental sustainability and the rising cost of oil based 
fuels. Van den Hoed (2004) argued that the fact that a number of vehicle manufacturers 
had embraced protein exchange membrane (PEM) fuel cells as a possible solution was 
evidence of mimetic homogeneity, yet the researcher was struck by the different levels 
of apparent investment and interest by the different vehicle manufactures and thus the 
first idea was to look at why the different companies appeared to be taking different 
approaches. 
 
The first idea was to not adopt any lens, but develop qualitative case studies based on 
open-ended interviews with executives in the manufacturers and let the data speak for 
itself using a grounded theory methodology (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Gummesson, 
2000). The feedback received in a number of discussions with faculty and colleagues 
was that such an approach was highly risky. The first problem was identifying the key 
executives at each firm and gaining access to them. Next it would be necessary to get 
past the official explanations and uncover what really happened. Even if one was able to 
do that, another problem is the degree to which such people agree with each other or are 
retroactively truly honest with themselves about their individual and collective 
cognitive processes. To make things more difficult, many of the key people are 
Japanese and German and a working knowledge of both Japanese and German would 
have been useful as people are more comfortable in their own language. 
 
As a result of this feedback this approach was abandoned and a process undertaken to 
look at 14 different approaches or lenses with which to look at the phenomena. This 
approach, shown in Table 3.1, shows the different lenses evaluated and an evaluation of 
each of them in looking at their fit with the researcher’s interest, the potential 
contribution to theory, interest for practice, and a concept called “doability” which had 
to do with issues concerning access and the researcher’s own assessment of his abilities. 
 
As a result of this analysis, which was reviewed by a panel of Cranfield School of 
Management academics, the focus of the research was built around the idea of 
developing a new framework which would explain the heterogeneity around the ideas of 
depth and breadth. These ideas, which later became those defined in Sub-section 6.2.2, 
were still in an early stage of definition although a research program was designed for 
this approach and Nissan was selected as the site for a pilot study due to the researcher’s 
access to specific executives within the Research & Development organization.  
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 Interest Contribution Practice Doability 
Causal Actors     
Alliances  - ++ ++ + 
Senior Management ++ ? + -- 
Government - + + + 
Strategic Planning ++ + + -- 
National Culture -- + + -- 
Complementors + + ++ + 
Christensen’s model     
Initial Markets ++ + +++ + 
Improvement & Learning + ++ ++ + 
Heterogeneity      
New framework + - + + 
Ambidextrous Organization - + + + 
Other Frameworks     
Dynamic Capabilities  ++ + + + 
Co-Evolution  + + -- - 
Population Ecology - + ? + 
Nonmarket Strategy 
System 
+ ? + - 
 
Table 3.1 Subjective evaluation of possible approaches 
 
Over the course of six months the head of research and development for the company 
was brought into the process and, after the requisite non-disclosure forms had been 
signed, access was given to Nissan’s current plans for product development in safety. 
Unfortunately, when presented with requests for information along the lines of Table 
3.2, the Nissan executives were simply unable to comply. Not only would such an effort 
require a large amount of time, but the most difficult part would be to first identify 
where in the organization the data would exist i.e. engineering, strategic planning, 
public relations, regulatory affairs, finance, etc. and then work through internal channels 
to get access. 
 
Concept Indicators of Breadth Indicators of Depth 
Program length (years) Longer (e.g. 15 years) Shorter (e.g. 5 years) 
Number of parallel applications Many  Few  
Total annual spending High Higher 
Total program spending Higher High 
# people involved Many Few 
# sites involved Several One or two 
Role of suppliers and 
collaborators 
Large number of suppliers and 
collaborators involved 
Small number of Key suppliers 
and collaborators involved 
Patent generation Higher Lower 
Strategic Timescale Shorter term Longer term 
 
Table 3.2 Pilot study design 
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As a result of the failure of the pilot site, the research design was changed again to 
eliminate the need for direct access and to rely instead on publicly available patent data 
and new product introductions in order to infer the apparent strategies used by the 
different manufacturers and then to confirm those results by interviewing industry 
experts. At this time the scope of the project was expanded to look into additional 
technologies beyond hydrogen fuel cells, and hybrid vehicles, seat belts, airbags and 
catalytic converters were initially considered. The number of vehicle manufactures at 
the time was five including GM, Ford, Toyota, Nissan and what was called at the time 
DaimlerChrysler. Catalytic converters were later dropped due to problems in finding 
any interesting performance data, and DaimlerChrysler was dropped due to problems 
associated with its process of dissolution which was thought to cloud the data. 
 
The research, however, continued to proceed along inductive lines with a narrow 
research question built around the idea of determining whether in fact there was 
heterogeneity in approach across the manufacturers using the ideas of depth and 
breadth. Three propositions were logically induced from the existence of the construct 
which involved the manufacturers showing a path dependency in terms of depth and 
breadth, deeper strategies leading to later but potentially more substantial technological 
progress and broad strategies leading to potentially more rapid introduction of less 
substantial technological leaps. 
 
There were four problems with this approach. In the first place, the data for the 
propositions was not compelling and although they were downgraded to conjectures in 
the thesis submitted in December 2009, their role in the research was unclear. Second, 
the research question was considered too narrow by the examiners and the contribution 
to knowledge not clearly linked to it. Third, the overall linkage between the research 
question, gaps in the literature, method, data analysis, conclusions and contribution was 
thought to be unclear at best. Fourth, the thesis lacked a discussion chapter separate 
from the conclusion chapter and had a number of other omissions and deficiencies. 
 
The research methodology has thus been modified again to reflect the input of the 
examiners and align it closer with established case study methodology in general and 
Eisenhardt (1989) in particular. A detailed mapping of the examiners’ comments and 
changes to the thesis is shown in Appendix G. 
 
3.3.2 Research programme 
 
As a result of the process outlined in Sub-section 3.3.1, the thesis has been aligned with 
Eisenhardt’s (1989) roadmap for performing case study research, and that alignment is 
shown in Table 3.3 in which the headings are taken directly from her paper and the 
thesis content and chapter and section reference are given for each heading. One of the 
key points made by Eisenhardt is that case study methodology can and should adapt 
during the study itself and research questions at the beginning of the research should be 
considered “tentative” and that it “may shift during the research” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 
536). In this light the thesis has been able to embrace the recommendations made in the 
interest of producing a more robust study and not in the sense of retroactively justifying 
work that has already been done. 
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Web Site Thesis content Chapter-
Section 
Getting started o Research question defined 
o A priori construct developed on depth and 
breadth 
1.1 
3.3.3 
Selecting cases o Site selection discussed in depth and 
alternatives discussed 
3.4 
Crafting instruments 
and protocols 
o Research designed around four sources of 
data including patents, deployment data, 
expert interviews and prior knowledge 
o Patent data from Eureka database 
o Deployment data from variety of sources 
o Interview guides developed and methodology 
discussed 
3.3.2 
 
 
3.5 
3.6 
3.7, App. B1 
Entering the field o Write-up of case studies  
o Write-up of interviews 
Chapter 5 
App. B3 
Analyzing data o Data analysis presented in eight case studies 
(4 by vehicle manufacturer, 4 by technology) 
o Cross case analysis performed 
Chapter 5 
 
Chapter 6 
Shaping hypothesis o A priori construct refined in light of the data Chapter 6 
Enfolding literature o Gaps in innovation and automotive literature 
o Use of patents in management science study 
o Concepts related to depth and breadth 
o Discussion of findings and links to literature 
2.2 
2.3 
6.2.1 
6.4, 6.5 
Reaching closure o Theoretical saturation  
o Cross case comparisons 
o Thesis conclusions 
App. B2 
Chapter 6 
Chapter 7 
 
Table 3.3 Application of Eisenhardt’s (1989) roadmap  
 
The research program for the thesis is shown in Figure 3.1 and involves triangulating 
data (Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989) from four different sources to develop two sets of 
case studies covering four companies and four technologies within the automotive 
industry. Miles and Huberman (1994) argue for such multiple-case sampling in order to 
add confidence to findings although they maintain that it does not necessarily add 
“generalizability” (p. 29) to the theory developed. Eisenhardt (1991) supports the idea 
and maintains that many of the most highly cited studies in sociology explicitly or 
implicitly consider multiple case studies although they might be at one location. For Yin 
(1994) multiple cases are like a series of experiments and he stresses the idea of 
“replication” (p. 45). The data sources are an analysis of the cumulative U.S. patents 
filed by the vehicle manufacturers in each of the four technologies (Section 3.5); an 
analysis of the deployment of those technologies by the manufacturers (Section 3.6); 
interviews with industry experts, who were selected for their knowledge of the 
technologies and companies under study, (Section 3.7); and the researcher’s prior 
knowledge of the industry (Section 3.8). Figure 3.1 also shows how, using Eisenhardt’s 
(1989) terminology, an a priori construct can be used with the case study methodology 
to provide a starting point for thinking through the sources of data and analytical tools. 
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Figure 3.1 Research Methodology 
 
Figure 3.1 also shows that much emphasis has been placed on developing the context 
for the research which is presented in Chapter 4. As discussed in Sub-section 3.2.2, part 
of Yin’s definition of a case study is that the “boundaries between phenomena and 
context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 1994, p. 13) and it was felt that significant effort 
was required to ensure a rigorous coverage of the context for the research; this was done 
by using the researcher’s prior knowledge as a base, organizing it using theory, 
supplementing it with additional desk research and then corroborating the result with 
three of the industry experts. For this effort the thesis applied Geels’ (2002) socio-
technical model to the automotive industry and explored its possible interpretation as a 
co-evolutionary system (Lewin and Volberda, 1999). 
 
3.3.3 Depth and breadth as an a priori construct 
 
One of the key recommendations made was to position the depth and breadth construct 
as emerging from the analysis of the case studies and discarding the inductive method 
discussed above. The key insight gained in the study of Eisenhardt (1989) is the role 
that an a priori construct can play in case study research. In fact, the relatively rough 
idea around the concepts of depth and breadth were in fact such an a priori construct 
and used as Eisenhardt recommends. Figure 3.2 gives an early version of the construct 
which was later simplified and is presented in Chapter 6 as Figure 6.2. 
 
Deployment 
Data Analysis 
Context 
Development 
Expert 
Interviews 
Patent 
Analysis 
Case  
Studies 
Prior Knowledge 
& Desk Research 
 
Findings 
 
A Priori 
Construct 
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Figure 3.2 Preliminary construct for depth and breadth  
 
As will be seen in Chapter 6, the main difference between the construct shown in Figure 
6.2 and that finally found in the data is that the references to organizational learning 
were dropped during the research as lacking empirical evidence.  
 
Eisenhardt (1989) discusses both the advantages and disadvantages of having an a 
priori idea of the constructs that might emerge from the data. On the one hand she 
explicitly talks about such constructs being able to “help shape the initial design” but 
also talks about the ideal of a “clean theoretical slate” and that “preordained theoretical 
perspectives or propositions may bias and limit the findings” (p. 536). Yin also stresses 
the importance of going into case study design with a “rich, theoretical framework” 
(Yin, 1994, p. 46). The thesis used the construct to inform the decisions about patent 
analysis and deployment data analysis which will be discussed further in Section 3.5 
and 3.6 but did so only in a limited way in the expert interviews in order to limit the 
potential of biasing the research. As will be developed further in Section 3.7, the 
construct was not included in the interview guides but was discussed during the 
interviews as a possibility. Chapter 6 explores the evidence for and against the construct 
and highlights the comments from the experts both in support of it and when alternative 
explanations of the data were forthcoming. 
Broad range of 
discovery 
Many small 
parallel projects 
Broad Agenda 
Broad range of patents with 
few patents on each subject 
Incremental 
Improvements in many 
products 
• Early 
introductions with 
some new 
features 
• Broad 
organizational 
learning 
Narrow range 
of discovery 
Few Very large 
projects 
Narrow range of patents with 
many patents on related 
subjects 
Step change Improvement 
in few products followed by 
roll out to other products 
• Late introductions 
with superior 
features 
• Narrow 
organizational 
learning 
Deep Agenda 
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Company 
3.4 Site selection 
 
As discussed in Section 1.1, the potential radical evolution of automotive power train 
technology was chosen for the research due to the researcher’s personal experience in 
the industry, its importance to the world’s economy and the impact that the evolution of 
power train technology will have on environmental sustainability in the years ahead. 
The automotive industry has also proved to be a fruitful ground for management 
research as discussed in Sub-section 2.3.2.  
 
According to Yin (1994), replication is the key point for multiple case studies and he 
recommends developing six to ten case studies which ought to be selected such that 
each case either “predict similar results” or “produce contrasting results for predictable 
reasons” (p. 46). Yin goes on to suggest that four to six cases are sufficient to see 
different patterns emerge. Building on Yin’s recommendations, the thesis develops a 
total of eight cases including four company case studies and four technology case 
studies. As the technologies are the same in each case, the thesis actually has a total of 
16 nodes in the analysis. 
 
Miles and Huberman (1994) stress the importance of setting a boundary around case 
design in order to drive sampling decisions and help focus the research although they 
also maintain that such boundaries can shift during the research. For the thesis, an initial 
decision was to focus on the United States (U.S.) as a geographic boundary for the 
research in terms of site selection and data analysis. 
 
3.4.1 Company selection 
 
U.S. market share was chosen as a measure of size, although other factors such as 
number of employees, revenue, etc. could have been chosen. Firms of sufficient size 
were thought to be in a position to dedicate sufficient funds to developing alternative 
power train technologies and thus could be classified as potentially showing similar 
results in Yin’s (1994) terms. Table 3.4 gives market share data for the United States in 
2000 and 2008 from the industry trade publication, Automotive News. 
 
% U.S. Market Share 2000 % U.S. Market Share 2008 
General Motors Group 28.3 22.3 
Ford Group 24.1 15.1 
Chrysler 14.0* 11.0 
Toyota/Lexus 9.3 16.7 
Honda/Acura 6.7 10.8 
Nissan/Infiniti 4.0 7.2 
VW Group 2.3 2.4 
Hyundai/Kia - 5.1 
      * 15.1% including Mercedes 
 
Table 3.4 U.S. market share data for cars and light trucks (2000, 2008) 
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As shown in Table 3.4, the firms with the highest market share over time are GM, Ford, 
Chrysler, Toyota, Honda and Nissan. Chrysler was excluded from the sample due to 
complications arising from its aborted merger with Daimler. In 1998 Chrysler merged 
with Daimler and apparently combined its intellectual property efforts in the U.S. 
Daimler then sold Chrysler in August 2007, confusing the issue further, and it was 
decided to simply remove the company from the sample rather than attempt to purify 
the data. Honda has a significant presence in the U.S. but is a significantly smaller 
player in the global automotive business. Ernst (1998) recommends that patent analysis 
should also be done with companies which are somewhat homogenous in size, and thus 
Honda has been left out of the research. The Volkswagen Group (VW) and Hyundai 
have significantly smaller presence in the US but were also excluded from the sample 
for other reasons. VW is a very large global player but has struggled in the U.S. market 
over the years and was thought to have fundamentally different motivations due to its 
reliance on the European market. Hyundai not only has a very different global footprint 
to the other manufactures but is largely focused on a different segment of vehicles and 
thus was also thought to have different motivations from the other companies in the 
sample. As the interest was to find firms which could be predicted to show similar 
results, both of the firms were excluded. 
 
3.4.2 Technology selection  
 
As the purpose of the thesis is to explore the way vehicle manufacturers approached 
discontinuous and potentially disruptive technology, the primary consideration in 
choosing technologies for analysis was the degree to which they were considered as 
such at the time of their introduction.  
 
As shown in Sub-section 2.3.2, a majority of studies focused on the automotive industry 
use changes to automotive power train technology as the context within which to do the 
research. One such technology, the hydrogen fuel cell has been the subject of increasing 
attention and investment (Dunn, 2002, Steinemann, 1999). Van den Hoed (2004) has 
documented how the automotive industry had, from 1998 to 2002, come to regard the 
fuel cell as the primary sustainable alternative to the internal combustion engine and this 
technology was the first selected to be part of the sample. 
 
Due to their explosion in the automotive market, hybrid vehicles, which have both 
internal combustion and electrical drive train components, were also added to the scope 
of analysis. At the time of its introduction (in the Honda Insight and Toyota Prius), the 
technology was dismissed by many automotive executives as being too expensive for 
automotive applications and representing to sharp a break with current vehicle 
technology. Battery electric vehicles would, in hindsight, represent an interesting case 
study but were considered an unviable solution in 2003/2004 when the selection of 
technologies was being made and were thus not included in the scope of the thesis, 
although the technology is discussed together with fuel cell electric vehicles and hybrid 
vehicles even though the patent data for battery electric vehicles was not included. The 
problem with fuel cell and hybrid technologies in terms of academic research is that the 
technologies are still in development and it was recommended to add technologies 
further along in their life cycle as additional case studies in the research. 
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Four additional technologies were considered, as shown in Table 3.5, and each 
technology was considered regarding the degree to which the technology represented a 
discontinuity to automotive technology at the time of its introduction, the number of 
years between introduction and 2006, when these decisions were made, and the degree 
of patent and deployment data available.  
 
 Discontinuity Years since 
introduction 
to 2006 
Data 
Availability 
Fuel Cells Electric  Very High 10 Medium 
Hybrid  High 10 High 
Seat belts Medium 40-50 Medium/Low 
Airbags High 25-30 Medium 
Anti-lock brakes Low 20-25 Low 
Common rail diesel Low 10-15 Low 
Catalytic converter Medium 15-20 Low 
 
Table 3.5 Technology selection 
 
The degree of discontinuity was determined by evaluating the technologies involved 
and comparing them with the researcher’s prior knowledge of automotive engineering, 
as well as looking at criteria such as the novelty of the technologies under study to the 
industry or the world, the impact of the new technology on vehicle architecture, and the 
distance between the cost of the new technology and the targets that would have to be 
achieved for viability in automotive. Both fuel cell and hybrid technologies represent a 
sharp departure from traditional internal combustion engine technology, requiring the 
development of totally new power electronics in both cases and a completely new 
chemical-electric technology for fuel cell and battery chemistry as well as for the 
storage and delivery of new types of feed stock such as methane and hydrogen in the 
case of fuel cells. This last issue brought the vehicle manufacturers to cryogenic 
technology as well as other ways of storing hydrogen such as the use of metal oxides. 
While commonplace today, vehicle crash testing and the effects of crash dynamics on 
passengers was largely an unknown discipline back in the 1960’s and represented an 
important discontinuity for the vehicle manufacturers (Johannessen, 1984). Airbags 
were, in the 1970’s considered even more exotic and required the vehicle manufacturers 
to incorporate aerospace technology in the form of sensors, microprocessors and 
explosive devices on cars and, again, while the technology is accepted today, accounts 
such as that of Struble (1998) give a sense of the nature of the discontinuity perceived at 
the time. Anti-lock brakes also involved the application of sensors and microprocessors 
but the technology was better known by then and the challenge for anti-lock brakes was 
more about cost reduction of the systems already working in luxury cars and heavy 
trucks than dealing with technological discontinuity per se. The issue in common rail 
diesel engines was the pressure level required for the fuel system but this was thought to 
be a lower level of discontinuity as it only affected a limited number of components and 
did not involve any fundamentally different technology. Finally, although the catalytic 
converter involved very new technology and the development of completely new testing 
and analysis protocols, it was also limited in its impact on vehicle architecture. 
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Time since introduction was measured in an approximate way but its purpose was only 
to ensure an adequate level of historical data in order to determine the paths pursued by 
the different vehicle manufactures. While a more rigorous process of determining time 
frame could certainly be developed, it was not thought to add relevant depth. 
 
Data availability was thought through in terms of both patent data and deployment data 
and while these topics will be discussed in depth in Sections 3.5 and 3.6, preliminary 
research was done prior to selecting the technologies. The problem with common rail 
diesel technology was that diesel engines are still not very popular in the United States 
and thus very few models have been introduced and therefore, it was thought that 
deployment rates and even patent counts would be lower than if the study was focused 
on European manufacturers. The patent patterns for catalytic converters were produced 
but when looking for deployment data the problem was that converter performance is 
not readily available in the public domain and thus the level of granularity is extremely 
limited. A similar problem existed for anti-lock brakes as cars were either equipped with 
them or not. For these reasons anti-lock brakes, common rail diesel technology and 
catalytic converters were dropped from the study. A similar problem concerning 
deployment data occurred in the seat belt data set despite initial indications that it would 
be possible to find richer seat belt data, and this issue is discussed in Sub-section 3.6.2. 
 
These technologies were largely chosen based on their link to environmental and safety 
concerns as it was thought that such issues would be more analogous to the set of issues 
affecting fuel cell electric vehicles and hybrid vehicles and that other technologies 
which only had an impact on performance such as fuel injection, or passenger comfort, 
such as so-called “infotainment systems”. The technological development and product 
deployment of seat belts and airbags were largely driven by legislation, so perhaps one 
could argue for focusing on technologies that are more independent. According to 
interview subject number 6, however, the last major product innovation in automotive 
that was not the direct result of legislation was the V8 engine, and while this might be 
an exaggeration, the industry is heavily regulated and as will be seen in Chapter 4, the 
regulatory environment forms a critical part of the socio-technological regime and 
greater landscape. The disadvantage of focusing on safety and environmentally driven 
technologies is that it is difficult to determine the balance of competitive dynamics and 
regulation in the decisions of the vehicle manufactures to first develop and then deploy 
the technology. One aspect of this issue, which will be explored further in Section 6.4 is 
to consider when it makes sense for a firm to go beyond compliance (Reinhardt, 2005). 
Another is to consider the timing of the introduction of safety features and, while there 
is a class of safety-critical features for which no compromise can be made, the fact is 
that there are a large number of solutions for different problems and the cost benefit of 
them are routinely looked at in the industry. 
 
A final issue concerning the choice of technologies is that two are largely linked to 
environmental issues and two to safety issues and the degree of comparability between 
these two sets of issues (Baron 1995) is not established. What is true is that both sets of 
issues are very high on the agendas of both the government regulators as well as 
consumer activists, but it is also true that the issues are different, fall under the 
responsibility of different agencies in the United States’ federal and local governments 
and are evolving along different time frames. 
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3.5 Patent data and mapping software 
 
3.5.1 The choice of patents as a source of data 
 
Understanding a firm’s technological developments by looking at its pattern of patents 
is well established in the literature (Griliches, 1990; Pavitt, 1982). This type of analysis 
does have important limitations, covered below, but is nevertheless considered one of 
the best tools available to researchers considering the barriers to access, confidentiality 
and other methodological problems when trying to go deeply into the way companies 
bring out new technology (Pavitt 1982, 1988, Ernst, 1998). Due to its focus on the 
automotive industry, the use of patent data as a primary source of empirical evidence 
was thought to be reasonable as a surrogate for more detailed data on research and 
development expenditure. The ideas that specific industries engage in different levels of 
patenting and that, within a specific industry, the relation of overall R&D spending to 
the number of patents produced are well established in the literature, as is the idea that 
industry is far more important than national origin (Scherer 1983). While the 
automotive industry has propensity rates somewhat lower than other sectors (Arundel 
and Kabla, 1998), the critical finding from the discussion in Sub-section 2.4.2 appears 
to be to keep the data set homogeneous within an industry. 
 
As patent data in the United States is quite accessible, it was decided to focus on the 
leading players in the U.S. market. This idea of looking at a critical market and the 
patents filed in it was first done by Reekie (1973) in his work on the international 
pharmaceuticals industry. As discussed in Section 2.4, many researchers including 
Soete (1987), Tong and Frame (1994) and Furman et al. (2002) used U.S. patent data 
because of the reliability and stability of the U.S. patent office, the quality and depth of 
the data it provides, and the idea that firms will take the trouble to patent in the U.S. 
whenever it is an important market for them. One of the main findings of Section 2.4 is 
that digital databases of patents and analytical tools have provided researchers with the 
ability to focus on increasingly granular aspects of the innovation process and the thesis 
follows in this direction by using patents to focus on the technological development 
level within the specific firms in the sample. 
 
An initial search for patents was done using the USPTO Patent full-text and image 
database performing a search for each manufacturer using the keywords “seat belts”, 
“airbag “, “fuel cell” and “hybrid” in the title and abstract. This approach did produce a 
collection of patents but had several problems. First the key words at times gave faulty 
results as not all patents concerning these technologies would have the keywords in 
their title and abstract and the term “hybrid” is found in common use for hybrid systems 
which have no relation to power train technology but do combine two technologies in 
other applications. Second, the total number of patents was low compared to other 
researchers such as Van den Hoed (2004, 2005), indicating that many patents were not 
being accounted for. For Ford, for example, only 15 patents were found for seat belts 
and 14 for fuel cells. Third, the volume of information provided by this initial effort was 
enormous and the issue of how to interpret this volume of data became critical. Gray 
(2007) suggests that science is in fact entering a new paradigm which he calls data 
intensive science where the central challenge is making sense of large amounts of data 
and thus the idea of visualization became central to the thesis. 
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3.5.2 Limitations in using patents 
 
As developed in Sub-section 2.4.2, there are three problems with using patents in 
general and the methodology chosen raises others which will be discussed in Sub-
section 3.5.3. These problems are discussed in depth by the pioneers in using patents 
and then repeated with minor variations by many others (Schiffel and Kitti 1978, Soete, 
1987, Pavitt, 1985, Griliches, 1990). 
 
Patents only cover a small part of innovative activity and much invention is not 
patented. Griliches’ (1990) Knowledge Production function provides an analytical 
framework for this issue, and while Griliches does not develop a theoretical construct to 
explain why some inventions are patented and others are not, such a construct would 
logically include factors which are technology specific and related to technical 
architecture of the invention, as well as others which are firm-specific and have to do 
with the intellectual property strategy of a specific firm. The first problem is therefore 
that not all invention can be patented for a variety of technical reasons. By comparing 
data sets of patents within the same technological deployment, e.g., airbags to airbags or 
seat belts to seat belts, the expectation is that at least the technologically specific aspects 
of this effect will be similar across the data set.  
 
The second problem cited is that not all patentable innovations are actually patented and 
that different firms have a different propensity to patent based on the options available 
for protecting their intellectual capital. Arundel and Kabla (1998) built on Soete’s 
(1987) work in this area and found that, within industries, the propensity to patent was 
largely similar irrespective of other factors such as a firm’s nationality. The thesis is 
confined to automotive manufacturers and therefore the propensity to patent could be 
considered as similar across the four firms selected. 
 
The third problem is that patents have different levels of quality; meaning importance, 
value, depth, etc. This problem becomes even more acute when looking across different 
national patent systems. The thesis covers this problem in three ways: first, by looking 
at only U.S. patents, the thesis adopts a long tradition (Soete, 1987; Tong and Frame, 
1994; Furman et al., 2002) in research using patents by relying to some degree on the 
U.S. patent office to impose a minimum level of quality on the sample. The second way 
that the methodology accounts for differences in quality is by looking at relatively large 
numbers of patents for each innovation and company following Griliches’ (1990) 
finding that in large numbers the differences can become less critical. In the sample 
shown in Table 3.2 the smallest group of patents is found in Ford’s patents concerning 
fuel cells with 40 patents which could be considered large enough to even out quality 
issues is difficult to say. The third and perhaps most important issue is that the thesis 
does not base its primary finding on the number of patents, which is where patent 
quality would have the largest impact but on the relationship between patents and their 
subject matter. This is done by using the free text analysis of the claims section and the 
Themescape maps which are described in Sub-section 3.5.3. 
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3.5.3 Aureka Database and Themescape Maps  
 
To solve the problems associated with the initial effort to access patents, a specialist 
patent research company, InnovarIP (www.innovarip.com) was engaged to perform the 
relevant search of U.S. patents through 2006 using Thompson’s Aureka database of all 
U.S. patents and Aureka’s Themescape free text matching application. The findings of 
this effort in terms of patent counts are shown in Table 3.6, which also indicates in bold 
type the technologies and companies finally selected. InnovarIP was asked to find all 
patents for all major manufactures for the four technologies discussed above as well as 
catalytic converters and anti-lock brakes which were later dropped from the research as 
discussed in Sub-section 3.4.2. 
 
Company Name Total US 
Patents 
Airbags Seat 
Belts 
Hybrid 
Cars 
Fuel 
cells 
Catalytic 
Conv. 
General Motors 13078 139 116 66 205 222 
Toyota 10588 90 60 145 109 515 
Ford 10238 46 63 142 40 366 
Volkswagen AG 568 18 3 - 3 179 
DaimlerChrysler  3203 - - 0 - 87 
Honda Motor 10901 3 6 28 16 243 
Nissan Motor 8519 47 103 84 82 410 
Kia Motors 19 2 1 - 1 1 
Renault 932 1 3 10 2 66 
Suzuki Motor Co 688 - 14 27 2 38 
Mitsubishi 98 6 12 22 70 113 
Mazda Motors 2341 35 25 2 - 115 
PSA  284 - - 2  18 
 
Table 3.6 Total U.S. patents through 2006 
 
For the analysis itself, the thesis compares the claims section of the patents with each 
other, as did Tong and Frame (1994), rather than focusing on title and abstract. Patent 
writers and lawyers consider very carefully the words they use in titles and abstracts and 
do so with an eye to fulfilling internal company goals or external public relations 
objectives, regardless of the technical nature of the patents themselves. According to 
InnovarIP, the U.S. patent office gives only cursory review to titles and abstracts as they 
have no legal weight but do look very closely at the claims section which must be 
specifically related to the technical innovation of the patent. This makes the claims 
section more difficult to manipulate for legal or public relations purposes and also 
makes it a potentially more robust source of data for the thesis. 
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The problem with looking at the claims section is that the volume of information to 
read, code and analyze becomes very large and in line with Gray (2007), the thesis 
chose to use Aureka’s text matching algorithm and Themescape visualization tool to 
interpret the data. The application compares text fields in the patents themselves, finds 
words and phrases which come up in different patents, and groups them together. The 
algorithm is of a type called a naïve Bayesian classifier, which works with probabilities 
to determine the relationship between different documents. The use of databases such as 
Aureka and its free text analytical tools is becoming accepted practice in industry and 
has been called Patent Informatics by Trippe (2003) who considers such tools a robust 
way of looking at patents and their relationship to each other. 
 
Once it has identified those words and phrases most commonly used in the patents, 
Aureka then groups those patents with statistically similar content. These groups are 
then graphically displayed in Themescape maps which represent the full set of patents 
as a topographical map of what looks like an island or group of islands. When there is 
more or less correlation between one set of patents and another, the software places 
them closer or farther away from each other on the map. When a number of patents 
share a phrase such as “detection shield substrate” or “glove box enclosure” the 
Themescape map will show them as hills or even mountain peaks. When there is little or 
no relation the system will create “islands” and separate groups by “water”. The net 
result is an attractive and easy-to-use representation of the full set of patents which can 
be used to directly look at the issues of depth and breadth. A deep approach to 
introducing new technology would logically result in a map which resembles a volcanic 
island with relatively small land mass and high mountains grouped tightly together. A 
broader approach would show a larger, lower island with a number of peaks farther 
apart. A still broader strategy would resemble an archipelago with few peaks. 
 
 
 
Fig 3.3 Themescape representation of General Motors U.S. patents in fuel cells 
Peak 
Island 
Lagoon 
Valley 
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The thesis then performs an analysis of the different patent patterns by using the 
metaphor of a topographical map and counting and comparing ‘mountain peaks’, ‘small 
islands’, ‘lagoons’, etc. The Themescape representations of the U.S. patents for each of 
the technologies under study in each of the companies such as Figure 3.3 are shown in 
Section 5.2. 
 
The use of the tools described above however does present a fourth problem, which is 
that it is unclear what exactly concepts such as “distance” and “height” in the 
topographical metaphor mean in terms of actual technology development, and that the 
text analysis software can identify false patterns in the data. For the Themescape maps, 
distance is an indication of the probability that two patterns deal with similar technology 
as calculated by the naïve Bayesian algorithm mentioned above. An analysis of patents 
filed by DaimlerChrysler, for example in the area of seat belts, produces a misleading 
picture with two large “islands” or areas of work due to the fact that a number of their 
patents use German words thereby causing the analysis to separate the patents into 
German and English areas; a deeper bilingual analysis would find more commonality 
between them. The idea that the powerful analytical tools that are increasingly being 
applied to patents can bring technological risks caused by the tools themselves is 
outlined in the conclusions to Section 2.4. In the case of the thesis, DaimlerChrysler was 
removed from the sample partly because of this problem as well as the issues of its de-
merger discussed in Sub-section 3.4.1.Each of the 16 maps shown in Section 5.2 was 
analyzed for such false artefacts and no obvious problems were found. What is critical 
to consider, however, is that the use of visual patent mapping is quite new to academic 
research and further research will be required to fully operationalize it. 
 
An important aspect of the analysis and mapping process, for example, is that the 
analysis ignores so called “stop words” such as “and”, “the”, “process”, etc., which are 
very common and thus distort the statistical analysis. Themescape has approximately 
1,000 such stop words in its algorithm and Blanchard (2007) argues that small changes 
in the stop word list can make a big impact on the resulting maps. In his research, 
Blanchard refers to different mapping software such as Aureka, STN, AnaVistTM and 
OmniViz as “black box” (p.308) and shows how a skilled analyst can generate different 
maps for different purposes based on the careful selection of stop words. 
 
Another issue is managing scale effects and calibrating the interpretation of the 
Themescape maps for the number of patents in a given sample. For example, the 
patterns of two manufacturers might appear similar but the number of patents in the 
sample range from 40 to 205. According to the senior patent specialist at Thompson 
scientific, Ric Snead (Telephone conference, May, 2010), the maps generate their own 
scale based on the number of documents under study and that the scale is logarithmic in 
that for any given order of magnitude, in terms of total number of documents, the scale 
should be similar; he did not see a major problem in comparing patterns based on 50 or 
100 patents with others based on 200 patents. The thesis attempts to deal with this 
problem by commenting on each case separately. The analysis looks at factors such as 
the topography of the pattern, as well as its overall size, and highlights those cases 
where the number of patents is very small or very large. 
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A third issue is that by looking at all cumulative US patents up to 2006, there is no 
correction for time and major changes in strategy will simply not be captured. While 
parsing the data in time slices might be an attractive option, the advantage of this 
approach is that the data set becomes more robust by using a larger number of patents as 
suggested by Griliches (1990). The other temporal issue is that the different sets of 
patents were accumulated over long periods of time and the firms themselves have gone 
through significant changes during the period. As will be discussed in Sub-section 5.3.2, 
seat belts were first introduced in the 1950’s and much of the early work was done in 
the 1960’s. Airbag research started approximately ten years later, with fuel cells and 
hybrid research starting in the 1980’s and 1990’s respectively. The thesis attempts to 
deal with the second problem by taking this into account and attempting to factor in the 
evolution of the firms involved as required. 
 
Finally there is a question as to whether the maps do in fact reflect the scope of 
technological development at all. In order to answer this question the Themescape maps 
generated for Ford’s patents in airbags and fuel cells were compared with a manual 
coding of those patents found in the same categories in the initial patent search. Ford’s 
airbag patents and fuel cell patents were chosen because both have relatively few 
patents (46 and 40, respectively) and the airbag pattern shows a very tight focused 
pattern while the fuel cell patents are very spread, as discussed in Sub-section 5.2.2 and 
shown in Figures 5.6b and 5.6d. While the total number of patents found in the 
preliminary study was less than in the final search, the patent counts for airbags and fuel 
cells were similar (15 and 14). The results of the analysis are shown in Table 3.7, in 
which it can be seen that the fuel cell patents fall into 10 categories compared to 8 in 
airbags and the categories appear to represent more disparate technologies and the albeit 
limited manual analysis confirms the direction shown in the Themescape maps.  
 
Ford Airbags Patents Ford Fuel Cell Patents 
 Category Patent 
number 
 Category Patent 
number 
1 Electronic circuits 4 262 931 
4 366 465 
5 544 914 
1 Cell design -PEM 4 195 119 
2 Integrated circuits 5 809 451 2 Cell design - solid oxide 7 014 934 
3 Steering wheel housing 5 265 305 
5 378 013 
5 435 597 
3 Cell design - Redox 4 396 687 
4 407 902 
4 Passenger side housing 5 669 626 
5 810 338 
5 489 116 
4 Cell design - Alkali 
metal/sulfer  
3 951 689 
5 Door housing 5 447 326 5 Air system 6 716 546 
6 896 095 
6 Gas components 5 172 933 
5 007 662 
6 Power electronics  6 792 341 
6 795 756 
7 Igniter components 4 370 930 7 Energy dissipation / 
management 
6 924 050 
6 591 926 
8 Complete system 4 262 931 8 Carbon monoxide removal 6 733 909 
   9 Heating system 6 916 566 
   10 Gas storage 6 736 229 
 
Table 3.7 Manual coding of partial list of Ford’s airbag and fuel cell patents 
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Web Site 
3.6 Deployment data 
 
3.6.1 Data Sources 
 
Data on the introduction of each of the four technologies comes from different sources, 
and the specific data sets used are discussed below for seat belts, airbags, and hybrid 
and fuel cell electric vehicles respectively. The method of research was to start with the 
manufacturer’s web sites and cross-check data there with online resources, as shown in 
Table 3.8 indicating the sites, their descriptions, and the data provided for the thesis.  
 
Brief Description Data Used in Thesis 
www.gm.com Corporate web site of 
General Motors 
U.S. vehicle fleet, 
sustainability reports and 
future strategy 
www.ford.com Corporate web site of 
Ford Motor Company 
As above 
www.toyota.co.jp Corporate web site of 
Toyota 
Sustainability reports and 
future strategy 
www.nissan-global.com Corporate web site of 
Nissan 
As above 
www.toyota.com U.S. web site of Toyota Data on U.S. vehicle fleet 
www.lexus.com U.S. web site of Lexus As above 
www.nissanusa.com U.S. web site of Nissan As above 
www.infinitiusa.com U.S. web site of Infiniti As above 
www.autoliv.com Autoliv company website Detailed data on seat belts 
and airbags currently on the 
market 
www.wikipedia.org On line encyclopaedia General information on 
technologies and links 
www.sae.org Web site of the Society 
of Automotive Engineers 
Reports and technical articles 
www.autonews.com On line portal for 
automotive news 
JATO specifications on all 
vehicles for sales in the U.S. 
www.safercar.org NHTSA Consumer portal  Safety data for many 
vehicles 
www.nhtsa.dot.gov NHTSA home page Official U.S. Government 
safety studies and reports 
www.fuelcells.org Portal of fuel cells 2000  Access to semi-annual fuel 
cell Databook  
www.conceptcarz.com Webzine published by 
Daniel Vaughan 
Data on prototypes and 
concept cars 
www.autobloggreen.com Webzine published by 
Weblogs, inc. 
Data on prototypes and 
concept cars 
www.hydrogencarsnow.com Blog by Journalist Kevin 
Kantola 
Prototype specifications 
 
Table 3.8 Partial list of web sites providing deployment data 
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o Seat belts  
 
With respect to seat belts, the technical data on the type of seat belts deployed by the 
manufacturers is irregular concerning which of the available components are actually 
incorporated onto which models. A company will, for example, boast about the 
pyrotechnic pretensioners on a specific model but will not specify which models do not 
have such devices. As such, comprehensive technical data was not readily available. As 
discussed in Sub-section 3.4.2, seat belts were selected in part because it was thought 
that deployment data would be readily available due to the interest in occupant safety 
and the fact that this assumption was incorrect led to serious consideration of taking seat 
belts out of the scope of the analysis. 
 
Fortunately, data was found connected with two specific evolutions in seat belt 
deployment and these were used as a surrogate for the larger question of the 
manufacturers’ deployment patterns: the introduction of rear seat belts and pyrotechnic 
pretensioners. Since January 1968, vehicle manufacturers have been required to install 
lap belt anchorages for each front and rear seating position and upper torso belt 
anchorages at each forward facing outboard seating position, but there was no 
requirement for installing rear seat belts. Saab and Volkswagen joined Volvo in putting 
seat belts on the rear seats in 1985, and in 1986 General Motors announced it would 
begin phasing in lap belts with shoulder restraints for the rear outboard seats of all of 
their vehicles. Over the next 3-4 years all manufacturers active in the U.S. market 
followed suit. In 1999, the United States’ National Highway Traffic and Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) performed a study to evaluate the safety impact of the rear 
seat belts, and this gives a snapshot of seat belt deployment.  
 
Pyrotechnic pretensioners were deployed by most manufacturers at the end of the 
1990’s and the beginning of the 2000’s for front seats, and their deployment offers a 
second reference point. NHTSA provided a data set from model years 2001 to 2010 
showing all models in the U.S. market and indicating which came with pretensioners as 
standard equipment. Unfortunately (for our purposes), both Toyota and Nissan had 
already equipped all of their U.S. models with pretensioners prior to model year 2001 
but the data is useful when looking at General Motors and Ford. 
 
An additional advantage of using NHTSA data for seat belts is that NHTSA assures that 
common definitions are used for the technologies under discussion and thus safeguards 
the rigor of the analysis. Data from the NHTSA rear seat belts report and the 
pretensioner data are provided in Appendix E. 
 
Seat belt technology has been largely driven by a combination of developments at the 
niche level and legislation as opposed to ideas coming out of the major vehicle 
manufacturer’s research efforts or market research; this idea of the origin of 
discontinuous innovation in the automotive industry will be discussed in greater depth 
in Section 6.4. 
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o Airbags  
 
Appendix E provides a list of the type and number of airbags provided on cars 
introduced by the four firms under study from 1995 to 2006. As will be further 
developed in Sub-section 5.3.3, airbag development occurred in two dimensions over 
time. On the one hand, the deployment of airbags became increasingly sophisticated and 
tied into more complex electronic and mechanical components. On the other, cars were 
equipped with more and more airbags to protect more vehicle occupants from more 
types of collisions. 
 
Along this first dimension, the thesis refers to first generation airbags as the kind 
described in Sub-section 5.3.3. Second generation airbags had superior designs, in that 
the overall airbag module was smaller, and more sophisticated electronic sensors were 
moved closer to the airbag and further from possible damage in a crash situation.  
 
On/off switches were added so that the passenger side airbag could simply be switched 
off by the driver if travelling with a child or small person. Next, smart airbags were 
deployed which worked in conjunction with an occupant sensor and deployment 
algorithms, such as not allowing the airbag to deploy if it detects a small occupant based 
on that person’s weight. Airbag manufacturers then developed two stage airbags or 
advanced airbags which could be deployed at different speeds and even to different bag 
volumes depending on the force of the collision and the size of the occupant.  
 
The other dimension could be referred to as airbag proliferation. The first airbags 
installed only protected the driver. The passenger in the front seat was normally next 
with an airbag housed in the instrument panel. Side airbags were next introduced in the 
doors, and rear seats received airbags both in front of the passengers and along the side.  
 
Additional airbags have been deployed recently for knee protection in the front seats 
and below the roof. Figure 3.4 shows Ford’s Safety Canopy system which is a good 
example of the current level of airbag technology. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Ford’s Safety Canopy system deployed on the Ford Edge 
(From: www.fordvehicles.com/crossovers/edge/features/interior, accessed 15.6.09) 
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o Hybrid and fuel cell electric vehicles 
 
In order to avoid issues of access and confidentiality, the thesis focuses on technical 
specifications which have been published by the manufacturers and other sources of 
data shown in Table 3.8. On the positive side, the manufacturers publicise these 
vehicles as a part of their overall public relations and marketing, so data is available for 
the commercially available hybrids and the fuel cell prototypes and concept cars. On the 
negative side, much of the technical data, such as cost, weight and volumetric size are 
either restricted by the manufacturers for competitive reasons or difficult to compare. 
For the comparison of the hybrid programs at each of the four manufacturers under 
study, the thesis focuses on five aspects of hybrid technology as follows: 
 
1. The type of vehicle which is equipped, i.e., compact, SUV, etc. 
2. The hybrid architecture used as discussed in Sub-section 5.3.5. 
3. The battery technology employed. 
4. Fuel economy measured in kilometres per litre. 
5. Top speed on electric power when applicable. 
 
For the comparison of the prototypes of fuel cell electric vehicles at each of the 
manufacturers, the thesis looked at five parameters as follows: 
 
1. The type of vehicle which is equipped, i.e., compact, SUV, etc. 
2. The fuel cell type and the fuel source it requires, such as methane, hydrogen, etc.  
3. The storage medium for each fuel source. 
4. Range as measured in kilometres. 
5. Top speed as measured in kilometres per hour. 
 
3.6.2 Limitations to deployment data 
 
There are four limitations to the deployment data applicable to all of the technologies. 
 
The first limitation, discussed in Section 3.3, is access to data. In a perfectly transparent 
world the opportunities for scientific investigation would be limitless, but in the real 
world, there are limits to the data that companies possess, are willing to share, and that a 
researcher can access. An example of this is seat belt and airbag data held by NHTSA. 
NHTSA tracks all aspects of vehicle safety in every vehicle sold in the United States 
and keeps all of this data in a central database. While the database is restricted to 
NHTSA investigations, NHTSA reports are published in the public domain so that data 
sets used in particular reports can still be accessed. Thus the rear seat belt data and 
pretensioner data used in Sub-section 5.2.1 comes from such reports. 
 
A second important challenge from a methodological point of view is to ensure that the 
words used in specific sources are in fact comparable across the different companies 
and to ensure like-to-like comparisons. In some cases this is self evident as a vehicle 
either has one, two or multiple airbags, for instance but in other cases it is somewhat 
more complex, as Toyota might refer to “smart” electronics in a different way than 
Ford. Again, the advantage of using a government agency such as NHTSA is that it 
provides its own definitions and makes its own efforts to ensure a rigorous comparison. 
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The third problem is that verification of official web sites, webzines and blogs is 
extremely difficult. The official websites tend to support their own corporate agenda 
and might be biased. Bloggers and on-line journalists are also subject to exaggeration 
and often do not have the rigorous fact-checking approach required by traditional 
media, much less the analytical rigor required by social science. 
 
The fourth limitation is that, although there are limits to data, the internet offers a huge 
amount of data and there is the danger of missing something. In reference to the seat 
belt data mentioned above, for example, while an effort was made to scan all the 
relevant publications by NHTSA and use their search engines, an exhaustive study of all 
of NHTSA’s publications was not possible. This type of research is inevitably like 
looking for something in a dark attic using a flashlight. The problem is twofold. On the 
one hand one might miss interesting data by simply not shining a light on it and also 
might be pulled towards a certain type of analysis as a function of where the light is 
shining. 
 
Specific problems associated with the data sets for each technology are as follows: The 
seat belt data is much more limited than desired but it has simply not been possible to 
obtain detailed deployment data for all models for the 50 years since the deployment of 
seat belts began. The choice to rely on partial data from NHTSA was made mainly due 
to the reliability and granularity of the data sets and the partial nature of the data, and 
limited time series were accepted as a trade off. 
 
The airbag data set is better from all four points of view and the only main concern is 
the degree to which the definitions of each type of technology are in fact completely 
common across the four manufacturers. What is positive, however, is that the data sets 
are internally consistent within each manufacturer and, as the objective of the analysis 
was to understand the pattern of deployment, the importance of perfect consistency 
across the manufacturers in terms of definitions is not critical. 
 
The choice was made to limit hybrid vehicles to those actually on the market in the 
United States in order to avoid the problems associated with fuel cell data as all vehicles 
on the market do, in fact, have to publish performance specifications which are checked 
by public and private groups such as the Environmental Protection Agency which 
publishes fuel economy data. The problem with the data on hybrids is that some of the 
most interesting technical information, such as detailed data on the type of 
transmissions and component performance, is not publicly available and has not been 
included. Keeping the analysis at a fairly broad level, however, does provide sufficient 
information for the purposes of the thesis and assures that the data set is sufficiently 
robust. 
 
The main problems with the fuel cell data is that there might be concepts and prototypes 
developed by the manufacturers which are not in the public domain, and the 
performance characteristics of such vehicles is not independently verified in most cases. 
Nevertheless the interests of the manufacturers coincides with publicizing their progress 
in fuel cell vehicles for public relations reasons, and one would expect them to not 
excessively over-promise as the specialised press monitors their statements and looks 
for internal validity. 
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3.7 Interviews and triangulation  
 
3.7.1 Purpose and approach 
 
The purpose of the interview program is first to corroborate the contextual discussion in 
Chapter 4, second, to validate the results of Chapter 5 and third, explore to what degree 
the results found for the four technologies represent paths in the sense used by Teece et 
al. (1997). The overall idea is triangulate (Yin, 1994) the patent and deployment data 
and thus to make the thesis more robust. Miles and Huberman (1994) cite Rossman and 
Wilson (1984, 1991) as suggesting that in addition to triangulation linking qualitative 
and qualitative data can provide richer detail improving analysis and also open up “new 
lines of thinking” (p. 41) . Miles and Huberman (1994) offer criteria for determining the 
level of prior instrumentation needed for a study offering two extremes and a middle 
course, and Table 3.9 summarizes these arguments.  
 
Little Prior Instrumentation Much Prior Instrumentation Middle course 
o Instrumentation “can 
blind researcher to the 
site” 
o Instrumentation tends to 
“strip out context” 
o the statistical approach 
for large samples in 
unnecessary for case 
studies 
o instrumentation itself is a 
“misnomer” and all that is 
needed are some 
orientating questions 
o No reason not to plan 
ahead 
o Instrumentation limits 
unnecessary information 
o Common instrumentation 
needed for comparable 
studies and theory 
building  
o Validated instruments are 
“the best guarantee of 
dependable and 
meaningful findings” 
 
o Less instrumentation for 
exploratory research and 
more for confirmatory 
studies 
o Less instrumentation for 
single case studies and 
more for multiple case 
studies 
 
 
Table 3.9 Guidelines for prior instrumentation  
(adapted from Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 35-36) 
 
As discussed in Sub-section 3.2.2, the research is exploratory in nature and looks at a 
limited number of case studies. Therefore it was thought that less rather than more 
instrumentation would be appropriate but that a certain degree of preparation would be 
beneficial. Thus, the interviews were conducted using a semi-structured method as 
recommended by Easterby-Smith et al. (2002), and interview guides (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994) were used to assure a degree of validity and are shown in Appendix 
B1.  
 
The interviews were not recorded for four reasons. In the first place it was thought that 
recording the interviews might limit the subject’s willing to discuss firm-level issues, or 
at least might introduce anxiety (Easterby-smith et al., 2002). Second, the interviewer is 
experienced in remembering the salient facts and concepts, and third it was considered 
that detailed interview notes would be sufficient for the purposes of analysis in any 
case, and finally, as many of the interviews were conducted on the telephone it was 
thought that recording would be not only technically challenging but also make more 
difficult the issue of trust mentioned above. Notes were taken by hand and summaries of 
each interview were immediately written up and are also included in Appendix B2. 
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Interviews were conducted at both the firm level and technology level, and analysis was 
performed by cross-checking the interview notes with each case study and the 
discussion themes raised in Chapter 6 in an iterative way. A more formal coding system 
was not pursued due to the limited number of interviews and a sense that theoretical 
saturation (Glaser and Straus, 1967), had already been reached. 
 
3.7.1 Interview Subjects 
 
The advantage of looking at innovations which occurred in the past, such as seat belts 
and airbags, is that what has happened is part of historical record and the much of the 
data is clear and robust. One of the limitations of the approach is that the engineers and 
managers who were closest to developing the deployment strategy for these innovations 
have for the most part retired or moved on in their careers. The choice was made, 
therefore, to interview independent technologists and management consultants familiar 
with either the technologies or the companies under study or some combination thereof; 
the interview subjects are shown in Table 3.10. 
 
* Also reviewed Chapter 4 
Table 3.10 Interview subjects 
 
The advantage of using management consultants is that they might be more objective 
than current or past employees of the firms under study. Finally three of the experts 
were also asked to review a draft version of Chapter 4 in order to add validity to its 
description of the industry.  
# Subject Name Position Companies 
/Technologies  
1 A. Egglestone* Independent Consultant,  
Formerly Marketing Director, Europe, 
Ford and Director, Intelligent Energy 
Ford 
Fuel Cells, 
Hybrids 
2 J. Olssen R&D Director, Autoliv Seat Belts, 
Airbags 
3 M. Wiseman Director, Alternative Powertrain, Ricardo Fuel Cells, 
Hybrids 
4 S. Parker* Independent Consultant,  
Formerly Managing Director, Ricardo 
Strategic Consulting and advisor to Nissan 
Nissan 
5 L. Bailoni* Vice President, Bright Automotive 
Former Management Consultant and 
Industry Analyst 
Seat Belts, Fuel 
Cells, Hybrids 
6 C. Oge Director, PRTM GM, Toyota 
7 G. Mercer Director, International Motor Vehicle 
Program 
Formerly, Senior Partner, McKinsey & 
Co. 
Ford 
Fuel Cells, 
Hybrids 
8 D. Struble President, Struble Walsh Engineering  
 
Seat Belts, 
Airbags 
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3.7.3 Limitations of interviews and triangulation 
 
Two of the problems with using interviews discussed in the literature are the nature of 
the interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee, and the cognitive process in 
each of their minds. The primary issue in dealing with the first point is to build trust 
between the interviewer and interviewee (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002). Miles and 
Huberman (1994) argue that familiarity with the subject under study is of primary 
importance in establishing that trust. With respect to the behaviour and thinking of the 
interviewees, the key here is to avoid misinformation either deliberate, as in the case of 
Margaret Meade cited by Easterby-Smith et al. or accidental, as in the case where an 
interviewee is misinformed. In order to control for misinformation, interview subjects 
were selected based on their expertise, personal relationship or both. In order to avoid 
firm bias it was decided to rely on management consultants and independent suppliers 
who would not give a biased view of any one of the companies in the sample. 
 
The danger of familiarity is that a subject might respond to what they understand is 
desired by the researcher and in order to limit this affect, i.e., the ability of the 
researcher to affect the outcome of the interview, the interview guides were designed in 
an open way and a conscious effort was made to avoid leading the interviewees during 
the interview. As pointed out by Miles and Huberman (1994), qualitative research 
requires a high degree of self knowledge. This conscious effort was critical in allowing 
the interviewees to give their views of the deployment strategies being pursued in the 
different firms despite the researcher’s potential bias introduced by considering the a 
priori construct defined in Sub-section 3.3.3. 
 
With regard to the specific set of interview subjects used for the thesis, the major danger 
was in establishing the validity of the sample and whether it is large enough to support 
the research. Janesick (2000, p. 393) defines validity in qualitative work as having to do 
with “description and explanation and whether or not the explanation fits the 
description”. The program was designed to ensure at least one subject for each of the 
manufacturers and for each of the technologies and, as the interviews have provided 
explanations which are consistent with the patent and deployment data, the sample size 
could be considered sufficient for the purposes of the thesis. 
  
Triangulation is designed to overcome the limitations of different sources of data by 
comparing them with one another. The challenge for the researcher is to maintain a 
critical perspective when going through this process, sifting through the empirical data 
and developing conclusions. Janesick (2000) has come to prefer the term crystallization 
to triangulation as, for her, the process has to do with choosing which facets of an issue 
to focus on while recognizing that there will be facets or aspects of reality that the 
researcher does not see at any point in time. When different streams of data point in the 
same direction it is tempting to only see the correlation and ignore any contrary 
explanations as to why the data points agree. When data does not correlate there is a 
strong temptation to look for alternative explanations rather than considering rejecting 
the main hypothesis. A conscious attempt was made to control for both of these 
problems and perhaps the most robust aspect of the critical realist ontology is the idea 
that it is normal to be only partially able to explain reality and therefore it is acceptable 
to have unexplained anomalies in the data (Blaiklie, 1993). 
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3.8 Prior knowledge 
 
One of the debates currently underway in the area of qualitative research is the 
appropriate role of the researcher in influencing their research through their own 
experience. According to Fine et al. (2002, p. 108) there has been a “tendency to view 
the self of the social science observer as a potential contaminant” and they argue for a 
more reflexive paradigm in which the researcher’s experience can be seen as part of the 
research. Gergen and Gergen (2002) also discuss reflexivity and refer to it as one of the 
major innovations in qualitative research. While the thesis does not take on a reflexive 
epistemology per se, prior knowledge does play a role in the research and is considered 
an asset to be exploited rather than a problem to be resolved. 
 
This is not to underestimate the danger of bias which, in any case, must be managed. To 
do this the thesis first makes explicit the use of prior knowledge in informing the 
literature review and research methodology shown in Figure 3.1, including the expert 
interviews and case studies, and the development of Chapter 4, which establishes the 
context for the research. Second the thesis makes use of well-established frameworks 
such as Eisenhardt’s (1989) roadmap for case study research and Geels’(2002) model of 
a socio-technological regime to ensure that the research is well structured and that the 
use of prior knowledge does not lower the level of academic rigor of the research. 
Finally the research is firmly grounded in the empirical data, and a conscious effort has 
been made to control for bias while at the same time taking advantage of prior 
knowledge of the sector and several of the firms and technologies under study. 
 
3.9 Chapter summary 
 
The purpose of this Chapter was to explain the research methodology used in the thesis 
and discuss the rationale for choosing it as well as highlighting its limitations. Bhaskar’s 
(1975) Critical Realist Perspective was chosen due to its fit with the exploratory nature 
of the research which also led to the decision to base the research on case studies using 
Eisenhardt’s (1989) roadmap for performing case study research with an a priori 
concept in mind at the start of the project. This approach was chosen after several false 
starts which are briefly reviewed. The final research design is shown in Figure 3.1, and 
each aspect of the research program is discussed in detail, highlighting its advantages 
and limitations and in some cases exploring avenues not taken. 
 
In terms of the typology of research concerning new types of automotive power train 
technology presented in Sub-section 2.3.2, the research belongs in the category of 
understanding the history and current status of the transition without taking a biased 
view of it. In terms of the typology of research using patents in management science 
presented in Section 2.4, the thesis falls into the product and product category level and 
can be thought to be at a similar level of focus to work done by Penan (1996) and 
Prencipe (1997). The research is also an example of using patent informatics (Trippe, 
2003) and goes further than other researchers in pioneering the use of mapping 
software, in this case Thompson’s Themescape maps and, while using such a new tool 
brings about a number of interpretation issues which are discussed, it also gives an 
example of Jim Gray’s (2007) idea of data intensive science which will become 
increasingly important as researchers attempt to deal with increasing amounts of data. 
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CHAPTER 4 CONTEXT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The thesis develops case studies in the automotive industry as the context for studying 
how firms react to discontinuous and potentially disruptive technological change. Effort 
was made to look at the context in a rigorous way for three reasons. First, Yin (1994) 
argues that case studies are especially appropriate “when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 13) and thus defining the industry 
clearly is necessary in order assist in the process of separating out the phenomena of 
interest. Second, as discussed in Section 3.8, the researcher possessed a degree of prior 
knowledge concerning the industry and it was considered necessary to make that 
knowledge explicit in order to avoid bias in the research. Third, the thesis contributes to 
the theory of the technology-based firm (Granstrand, 1998) and the reason that 
Granstrand put forward a separate theory for those firms affected by and involved with 
technology was due to the co-evolutionary interaction between such firms and their 
environment and it was therefore considered necessary to establish that such co-
evolutionary effects occurred in the automotive industry.  
 
The objective of Chapter 4 is thus to develop a rigorous definition of the automotive 
industry and uncover evidence for its consideration as a co-evolutionary system as 
described by Lewin and Volberda (1999). Section 4.2 will first review the theory which 
is used in the Chapter, and also discuss Pavitt’s (1984, 1987) technology trajectories 
which were not used and explains why not, as this sheds some light on the complexity 
of the industry. It also explains why Geels and Schot’s (2007) technology pathways 
were adopted to look deeper into the technologies in Section 5.3. Section 4.3 will use 
Geels’ (2002) socio-technological model to describe the industry and Section 4.4 will 
apply Lewin and Volberda’s (1999) five properties of co-evolutionary systems, and 
examples from the industry for each of the properties will be presented. As the 
examples are not comprehensive, the findings of this section will be limited to allowing 
for the consideration of the industry as co-evolutionary. As stated in Section 3.6, a draft 
of this Chapter was reviewed in depth by three of the industry experts who participated 
in the interviews for the thesis to assure the accuracy of the descriptions made and 
examples used as well as the validity of the findings. 
 
o Transition changes and the multi-level perspective 
4.2 Theory applied to context analysis 
 
 
The work by Kemp et al. (1998) discussed in Sub-section 2.3.1 can be thought of as part 
of the multi-level perspective. According to Geels, Rip and Kemp first developed the 
multi-level perspective but Geels (2002) provides a very detailed look at the perspective 
at the same time as he enriches it. Citing Rip and Kemp (1998) and others, Geels 
defines the multi-level approach as looking simultaneously at three levels of analysis 
and uses the shift from sailing ships to steamships as an example. 
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The first level is the overall socio-technical landscape in which industries compete. The 
landscape changes relatively slowly and analysis of it includes social, economic, 
political and technological aspects. The second level of analysis is called Socio-
technical regimes and, for this, Geels adds considerably to Nelson and Winter’s (1982) 
concept of technological regime to include a total of seven dimensions which make up 
the web of actors and ideas around which Dosi’s (1982) idea of dominant design would 
exist. The third level of the perspective is at the niche level where Geels, like Kemp et 
al. (1998) and the other researchers contributing to this area, believe that innovations 
truly occur. Geels’ example focuses on England’s dominant position in shipping in the 
1700’s and the tremendous changes which swept the world over the next 200 years, 
including the rise of the United States, shifts in world trade patterns and even 
geopolitical concerns. The sailing ship was the artefact at the centre of one regime 
which was eventually replaced by the coal powered steamship at the centre of another. 
Tug boats and short haul mail routes were niches in which the first steam powered 
vessels became popular. Geels also provides a rather comprehensive illustration of the 
regime concept and actually uses the automotive industry as a brief example. His 
framework is used to describe the overall context of the empirical evidence of the thesis. 
The seven dimensions Geels spells out in looking at a Socio-technical regime are: 
 
1. The technology itself 
2. User practices and application domains, by which Geels means markets 
3. The symbolic meaning of the technology to the society at large 
4. The infrastructure which is required to use it 
5. The industry structure in which it is produced, including original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs), suppliers, etc. 
6. The set of rules and regulations or policy imposed by regulatory bodies 
7. The sum of technological and scientific knowledge 
 
The multi-level perspective is thus built around a macro landscape, which changes 
slowly over time, in which exist a number of socio-technical regimes representing the 
major elements of industrial society. Within each regime there are or could be a number 
of niches in which innovation or novelty, as Geels calls it, can occur. Profound 
transitions, such as sail to steam, occur because of what Geels calls niche accumulation. 
The process he describes is that the new technology is adopted in, or is used to create, 
several niches over time. Once a new technology is present in a large enough number of 
niches it can develop its own socio-technological regime which will then compete with 
the incumbent technology’s regime. Often the adaptation process is done by employing 
the technology as an “add-on” to existing technology or developing hybrid solutions 
which combine elements of both. Steam power, for example was first introduced on 
ships for auxiliary power, and iron was used in combination with wood prior to the 
large scale construction of iron ships. Another mechanism which Geels cites as 
contributing to the emergence of a new regime is through explosive growth in those 
niches in which the new technology is successful. In his examples there were huge 
increases in transatlantic passenger traffic, which was one of the first transoceanic 
applications of steam ships. When a niche itself takes off, it pulls the new technology 
along with it potentially giving it enough scale to begin developing a new socio-
technological regime. 
o Co-Evolutionary perspective  
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In their seminal prolegomena on co-evolution (1999), Lewin and Volberda introduce 
this perspective and situate it at the centre of the intention-adaptation debate.  
 
After reviewing population ecology, institutional theory, the industrial organisation 
perspective, transaction cost view, behavioural theory of the firm, evolutionary theory 
and the resource-based view, as well as contingency theory and what has been called the 
punctuated equilibrium view, Lewin and Volberda argue that all of the above lenses 
simplify the actual complexities of the world in which organisations adapt to their 
environment and at the same time affect that environment. Lewin and Volberda define 
co-evolution as the “joint outcome of managerial intentionality, environment, and 
institutional effect” (Lewin and Volberda, 1999, p. 526). Lewin and Volberda discuss 
the five properties of a co-evolutionary system as follows: 
 
1. Multi-levelness has to do with the co-evolutionary process taking place within 
firms, between firms in a strategic niche, across industries and in fact in the 
greater environment.  
 
2. Multidirectional causalities are where different actors affect each other; it is 
often quite complex to track which element in the complex system affects which 
others. 
 
3. Nonlinearity has to do with the uneven and often unexpected impact that 
changes, in one part of what is in fact a complex system, have on other parts. 
These impacts can be non-linear in the sense that a small change in the 
environment can have a huge impact on organisations. 
 
4. Positive feedback is the process of different changes reinforcing each other in a 
positive way (or negative, depending on one’s point of view). 
 
5. Path and history dependence is the idea that co-evolutionary changes happen 
over time and that what has happened previously has a direct impact on what 
will happen next. This is not to say that changes cannot be radical or disruptive 
but simply to acknowledge that there are patterns to change and that history does 
matter when looking at such phenomena. 
 
o Technological trajectories 
 
Pavitt (1984, 1997) developed a set of five major technological trajectories which 
include the main sources of technology and the main aspects of innovation strategy 
which he defines as positions, paths, and processes and refers to the automotive industry 
as scale intensive. The promise of Pavitt’s framework is that by characterizing an 
industry as following one of the five trajectories, the researcher would have a clear set 
of concepts to work with to get at the technology strategy of firms in that sector. Table 
4.1 shows Pavitt’s (1984, 1997) 5 trajectories and the key characteristics of each.  
 
Souitaris (2002) built on Pavitt’s typologies by arguing that different managerial factors 
would drive innovation in the different trajectories such as marketing and strategy for 
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supplier dominated firms, finance and R&D for scale intensive firms, growth and 
project management for specialized suppliers and R&D, profit growth, and licensing for 
science based firms. Souitaris did not comment on the information intensive trajectory. 
Souitaris did find Pavitt’s trajectories compelling at the firm level with the addition of 
his discussion on management. For application to the thesis, the typologies would have 
to be adapted to the technology level from the firm level for which they were created, 
and this poses a potential challenge. Prior to undertaking that effort, however, it is 
necessary to consider which of the typologies presented by Pavitt do, in fact, best 
describe the modern automotive industry, as one could argue that its place as a scale-
intensive business is not as clear today as it might have been in 1984 and even 1997. 
 
 Supplier 
Dominated 
Scale-
Intensive 
Science- 
Based 
Information-
Intensive 
Specialised 
Suppliers 
Main Task Use 3rd party 
technology to 
reinforce 
competitive 
advantage 
Incremental 
improvement 
and diffusion of 
best practice 
and design 
Monitor and 
exploit 
advances from 
basic research 
Develop and 
operate 
information 
systems to 
introduce new 
services 
Match new 
technology to 
the needs of the 
most advanced 
users 
Positions Based on non-
technical 
advantages 
Cost effective 
and safe 
products and 
processes 
Portfolio of 
products 
including 
pipeline 
Depth of 
information 
infrastructure 
Relationship 
with advanced 
users 
Paths Strategic 
purchasing & 
roll-out 
Incremental 
integration of 
new knowledge 
Major jumps Customer needs 
analysis and 
service 
development 
Optimisation of 
reliability and 
performance 
Processes Flexible 
response 
Diffusion of 
best practice 
Basic research 
& regulatory 
process 
New service 
development 
Interactions 
with users 
Table 4.1 Summary of Pavitt’s Technology Trajectories 
(Adapted from Tidd et al., 1997) 
 
Specifically, four industry trends blur the distinction in Pavitt’s typology; the growing 
role of suppliers, increased government regulation, heavier use of information 
technology and shorter production runs. In the first place, automotive suppliers such as 
Bosch, Denso and others have assumed a growing role in developing and disseminating 
new technology. In areas such as common rail diesel technology and many others it has 
been the automotive suppliers and sometimes one firm who bring about an innovation 
and then progressively roll it out to its customers. In this regard the automotive industry 
sometimes behaves using the “supplier dominated” trajectory and it is the power of the 
purchasing department and engineering’s ability to incorporate a supplier’s module or 
component that is key. 
Secondly, as government regulation increases in areas such as safety, pollution and fuel 
economy, the industry is increasingly obliged to follow the “science based” trajectory of 
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doing basic research and following government regulations in order to get its products 
“through” the system. Much of this basic research is in areas such as testing protocols 
that are not easily visible to the public but nevertheless have a huge impact on 
competitiveness. The third trend is the increasing importance of customer research and 
customer relationship management, as well as other applications of advanced 
information processing technology in such areas as automotive financing, warranty 
administration, parts and service, outbound logistics and vehicle design. The power of a 
company’s information technology is becoming increasingly central to its competitive 
positioning; this could lead one to classify the industry as “information intensive”.  
 
Finally, the scale of automotive production is actually reducing with increasingly 
shorter production runs of new models. In fact the most profitable automotive company 
over these twenty years has been BMW with just a fraction of the scale of some of its 
rivals. While production runs of hundreds of thousands of units was the goal of every 
carmaker in the past, some of the industry’s most exciting products are designed with 
volumes of only 50,000 units. Thus, the car companies are beginning to behave as 
specialised suppliers and are often most successful when appealing to very specific 
groups of advanced users. As Pavitt’s trajectories cannot inform the research due to this 
ambiguity, and were in any case developed for the firm level, the thesis will apply Geels 
and Schot’s technological pathways to inform the technology case studies and guide the 
analysis. Prior to exploring the technologies, however, it is first necessary to firmly 
establish at what level in the multi-level analytical framework, discussed in Sub-section 
2.3.1, the automotive industry should be considered.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Geels’ view of personal transportation (Geels, 2002, p. 1258) 
 
4.3 A Socio-technological model of the automotive industry 
 
Geels’ (2002) application of the model to personal transportation is shown in Figure 4.1.  
 
The following discussion will develop Geels’ ideas further and attempt to rigorously 
apply the seven elements discussed above to the industry drawing on research done in 
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the academic and practitioner literature as well as the researcher’s own knowledge of 
the industry.  
 
o Technology 
 
The first automobile was built by Karl Benz in 1885, based around a four-stroke cycle 
petrol engine which he patented the next year. Over the next 124 years the technology 
has steadily developed across a number of different technological areas. The modern 
automobile has over 10,000 parts and is generally considered to be made up of a 
number of different systems and modules. In Figure 1, Geels divides the vehicle into 5 
major areas and, while this is the basis for most, if not all, vehicle breakdowns at the 
aggregate level, car manufacturers and suppliers go further at the operational level. 
 
The term system is normally used to refer to groups of components which perform a 
specific function. The brake system is an example and consists of discs, callipers and 
friction pads on the wheel, an electronic control unit, hydraulic fluid, lines and pressure 
pump, and the brake actuator located behind the brake pedal. Modules have more to do 
with the assembly process of cars and light trucks and consist of subassemblies of 
components which are all placed on the assembly line together as a unit. The idea 
behind modules is that logistics and final assembly processes become much faster and 
dimensional quality control can be improved at lower cost (Sako and Warburton, 1999). 
 
Systems and modules are not always mutually exclusive and a “front corner module”, 
for example, has those brake components located on or around the wheel together with 
the steering knuckle, spring, and shock absorbers all bundled together for easy 
assembly. Figure 4.2 shows two types of front corner modules manufactured by Delphi. 
  
 
Figure 4.2 Front corner modules 
(from www.delphi.com accessed 12.5.09) 
 
In the industry, the term component is used to describe the pieces and devices that make 
up the systems and modules defined above. Brakes give an illustration of the range that 
components can have in terms of size, complexity, and number of parts. Automotive 
brakes work by pressing two pieces of material against a steel disc with hydraulic force. 
The disc itself is referred to as a component. The brake pads are relatively inexpensive 
components and consist of a piece of friction material attached to a steel or plastic 
Comment [A4]: figure 4.1? 
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housing so that they can be attached to the callipers. The electronic control unit is a 
small computer that is attached to sensors that monitor different aspects of a vehicle’s 
motion and the brake’s performance. The unit itself is referred to as a component, as are 
its sensors. Figure 4.3 shows the mechanical components of a typical brake system and 
a schematic view of the electronics associated with anti-lock brakes.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Brake system 
(from www.mycarbox.com and www.madehow.com accessed 12.5.09) 
 
Another example at the component level is a headlight which is sometimes integrated 
into a front end module. A headlight is made up of up to 30 parts as shown in Fig 4.4 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Automotive headlight 
(from www.expo21xx.com accessed 12.5.09) 
 
o Markets 
 
In many ways, General Motors’ Alfred Sloan created the idea of market segmentation 
by developing vehicles for “every purse and pocket”, and today the industry is normally 
segmented using five different concepts: geography, form, size and price, 
demographics, and psychographic profiles of drivers/owners. 
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1. Geography 
 
Table 4.2 shows worldwide sales of cars and light trucks in 2007 according to 
Automotive News. At the time of writing, the industry is facing its worse slump in 
memory but, while the overall volume might fall sharply in 2008 and 2009, the basic 
geographic distribution will most likely remain similar. 
 
Region Cars 07 Trucks 07 Total  
Asia-Pacific 14,727,330 6,692,764 21,420,094 
Europe 19,198,854 3,728,731 22,927,585 
North America 9,379,152 9,993,099 19,372,251 
Central/S. America 3,336,011 1,072,092 4,408,103 
Middle East 1,907,938 459,110 2,367,048 
Africa 947,718 458,057 1,405,775 
TOTAL 49,497,003 22,403,853 71,900,856 
 
Table 4.2 Global Automotive Sales 
(from Automotive News 2008 Global Market Databook) 
 
Looking at the country level, the United States, China, Japan and the top 6 markets in 
Europe (Germany, the U.K., Italy, Russia, France and Spain) make up a total of 
48,600,000 vehicles, or 68% of the total. While some companies in particular segments 
are able to successfully market the same vehicle all over the world, large manufacturers 
are struggling with the challenge of internationalisation (Freyssenet and Lung, 1999) 
and normally develop different vehicles for these different major markets as well as 
others. This is due primarily to five reasons.  
 
First, people in the different markets have preferences about what kind of car they drive. 
Americans tend to prefer larger, more powerful vehicles. Europeans appreciate a 
different kind of styling, buy smaller cars due to regulatory and size restrictions, and 
enjoy responsive suspension. Japanese buy even smaller vehicles and appear to be 
happy with what North Americans and Europeans would consider underpowered 
engines. 
 
Second, regulation is different in the different markets and, while there is a tendency to 
convergence, the fact is that safety and environmental standards remain different in the 
different regions.  
 
Third, the automotive companies themselves have all developed from home markets 
and there is a degree of organisational inertia which tends to reinforce the idea that each 
region needs its own design, styling, and even engineering. Some OEMs, such as 
Honda, BMW and Mercedes, continue to focus R&D largely in their home markets 
which are staffed by nationals and long term employees who rarely move. Others, such 
as GM and Ford, have significant R&D assets located outside their home market and 
have experienced a degree of regional diversity as a result. 
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Fourth, in the researcher’s experience, the regionalisation process plays out in the 
industry in the following way. In order to get closer to customers in Europe, a Japanese 
or American company, for example, will open a styling studio in London, Milan or 
Barcelona and staff it with creative people. These people will then develop ideas that 
they think will appeal to the European market and benchmark themselves against 
successful vehicles in the market. In the end the process reinforces the idea that each 
market is different since designers and engineers involved are being paid to develop and 
accentuate those differences.  
 
The fifth and final reason for the difficulty in developing a truly “world” car is the 
tremendous complexity involved. The industry as a whole is very familiar with 
spectacular failures to produce such a vehicle such as the 1993 Ford Mondeo, also 
known as CDW27. Billed as a world car, the North American and European versions 
actually shared very few parts (wikipedia.org/wiki/Ford_Mondeo accessed 13.5.09). 
Some would argue that the 1996 Fiat Palio, or “178 project”, was one of the more 
successful attempts at developing a world car (Camuffo, 2000). Luxury brands such as 
Mercedes and BMW have been successful selling the same cars all over the world by 
designing for specific key markets, such as Germany and the United States, and then 
making whatever changes are needed for legal issues in others.  
 
2. Form 
 
Within the industry, perhaps the strongest technological paradigm has to do with the 
basic forms that we all recognise in motor vehicles. Form refers to the traditional 
layouts or architectures called sedans (saloons), station wagons (estates), coupes 
(coupés), speedsters (sports cars), vans and pickup trucks. Over the last twenty years, 
innovative body styles such as mini-vans and the ubiquitous sports utility vehicles have 
been added to the mix, as have so-called “crossover” vehicles which combine different 
elements of the more classical body styles. 
 
3. Size & price 
 
Two other basic ideas are that bigger cars should cost more money than smaller cars and 
that there are different levels of quality and performance between brands. Our 
willingness to pay for motor vehicles has been found to correlate directly with these 
ideas. If one were to plot all of the cars on sale in a given market by price and basic size, 
one would find a fairly strong correlation within brands of similar prestige with people 
paying more money for larger vehicles. 
 
4. Demographics 
 
Different people have different needs and buy different cars. Men and women have 
different driving patterns and, in general, look for different things in their vehicles. 
Older and younger drivers have different tastes and people with different levels of 
affluence buy different types of cars. In general, this type of segmentation is referred to 
as demographics and is often done within a specific geographic market such as North 
America, Europe or Japan. 
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5. Psychographic profile of the driver/owner 
 
The fifth way of segmenting the automotive market is by how people use and think 
about their cars, and market researchers have found correlations between car use and 
lifestyle. BMW buyers, for example, also appear to ski and play tennis; using this kind 
of data, automotive companies have developed psychographic profiles distinguishing 
between people who might have the same demographics but different lifestyles.  
 
o Symbolic Meaning 
 
Titles such as The Car Culture (Flink, 1976); The Automobile Age (Flink, 1990); The 
Automobile and American Culture (Lewis & Goldstien, 1983); A Nation on Wheels: 
The Automobile Culture in America Since 1945 (Foster, 2002); Two Billion Cars 
(Sperling and Gordon, 2009) and many others go into detail on the impact that the 
automobile has had on society and discuss three broad issues. 
 
In the first place, cars have changed the way we live, where we live, and how we spend 
our free time. Having a car has become part of people’s aspirations in many parts of the 
world for its association with personal freedom, economic progress and, in some places, 
as a sign of coming of age. People also define themselves publicly by what they drive. 
The choice of a large Sports Utility Vehicle (SUV) or bright red sports car says a lot 
about the person driving it, or at least about what that person wants to communicate, 
and in developed countries cars are often an important fashion statement. 
 
Second, the idea that there is a causal link between our motorised lifestyle and climate 
change is now entering the cultural fabric and giving rise to an increasingly vocal and 
committed backlash against the automobile and the suburban lifestyle that it has 
allowed. Driving an energy-efficient vehicle, such as a hybrid car, has also become 
something of a statement about the politics of the driver.  
 
Finally, industrial production of automobiles, their components, and the development of 
the infrastructure to support them has also played a key role in overall industrialisation 
and the dissemination of manufacturing know-how. 
 
o Infrastructure 
 
In his chart reproduced as Figure 4.1 above, Geels (2002) distinguishes between two 
aspects of automotive infrastructure: road and traffic infrastructure, and fuel 
infrastructure. A third element of the infrastructure surrounding the automotive industry 
is the network of restaurants and lodging facilities which have sprung up along the 
highway routes. The network of repair shops and retail outlets could also be considered 
part of the infrastructure due to its historical origin and its importance in any substantial 
shift in the socio-technical regime. 
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1. Road and traffic infrastructure 
 
Without roads and parking facilities, cars and light trucks have extremely limited value. 
According to the popular website, about.com, there are over 2 million miles of asphalt 
roads in the United States. In the United States, the building of the interstate highway 
system in the 1950’s led to a huge increase in vehicle traffic and economic growth 
(Rose, 1979) and country after country has undertaken similar programs over the years. 
India, for example, is currently building a series of highways running all around the 
subcontinent called the “golden quadrilateral” (www.nhai.org accessed 14.5.09). 
The first traffic light was reportedly set up outside the houses of Parliament in the 
United Kingdom in 1868 and had gas lights for use at night. The first electric traffic 
light was deployed in Salt Lake City Utah in 1912 and the first four-way, three colour 
device in Detroit in 1920 (wikipedia.org, accessed 15.4.09). Since then, traffic control 
systems have become commonplace all over the world. Systems were first operated by 
manual switches and then pre-programmed using first electromechanical and then 
digital control systems. Today such systems are operated by integrated networks which 
allow local authorities to monitor and direct traffic patterns. Active management of road 
and highway networks is becoming increasingly common, and the latest innovation is to 
allow cars to communicate directly with the highway system using electronic toll-
collection technology based on radio frequency identification technology. 
Parking also plays an important role as it is no use to go somewhere in a car if you 
cannot park it. While there is a strong link between parking availability and regulation, 
which will be covered below, the need for parking has had an important impact on 
planning and architecture and can be tied directly to the rise of suburbs and shopping 
centres in the U.S. and other parts of the world. The first parking meters were reportedly 
installed in Oklahoma City in 1935 (wikipedia.org, accessed 15.4.09), and the 
infrastructure has developed remarkably since then with large parking lots and parking 
structures in virtually every city of the world. Parking structures have also become 
sophisticated, with electronic signage indicating the number and location of available 
spaces. Payment systems such as those discussed above have also been integrated into 
parking lots, eliminating the need to pay an attendant or an automated machine with 
cash or a credit card. 
 
2. Fuel infrastructure 
 
In conjunction with the rise of the automobile, the worldwide petroleum industry 
developed its enormous infrastructure to deliver the fuel that cars and trucks need. This 
worldwide network of production facilities, oil tankers, refineries, storage facilities, tank 
trucks, and filling stations represents an enormous investment. According to 
wikipedia.org (accessed 15.4.09), the world's first purposely built gas station was 
constructed in St. Louis, Missouri in 1905 and today there are thousands of such 
stations in every country of the world, with over 200,000 in the U.S. alone 
(wikipedia.org, accessed 15.4.09). Ford’s Model T was able to go between 130 and 210 
miles on a full tank of gasoline (wikipedia.org, accessed 15.4.09) so that, for longer 
trips, it became essential to have a refuelling point along the way. 
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As the highways were built up, gas stations became available along the routes and it 
soon became possible to drive continuously across the United States, and eventually 
most of the world, refuelling along the way. Most people can find a station within 
minutes of their home and office. Filling a tank of gasoline or diesel fuel can be done in 
just a few minutes and many gasoline stations are in fact self-service with automated 
billing machines allowing drivers to simply use their credit card at any time of day or 
night. One of the biggest hurdles in developing alternative power train technologies 
such as electric or hydrogen powered cars is the development of an infrastructure which 
is as convenient and permits such long trips.  
 
3. Food and lodging 
 
A third component of the infrastructure developed around the motor vehicle is the 
network of restaurants and lodging facilities located along most of the world’s many 
highway routes. 
 
Ray Kroc, a milkshake machine salesman, first saw the McDonald brothers’ restaurant 
in California in 1954 and, convinced that the format would work well elsewhere, he 
opened his own McDonald’s in Des Plaines, Illinois in 1955 (mcdonalds.com). Today 
there are over 31,000 McDonald’s restaurants in the world (mcdonalds.com) and, to a 
large degree, the chain reached its prominence by offering Americans a standardised 
meal of reliable quality as they began making long car trips using the newly built 
interstate highway system in the 1950’s. 
 
Other entrepreneurs developed other chains, and hotel operators created the idea of the 
motor-hotel, or motel, which soon began to populate the places where the large 
highways intersected, providing travellers a place to stay. Eventually the entrepreneurs 
began developing destinations along the highway routes where people would actually 
go with their cars. Disneyland in Anaheim, California, was perhaps the most famous of 
these destinations, and today one can find a wide range of roadside activities and 
services on a “road trip”. 
 
 4.   Sales and Service 
 
As the automotive manufacturers expanded their sales they looked to local mechanics 
and in some cases gas station operators to provide service to the vehicles. These 
workshops eventually grew into the authorised dealer networks we see today. This 
pattern was first seen in the United States, then in Canada and other countries around 
the world. The typical authorised dealer eventually provides four critical functions in 
the socio-technological system including: new car sales, used car sales, service and 
spare parts, and the sale of automotive finance and insurance. There are also 
independent mechanics that repair cars outside of the authorised system, and car owners 
typically take their cars to the dealership during its warranty period and then go to a 
more inexpensive independent after the warranty expires. 
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What have emerged over the last twenty to thirty years are independent players working 
to “unbundle” the classic role of the car dealerships. One group is the so called “fast fit” 
repair sector, which has large chains offering repairs of standardised items such as oil 
change, exhaust and muffler (silencer) replacement, brake system service, tyres, etc. 
Another group of companies is focused on selling used cars and, while again there have 
always been local independents in this side of the business, larger, well-financed 
companies are increasingly involved, such as Carmax, the United States' largest used-
car retailer and a Fortune 500 company. Supporting the used car segment is a large 
network of business-to-business entities involved in the buying and selling of used cars. 
Many of these companies use live or internet auctions in which they buy large numbers 
of used cars from banks and finance companies and then resell them to used car outlets 
and traditional dealers at wholesale prices. 
 
The financial services industry has also made efforts to break away from car 
dealerships, and many banks and insurance companies offer a full suite of services 
through their own branch networks and on-line platforms. All OEMs have also had their 
own finance companies which offer credit to both the dealer network and consumers, 
and for many years these divisions were often sources of much needed profitability for 
the OEMs. At the time of writing, however, the 2008 financial crisis has altered the 
situation in many firms causing huge losses for most automotive finance companies. 
 
Companies have also been set up to sell new cars only and there has been much interest 
in doing so using the internet since 1999/2000. The problem that such on-line and direct 
sales organisations have had is the resistance of the car manufacturers themselves to 
support a multi-channel strategy and their active desire to prop up their dealer networks 
in the face of increasing pressure. The dealer networks have been consolidating with 
public companies acquiring large holding of dealerships in the United States, United 
Kingdom and other markets, and the manufacturers themselves have encouraged larger 
dealers to acquire smaller ones in the interest of generating scale economies around 
specific cities or “market areas”. This approach emerged naturally in the U.K. as 
publicly owned groups went through a process of buying and selling dealerships of the 
same brand until they owned all of the dealers in a specific town or district. Once a 
single entity has control of all of a brand’s dealers in the same area, they can achieve 
local economies of scale and, more importantly, can avoid bitter, intra-brand price 
competition. 
 
A fifth component to the sales and service infrastructure is the large number of 
junkyards spread all across the United States and the world, which provide a critical 
disposal service to car owners since 65% of a modern automobile is made of steel; 
while the price of steel has fluctuated over time, its recovery has proven to be a viable 
business in its own right (www.recycle-steel.org, accessed 15.5.09). 
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o Industry structure 
 
The modern automobile industry traces its roots to the pioneers of the automobile, and 
many of the leading companies still bear the names of those inventors such as Daimler, 
Benz, Peugeot and Ford. As the horse-drawn carriage gave way to the automobile, it 
was the engine manufacturers who became the system integrators and incorporated 
wheels, body components, interior components, etc., to make a complete motor car. 
Two trends are currently changing the structure of the industry i.e. globalization, and the 
emergence of the tiered system in the supply base. 
 
Probably the most significant trend at the OEM level has been globalisation as 
automotive companies have been under increasing pressure to be active in larger 
markets around the world and at the same time reduce their cost base. In some cases the 
manufacturers have acquired each other in an attempt to gain the necessary scale and 
achieve synergies (Shimokawa, 1999).  
 
Manufacturers assemble components into finished cars and although most of them also 
make their own engines or buy them from each other in some cases; most other 
components are outsourced to a large and complex supply base which has also been 
undergoing change. Pilorusso (1997) discusses the emergence of a tiered system of 
supply where tier 1 suppliers sell pre-assembled components, modules, or systems to 
the OEMs and they in turn buy subassemblies from second tier suppliers who buy from 
third tier suppliers. 
 
Historically, the major automotive OEMs were vertically integrated; Ford’s renowned 
plant in La Rouge, Michigan, reportedly made all of its own components and even had 
its own blast furnace for steel production (www.ford.com/about-ford/heritage accessed 
14.5.09). This gave way to a policy called “tapered integration” where car companies 
made at least some of what they needed so that they would have deep firsthand 
knowledge of the technologies and costs involved and could selectively allow other 
suppliers to make part of their needs. This pattern also allowed the OEMs to keep their 
own component plants busy, even during economic slowdowns. It also led to an 
antagonistic and hostile relationship between the large profitable OEMs and their 
suppliers who seemed forever stuck in a cycle of boom and bust. Suppliers bid for 
contracts each year and “built to print” components designed by the OEMs engineering 
groups. 
 
In the 1980’s this strategy was seen as being inferior to the pattern that had developed in 
Japan, where the major OEMS would take ownership stakes in their closest suppliers 
and nurture those relationships over many years. This system is known as “keiretsu” 
and creates networks of companies with a shared future. Japanese companies would 
typically only have two suppliers for any given component, giving one the lion’s share 
of their business but always awarding contracts for the life of a specific vehicle. The 
tiered structure came about in the West largely due to the OEMs’ desire to emulate the 
Japanese example and thus reduce their own purchasing and logistics expenses by 
pushing increasingly complex and costly tasks to a reduced group of suppliers. One 
result of this trend has been an unprecedented concentration process in the supplier 
industry and the emergence of a small group of very large suppliers around the world. 
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Raw material suppliers had managed to stay out of the tiered system either by supplying 
high volume commodities such as steel directly to the OEMs, or by continuously 
advancing the technological sophistication of their products so that the OEMs will 
specify their use in the manufacture of components by other companies. This has 
changed with a move to commodity purchasing strategies by many OEMs that 
consolidate not only their own but also supplier commodities to get the best deal. 
 
Other speciality suppliers have developed assembly capabilities for niche vehicles with 
relatively low production runs. Convertibles, for example, are typically built by 
independent manufacturers on contract to the OEMs who design and market the cars. 
Still other suppliers focus on developing the engineering talent needed in the industry 
and providing it on a variable cost or project basis to the OEMs. 
  
One question that is often asked in looking ahead is the degree to which the emergence 
of very large and diversified suppliers might make it easier for fundamental change in 
the overall system. While the large OEMs have a vested interest in maintaining the pre-
eminence of the internal combustion engine, due to their own investment in the 
technology and the prevailing paradigm in the minds of their engineers and executives, 
new entrants might not have this limitation. An electric motor or battery manufacturer 
could acquire all of the other needed components from these large suppliers and 
challenge the current socio-technical regime directly. 
 
o Rules and regulations 
 
Legislation plays a critical role in the automotive industry, and covers the vehicles 
themselves, how they are used by the driving public, and also the industry itself. 
 
The regulations concerning the product itself start with the homologation process which 
allows vehicles to be driven in a particular country and are primarily focused on auto 
safety but also deal with atmospheric contamination, fuel economy, recyclability of 
parts, availability of solutions for the physically impaired, and so on. The role of 
regulation in the development of seat belts, airbags, fuel cell electric vehicles, and 
hybrid vehicles will be discussed further in Section 4.3. 
 
Regulations concerning usage cover the rules of driving, including such basic ideas as 
whether a country stipulates driving on the left or right hand side of the road and speed 
limits, as well as licensing procedures and vehicle maintenance standards. Most 
developed countries have a regular inspection process such that all vehicles running 
must pass a regular maintenance inspection in order to be deemed roadworthy.  
 
The third area are those regulations that affect the industry itself, and many countries 
have special rules for the automotive sector that affect the industry in five ways. 
 89 
The first aspect is local content legislation that requires that some percentage of parts or 
even final assembly is done locally and this is common in developing countries. Locally 
produced components are often made by the same international parts suppliers, and the 
need to produce all over the world has been one of the drivers of concentration in the 
supplier industry. The industry’s technique to accommodate local production in small 
markets has been to set up assembly plants where required and send all of the requisite 
modules and components to those plant for assembly into a car. Such plants are called 
Complete Knock-Down (CKD). 
 
A second area which is legislated is the relationship between the OEMs and their dealer 
networks. In Europe, for example, the industry was given a block exemption from the 
1957 Treaty of Rome, which pushed for open competition in Europe and allowed the 
OEMs to keep their networks more or less intact. The legislation was last amended in 
2002 and will be again in 2010. The European Commission claims it is trying to find the 
right balance between encouraging competition while making sure that the industry has 
sufficient incentive to provide adequate service and guarantee public safety.  
 
A third area is international commerce and the transfer prices of vehicles from country 
to country. Due to the complexity of local taxation policies, it might be advantageous 
for a company to sell cars in one country for use in another, or to play with its internal 
invoicing for components in order to move profits from place to place. Private 
entrepreneurs are often able to make profits through arbitrage across the different 
markets in what is known as the “grey” market. A common practice is to buy surplus 
new cars in one market at a sharp discount and physically move them to another distant 
market where they are sold again as new cars. 
 
A fourth area are rules and regulations regarding the environmental sustainability of the 
industry itself, and a common issue is to oblige the OEMs to ensure the proper disposal 
and recycling of the vehicles, their batteries, tyres and other key components after the 
useful life of the vehicle is over. 
 
The final area, very topical at the time of writing, are policies designed to support the 
automotive industry in times of economic slowdown or crisis. In many countries, the 
automotive industry represents a significant share of GDP and is often a measure of the 
state of the economy. One practice is to stimulate the purchase of new cars by offering 
cash incentives for the oldest vehicles still in circulation. Substituting newer cars for 
older cars has a very positive effect on pollution reduction, since newer cars are built to 
tougher environmental standards. Another is direct loans or investments in car 
companies in times of crisis; at the time of writing, the United States Treasury owns a 
majority stake in General Motors. 
 
o Technological and scientific knowledge 
 
At the beginning of the automotive age, the primary area of what Geels (2002) calls 
techno-scientific knowledge which created competitive advantage was concentrated on 
the engine and the mechanical and thermo-mechanical components that made up the 
power train system. 
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Henry Ford brought mass production technology to the forefront of the industry in the 
1920’s. Materials science evolved steadily throughout the industry’s history, and the 
1940’s and 1950’s were noted for the use of decorative chrome, faired body styles and 
the first uses of plastic. Around the same time, electro-mechanical devices became 
increasingly important in motor vehicles. The 1960’s saw electronics come into play, 
and the Engine Control Unit was one of the first mass applications of microprocessors 
in the 1970’s. According to The Economist (28/1/95) the value of the electronics in an 
average car has risen from $75 in 1970 to around $2,000-3,000, depending on the 
model. As even more sophisticated electronics are incorporated into cars for their 
operations and what has become known as “infotainment”, or the combination of driver 
information systems and passenger entertainment, are added, this figure will continue to 
increase. Interest in safety technology and crash testing grew as a result of public 
campaigning and legislation in the 1970’s, 80’s, and 90’s, and pollution control 
technology also saw a huge development at the same time. Figure 4.5 shows how the oil 
embargo of 1973 caused gasoline prices to rise by 64 % in the United States between 
1972 and 1976, stimulating demand for smaller, more fuel-efficient cars. 
 
European and especially Japanese carmakers have had more experience with this type of 
technology and, according to Halberstam (1986), their advantage over Detroit’s “big 
three” in this area partially explained the rise of Nissan, Toyota, and Honda in the 
American market. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Average cost of gasoline in the U.S. (cents/gallon) 
(From U.S. Energy Information Administration) 
 
Another advantage the Japanese had was their production technology, and a new wave 
of effort was made around the world to adopt what became to be called “lean 
manufacturing” (Womack, 1990). 
 
Although research into alternative power trains has been going on since the 1960’s, 
heightened awareness of global warming has led to legislation, notably in California, 
that has stimulated the further development of the electric vehicle and the hybrid 
vehicle, which has both an electric and internal combustion engine. Work on alternative 
power train technology has concentrated mainly on battery and fuel cell technology, 
electronic control systems, vehicle architecture, and the issue of developing an 
alternative infrastructure to fuel the cars.  
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o Multi-levelness 
4.4 Examples of co-evolutionary dynamics in automotive 
 
Lewin and Volberda (1999) discussed five properties that, in their view, would establish 
a system as being co-evolutionary. The five tests that such systems should possess are: 
multi-levelness, multi-directional causalities, non-linearity, feedback, and path and 
history dependence. The following section will discuss each of the five properties in 
turn and show examples from the automotive industry as defined in Section 4.3. 
 
 
The first test proposed by Lewin and Volberda (1999) is Multi-levelness or the idea that 
the co-evolutionary process takes place within firms, between firms in a strategic niche, 
across industries and, in fact, in the greater environment. In looking at the automotive 
industry, the property can be applied as it is possible to find different levels of analysis 
in all seven aspects of Geels’ socio-technical system. The following examples are drawn 
from the technology and industry structure. 
 
1. Seat belts and interior design 
 
The section describing the automobile itself is presented in nested levels of analysis, 
starting with components and building up to modules, systems, and eventually the larger 
sections of the car such as chassis, body, etc., and finally to entire vehicles, classes of 
vehicles, etc. An innovation at the component level will have an impact on the system 
which can then have an impact on the overall vehicle architecture.  
 
When the three point seat belt, for example, was first introduced, the anchor point for 
the shoulder strap was located on the B pillar, the steel beam between the front and rear 
side windows. The introduction of the modern tensioner device was finally incorporated 
into the B pillar and covered in plastic fairing. This arrangement has taken on what Dosi 
(1982) called a dominant design. It affects not only the seat belt arrangement but also 
the design of the seat and the interior design as a whole, as the passenger space in the 
rear seats needs to accommodate the more substantial B pillar in which the tensioner, 
reel, and other components can be housed. The latest trend, currently available in high 
end vehicles, is to have seat belts integrated into the seat itself and no longer connected 
to the B pillar. This frees interior designers from the constraint mentioned above but 
requires substantially more complex seat designs. One idea made possible by this 
innovation in larger vehicles is to allow the front passenger seat to swivel and face the 
rear seats.  
 
1. Tiered supplier structure 
 
In the supply base, there are also a number of levels which each affect the other. In the 
first place, the tiered structure discussed in Section 4.2.1 gives a natural set of levels 
nested within each other. The recent financial crisis has shown how interdependent the 
different levels can be and how first tier suppliers have had to struggle in those cases 
where their suppliers were in financial difficulties and how the OEMs themselves have 
had to offer financial support to critical suppliers in order to keep them operating and 
avoid disruptions in their assembly plants. 
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o Multi-directional causalities 
 
The examples mentioned above focus on interactions between different levels within 
Geels’ seven components of a socio-technical system such as the industry structure. 
Multi-directional causalities go beyond those dynamics and refer to the idea that one 
aspect of one part of the system can affect another one and that it might be very difficult 
to find clear causal relationships. An example of this phenomena in automotive is the 
trend toward modular assembly. 
 
Assembly modules were first developed in the OEMs’ factories as subassemblies. Such 
assemblies included seats, dashboards, and groups of chassis components. In the 1980’s 
Ford was faced with the need to increase throughput in its assembly plants but had 
limits on capital expenditures and did not wish to make the plants larger. The solution 
was to ask suppliers to take on the assembly of specific modules and use the newly 
available space for vehicle assembly. The two largest seating suppliers, Lear Seating 
and Johnson Controls, quickly adopted the practice and sold other OEMs on the idea of 
buying fully built-up seats. This created an interest in the approach and it was later 
extended to other modules causing a number of changes in different parts of the socio 
technological system. 
 
One impact has been to change the pattern of merger and acquisition within the supply 
base and several companies have been assembled around core competence in the 
logistics and assembly area, rather than with a technological or systems rationale. 
Suppliers who have moved into modular assembly have had to acquire capabilities in 
dimensional control and quality management of their second tier suppliers to a degree 
which was unheard of prior to these developments. 
 
A second set of impacts has been on the OEMs themselves in terms of processes and 
positions to use Teece et al.’s (1997) terminology. One process which changed as a 
result of modular assembly, to give one example is in-bound logistics. The manufacture 
of modules as opposed to components has also changed the in-bound logistics patterns 
of many assembly plants, with small industrial parks springing up around the main 
assembly plant for modular assembly which are sometimes even integrated into the 
main plant by conveyor systems. These are found, for example at Ford’s Valencia plant 
in Spain where a number of conveyors connect the plant to its supplier’s factories 
located on the other side of the railway line. 
 
An example of changes in position are in part a result of how Chrysler Corporation, in 
the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, undertook a fundamental re-think of the way it would 
approach component design as a result of its economic problems. In the past, Chrysler 
and other OEMs had teams of engineers devoted to practically every part of the car and 
would contract their suppliers to “build to print” or manufacture according to detailed 
specifications and blueprints. In order to emerge from its crisis, Chrysler was forced to 
furlough many of its engineers and pass most of the design responsibility to suppliers of 
systems and modules. Today, this trend has continued across many OEMs who now 
define their core competences (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), as marketing, vehicle 
design, power train design and development and vehicle assembly, but no longer as the 
development of many of their systems and modules. 
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One interesting aspect to this trend is that the Japanese manufacturers did far less to take 
advantage of modular assembly than their Western counterparts due to the fact that they 
are quite capable in the area of dimensional control and quality management.  
 
Finally, the switch to modular assembly has changed the way cars are maintained and 
repaired, as it has become more inexpensive to simply replace a certain module, such as 
a front corner unit, than to replace a damaged component within it. This of course 
creates its own effects in the logistics of spare parts as well as the repair and 
maintenance industry. 
 
o Non-linearity 
 
The third test has to do with the uneven and often unexpected impact that changes in 
one part of a complex system has on other parts. These impacts can be non-linear in the 
sense that a small change in the environment can have a huge impact on organisations 
and vice versa. A tragic and very topical example of nonlinearity is the faulty design of 
Firestone's Wilderness AT, Firestone ATX, and ATX II high performance tyres in the 
summer of 2000. This issue changed the course of the Ford Motor Company and, to a 
large degree, the structure of the industry itself. The design defect meant that the treads 
of the tyres separated at high speeds if under-inflated, and this could cause the large, 
heavy SUVs to roll over. According to the Firestone Tire Legal Information Center 
(www.firestone-tire-recall.com accessed 15.5.2009), there were a total of 119 deaths 
attributed to accidents on Ford Motor Company’s flagship Explorer brand SUV in the 
United States. 
 
Ford’s CEO at the time, Jacques Nasser, had been working on an ambitious process to 
re-invent the company as a consumer-focused rather than engineering and finance 
driven firm and had a number of initiatives underway around the world to this end. 
Several such initiatives were focused on how cars were sold and involved an internet-
based program called Ford Connect and a restructuring of the dealer network into larger, 
more cost effective dealers which would each dominate a market area. As part of Ford’s 
response to the crisis, Nasser testified before the United States Congress on 20 June, 
2001, and insisted that the “problem is with the tyres and not the vehicle” 
(www.justauto.com accessed 15.5.2009). This statement received a huge amount of bad 
publicity and, after Ford’s reported heavy losses in the second and third quarter of 2001, 
Nasser was dismissed as CEO. 
 
The aftermath of Nasser’s dismissal was the promotion of a generation of executives 
who had been uncomfortable with his reforms. Bill Ford, grandson of Henry Ford, took 
over as CEO in order to return Ford Motor to its roots (Connelly, 2003). Under Ford’s 
leadership, most of Nasser’s reforms were scrapped and many of the executives he had 
hired to run them were dismissed. The nonlinearity of the example has to do with an 
engineering problem at a supplier which not only caused 119 fatalities and affected the 
careers of many auto industry executives but also brought to an abrupt halt a profound 
and potentially important change in the way business was done by the third largest 
player in the industry. Had this event not occurred, it’s possible that Nasser would have 
been successful and the industry would have adopted his ideas, altering the socio-
technological landscape. 
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o Feedback  
 
The fourth test is the extent to which changes reinforce each other, either in a positive or 
perhaps negative way. The story of the diesel engine in the United States and Europe is 
a good example of feedback. After the rise in fuel prices in the 1970’s, diesel engine 
technology was perceived by many to be part of the solution. While a bit more 
expensive to manufacture, diesel engines get approximately 30 - 50% better fuel 
economy than the equivalent gasoline engines. 
 
Many OEMs launched diesel versions of their cars in the late 70’s and early 80’s, and 
today approximately 50% of new cars sold in Europe are powered by diesel engines. 
The European regulatory climate is better suited to the benefits of diesel technology and 
the price of diesel fuel is traditionally lower in Europe than unleaded gasoline as it has a 
lower fuel tax imposed on it. European consumers can therefore justify spending a bit 
more on a vehicle which will be substantially cheaper to fuel during the life of the car. 
European carmakers can also rely on a stable regulatory climate in which diesels do 
well (Diesel Technology Forum, 2001). 
 
In the United States, diesel penetration is practically negligible as the technology was 
not accepted by the American consumer; diesel fuel is not subsidised in the United 
States as it is in Europe, and the Environmental Protection Agency’s regulations are not 
favourable. Although opinions differ, the generally accepted explanation for the 
consumer’s response was that the consumers rejected the first cars offered with diesel 
engines due to perceived slow acceleration and high noise. Engineers and product 
planning executives therefore did not invest in improving the technology for the U.S. 
market even while they were doing so in Europe. BMW, for example, developed a line 
of very quiet, powerful diesel engines which were offered in Europe but not promoted 
in the Unites States. Since the car company executives did not believe that people would 
buy the cars, they did not go to the trouble of marketing the improved engines or 
lobbying the EPA to adopt a more favourable regulatory climate. Present concerns over 
the environment and fuel economy are bringing the diesel back to the U.S. and, at the 
time of writing, BMW, Volkswagen and Mercedes are marketing 2009 models with 
modern, clean, and powerful diesel engines. Figure 4.6 gives an example. 
 
 
Figure 4.6 2009 Volkswagen Jetta SportWagen TDI 
 (from www.dieselforum.org accessed 15.5.09) 
  Diesel  Gasoline  
City Fuel Economy (l/100km) 7.84 11.20 
Highway Fuel Economy (l/100km) 5.74 8.11 
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o Path and history dependence  
 
Co-evolutionary change happens over time, and what has happened previously has a 
direct impact on what will happen next. This is not to say that changes cannot be radical 
or disruptive, but simply acknowledges that there are patterns to change and that history 
does matter when looking at such phenomena. Despite the fact that it is a source of 
technological development, the automotive industry is quite conservative. Two 
examples of path dependence are automotive styling and the continued strength of 
independent dealers. 
 
1. Design and styling cues 
 
When developing a car company’s model range, automotive stylists pay an enormous 
amount of attention to the history of a particular brand and run tremendous risks when 
they do not respect the brands identity. If one looks at Ford’s Mustang cars over time or 
GM’s Corvette one will see a natural progression from model to model. The popular 
Volkswagen Golf has also changed in an evolutionary way since its debut in 1974 and 
through the six different versions of the car that have been developed over 35 years. The 
Golf mark 6 was introduced in 2009 and will likely be in production until 2014 or 2015. 
 
An example of the importance of continuity can be found in the related business of 
performance motorbikes. In 2002 Ducati launched the 998, a replacement for its very 
popular 996 top-of-the-line motorcycle, and made a fundamental change to the styling 
of the bike. Ducati motorcycles have always had a clear separation between the 
aerodynamic fairing around the engine and the fender over the front wheel. For the 998, 
Ducati chose to extend the fairing over the wheel to decrease the bike’s drag coefficient. 
The response by the Ducati enthusiasts was very negative and sales of the new bike 
plummeted, driving the company into losses. The company later launched the 1098 
which went back to Ducati’s classic styling and was very well received by its market. 
 
2. Independent dealer network  
 
The dealer network is also a good example where one can see path dependency in action 
at the political level and in terms of change management. As briefly described in 
Section 4.3, the dealer network grew out of the need of the automobile manufacturers to 
provide service outlets and re-fuelling infrastructure at the beginning of the last century. 
Having proven to be successful, the same model was adopted as the OEMs expanded 
internationally and, today, most of the independent dealers around the world can trace 
their origins to a local mechanic or entrepreneur. 
 
One of the manifestations of this model in the United States is that car dealers are often 
some of the largest and most successful local businessmen in many towns and cities 
across the country. At the local level, politicians look for funds and the auto dealers are 
a natural place to look. In the United States, they are often involved in supporting 
candidates for local office as well as representatives to the state government assembly 
and the U.S. Congress. Many states have legislation which supports independent car 
dealerships and attempts to limit the power of the OEMs with respect to their dealers, or 
block novel approaches to automotive retailing, such as internet sales across state lines. 
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In continental Europe the situation is a bit different, as most countries have a 
parliamentary system in which the political parties, not local voters, choose their 
representatives and, at the national level, the OEMs have more clout than local dealers. 
In both the U.S. and Europe however, the power of these local dealers has made it 
difficult for the OEMs to evolve at the speed they would have liked as they are 
constrained by the dealers’ own priorities and their ability to fund new investment.  
 
o Conclusion  
 
The purpose of Section 4.3 was to explore to what degree the modern automotive 
industry could be considered as co-evolutionary as defined by Lewin and Volberda 
(1999). In looking at the five properties they discussed, this section demonstrates that 
examples can be found of the properties of multi-levelness, multi-directional causalities, 
positive feedback, non-linearity, and path and history dependence. These examples are 
listed in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 Examples of co-evolutionary properties in automotive 
 
Property of Co-evolutionary System 
4.5 Chapter summary 
 
The purpose of Section 4 was to define the context for the thesis by applying. Geels’ 
(2002) socio-technological model, and showing examples of its behaviour as a co-
evolutionary system as described by Lewin and Volberda (1999). The chapter highlights 
the critical role that government regulation, suppliers, and consumer preferences play in 
determining the agenda of the vehicle manufacturers and also gives examples of the co-
evolutionary dynamics that exist between these and other actors in the industry and the 
decisions and investments made by the vehicle manufactures in new technology. By 
defining the industry as a socio-technological regime (Geels, 2002), the use of Geels 
and Schot’s (2007) technological pathways in Sub-section 5.3.1 becomes clearer and, 
by demonstrating that co-evolutionary processes do occur in the industry, it makes it 
possible to use the empirical data from the thesis to contribute to Granstrand’s theory of 
the technology-based firm. This chapter therefore makes explicit the starting point for 
discussing the four technologies of interest and for performing further research into 
patents, deployment data, and the opinions of industry experts which is presented in 
Chapter 5. Finally by capturing what is known about the context in an explicit way, this 
Chapter will assist in controlling the researcher’s prior knowledge from influencing the 
thesis through more subconscious ways. 
 
 
 
Automotive Example 
Multi-Levelness o Seat Belts and Interior Design 
o Tiered Supplier Structure 
Multi-directional Causalities o Modular Assembly 
Nonlinearity o Firestone Tyre Tragedy 
Feedback o U.S. Diesel Engine Penetration 
Path And History Dependence o Design and Styling Cues 
o Independent Dealer Network  
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CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDIES 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Research methodology 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
The purpose of Chapter 4 was to rigorously establish the context for the research at the 
industry level, defining the modern automotive industry as a socio-technological regime 
Geels (2002) and to show examples that indicate that the automotive industry can be 
considered as a co-evolutionary system (Lewin and Volberda, 1999). The purpose of 
this chapter is to explore the apparent strategy that the vehicle manufacturers made 
when introducing new technology into their products and to discuss the implications of 
those choices thus adding to the understanding of the research question stated in Section 
1.1 which is “What strategies do automotive companies follow with respect to the 
investigation and deployment of discontinuous technologies?” 
 
As outlined in Sub-section 3.3.2, the thesis developed case studies concerning the 
approach taken by four vehicle manufacturers with respect to four technologies and data 
is drawn from four sources including desk research and context development, patent 
analysis, a detailed look at the deployment data, and interviews with experts on the 
companies and technologies under study. The methodology is shown graphically in 
Figure 3.1 and reproduced as Figure 5.1 for convenience. 
Prior Knowledge 
& Desk Research 
 
Findings 
 
A Priori 
Construct 
 
Deployment 
Data Analysis 
Context 
Development 
Expert 
Interviews 
Patent 
Analysis 
Case  
Studies 
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The selection of the vehicle manufacturers and technologies is discussed in Section 3.4 
and shown in Table 5.1 
 
Vehicle Manufacturers Technologies 
• General Motors (GM) 
• Ford  
• Toyota 
• Nissan 
• Seat belts 
• Airbags 
• Fuel cell electric vehicles 
• Hybrid vehicles 
 
Table 5.1 Research site selection 
 
Section 5.2 will present the case studies for General Motors, Ford, Toyota and Nissan 
and will review the patent data, analyzing the deployment data and finally conclude 
with a discussion of each company’s apparent technology strategy. Comments from the 
industry experts will be incorporated where appropriate and cited accordingly. Section 
5.3 will thus present the case studies for seat belts, airbags, fuel cell electric and hybrid 
vehicles. For each technology, Section 5.3 will discuss the history and context of the 
technology, discuss the technology pathway it appears to be on using Geels and Schot’s 
(2007) typology and perform cross case analysis on the patent and deployment data. 
Section 5.4 will conclude the chapter by exploring the degree to which the apparent 
strategies pursued by the different manufacturers in each of the technologies were 
heterogeneous and evaluate the degree to which any differences amongst them produced 
different results.  
 
o Patent analysis 
5.2 Company case studies 
 
5.2.1 General Motors 
 
 
Table 5.2 gives the total number of U.S. patents filed by General Motors up to 2006 as 
well as the number and relative percentage of patents filed in each of the four 
technologies under study. Table 5.2 shows that General Motors has produced a 
relatively large amount of patents in airbags and fuel cells, an average number in seat 
belts and a relatively low number of patents in hybrids. 
 
 Total U.S. 
Patents 
Seat Belt 
Patents 
Airbag 
Patents 
Hybrid 
Patents 
Fuel Cell 
Patents 
Total Patents 13,078 116 139 66 205 
% General Motors 100% 0.89% 1.06% 0.50% 1.57% 
Average % Across 
sample 
 0.81% 0.76% 1.03% 1.03% 
 
Table 5.2 General Motors’ patents 
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Figures 5.2a - 5.2d show the total number of patents for each technology plotted using 
the Themescape maps as described in Sub-section 3.5.3. The analysis compares 
different features of the patenting patterns by using the metaphor of a topographical 
map counting mountain peaks, small islands, inlets and lagoons, etc., of each of the 
representations as if they were islands or groups of islands in the sea.  
 
General Motors’ seat belt patents shown in Figure 5.2a appear to be spread out over a 
relatively large area with eleven peaks on three separate ridge lines. While there are no 
islands as such in the seat belts pattern, the valleys between these three areas appear 
quite deep indicating several different areas of research.  
 
In airbags, on the other hand, General Motors’ patents appear closer together in the 
representation. The airbag pattern has two adjacent peaks with one of them consisting of 
a large number of related patents and showing up as a large, broad mountain in the 
Themescape representation. The overall pattern is quite small with no islands. Taking 
into account that General Motors has more patents in airbags than in seat belts (139 vs. 
116), the compact nature of the pattern is even more pronounced. As will be seen in 
Figure 5.19, however, airbag patterns were generally closer together for all of the 
manufacturers with the possible exception of Toyota, so that the pattern observed for 
General Motors might be explained by the history of airbag legislation and development 
discussed in Sub-section 5.3.3. 
 
General Motors’ hybrid patents shown in Figure 5.2c also show a focused pattern and 
are made up of 63 patents. The hybrid pattern has seven peaks separated by deep 
valleys. There are no islands and the entire set of patents covers a relatively small area. 
 
The fuel cell patents for General Motors appear to be quite spread out in the 
Themescape representation. As shown in Table 5.2, General Motors filed 205 fuel cell 
patents representing 1.57% of all of its U.S. patents which appears to indicate a very 
large and ambitious program of research. The pattern depicts an eleven island 
archipelago spread out over a wide area with only one small peak. It is not the case, 
however, that more patents would automatically lead to a wider pattern, as can be seen 
in the above contrast between patents concerning seat belts and airbags. What does 
appear to be the case is that the scope of the fuel cell development efforts at General 
Motors far exceeded that of the hybrid program and, with a program more than three 
times the size, it stands to reason that the technological research would spread out. 
 
Table 5.3 shows the salient features of the maps applying the topographical metaphor 
outlined in Sub-section 3.5.3. 
 
 Seat Belts Airbags Hybrid Vehicle Fuel Cell Vehicle 
Relative area Large Small Medium Very large 
Type of landmass Contiguous with 
broad valleys 
Contiguous  Contiguous with 
one Peninsula 
Archipelago 
Number of islands 0 0 0 13 
Number of peaks 11 2 8 1 
 
Table 5.3 Major features in GM patent visualizations 
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Figure 5.2a GM seat belt patent visualisation 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2b GM airbag patent visualisation 
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Figure 5.2c GM hybrid patent visualisation 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2d GM fuel cell patent visualisation 
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o Deployment data 
 
1. Seat belts 
 
Table 5.4 shows how GM put rear seat belts on 36 models over two years, possibly to 
live up to a public commitment it made in 1986, in one wave. In the case of 
pretensioners, however, General Motors appeared to follow a slower path. Pretensioners 
were rolled out over at least the seven years for which data was available. By 2007, GM 
had put pretensioners on its entire product range except for several versions of the GMC 
Sierra, which was in its run-out year, and two models of a 15 passenger minibus. GM 
did not actually have 100% coverage on all passenger cars until 2008, and never 
equipped the minibus with the devices even for the driver.  
 
Model year 88 89 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
Models with rear seat belts 9 36 - - - - - - - 
Total models with back seats 39 36 - - - - - - - 
Percentage with rear belts 23% 100% - - - - - - - 
Percentage of models with 
pretensioners 
- - 13
% 
9% 18% 33% 50% 86% 96% 
 
Table 5.4 Rear seat belt and pretensioner penetration in General Motors 
 
One possible explanation of the pretensioner data is that GM chose to gradually 
introduce the pretensioners due to their cost and waited until major restyling for each 
vehicle platform.  
 
Interview subjects number 2 and number 5 offered a different reading of the data. In 
their view, what is important is obtaining a five star safety rating by NHTSA and other 
rating agencies and suggested that GM simply did not need the pretensioners to achieve 
this. The experts suggested that GM’s older models were most likely built with heavier 
gauge steel and that maybe it took longer for lighter, more modern designs to make their 
way into GM’s fleet. Heavier cars would perform well on the crash tests with or without 
the pretensioners and GM would only need to introduce the devices when models were 
re-designed using lighter steel.  
 
U.S. crash tests are, according to interview subject number 2, less demanding than 
European and Japanese tests in terms of stressing the need for pretensioners, and thus it 
stands to reason that GM and Ford were slower than Toyota and Nissan to adopt the 
technology in the U.S. A final reason given by the same expert is that GM, like Ford, 
specifies seat belts quite early in their product development process and thus was locked 
in to a specific design. Pretensioners require some space next to the seat as well as 
electrical power and electronic connections; according to this logic, GM simply would 
not be able to place the devices into a specific model until its complete re-design. 
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2. Airbags 
 
General Motors was a pioneer of airbag technology in the 1970’s but only deployed 
airbags across its vehicle fleet in the early 1990’s and appeared to be relatively slow to 
roll out the new technology. This can be seen in Figure 5.3, where each of the circles 
shown represents a specific new model and major innovations such as side airbags 
discussed are shown in their first year of deployment. 
 
  
Figure 5.3 Airbag introductions by General Motors  
 
GM, for example, put side airbags into the front doors of the Cadillac Seville in 1997, 
and was the first U.S. carmaker to do so, but then waited 8 years to extend the 
technology to other, less expensive vehicles. Interview subject number 6 explains that 
GM’s internal accounting rules require a specific vehicle division, such as Cadillac, to 
fund the development of new technology, and this explains why airbags were first 
installed on Cadillac but does not explain the time it took to further deploy the 
technology to other models and divisions. A possible explanation is that GM did not see 
a competitive advantage in a faster roll-out and only started to put in the side airbags as 
a result of competitive pressure when the Japanese started deploying them in 2003. GM 
also introduced second generation airbags into its fleet gradually between 1995 and 
2003 and did not install on/off switches in its vehicles. 
 
On/off switches were a temporary fix for the child safety problem which will be 
discussed in Sub-section 5.3.3, and was solved by the new smart systems consisting of 
occupant sensors, smart electronics and a two-stage airbag. General Motors started 
deploying this technology in 2004 and was thought by interview subject number 8 to 
have made significant investments in it. 
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3. Hybrid and fuel cell electric vehicles 
 
General Motors began testing fuel cells in 1964 and was the first manufacturer to 
produce a fuel cell electric vehicle in 1968 called the Electrovan 1. In 1969, GM 
developed the GM 512, a lightweight hybrid prototype which used a combination of 
batteries and a two-cylinder gasoline engine. General Motors led the industry launching 
the EV-1 in California in 1996 using lead acid batteries in its first two generations and 
switching to a nickel metal hydride (NiMH) battery in the third, steadily increasing the 
vehicle’s range as shown in Figure 5.4. 
 
Figure 5.4 Range of General Motors’ electric vehicles 
 
In 1999, General Motors announced an agreement to develop hybrids and fuel cell 
vehicles together with Toyota, and there was talk of developing a Chevrolet model 
based on Toyota’s Prius hybrid. In 2004, hybrid technology was taken out of the 
collaboration and in 2006 the fuel cell collaboration with Toyota also ended. 
 
Looking ahead, GM’s official position has been that the global automotive industry 
must develop alternative sources of propulsion, based on diverse sources of energy. In 
the International AMI Congress held in Leipzig on 31 March, 2009, GM showed a chart 
(Figure 5.5) to explain GM’s advanced propulsion technology strategy, and in its 2009 
Corporate Responsibility Report GM says that: “For the foreseeable future, this strategy 
calls for technology plans that support the co-existence of liquid fuels (conventional, 
synthetic and biofuels) as the primary in-vehicle energy carrier. In concert with liquid 
fuels, both electricity and hydrogen will play important roles as future transportation 
energy carriers. There will also be significant level of plug-in hybrids and electric 
vehicles as battery technology becomes more capable and affordable than it is today.” 
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Figure 5.5 General Motors’ technology vision 
 
At the time of writing, General Motors has gone through bankruptcy and government 
intervention but has reiterated its commitment to sustainable transportation. According 
to the official press release dated 10 July, 2009, “GM also has moved aggressively to 
develop a full range of energy-saving technologies, including advanced internal 
combustion engines, biofuels, fuel cells and hybrids. The company is also a leader in the 
development of extended-range electric vehicles, with its first model, the Chevy Volt, 
currently undergoing road testing and scheduled for launch in 2010. The new GM is 
also taking steps to make advanced battery development a core competency, and 
expects to make additional announcements on this matter late this summer”. The Chevy 
Volt is a hybrid vehicle in which a small internal combustion engine runs an electric 
generator to supplement the batteries and extend the vehicle’s range. In the past, the 
degree to which GM’s alternative energy programs were true strategic moves or 
substantial public relations investments was open to question (Doyle, 2000). However, 
with the U.S. Government owning 60.8% of the “New GM” and the environmental tone 
of the current U.S. administration, its commitment might increase. 
 
With respect to hybrid vehicles, GM has had, over the last few years, four distinct 
hybrid systems, as shown in Table 5.5. GM put a pre-transmission hybrid on its 
Silverado pickup truck and then developed a power-split system which it placed on the 
Saturn Vue and Aura models in 2005 and 2006 respectively. In 2004, GM entered into a 
collaborative agreement with DaimlerChrysler, replacing the previously-mentioned 
arrangement with Toyota on hybrids. This collaboration led to a new, two-mode system 
which was then placed on the 2008 Saturn Vue, 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe and 2008/9 
models of the Silverado and Sierra.  
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GM’s latest system is called E-flex and will be used on the Chevy Volt. The system 
uses a small, 1 litre internal combustion engine running a generator which then powers 
the wheels when the battery is discharged. The E-flex architecture is designed to enable 
General Motors to build a range of electric power train options from a common 
platform, using the same electric motors, control systems, etc., but varying the size and 
configuration of the batteries and other energy sources such as fuel cells or, in this case, 
an internal combustion engine. As shown in Appendix C3, GM has 8 hybrids for 2010 
which cover 23% of its fleet (if one excludes some of GM’s body styles and the heavier 
trucks and passenger vans). 
 
Model Year Vehicle 
Type 
Architecture Battery 
Type 
Fuel 
Economy 
(km/l) 
Top Speed 
Electric 
(km/hr) 
Chevrolet 
Silverado 
FWD 
2003 
2005 
2009 
Pick Up Pre-Transmission 
Pre-Transmission 
Two Mode 
NiMH 7.1 
7.3 
8.9 
n/a 
Chevrolet 
Silverado 
4WD 
2003 
2004 
2008 
Pick Up Pre-Transmission 
Pre-Transmission 
Two Mode 
NiMH 6.8 
6.8 
8.5 
n/a 
GMC Sierra 2003 
2009 
Pick Up Pre-Transmission 
Two Mode 
NiMH 7.3 
8.9 
n/a 
Saturn Vue 
Green Line 
2005 
2008 
SUV Power Split 
Two Mode 
NiMH 11.1 
11.9 
n/a 
Saturn AURA 
Green Line 
2006 Sedan Power Split NiMH 11.5 n/a 
Chevrolet 
Tahoe 2WD 
2007 SUV Two Mode NiMH 8.9 n/a 
Chevrolet 
Malibu 
2007 
2009 
Sedan Power Split NiMH 11.5 
12.4 
n/a 
Chevy Volt 
E Flex 
2011? Compact Range extension Lithium Ion 21.3 40 
 
Table 5.5 Performance characteristics of GM’s Hybrid Vehicles 
 
According to interview subject number 3, GM, like Ford, favoured the deployment of 
hybrid technology on its light trucks and SUV’s in order to downplay the poor fuel 
economy of the vehicles. 
 
In terms of fuel cells, GM waited almost 30 years after the Electrovan 1 to develop its 
second fuel cell electric vehicle, but then developed 14 such vehicles over 10 years 
using four distinct architectures. Table 5.6 shows GM’s fuel cell program in which is it 
appears that GM pursued several different technological solutions in parallel.  
 
Over the years, GM has placed different types of fuel cells on different models such as 
the Opel Zafira minivan and the Chevy S-10 pickup. GM also worked on developing 
new generations of its hydrogen vehicle, based on the Opel Zafira, improving the 
components and systems integration across four generations of the vehicle over 7 years. 
 
In the case of the Autonomy concept car and subsequent Hy-wire prototype, GM 
worked on developing new vehicle architecture around the fuel cell. These two vehicles 
were built around a flat, skateboard-like platform upon which different passenger 
compartments could be fitted.  
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The fourth and current thread of GM’s thinking is the Provoq concept which takes 
advantage of the same electric vehicle architecture as the Volt hybrid mentioned above 
but reduces the size of the battery and substitutes GM’s fifth generation fuel cell stack 
for the small engine in the hybrid version. 
 
Model Year Vehicle 
Type 
Fuel Source Storage Range (km) Top Speed 
(km/hr) 
GM Electro Van 1968 Van Liquid 
Hydrogen 
and Liquid 
Oxygen 
Cryogenic 
tanks 
  
EV1 FCEV 1997 Sport 
Car 
Methanol n/a n/a n/a 
Cintra 1997 Mini-
van 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Zafira 1998 Mini-
van 
Methanol Pressurised 
Tank 
483 120 
HydroGen 1 
(Zafira 2) 
2000 Van Liquid 
Hydrogen 
n/a 400 140 
Precept FCEV 2000 Compact Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
Tank 
800 193 
GM HydroGen 3 
(Zafira 3) 
2001 Van Liquid 
Hydrogen 
Cryogenic 
Tank 
400 160 
Chevy S-10 2001 Pickup 
truck 
Low sulphur 
gasoline 
(CHF) 
Gas Tank 386 113 
Advanced GM 
HydroGen 3 
(Zafira 4) 
2002 Van Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
Tank 
270 160 
Autonomy 2002 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Hy-wire  2002 Van Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
Tank 
129 160 
Chevrolet Sequel 2005 SUV Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
Tank 
483 145 
Chevrolet 
Equinox FC 
2006 SUV n/a n/a 320 160 
GM HydroGen 4 
(Zafira 5) 
2007 Van n/a n/a 320 160 
Chevy Volt  
Fuel Cell 
2007 Compact Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
Tank 
483 120 
Provoq 2008 SUV Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
Tank 
483 160 
 
Table 5.6 Performance characteristics of GM’s Fuel Cell Vehicles 
 
One explanation for the size and complexity of GM’s fuel cell program has to do with 
the perceived strategic importance that the company placed on fuel cells during the late 
1990’s. According to Van den Hoed (2004), GM started late in the fuel cell race and 
only began its program in earnest after the collapse of its battery electric program. GM 
also made the decision to develop its own technology together with Toyota and chose 
not to invest in a fuel cell company, unlike Ford and Daimler which invested in Ballard 
power systems.  
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Perhaps because GM was in a hurry to catch up, they pursued several parallel tracks, 
rather than a sequential strategy. In any event, by the early 2000’s GM was perceived by 
many as the leader in fuel cells with many projects and public relations activities. 
 
The experts interviewed give other explanations for GM’s fuel cell program. Interview 
subjects 3 and 6 maintained that GM’s (and Ford’s) fuel cell program was the result of 
an explicit agreement with the Bush administration to make a public show of fuel cell 
research in exchange for no further increase in the obligatory fuel economy legislation 
known as CAFE. The argument is that GM’s estimated three hundred million dollars in 
annual spending was considered a small investment for such political relief. The same 
experts maintained that the choice to scrap its electric vehicle program in favour of fuel 
cells was also the result of political infighting in GM, and that Larry Burns, GM’s head 
of R&D, pushed the fuel cell program due to his own belief in the technology and as a 
way to gain internal political advantage over rivals who favoured battery electric 
vehicles. 
 
o Overview 
 
Looking across the data set, it is difficult to find a consistent pattern in the data. General 
Motors patents show tight, contiguous patterns in airbags and hybrids, a very spread out 
pattern in fuel cells and something in between in seat belts. In terms of deployment the 
company also appears to have different approaches in the different technologies 
developing new generations of airbag and hybrid technologies sequentially while 
pursuing parallel tracks in fuel cells. The seat belt data is an example of the 
heterogeneity seen in General Motors as it appeared to follow a focused, fast program in 
its deployment in rear seat belts and a very slow program in pretensioners although the 
pretensioner data can be explained by design issues as discussed above.  
 
According to interview subject number 7 General Motors’ technology development and 
deployment can be explained by the company’s deep belief in economies of scale and 
their position as the world’s largest vehicle manufacturer. His view is that General 
Motors engineers would “polish the hairs of a doorknob” in a combination of 
“technological arrogance” and risk aversion to costly recalls. This view is characterised 
by a quote attributed to a GM executive concerning airbags, given by interview subject 
8, that “there is not a problem we can’t solve. The only question is which problems to 
solve”. The term “technological arrogance” is also used by interview subject 6, who 
worked closely with General Motors’ product development group for many years and 
maintains that the specific technological choices made by the company have much to do 
with the company’s internal accounting process which required the vehicle programs to 
fund new technology resulting in Cadillac often being the only division to be able to 
invest. 
 
General Motors appears to be able to generate large numbers of patents in different 
patterns when it needs to and can deploy technology in different ways. Sub-section 
6.3.3 will discuss the General Motors data in more detail and attempt to draw more 
definitive conclusions. 
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5.2.2 Ford  
 
o Patent analysis 
 
Table 5.7 shows the total number of U.S. patents filed by Ford up to 2006 as well as the 
number and relative percentage of patents filed in each of the four technologies under 
study. The data shows an exceptional number of patents filed by Ford in the area of 
hybrid technology and relatively small numbers of patents in the other technologies and 
especially in the area of fuel cells. 
 
 Total U.S. 
Patents 
Seat Belt 
Patents 
Airbag 
Patents 
Hybrid 
Patents 
Fuel Cell 
Patents 
Total Patents 10,238 63 46 142 40 
% Ford 100% 0.62% 0.45% 1.39% 0.39% 
Average % Across 
sample 
 0.81% 0.76% 1.03% 1.03% 
 
Table 5.7 Ford patents 
 
Figure 5.6a – 5.6d shows Ford’s patents in the same technologies. And Table 5.8 gives 
the salient features of the Themescape maps generated. The seat belt pattern does have 
several different contour lines separated by valleys but only one peak and one small 
island. The airbag pattern has three separate peaks, a much smaller land mass and no 
islands. Ford does, however, have fewer airbag patents than seat belts (46 vs. 63) so one 
would expect the land mass to be smaller. Ford’s patents in hybrids and fuel cells, on 
the other hand, resemble each other even though Ford has more than three times as 
many patents in the hybrid area (142 vs. 40). In hybrids, Ford’s patent pattern spreads 
out over a wide area with four islands, one very large lagoon and four peaks spread out 
over the topography. In fuel cells there is only one island, but the larger landmass has 
two lagoons separating its three peaks. 
 
The most likely explanation of Ford’s relatively small fuel cell program is its 1997 
investment of $425 million in Ballard Power Systems, which had already developed a 
lead in developing PEM fuel cell technology and in which DaimlerChrylser had also 
invested. By making a direct investment in a fuel cell supplier, Ford appears to have 
chosen to outsource its fuel cell research although continued with its own development 
program as is seen below. 
 
 Seat Belts Airbags Hybrid Vehicle Fuel Cell Vehicle 
Relative area Small Small Large Medium 
Type of landmass Contiguous with 
broad valleys 
Contiguous  Spread out with 
two lagoons  
Spread out with 
two deep lagoons  
Number of 
islands 
1 0 4 1 
Number of peaks 6 6 6 3 
 
Table 5.8 Major features in Ford patent visualizations 
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Figure 5.6a Ford seat belt patent visualisation 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6b Ford airbag patent visualisation 
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Figure 5.6c Ford hybrid patent visualisation 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6d Ford fuel cell patent visualisation 
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o Deployment data 
 
1. Seat belts 
 
The data on Ford’s rear seat belt deployment is shown in Table 5.9 Ford’s deployed rear 
seat belts on five models over a two year period and then another 10 models in 1990. It 
is possible that Ford’s back seat program was simply slower than GMs and that the 
deployment strategy was fundamentally the same. Ford also appears to have uncoupled 
the deployment of rear seat belts from major re-styling as did GM. 
 
The pretensioner data for Ford is less clear, as Ford had already installed the devices on 
70% of its models prior to 2001 when the NHTSA data set picks up. Ford did, however, 
take an additional five years to reach full deployment and appeared to place the 
pretensioners on models at the time of major re-styling efforts, echoing GM’s very slow 
deployment. 
 
Model year 88 89 90 91 01 02 03 04 05 06 
Models with rear seat belts 3 5 15 16 - - - - - - 
Total models with rear seats 16 16 16 16 - - - - - - 
Percentage with rear belts 19% 31% 94% 100% - - - - - - 
Percentage of models with 
pretensioners 
- - - - 77% 86% 86% 96% 84% 100% 
 
Table 5.9 Rear seat belts and pretensioner penetration in Ford 
 
As discussed for GM, the most likely explanation of Ford’s pretensioner data is that the 
vehicles which were last to receive the technology were models in which the additional 
benefit of pretensioners, in terms of safety, did not outweigh the incremental cost due to 
other aspects of the overall crash dynamics such as heavier steel. In Ford’s case the fact 
that it did put the devices quickly on 70% of its models could be interpreted to mean 
that Ford was ready to use pretensioners but delayed introduction on some models until 
they were fully re-designed and could make full use of the technology. 
 
2. Airbags 
 
Ford’s airbag deployment shown in Figure 5.7 appears as a series of groups of models 
or waves. Ford first put both first and second generation airbags into 9 models in 1995, 
updated 16 models to second generation between 1997 and 2002, and then started 
bringing advanced airbags into 4 models in 2004/05.  
 
There is some evidence which suggests that Ford chooses to follow the market and play 
catch-up, launching deep programs to equip its fleet just a few years behind the other 
manufacturers. 
 113 
 
 
Figure 5.7 Airbag introductions by Ford  
 
First, interview subject number 1 recalled how safety, driven by marketing research, 
became a major push at Ford of Europe and, while this strategy was executed in Europe, 
it still had not been extended to the U.S. market by 2006.  
 
Second, Ford also appears to have delayed extending airbag technology to its fleet of 
vans and light trucks until required to do so by regulations. In 2000, for example, Ford 
put first generation technology on its E-250 Econoline van, while it had already 
installed second generation airbags on passenger cars 5 years before and had also used 
second generation technology on the smaller E 250 van.  
 
Third, Ford appears to lag behind its competitors. Ford, for example, introduced smart 
airbags into one model in 2004 while Nissan had started deploying smart technology in 
2003, and the data also shows GM and Toyota ahead of Ford. In 2004, GM had 
deployed smart airbags on 4 models and Toyota not only introduced 3 models with 
smart technology in the same year but also launched its advanced systems in one model. 
 
Finally, since 1999, Ford has owned 100% of Volvo Cars, which according to interview 
subject number 2 is together with Mercedes Benz the market leader in safety 
technology. This leads to the conclusion that although Ford had access to advanced 
airbag technology it appears to have chosen to deploy airbags according to its own 
timetable. 
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3. Hybrid and fuel cell electric vehicles 
 
The Ford Motor Company built two electric prototypes between 1913 and 1914. In 
1966, Ford R&D built the Comuta demonstration vehicle with lead acid batteries, a top 
speed of 25 mph (41 km/hr) and a range of 40 miles (66 km). In 1979 Ford worked with 
Gould Inc., a battery manufacturer, to equip a Ford Fiesta with an experimental nickel-
zinc battery which reached 65 mph (108 km/hr) and had a range of 100 miles (166 km).  
 
In 1988 Ford won a DOE contract to fit an Aerostar van with a sodium-sulphur battery. 
Continuing with sodium-sulphur, in 1991 Ford developed the Connecta concept car, 
which had first plug-in capability, and went on to build a a fleet of 84 panel vans based 
on its Escort vehicle between 1992 and 1993. The two seat delivery vehicle had a top 
speed of 70 mph (km/hr) and a range of 100 miles (166 km). In 1998, Ford abandoned 
the sodium- sulphur batteries for lead-acid and nickel metal hydride batteries in a fleet 
of 2,000 postal delivery vehicles based on the Ford Ranger SUV. The cars had a top 
speed of 75 mph (125 km) and range of 30-70 miles (50-116 km). In 1999, Ford 
invested $150 million to take a controlling interest in a Norwegian company called 
TH!NK. TH!NK had developed its first generation TH!NK City in 1991, and was part 
of Ford until 2003 when Ford chose to discontinue its involvement. 
 
With respect to hybrid vehicles, it took Ford four years after the U.S. launch of the 
Toyota Prius and Honda Insight in 2000 to launch the Escape Hybrid in 2004 with 
Toyota technology. The Escape Hybrid was the first hybrid sports utility vehicle on the 
market and Ford continued with the same technology in its hybrid program shown in 
Table 5.10. According to interview subject number 7, Ford is “pedalling quickly” to 
catch up in hybrids and is developing its own solution to replace the Toyota technology 
it is presently using. The Escape family of hybrids, for example, has shown increased 
fuel economy in 2007 and 2008 as compared to the initial launch in 2005 as shown in 
Table 5.10. For the Mercury Mariner, on the other hand, introduced in 2006, the hybrid 
power plant was not improved until a totally new vehicle was launched in model year 
2010. At the time of this writing Ford has four hybrids on the market, counting the two 
versions of the Escape as one model and counting the Mercury Mariner and Mercury 
Milan as two additional models as shown in Appendix C3. These models represent 17% 
of Ford’s product line. 
 
Model Year Vehicle 
Type 
Architecture Battery 
Type 
Fuel 
Economy 
(km/l) 
Top Speed 
Electric 
(km/hr) 
Escape 4WD 2005 
2007 
2008 
SUV Power Split NiMH 11.5 
11.6 
11.9 
40 
Escape FWD 2005 
2007 
2008 
SUV Power Split NiMH 12.4 
12.8 
13.5 
40 
Mariner 2006 
2007 
2010 
Compact Power Split NiMH 11.5 
11.5 
11.9 
40 
Fusion/Milan 2008 Compact Power Split NiMH 16.2 75 
 
Table 5.10 Performance characteristics of Ford’s Hybrid Vehicles 
 115 
In fuel cells, Ford began development work in 1998 and in 1999 it produced its first 
working prototype on the Contour platform called the P2000 which used compressed 
hydrogen, as shown in Table 5.11. In 2001 Ford built a second prototype using 
compressed hydrogen on the Focus platform called the Ford Focus FCV CG H2. Also in 
2001 Mazda, a Ford subsidiary put a methanol reform unit on the Premacy platform. In 
2002 a new pre-production version of the Focus prototype was built, and in 2005 Ford 
built a number of the Focus FCV for testing and demonstrations such as that conducted 
at the North American Auto Show in Detroit in 2006. In 2007, Ford introduced a plug-
in hybrid- hydrogen fuel cell prototype based on the Edge Platform and its new 
HySeries power train which had a range of 40 kilometres on battery power and then 
used the fuel cell. All of Ford’s fuel cell vehicles to date have been test vehicles and 
prototypes, including its latest Fusion 999, with a 400kw fuel cell, which set a speed 
record for fuel cell vehicles by reaching 207 miles per hour. Ford has generally worked 
on one platform at a time and, with the exception of the Mazda Premacy project, is 
committed to compressed hydrogen as the fuel source. 
FORD Year Vehicle 
Type 
Fuel Source Storage Range (km) Top Speed 
(km/hr) 
P2000 FCEV 1998 Sedan Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
canister 
160 128 
Th!nk FC5 2000 Sub-
compact 
Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
canister 
n/a 128 
Focus FCV 2000 Compact Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
canister 
n/a n/a 
Premacy FCV 2001 Sedan Reformatted 
methane 
Pressurised 
canister 
306 160 
Focus FCV (2) 2001 Compact Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
canister 
160 128 
Advanced Focus 
FCV 
2002 Compact Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
canister 
306 160 
Explorer FCV 2006 SUV Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
canister 
560 140 
Edge HySeries 2007 Compact Compressed 
Hydrogen, 
Electricity 
Pressurised 
canister, 
Battery 
360 140 
Fusion 999 2008 Compact Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
canister 
n/a 345 
 
Table 5.11 Performance characteristics of Ford’s Fuel Cell Vehicles 
 
The overall conclusion from Ford’s fuel cell program, shown in Table 5.11, is that after 
a strong start it appears to have slowed down substantially; Ford developed a total of six 
prototypes between 1998 and 2002 and only three between 2003 and 2008. Ford’s 
relatively weak fuel cell program appears to corroborate the idea expressed above that 
there was an explicit deal between GM and Ford and the Bush administration on fuel 
cells, in which Ford, according to interview subject number 6, agreed to spend one 
hundred and fifty million dollars per year or half of the commitment made by General 
Motors. A different reading of Ford’s history in fuel cells and electric vehicles, provided 
by subject number 3, is that at one point in time Ford did actively pursue investments in 
alternative power train technologies, including its investment in Ballard, but simply had 
to pull back from non-essential activities due to financial constraints. 
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Figure 5.8 shows Ford’s blueprint for sustainable technologies in which it clearly places 
fuel cell vehicles in the very long term. Ford places fuel cells as a possibility for 2020 
together with battery electric vehicles, essentially ruling out any development on 
specific models at this time and thus restricting the technology to research projects, 
demonstration vehicles and concept cars. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8 Ford’s sustainable technologies migration plan 
(from Ford Motor Company’s 2007/8 Blueprint for Sustainability Report) 
 
o Overview 
 
It is also difficult to see any broad pattern in the Ford data as its approach appears to 
vary with the technology in question. Ford’s patent patterns as shown appear to be 
spread out in hybrids and fuel cells and more focused in seat belts and even more so in 
airbags. In a similar way Ford appears to be developing technologies in parallel in 
hybrids and fuel cells and pursued more focused technological development in seat belts 
and airbags. One explanation for the Ford data is that Ford approaches each technology 
in whatever way makes the most sense for it. Interview subject number 5 maintained 
that the key drivers for technological introduction were cost and perceived value and 
interview subject number 7 thought that strategy was driven by the size of the financial 
commitments. Subject number 8 felt that Ford’s culture was all about analysis again 
supporting this interpretation of the different patterns seen in the data. Subject number 7 
also gives an alternative view insisting that Ford “lurches back and forth” in terms of 
technology strategy according to the personality and agenda of the CEO at the time. 
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5.2.3 Toyota 
 
o Patent analysis 
 
Table 5.12 shows the total number of U.S. patents filed by Toyota up to 2006 as well as 
the number and relative percentage of patents filed in each of the four technologies 
under study. The data shows a very large output of patents in both hybrids both in 
absolute and relative terms and a major effort in fuel cells. 
 
 Total U.S. 
Patents 
Seat Belt 
Patents 
Airbag 
Patents 
Hybrid 
Patents 
Fuel Cell 
Patents 
Total Patents 10, 588 60 90 145 109 
% 100% 0.57% 0.85% 1.37% 1.03% 
Average % Across 
sample 
 0.81% 0.76% 1.03% 1.03% 
 
Table 5.12 Toyota patents 
 
The Themescape representations of Toyota’s patents are shown in Figure 5.9a -5.9d. In 
seat belts, Toyota has only two islands but also two large peninsulas. There is a central 
core area with two large, contiguous peaks but this is surrounded by hills spread out 
across the landmass. Toyota’s airbag patents resemble the seat belt pattern even though 
there are 30% more patents in the sample. This gives the airbag picture a higher 
elevation in the representation and six peaks. Toyota’s hybrid patents represented in 
Figure 5.9d appear as an eight island archipelago with four peaks, and covers a 
relatively large area in the representation. Toyota also has the largest number of patents 
in hybrids (145). 
 
Toyota’s fuel cell patents, on the other hand, cover a smaller area with a central land 
mass characterized by a large peninsula and a small island. The representation has only 
one peak but does have a central ridge line running like a cross dividing the landmass 
upon which most of the patents appear to be concentrated. 
 
Table 5.13 shows the salient features of the maps applying the topographical metaphor 
outlined in Sub-section 3.3.3 
 
 Seat Belts Airbags Hybrid Vehicle Fuel Cell Vehicle 
Relative area Large Medium Medium Medium 
Type of landmass Major central 
landmass two 
peninsulas 
Central landmass  Archipelago Contiguous with 
one Peninsula 
Number of 
islands 
2 4 8 1 
Number of peaks 2 6 4 2 
 
Table 5.13 Major features in Toyota patent visualizations 
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Figure 5.9a Toyota seat belt patent visualisation 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9b Toyota airbag patent visualisation 
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Figure 5.9c Toyota hybrid patent visualisation 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9d Toyota fuel cell patent visualisation 
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o Deployment data 
 
1. Seat belts 
 
The deployment data in Table 5.14 shows Toyota introducing the rear seat belts in one 
model in 1988 and then extending them a year later to its other 5 models.  
 
Model Year 1988 1989 
Models with rear seat belts 1 6 
Total Models with rear seats 6 6 
Percentage with rear belts 17% 100% 
 
Table 5.14 Rear seat belt penetration in Toyota 
2. Airbags 
 
In airbags, Toyota’s deployment is presented in Figure 5.10 and two ideas stand out. 
First, Toyota appears to bring out the new technology in selected models and then roll it 
out to the rest of its fleet. The time lag in roll-out from the first application to the second 
was six years in side impact, five years in smart technology, and just one year in the 
case of the advanced system. Second, Toyota deploys different generation technologies 
at the same time as it does in 2004 where it deploys second generation technology as 
well as smart airbags and advanced airbags. Like GM, Toyota shows a large time lag 
between its first introduction of side impact protection in 1998 and the next deployment 
in 2004 and, while this might be evidence of the technological difficulties associated 
with the technology, it might also indicate less market demand. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Airbag introductions by Toyota 
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Interview subject number 2 believed that the Japanese manufacturers including Toyota 
chose to make safety an issue in the late 1980’s and in this light Toyota’s rapid 
deployment of rear seat belts and its deployment of airbag technology was an effort to 
catch up and then get ahead of its American and European competition. 
 
3. Hybrid and fuel cell electric vehicles 
 
In 1992 Toyota adopted the Toyota Earth Charter and created an environmental 
committee chaired by its president to develop and then implement a series of four-year 
plans. Toyota refers to the need to reduce the environmental burden caused by cars as 
the only way to protect its future core business and has placed the development of 
environmentally friendly technologies at the top of its corporate agenda. 
 
Toyota’s view of sustainable transportation in shown in Figure 5.11 and is that all 
vehicles will become hybrids in the not-too-distant future and sees hybrid technology as 
the precursor for whatever types of ultimate eco-car will finally emerge. One of the 
points that Toyota makes is that “well to wheel” energy efficiency of different types of 
vehicles depends on the energy mix of a particular country and this supports the idea of 
developing the right car for the right place, at the right time. If electricity is produced 
from coal in conventional power plants, for example, an electric car might actually 
pollute more than a very efficient internal combustion engine vehicle. 
 
 
Figure 5.11 Toyota’s view of sustainability 
(from Toyota’s 2007 North American Environmental Report) 
 
Partly in response to California’s zero emissions legislation discussed in Sub-section 
5.3.4 and also due to the Earth Charter, Toyota developed an electric version of its 
RAV4 SUV in 1996 with a nickel-metal hydride battery pack, a range of 152 km and a 
top speed of 126 km/hr. According to interview subject number 3, Toyota was directly 
requested to build the RAV4 vehicle by California officials but sold only a few hundred 
cars and then went through a costly, but quiet, recall program. In 1997, Toyota 
produced the Toyota e-com which was a small city car concept with a 100 km range and 
top speed of 100 km/hr. A second version of the e-com was shown in 2001. 
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What proved to be the real breakthrough for Toyota however was the launch in 1997 of 
the Toyota Prius. At that time, much of the automotive industry’s attention was focused 
on fuel cell electric vehicles (Hoed, 2004) and hybrids were seen only as a technological 
forerunner to fuel cell vehicles as many of the components, such as the electric motors, 
inverter and control systems, are potentially compatible. Table 5.15 gives a sense of 
Toyota’s commitment to hybrid technology and its apparent two pronged strategy, one 
part of Toyota’s strategy appears to be focused on improving the Prius product by 
updating its styling and performance every few years. The other part seems to about 
placing hybrid power trains on more models. Toyota offers 7 hybrids out of a total of 24 
models in the United States or 29% of its product range, as shown in Appendix C3. 
Lexus has half of its 8 models available as hybrids 
 
Toyota Year Vehicle 
Type 
Architecture Battery 
Type  
Fuel 
Economy 
(km/l) 
Top Speed 
Electric 
(km/hr) 
Prius 1997 
2000 
2003 
2008 
2010 
Sedan Power Split NiMH n/a 
n/a 
17.5 
19.6 
21.3 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
50 
Camry Hybrid 2007 Sedan Power Split NiMH 14.5 n/a 
Highlander 
Hybrid 2wd 
2006 
2008 
SUV Power Split NiMH 14.5 
11.1 
n/a 
Highlander 
Hybrid 4wd 
2006 SUV Power Split NiMH 11.1 n/a 
RX400H 2005 SUV Power Split NiMH 11.5 n/a 
RX450H 2010 SUV Power Split NiMH 11.9 n/a 
GS450H 2006 
2009 
Sedan Power Split NiMH 9.8 
10.6 
n/a 
LS600H 2007 
2009 
Sedan Power Split NiMH 8.9 
9.4 
n/a 
 
Table 5.15 Performance characteristics of Toyota’s Hybrid Vehicles 
 
Another example of pursuing parallel tracks was in Japan, where cars have a three year 
warranty, the Prius was equipped with an all-electric running mode while in the U.S. 
this feature was never offered. On balance, Toyota’s program should be considered 
broad as the Prius was just one of the options it was developing and Toyota continues to 
pursue a broad strategy at the component level as shown for batteries in Figure 5.12. 
 
 
Figure 5.12 Toyota Battery Improvements 
(from Toyota Environmental Forum, June 2008) 
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In hybrids, Toyota is considered the technological leader and, according to interview 
subject number 6 who has particular expertise in the area of new product development, 
Toyota’s position is largely due to its disciplined approach to technology management. 
One element of the strategy is that Toyota will not allow a vehicle program to use 
completely new technology and will instead have new ideas worked out and tested and 
only then be allowed into a new vehicle program. Once a technology is “on the shelf” 
however, all programs are encouraged to use it and Toyota’s managerial accounting 
spreads the costs of the new technology out across the company. Toyota also reportedly 
takes a portfolio approach to technology management and thinks through where it hopes 
to see new technology well in advance. Finally, Toyota makes major power train 
innovations only at the 2 year re-styling and not at the 4 year new product launch, in a 
deliberate attempt to limit the technological risk of a new model.  
 
Toyota’s fuel cell program, shown in Table 5.16, has largely been focused on the FCEV 
/ FCHV program with one notable departure in the development of the FINE prototypes 
using the same technology. Toyota’s first fuel cell electric prototype was built at the 
same time and on the same platform as the RAV4 electric vehicle and used a hydrogen 
absorbing alloy as the fuel source. The next year, Toyota improved the vehicle’s range 
and speed by adding an on-board reformer which converted methanol. As for the fuel 
cell itself, Toyota took the decision to keep its fuel cell technology in-house and is now 
producing its fifth generation fuel cell. 
 
Toyota Year Vehicle 
Type 
Fuel Source Storage Range (km) Top Speed 
(km/hr) 
RAV4 FCEV 1996 SUV Hydrogen Metal Alloy 250 100 
RAV4 FCEV (2) 1997 SUV Reformed 
Methanol 
Gas tank 500 125 
FCHV-3 2001 SUV n/a Pressurised 
canister 
300 150 
FCHV-4 2001 SUV Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
canister 
250 152 
FCHV-5 2001 SUV Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
canister 
n/a n/a 
FCHV 2002 2002  SUV Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
canister 
290 155 
FINE-S 2003  Coupe Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
canister 
n/a n/a 
FINE-N 2003  Coupe Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
canister 
500 n/a 
FCHV-adv 2008  SUV Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
canister 
830 155 
 
Table 5.16 Performance characteristics of Toyota’s Fuel Cell Vehicles 
 
According to Toyota it has “made great strides in overcoming many of the technical 
challenges. We have increased the on-board hydrogen storage capacity and the vehicle 
range, increased the durability and reliability of the fuel cell stack, and have succeeded 
in subzero operation to as low as -34.5° F (-37° C)” (from Toyota’s 2008 North 
American Environmental Report).  
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The latest FCHV has actually been leased to several universities and a power company 
in Japan, allowing Toyota to argue that the cars are commercially available. While this 
claim is technically correct, these vehicles are still prototypes and the experts 
interviewed for the thesis concur that commercially-viable fuel cells electric vehicles 
are still 10-20 years away. 
 
o Overview 
 
With the exception of the pattern shown for hybrid vehicles, Toyota’s patents fall into 
fairly tight patterns with a central land mass and a couple of outliers. In terms of 
deployment, Toyota also appears to be very focused and consistent. 
 
While the interview subjects agreed with Toyota’s leadership position in hybrids, there 
was disagreement over the overall competitive position of Toyota in the area of 
alternative power trains in general. Subject number 7 was convinced that Toyota was 
“on the right track” and that the underlying technology developed for Prius will give it 
competitive advantage in whatever evolution the industry takes. The same subject 
argued that Toyota’s problems at the time of writing were only “chinks in its armour” 
and that it was still enjoying a dominant position in production technology. 
 
On the other hand, subject number 6 felt that Toyota was in trouble and had gone too far 
with an over-engineered hybrid system. Despite his respect for its development process, 
he felt strongly that Toyota’s consensus-based management team will not be able to 
“make the tough decisions” needed to compete in a world which will become battery 
electric. Their hybrid drive is expensive and the underlying component technology is 
not as useful as initially thought. Battery technology, for example, is moving to lithium-
ion while Toyota uses nickel-metal hydride batteries in its hybrids.  
 
According to subject number 4, Toyota itself acknowledges that it needs to change and 
be “less boring”. In this view Toyota’s ability to plan and the discipline it has to stick to 
the plan is considered a weakness rather than strength.  
 
 125 
5.2.4 Nissan 
 
o Patent analysis 
 
Table 5.17 shows the total number of U.S. patents filed by Nissan up to 2006 as well as 
the number and relative percentage of patents filed in each of the four technologies 
under study. The data shows a very large output of patents in hybrids and fuel cells both 
in absolute and relative terms. 
 
Nissan Total U.S. 
Patents 
Seat Belt 
Patents 
Airbag 
Patents 
Hybrid 
Patents 
Fuel Cell 
Patents 
Total Patents 8,519 103 47 84 82 
% Nissan patents 100% 1.21% 0.55% 0.99% 0.96% 
Average % Across 
sample 
 0.81% 0.76% 1.03% 1.03% 
 
Table 5.17 Nissan patents 
 
Table 5.18 shows the salient features of Nissan’s patent patterns shown in Figure 5.13a-
d and applying the topographical metaphor outlined in Sub-section 3.3.3, it appears that 
Nissan has a fairly consistent approach.  
 
Both the seat belt and airbag patterns have no islands, 4 peaks, and present a smaller 
landmass than the other manufacturers. The airbag representation is smaller than that of 
seat belts indicated a more focused group of patents. Nissan does have less than half as 
many patents in airbags as in seat belts (47 vs. 103) but, as explained in Sub-section 
3.5.3, the number of patents should not drive the map scale as long as the total number 
of patents is within the same order of magnitude; thus, if there were a partial scalar 
effect, it would not explain the difference in area. 
 
In hybrids, Nissan’s pattern appears quite concentrated and, although it does have three 
islands, its central feature is a very large mountain with three contiguous peaks.  
 
In fuel cells, Nissan’s pattern appears more spread out than in the other areas but still 
covers a largely contiguous, large landmass with only one small island. It does have 
three peaks along a central ridge but, with close to the same number of patents as for 
hybrids (82 vs. 84). This might have to do with the nature of fuel cell technology which 
is significantly less developed than the other areas under study. 
 
 Seat Belts Airbags Hybrid Vehicle Fuel Cell Vehicle 
Relative area Small Very Small Very Small Very Large 
Type of landmass Contiguous with 
two inlets 
Contiguous with 
one Peninsula 
Contiguous with 
two Peninsula 
Contiguous with 
two lagoons 
Number of 
islands 
0 0 2 2 
Number of peaks 4 4 3 3 
 
Table 5.18 Major features in Nissan patent visualizations 
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Figure 5.13a Nissan seat belt patent visualisation 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13b Nissan airbag patent visualisation 
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Figure 5.13c Nissan hybrid patent visualisation 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13d Nissan fuel cell patent visualisation 
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o Deployment data 
 
As outlined in Section 3.7, the deployment data covers each technology in turn. 
 
1. Seat belts 
 
Table 5.19 shows the deployment of back seat belts by Nissan and shows that Nissan 
put the belts on only one vehicle in 1987 and then waited until 1989/1990 to deploy the 
belts across its product range. Nissan was the first of the four manufacturers under study 
to install rear seat belts and did so in its Maxima model in 1987. Nissan then waited 
until 1989 to install the belts on the 200, 240 SX and Stanza, and the rest of its fleet 
only in 1990. The Pulsar was re-styled in 1990 and equipped with the rear belts at that 
time, but this is the only such example for Nissan. One interpretation of the data could 
be that the delay was deliberate and that perhaps Nissan chose to perfect the system 
before rolling it out across the fleet. 
 
Model Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Models with rear seat belts 1 1 3 7 
Total models with rear seats 6 6 6 7 
Percentage with rear belts 17% 17% 50% 100% 
 
Table 5.19 Rear seat belt penetration in Nissan 
2. Airbags 
 
Figure 5.14 shows Nissan’s airbag deployment which reveals the company making no 
new deployment over a four year period and then engaging in a massive 5 year program 
to upgrade the systems on its entire model range.  
 
As shown in Figure 5.14, Nissan fit both first and second generation technology on its 
entire product offering in 1995, placing the more expensive second generation 
technology on the higher end Maxima and Altima models while at the same time 
equipping the 200, 240 and 300 models with first generation technology. Nissan had 
more models with side impact protection, was one of the first in the market to install 
on/off switches and was the first with advanced systems and roof airbags. Nissan then 
appeared to redesign its airbag systems deploying new systems on new vehicles in 1999 
and 2000 and then updating its entire fleet after 2002. During this deployment Nissan 
went ahead with new airbags and, as can be seen in Appendix E, in some cases did not 
wait for a major facelift and changed airbags systems from one model year to another. 
 
As stated above, Interview subject number 2 characterised Nissan and the other 
Japanese manufacturers as fast followers in safety, and attributes both the seat belt and 
airbag data as evidence of its efforts to catch up on safety. 
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Figure 5.14 Airbag introductions by Nissan 
 
3. Hybrid and fuel cell electric vehicles 
 
Although Nissan reportedly released its first electric vehicle in 1947 and has had a 
research program going on for some time, Nissan’s CEO Carlos Ghosn has been 
sceptical of alternative energy technology. In 2005 Reuters reported that, in an address 
to the National Automobile Dealers Association, Ghosn said: “They make a nice story, 
but they’re not a good business story yet because the value is lower than their costs”. In 
the same speech Ghosn said that Nissan was only getting into hybrids to comply with 
fuel economy legislation in certain markets, that they were a niche product, and that 
they had written off fuel cell vehicles because they cost on the order of $800,000 each 
to build. 
 
Nissan’s hybrid program consists of only one vehicle, the Altima, and is shown in Table 
5.20. Interview subject number 3 did assign some importance to the Tino hybrid 
program which preceded Nissan’s adoption of Toyota technology but saw it as a road 
not taken by the company. As Nissan has a total of 19 models including Infiniti on the 
market in the US, its hybrid coverage is 5%, reflecting the scepticism shown by Nissan 
Management discussed above. 
 
Nissan Year Vehicle 
Type 
Architecture Battery 
Type 
Fuel 
Economy 
(km/l) 
Top Speed 
Electric 
(km/hr) 
Altima 2007 Sedan Power split NiMH 14.5 n/a 
 
Table 5.20 Performance characteristics of Nissan Hybrid Vehicle 
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o Fuel Cells 
 
Table 5.21 shows Nissan’s fuel cell program, which produced a series of prototypes 
based on the X trail SUV. 
 
Nissan Year Vehicle 
Type 
Fuel Source Storage Range (km) Top Speed 
(km/hr) 
Altra FCV 1999  Estate Methanol Reformer n/a n/a 
R''Nessa 1999  Estate Methanol Pressurised 
Tank 
n/a 70 
EFFIS 2003  Sub 
compact 
n/a Pressurised 
Tank 
n/a n/a 
X-Terra 2000  SUV Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
Tank 
160 120 
X-Trail FCV 2002 SUV Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
Tank 
200 125 
X-Trail FCV (2) 2003 SUV Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
Tank 
350 145 
X-Trail FCV (3) 2005 SUV Compressed 
Hydrogen 
Pressurised 
Tank 
500 150 
 
Table 5.21 Performance characteristics of Nissan Fuel cell Vehicles 
 
o Overview 
 
The interview subjects gave opinions on Nissan’s overall situation with subject number 
4 maintaining that Nissan has made impressive financial returns over the last 10 years 
but has been in permanent “turnaround” mode, subordinating all decisions to the 
achievement of the financial goals in a series of three year plans. Subject number 7 
maintained that Nissan was still “thrashing around” looking for a basic strategic 
direction as it emerges from its recovery phase. 
 
With respect to Nissan’s relatively new electric vehicle program the experts interviewed 
had different views about its chances of success. Subject number 4 understands that 
Nissan has committed virtually its entire research budget to the program and considers it 
as a “throw of the dice” and supports the view that Nissan was so far behind Toyota on 
hybrids that it was not worthwhile to try and catch up. Subject number 7 refereed to the 
program as a “Hail Mary” strategy making a reference to American football where the 
offensive team might throw the ball far forward in the closing moments of a game and 
pray that it will result in turning a loss into a win. Subject number 1 was also sceptical 
of the program, pointing out that it is dangerous to be “too soon” with new technology 
and that the infrastructure for electric vehicles was hard to imagine in urban 
environments.  
 
Subject number 6, however, is convinced that the future of personal transportation will 
be electric and that Nissan will successfully leapfrog Toyota’s lead in hybrids because 
its multicultural team was “pragmatic and determined to succeed”. For subject number 
5, Nissan recognizes the critical issues around consumer finance and will keep the 
purchase price of the vehicle competitive by leasing the batteries but is, at the same 
time, concerned about lithium-ion batteries which are actually thousands of small cells 
wired together with a huge potential for failure. 
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In July, 2008, the New York Times quoted Mr. Ghosn as making a firm commitment to 
putting 1 million electric vehicles on the road starting in 2012. “I want a pure electric 
car. I don’t want a range extender. I don’t want another hybrid.” 
 
Nissan has made a serious commitment to lithium-ion batteries as the cornerstone of its 
electric vehicle plans and built a series of prototypes around the technology over the last 
10 years, which led to its announcement in August 2009 of the launch of the Nissan 
Leaf, a medium-size hatchback that comfortably seats five adults and has a range of 
more than 160km and is shown in Figure 5.15. 
 
Figure 5.15 Nissan Leaf 
 
Figure 5.16 shows Nissan’s view of the future in which all cars will have a much lower 
CO2 footprint but where the internal combustion engine still makes up the majority 
share of the market in 2050. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.16 Nissan’s technology roadmap 
(from Sustainability Report 2007 of Nissan Motor Company) 
 132 
1. If the technology has emerged as the dominant design within its niche or niches 
5.3 Technology case studies  
 
Section 5.2 presented case studies of each of the four manufacturers and discussed how 
they looked at the four technologies under consideration. Section 5.3 takes an 
orthogonal look at the data by discussing each technology in turn and evaluating the 
response of the four manufacturers. Sub-section 5.3.1 will discuss Geels and Schot’s 
(2007) typology of technological pathways. Sub-sections 5.3.2 – 5.3.5 will present the 
case studies for seat belts, airbags, fuel cell electric and hybrid vehicles. Each sub-
section will discuss the history and context of the technology, discuss the technology 
pathway it appears to be on using Geels and Schot’s (2007) typology and then explore 
how the four manufactures appear to have approached the technology by looking at the 
patent data, deployment data and the opinions of the experts interviewed.  
 
5.3.1 Technology pathways 
 
As discussed in Sub-section 2.2.2, Geels and Schot (2007) develop the mult-level 
perspective and combine it with Suarez and Olivia’s (2005) typology of environmental 
change to define four pathways for technological transitions. 
 
Suarez and Olivia’s typology is based on evaluating the frequency, amplitude, speed, 
and scope of changes to the environment and combining these concepts to develop five 
different types of change: A regular environment is one in which few things change 
over time, the changes themselves are small and happen slowly and are normally 
confined to specific parts of the environment or landscape. A hyperturbulent 
environment has a large number of very low impact changes happening very quickly in 
different parts of the landscape. An environment might suffer from a once-in-a-lifetime, 
high amplitude, high speed specific shock which affects one aspect of the landscape. If 
the same change happens slowly it could be described as disruptive. Finally a high 
impact, high speed change with wide impact is described as an avalanche. After 
reviewing Suarez and Olivia’s typology, Geels and Schot throw out the hyperturbulent 
mode for change and then go on to introduce two additional ideas to the perspective in 
order to come up with their four pathways. One idea is the timing of change pressure 
with respect to the level of development or readiness of a new technology at the niche 
level. The other is the degree to which the new technology is complimentary or 
competitive with respect to the existing technology regime. In order to operationalize 
the idea of readiness Geels and Schot propose four tests of readiness as follows: 
 
2. If powerful actors have joined the technology’s development or deployment 
3. If scale effects are already being felt or, in other words, if the learning curve is 
providing measurable reductions in cost 
4. If the niche or niches amount to at least 5% of the total market 
 
Geels and Schot consider the degree to which the new technology is complementary or 
competitive with respect to incumbent technology and define four pathways for 
technological transitions as follows: 
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1. Transformation 
 
Transformation occurs when there is moderate pressure from the landscape for 
change but the technology is not ready in its niche application. In this case regime 
actors will change what they are doing to respond to the changes. Social pressure 
groups, for example, might demand changes to a set of services and, if the current 
set of industry participants do not make those changes, new entrants might come in.  
 
2. De-alignment, re-alignment 
 
In the face of far reaching and sudden landscape change, a regime can begin to fall 
apart even if there is no clear alternative developing in niche markets. What happens 
next is that different alternatives compete and eventually a new dominant design can 
emerge. Geels (2005) discusses the change from horse-drawn carriages to the 
modern automotive regime as an example of this kind of change. 
 
3. Technological substitution 
 
If there is a moderate to high degree of landscape pressure in any one of the 
categories discussed above, and the niche technology is ready, then what happens is 
technological substitution.  
 
4. Re-configuration 
 
Sometimes, with very moderate landscape pressure, new applications develop 
sufficiently, and are also symbiotic with the incumbent technology regime such that 
they can be adopted into it as add-ons or in a hybrid form. In some cases the new 
technology allows new configurations to emerge and, when this in turn causes 
substantial changes to the overall socio-technical regime, Geels and Schot refer to 
this pathway as re-configuration.  
 
5.3.2 Seat Belts 
 
o History and context 
 
Although simple seat belts had been used since 1885 (Johannessen, 1984), serious 
interest in them for cars did not occur till the 1950’s. Hugh De Haven is credited with 
the first serious study of what he called the second collision (De Haven, 1952). 
According to Nash (2009), De Haven put forward the fundamental principles of safety 
research still in use today. De Haven, together with Roger Griswold, also invented the 
first three point seat belt in 1952. Ford offered the first seat belts on a production car in 
1956 as part of an optional “lifeguard safety package” on its Crown Victoria sedan, and 
Saab became the first manufacturer to install front seat belts as standard equipment in 
Sweden in 1958 and brought them to the United States in 1962. 
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Saab used a two point seat belt and Volvo followed with Nils Bohlin’s patented three 
point system in Sweden in 1959 and the United States in 1963. By the early 1960’s, 
concern over automotive safety had been building in the United States and other 
markets, but was still considered a relatively minor issue. Using Geels and Schot’s 
terminology, at the time of their introduction there was mild environmental pressure. 
Effective 1 January, 1964, 23 state governments enacted legislation requiring seat belt 
anchor points in the front outboard positions in response to public pressure of the kind 
shown in Ralph Nader’s seminal book, “Unsafe at any speed” (Nader, 1965).  
 
As it was not considered economic to only install seat belts on cars destined for sale in 
the states that required them, most manufacturers placed front seat belts or at least 
anchor points as standard equipment in 1964. In 1966, The U.S. government passed the 
Highway Safety Act, which created the National Highway Safety Bureau (NHBS) and 
paved the way for the introduction of a series of safety regulations including Standard 
208 which required cars to have seat belts, which took effect on 1 January, 1968. The 
NHBS later became the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). 
 
Johannessen (1984) charts the technological development of seat belts in subsequent 
years showing a time lag between the appearance of superior technology in European 
brands, particularly Volvo, and the adoption of those improvements by Ford, Chrysler 
and General Motors. Volvo appealed to a segment of consumers who were especially 
concerned about safety, and as legislation continued to evolve technology has been 
available. The fact that seat belts were already being offered by Ford, Volvo and Saab 
facilitated the incorporation of the technology by the rest of the industry, which was 
faced with increasing pressure from consumers and regulatory bodies. Volvo, for 
example began installing seat belts in rear seats in 1967 and introduced pretensioners in 
1987. (from 
www.volvocars.com/us/footer/about/NewsAndEvents/Pages/Volvo_Safety_Firsts 
accessed 20.12.09) 
 
There has been, and still is, a segment of the market that is concerned about automotive 
safety. In the spring of 2009, for example, Volvo offered its “technology package” to its 
XC60 for $1,695 with five new active safety features as follows: 
 
- Adaptive Cruise Control  
- Collision Warning with Auto Brake  
- Distance Alert  
- Driver Alert Control  
- Lane Departure Warning 
(from www.volvocars.com accessed 13.4.09) 
 
o Technology Pathway Analysis  
 
If there is a moderate to high degree of landscape pressure and the niche technology is 
ready, then Geels and Schot call the pathway technological substitution. In the case of 
seat belts, of course, the seat belt did not substitute an alternate passenger restraint 
device so its substitution is, in fact, an addition. The thesis, however, maintains Geels 
and Schot’s nomenclature. 
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As over 50 years have gone by since the first production of automotive seat belts, the 
technology has advanced substantially, as shown in Table 5.22. All of the features 
shown in Table 5.22 are currently available as standard equipment or options on the top-
of-the-line Volvos, Mercedes and some other brands. 
 
In summary, it appears that the technological substitution pathway holds some validity 
for seat belts because, there was moderate environmental pressure leading up to federal 
legislation, the technology was ready at the niche level and actively supported by the 
supply base, and seat belts required little technical adjustment to the vehicle or the 
socio-technological regime. Where seat belts have struggled and are still struggling in 
some markets is on the social adaptation required to get people to use them. 
 
Component Description 
Buckle standard item which has also undergone technological 
development in order to be easy to open and close but also 
withstands crash forces 
Belt Grabber first introduced in 1986, this device which pulls up seat 
belt slack has become standard on most vehicles  
Height Adjuster relatively standard in manual form but also available with 
built in motor and even memory capability for automatic 
adjustment 
Retractors standard device since 1967, the retractor not only pulls up 
slack but also locks in place against sudden acceleration 
Active Seat belts seat belts equipped with a high speed motor which 
tightens just before crash and/or vibrates in order to advise 
the driver of an emergency 
Belt in Seat also referred to an integrated seat belt and discussed above 
Pretensioner pyrotechnic device which tightens seat belt sharply at the 
moment of impact 
Load Limiter First introduced in 1995, acts to adjust the force of the 
restraint to a steady load during crash dynamics in balance 
with the airbag 
Smart Belt system quipped with a 2-gear pretensioner which allows a 
lighter restraint immediately after initial impact or if 
occupant is smaller or lighter 
Trunk Belt new application of technology which acts to hold items in 
the trunk secure during an accident keeping them from 
impacting the passenger space 
Electronic Control Unit central processor for seat belt and airbag system 
 
Table 5.22 Selected Seat Belt Components 
(from Autoliv.com accessed 10.5.2009) 
 
o Empirical data 
 
Table 5.23 shows the absolute and relative patent counts for seat belts at the different 
manufacturers. In terms of filings, GM has filed many patents but is only slightly higher 
than the average for the sample in relative terms. Nissan, in contrast, has almost as 
many patents as GM but a much greater relative effort with seat belts representing 
1.21% of all of its patents or about twice the output seen from Ford and Toyota and 
36% higher than GM.  
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Nissan’s large number of seat belt patents could be interpreted as evidence of what 
interview subject number 2 referred to as the efforts of both Nissan and Toyota to push 
safety in order to develop competitive advantage. Toyota’s relatively small number of 
patents however, does not support this idea although one could argue that it is not 
necessary to perform extensive in-house research in a specific component area in order 
to seek rapid roll out or even relative technological superiority as the supply base is 
capable of supplying leading edge technology to the vehicle manufacturers in seat belts. 
 
Seat Belts Total U.S. 
patents 
Seat Belt 
Patents 
% of Total % of four 
firms 
General Motors 13,078 116 0.89% 34% 
Ford 10,238 63 0.62% 18% 
Toyota 10,588 60 0.57% 18% 
Nissan 8,519 103 1.21% 30% 
Total 42,423 342 0.81% 100% 
 
Table 5.23 Total seat belt patents by manufacturer 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.17 Seat belt patent visualisation 
 
 
Figure 5.17 show the Themescape maps from each manufacturer (Figures 5.2a, 5.6a, 
5.9a, and 5.13a) reproduced in a smaller scale for convenience and Table 5.24 shows a 
comparison of the salient features of the different patent patterns. 
 
Toyota 
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Toyota 
 
General Motors 
 
Ford 
 
Nissan 
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Feature GM Ford Toyota Nissan 
Overall Size Large Small Large Small 
Landmass Contiguous with 
broad valleys 
Contiguous with 
broad valleys 
Major central 
landmass two 
peninsulas 
Contiguous with 
two inlets 
Islands 0 1 2 0 
Peaks 11 6 2 4 
 
Table 5.24 Major features in seat belt patent visualization 
 
The General Motors pattern is much wider than the other manufacturers and shows 11 
peaks or focal points indicating that their patenting pattern covered a number of related 
but disparate topics. Ford’s pattern is similar to General Motors but much smaller and 
lower reflecting the lower elevation appears to reflect the overall lower level of activity. 
This relationship appear so to hold up in comparing the Nissan pattern with that of 
Toyota as they also have a similar shape with Toyota showing lower elevation and 
fewer patents. 
 
Table 5.25 shows the number of years required for rear seat belt deployment and the 
year when all of each manufacturer’s passenger cars had been equipped with 
pretensioners, in the front seats.  
 
Technology GM Ford Toyota Nissan 
Years to deploy rear seat belts on 
all models 
2 4 2 4 
Model year with standard 
pretensioners on passenger cars and 
light trucks 
2008 2005 2001 2001 
 
Table 5.25 Seat Belt deployment summary 
 
One explanation for the pretensioner data might be that the rate of deployment is a 
function of the numbers of models and since GM has more models than Ford and both 
of them have more models than Nissan or Toyota. This would explain how Nissan and 
Toyota were able to equip their entire fleet relatively quickly while it took Ford and GM 
longer but does not explain GM’s fast deployment of rear seat belts. A more likely 
explanation of the difference in the pretensioner data is discussed in Sub-sections 5.21 
and 5,22 and has to do with other aspects of GM and Ford vehicles which could have 
made the pretensioner devices unnecessary to achieve acceptable levels of crash 
dynamics. 
 
Interview subject number 8 felt that the response of the US manufactures to changing 
safety regulations was to lobby the government for more relaxed rules while the 
Japanese companies would “figure out what to do” in order to comply. While this idea 
is certainly tempting, neither the deployment data nor the patent data appear to be 
sufficiently compelling to support it. In fact two manufacturers, General Motors and 
Toyota appear to have done a significant amount of seat belt research while Ford and 
Toyota did substantially less. 
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5.3.3 Automatic seat belts and airbags  
 
o History and context 
 
Airbags are one of two technological solutions for the issue of passive restraint systems 
and a discussion of them requires looking first at automatic seat belts which were 
eventually rejected by the public and the industry in their favour. After years of false 
starts and court challenges starting in 1970, NHTSA first mandated the use of passive 
restraints in 1984 for implementation in cars between 1987 and 1990 (Kratzke, 1995). 
The problem was that, despite years of public awareness campaigns and increasingly 
vigorous laws and enforcement, many people continued to drive without fastening their 
seat belts and still do so today. The regulations were designed to oblige the vehicle 
manufacturers to develop a solution to this problem, although some would argue it is a 
social, not technical, one. Nevertheless, the key issue in Detroit was how to protect 
people who would not protect themselves. 
 
In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, however, there was no clear technological solution 
and neither airbags nor automatic belts were sufficiently developed. In terms of the 
environmental stimulus classification put forward by Suarez and Oliva (2005), the new 
law was felt as a specific shock by the vehicle manufacturers. 
 
 1. Automatic Seat Belts 
 
Many companies favoured automatic seat belts over airbags, arguing that airbags were 
dangerous in themselves and that seat belts were better protection. Johannessen (1987) 
provides a comprehensive account of the development of the automatic seat belt which 
lost the passive restraint battle to the airbag in the late 1980’s.The first production car 
with automatic belts was the VW Rabbit in 1975. This was a two point shoulder belt 
attached to a track on the top of the door. The anchor point was motorised and would 
travel up the track thus securing the occupant when the door was closed. Upon opening 
the door, the anchor point would slide down the track allowing egress. A separate lap 
belt was buckled manually by the occupant. GM launched a different 2-point system in 
its Chevette in 1978, in which the belt remained anchored above the door but was pulled 
out of the way by a secondary belt when the door was open. This system was upgraded 
to a 3-point system in 1980. Toyota launched its own 2-point system in 1981.  
 
Three conclusions can be drawn: The first is that all three systems were different and 
that what Dosi (1982) called “the dominant design” had not emerged. This is an 
indication of there not being a sufficiently developed niche market. 
 
A second issue is that they were launched during a time of legislative turmoil. Kratzke 
(1995) provides a detailed account of the legal battles between the automakers, 
insurance groups, activists and NHTSA over the passive safety legislation. In August 
1973, for example, a federal law was passed requiring all cars to have either automatic 
seat belts, airbags, or an interlock system which would not allow the car to operate if the 
driver seat belt was not fastened. This law created a huge public outcry and was 
eventually eliminated by a subsequent law in October the following year. 
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The third issue is that, rather than place the automatic belts on their top-of-the-line 
models, all three manufacturers placed them on relatively small, inexpensive cars. This 
could be seen as an indication that the efforts of carmakers were focused on influencing 
the public debate and developing low cost solutions to the problem. By 1987, 
Johannessen counts 11 models equipped with automatic belts in 1987 out of the 
approximately 100-150 models on sale in the U.S. 
 
 2. Airbags 
 
While the automatic seat belts were in development, parallel work was being done on 
airbags which would also satisfy the U.S. Government’s legislation on passive safety, 
keep the passenger in the vehicle and protect him or her from the “second collision” 
with the dashboard and windshield. 
 
An airbag system is made up of crash sensors and an airbag module which is made up 
of an inflator, housing, and inflatable bag. For the driver side airbag, the steering wheel 
and steering column interact with the airbag and driver during crash dynamics and their 
design becomes a critical element in the system. The key issues in airbag design are the 
“time budget”, or the time available for the airbag to deploy, and the force that the 
airbag should exert on the occupant in order to restrain them. 
 
Struble (1998) documents the history of airbag technology and credits Volkswagen with 
the first development work and Ford with the first working system in a fleet of 1972 
Mercury Montereys. These first units used compressed gas to fill the airbag and Struble 
credits General Motors engineers with the idea of using the combustion of sodium azide 
to produce the gas used to fill the airbags. The history of airbag deployment is one of 
technological uncertainty as different suppliers and OEMs used different variations on 
the GM system and suffered some significant problems with tragic consequences. 
 
One set of problems was with airbag deployment. A modern system has a series of 
sensors to ensure that not only do airbags deploy when required but also that they do not 
deploy when not needed. Typical systems connect sensors which detect accidents with 
others which test for no accident to a microprocessor which combines the information 
and makes the decision on whether to deploy or not. 
 
Another set of problems concerned small people and children who could be injured or 
killed by the force of airbag deployment. The early airbags could prove fatal and, 
according to NHTSA, 92 people were killed by passenger side airbags between 1986 
and 1 March, 2000, either because of being too small or out of position at the time of 
deployment. The two problems also happened at the same time, with the airbag 
deploying in a non-critical situation against an unbelted or out of position passenger. In 
the same time period as these fatalities, NHTSA estimates that airbags saved over 6,000 
people’s lives. In 1991, legislation was written to require that all passenger cars be 
equipped with driver and passenger airbags by 1998 (Kratzke, 1995). 
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Figure 5.18 U.S. Airbag penetration 
(from Department of Transportation document NHTSA 00-7013) 
 
Over the next decade, auto makers became engaged in an airbag competition which was 
partially based on increasingly tight regulations but also on public perceptions about 
safety. Airbags were considered good, and the more the better. Figure 5.18 shows that, 
by 1995, airbags had become standard equipment and the automatic seat belt had faded 
away. 
 
During the same years as this proliferation in the number of airbags per vehicle, a 
number of additional innovations were introduced. Side airbags were introduced to 
protect people from side impacts. Airbags were introduced for rear seats and even the 
so-called “curtain” or roof airbag became common on top end vehicles. An on/off 
switch was provided in many cars so that the passenger side airbag could be switched 
off if a child or smaller person was in the passenger seat. Later so-called “second 
generation airbags” replaced the first units and in recent years “smart” systems were 
introduced. Smart airbags incorporate additional features such as two stage airbags 
which can inflate to different sizes and different speeds depending on the severity of the 
crash, and can even be linked to sensors which determine the size of the occupant such 
that the force of the airbag is changed accordingly. 
 
o Technology pathway analysis  
 
In terms of Geels and Schot’s (2007) pathways, airbags appear to have followed the de-
alignment, re-alignment path as landscape change requiring passive restraint systems 
occurred in a relatively sudden way although there were indications that such legislation 
would eventually be enacted, the niche market was not yet developed with no dominant 
design, powerful actors or clearly identified segment of the market which supported the 
airbags, and the combination of advanced sensor electronics, explosives, and materials 
technologies was thought to be beyond the scope of the vehicle manufacturers at the 
time of the first airbag introductions and the early cost estimates made the devices 
prohibitive. 
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o Empirical data 
 
While General Motors was often first to market in airbags with a number of 
innovations, Table 5.26 shows how Nissan and to a lesser extent Toyota managed to 
take the lead in airbag technology. As discussed in Section 5.3, GM was first in several 
areas such as side airbags but then lost the initiative over time as the Japanese 
manufacturers first caught up and were then able to deploy faster across a larger portion 
of their albeit smaller vehicle fleet. According to interview subjects 2 and 8, it appears 
that the Japanese companies were committed to getting ahead on airbag technologies 
while the U.S. manufacturers took a slower, steadier deployment.  
 
Technology GM Ford Toyota Nissan 
1st Generation 1995 - 1996 1995 - 2000 1995 1995 
2nd Generation 1995 - 2002 1995 - 2005 1995 - 2004 1995 - 2005 
Smart Airbags 2004 - 2004 - 2004 - 2003 - 2005 
Advanced Airbags - 2004 - 2004 - 2003 - 
Side Airbags 1997 - - 1998 - 1999 - 
On/Off Switch - 2001 - 2001 
Roof Airbags 2004 - - 2004 - 2003 
 
Table 5.26 Airbag deployment time line 
 
Table 5.27 shows the relative patent counts for airbags and the data shows little to no 
correlation with the deployment data. Nissan, which was in a leadership position, has 
very few airbag patents in both absolute and relative terms. The answer to this apparent 
paradox might lie in the role that suppliers of airbag technology, such as Autoliv, play 
in the industry and the possibility for a company like Nissan to get ahead by simply 
buying the best technology available from such a supplier. General Motors, on the other 
hand has the largest patent count in both absolute and relative terms but shows little to 
no advantage in terms of the state of its technology deployed by 2006. What is true is 
that GM had managed to be first in several instances and perhaps its patent position has 
more to do with its cumulative effort over the years in airbag technology than its current 
level of activity. 
 
 Total U.S. 
patents 
Airbag 
Patents 
% of each 
firm 
% of four 
firms 
General Motors 13,078 139 1.06% 43% 
Ford 10,238 46 0.45% 14% 
Toyota 10,588 90 0.85% 28% 
Nissan 8,519 47 0.55% 15% 
Total 42,423 322 0.76% 100% 
 
Table 5.27 Total airbag patents by manufacturer 
 
Figure 5.19 shows the patent patterns of the four manufacturers in their US airbag 
patents up to 2006 reproducing the Themescape maps shown in Figures 5.2b, 5.6b, 5.9b, 
and 5.13b. In the graphical representation a certain degree of homogeneity can be 
observed, although all of the airbag patterns appear to cover a relatively small area 
compared to the other technologies under study. 
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Figure 5.19 Airbag patent visualisation 
 
Table 5.28 gives the salient features of Figure 5.19 and shows that only Toyota appears 
to have pursued separate lines of inquiry as shown by the islands in the Themescape 
representations and also covers the widest area.  
 
Feature GM Ford Toyota Nissan 
Overall Size Small Small Medium Very Small 
Landmass Contiguous  Contiguous  Central landmass  Contiguous with 
one Peninsula 
Islands 0 0 4 0 
Peaks 2 6 6 4 
 
Table 5.28 Major features in airbag patent visualization 
 
One aspect that seems critical is the idea put forward by interview subject number 2 that 
the Japanese companies are able to specify their choice of safety components including 
airbags late in the vehicle development process which allows them to take advantage of 
the latest innovations from the supply base. 
 
The case study appears to point to the critical role that the supply base can have in 
deploying new technology and also the importance of having a product development 
process of sufficient flexibility to take advantage of technological improvements. In 
periods of rapid change such as would be expected on the de-alignment, re-alignment 
pathway this aspect of the product development process appears to offer an advantage in 
terms of deployment. 
Toyta 
 
Ford 
 
General Motors 
 
Toyota 
 
Nissan 
Ford 
 
General Motors 
 
Toyota 
 
Nissan 
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5.3.4 Fuel cell electric vehicles 
 
o History and context 
  
The fuel cell electric vehicle is part of the broader potential transition to electric 
vehicles and it will be helpful to develop the context prior to looking at the degree to 
which technological pathway best describes the evolution of fuel cell electric vehicles. 
 
The power train is that part of the vehicle which provides motor force to the wheels. A 
traditional power train has four fundamental elements. At the heart of the system is the 
internal combustion engine which converts fuel into kinetic energy. The fuel is stored in 
a steel or plastic tank, and then pumped into the engine which transforms its latent 
chemical energy into kinetic energy. The energy is then transferred from the engine to a 
transmission via the crankshaft. The transmission then reduces the revolutions of the 
crankshaft and transfers the energy to a slower driveshaft which then goes through a 
differential and powers the wheels. Figure 5.20 shows a simplified view of a rear wheel 
drive vehicle. There are also a number of very complex subsystems required, such as the 
fuel system, exhaust system, control system, etc.  
 
Over the last 80-100 years, this system has been the dominant design in the automotive 
industry. In 1940, General Motors introduced the first fully automatic gearbox, but 
besides front wheel drive cars and incremental developments in the engine, transmission 
and fuel system, the power train has remained relatively unchanged. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.20 ICE Power train schematic 
 
A German engineer, Felix Wankel, for example, developed a very compact and smooth-
running 4-stroke engine, which Mazda introduced in its 1967 Cosmo vehicle and 
produced until 2000 in its RX line of sports cars. The “rotary engine”, however, never 
made it past a few models due to its relatively high fuel consumption. 
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During the 1970’s and 1980’s a number of university projects, environmentally 
committed hobbyists, and some entrepreneurs began developing alternative power trains 
including engines which ran on different fuels, battery electric cars, flywheel vehicles, 
and fuel cell electric vehicles (Hoffman, 2001). Today there are two major strands of 
development in this area. One involves replacing gasoline or diesel fuel with a new type 
of fuel which is partially or totally made from biological materials as opposed to fossil 
fuels, and the other is to replace the combustion-mechanical power train with a 
chemical-electric one either using a battery to store the electrical energy or using a fuel 
cell to produce energy from feedstock such as pure hydrogen, methane, etc. 
  
Although only fuel cell electric vehicles are considered as part of the scope of the thesis, 
a brief discussion of battery electric vehicles is appropriate as they do help in defining 
the overall context and indeed come up in the company case studies particularly in the 
case of Nissan. Alternative fuel vehicles are not discussed and considered out of scope. 
 
1. Battery electric vehicles 
 
At the end of the 19th century it became clear that the socio-technical system developed 
around horse-based personal transportation was drawing to a close, and the electrical 
vehicle was a strong contender during the process which eventually led to the 
dominance of the internal combustion engine. Geels (2005) discusses the change from 
horse-drawn carriages to the modern automotive regime as an example of the de-
alignment, re-alignment pathway, and argues that the horse and carriage regime was 
already failing to satisfy societal needs long before the internal combustion engine and 
passenger car emerged as the dominant design. After being surpassed by the internal 
combustion engine, the electric vehicle was regulated to very specific niche applications 
such as golf carts and forklifts, until the 1970’s and 1980’s when, for environmental 
reasons, they became popular again with a small group of ecologists and university 
research groups (Hoffman, 2001). 
 
In an electric vehicle, one or several electric motors replace the internal combustion 
engine. Energy storage is provided by batteries and an electronic control unit takes the 
place of the transmission. Electric vehicles can be more efficient due to several factors. 
One is that there is less need for the mechanical transfer of kinetic energy, as electric 
motors can be placed directly on the wheels. Another is that electric vehicles not only 
transfer energy to the wheels but can also recover energy by “regenerative braking” in 
which the electric motors can be used to slow the car and charge the batteries. 
 
The primary problem with electric vehicles has been the high cost and poor 
performance of battery technology. In terms of range, for example, the difference can be 
as high as 400% and, in terms of cost, a $20 plastic fuel tank costs a small fraction of 
the approximate $10-30,000 needed for a nickel metal hydride or lithium-ion battery 
pack (Alexander, 2006). Additional problems include power density and weight, cycle 
life and calendar life, as well as safety and disposal concerns as some of the more exotic 
chemical agents used in batteries are toxic and require complex handling and disposal. 
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Electric vehicles came into the mainstream in 1990, when the California Air and 
Resource Board (CARB) decreed that manufacturers which sold significant volumes of 
cars in California would have to sell a percentage of zero-emission vehicles in the total 
fleet that they sell. Doyle (2000) provides an account of the industry’s response which 
essentially involved spending tens of millions of dollars on developing such vehicles 
and also extensive lobbying to persuade California to relax its requirements. GM led the 
industry with the battery electric Impact in 1990 and the EV-1 in 1996. GM, however, 
only sold or leased 500 units in two years (Buss, 2001) and eventually abandoned the 
EV series after developing a third generation vehicle with a nickel metal hydride battery 
in 1999. Chrysler, Ford, Honda, Toyota and Nissan also offered electric versions of 
some of their vehicles, but the EV-1 was the only vehicle designed to be electric with an 
iconic body style offering very low aerodynamic drag. The argument made by the 
carmakers was that their efforts were made in “good faith” but that the technology was 
simply not available. A recent documentary released by Sony pictures, on the other 
hand, entitled “Who Killed The Electric Car”, makes the case that the GM project was 
deliberately designed to fail by Detroit and the major oil companies 
(www.whokilledtheelectriccar.com accessed 18.5.09) 
 
Van den Hoed (2004, 2005) shows how the battery electric vehicle lost out to fuel cells 
and hybrids in the mid 1990’s by showing cumulative patent counts across all three 
technologies in the U.S. each year from 1990 to 2003. His data shows that hybrid and 
fuel cell patents exceeded battery electric patents in 1997 and 1998 respectively. If one 
adds a reasonable time lag of 2-3 years from the allocation of funding to patents being 
granted, it would seem that the tide turned away from battery electric cars around 1995. 
 
Today the battery electric vehicle appears to be coming back with small players aiming 
at niche markets such as TH!NK, Tesla Motors, and Bright Automotive. Also Nissan 
has made a public commitment to launch the all electric Nissan Leaf in 2011 and also 
developing battery electric cars due to ever increasing pressure on environmental issues 
and potentially improved performance from lithium ion batteries  
 
2. Fuel cell electric vehicles 
 
Based largely on the failure of the launches in the 1990s and the lack of progress on 
batteries, fuel cell electric vehicles emerged as the preferred alternative for both 
carmakers and the State of California. In 1996, CARB relaxed its mandate, both in 
terms of timing and number of zero emission vehicles, and took steps to actively 
encourage fuel cells (Collantes and Sperling, 2008, Doyle, 2000; Van den Hoed, 2004). 
Fuel cell vehicles solve the battery problem by creating electricity directly from a 
source of fuel such as hydrogen. This technology has advanced significantly over the 
last 20 years and solves the range problem outlined above, although costs are still at 
least two orders of magnitude above a traditional power train. By 2005, almost all of the 
automotive manufacturers, with the notable exception of Volkswagen and BMW, had 
fuel cell programs underway. DaimlerChrysler, Toyota and General Motors, for 
example, made considerable investments in the technology and a number of 
partnerships were started between carmakers, carmakers and different combinations of 
government agencies, energy companies, component suppliers, and public and private 
research laboratories (Steinemann, 1999, Van den Hoed, 2004). 
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One of the lines of research which has been pursued by major oil companies and vehicle 
manufacturers is to store liquid fuels such as ethanol or gasoline in the vehicle and to 
produce hydrogen from that fuel in an on-board reformer. This of course adds cost and 
complexity to an already complex system but solves the infrastructure and on-board 
storage problems. 
 
o Technology pathway analysis 
 
Fuel cell electric vehicles are best described as being on the Transformation pathway as 
defined by Geels and Schot (2007) as the landscape pressure could be described as 
moderate, there is not large niche market, and fuel cells are not compatible with major 
elements of the current socio-technological regime, 
 
The pressure from the overall social and political environment towards a fundamental 
change in vehicle power trains has been building for some time. This pressure has been 
gradually growing as a segment of consumers are becoming concerned about the 
environment and oil prices continue to fluctuate. At the time of writing, the pressure 
appears to be far from sufficient to trigger a change from the internal combustion 
engine, mainly because none of the new technologies are cost competitive without 
changing the way externalities such as air pollution and climate change impacts are 
included in the cost of using cars. (Weis et al., 2003; Carle et al., 2005; Seidel et al., 
2005) 
 
Despite some specific applications such as space exploration, remote power generation 
and some forklifts, fuel cells have not found a large niche market and no dominant 
design has emerged despite the efforts of powerful industry players to support them. 
Buses are a potential niche application but have not yet gone beyond limited 
demonstration vehicles (Harborne et al., 2007). 
 
Unless reformer technology is used, fuel cell vehicles are not complimentary to the 
current socio-technological regime. In the first place, vehicle architecture will change 
sharply, as will the types of suppliers. Service and repair will also need to change. 
Perhaps the biggest change will need to come from the refuelling infrastructure, which 
would need to be rebuilt; hydrogen sceptics point to the estimated cost of replacing our 
entire fuel delivery infrastructure as the major factor which will inhibit this 
transformation. (Karplus et al., 2009; Siegel et al., 2005) 
 
o Empirical data  
 
Table 5.29 gives a summary of the deployment data discussed in Section 5.2 for each of 
the four manufacturers. General Motors has made the largest apparent commitment to 
the technology with four partially simultaneous threads. By contrast, Toyota also has a 
large fuel cell program in terms of patent counts and the number of prototypes, and even 
worked with GM, but has approached the technology in a much more focused way. 
Ford appears to be only monitoring fuel cell technology and Nissan appeared to have a 
similar approach to Ford but has not built a new prototype since 2005, and appears to 
have at least reduced its interest in the technology in favour of battery electric cars 
powered by lithium ion batteries. 
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Technology GM Ford Toyota Nissan 
1st Prototype 1968 1998 1996 1999 
Latest Prototype 2008 2008 2008 2005 
Number of Prototypes 16 9 9 7 
Number of Concepts 4 2 3 2 
 
Table 5.29 Summary of fuel cell development programmes 
 
Table 5.30 shows the total number of fuel cell patents for each manufacturer and 
General Motors again has the highest number of patents in this technology (205) and 
also the highest overall commitment to the technology of any of the firms in any of the 
technologies, with 1.57% of its total U.S. patents involving fuel cells. General Motors 
has almost twice as many patents as Toyota (109), 2.5 times as many as Nissan (82) and 
more than 5 times as many as Ford (40). 
 
Fuel cells Total U.S. 
patents 
Airbag 
Patents 
% of each 
firm 
% of four 
firms 
General Motors 13,078 205 1.57% 47% 
Ford 10,238 40 0.39%   9% 
Toyota 10,588 109 1.03% 25% 
Nissan 8,519 82 0.96% 19% 
Total 42,423 436 1.03% 100% 
 
Table 5.30 Total fuel cell patents by manufacturer 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.21 Fuel cell patent visualisation 
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Figure 5.21 reproduces the Themescape maps generated for the U.S. fuel cell patents of 
the manufactures (Figures 5.2d, 5.6d, 5.9d, and 5.13d) for convenience and shows the 
very different patterns across the sample indicating that the research programs of the 
manufacturers were also quite different in approach. These differences are called out in 
Table 5.31 which analyzes the topographies showing, for example, the large extent of 
GM’s patent pattern which resembles an archipelago in the Themescape representation. 
 
Feature GM Ford Toyota Nissan 
Overall Size Very large Medium Medium Very Large 
Landmass Archipelago Spread out with 
two deep lagoons  
Contiguous with 
one Peninsula 
Contiguous with 
two lagoons 
Islands 13 1 1 2 
Peaks 1 3 2 3 
 
Table 5.31 Major features in fuel cell patent visualization 
 
The data appear to show that General Motor’s large program, with the most number of 
prototypes covering different concepts, was supported by an equally ambitious research 
program with the largest number of patents covering different topics. The experts 
interviewed confirmed the large amount of government funds available for fuel cell 
research and raised the possibility, discussed in Sub-sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, that the 
U.S. manufacturers had actually struck a deal with the Bush administration to pursue 
fuel cell research in exchange for having no increase in CAFE standards. 
 
Considering the characterization of Fuel cell electric vehicles being on the 
transformation pathway in Geels and Schot’s (2007) terminology brings a perspective 
on the programs of each manufacturer. General Motors large program only makes sense 
if it truly believed it could bring about the transformation to the socio-technological 
regime. As such an outcome is unlikely in a time frame which would make any degree 
of investment profitable; the assertion that the program had non market and political 
drivers appears the most likely. Toyota’s large program must be seen in the context of 
its even larger commitment to hybrids and its overall corporate strategy, discussed in 
Sub-section 5.2.3, that there will be changes to the socio-technological regime sooner or 
later, as well as Toyota’s very different corporate culture which focused on the medium 
to long term. Ford and Nissan’s apparent strategies also appear to make sense as it 
would seem that both were using a hedging strategy (Avadikyan and Llerena, 2010) to 
assure that they would not be left too far behind just in case the transformation did come 
about. What can also be gleaned from the example, however, is the enormous political 
and industrial power that a firm would need to lead such a transformation. Fuel cells did 
receive support from the Californian and U.S. governments but was not able to keep the 
rest of the industry focused on this relatively long-term solution. 
 
At the time of writing it appears that interest in fuel cell vehicles is increasing and one 
manufacturer which is not in the sample, Honda, is commercializing a fuel cell electric 
vehicle in the Unites States. 
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5.3.5 Hybrid electric vehicles 
 
o History and context 
 
In 1996 and 1997 Honda and Toyota launched hybrid vehicles in Japan, called the 
Insight and Prius respectively. Hybrid vehicles have both an internal combustion engine 
running on standard automotive fuel as well as a battery and one or several electric 
motors, and come in a wide variety of configurations. Hybrids have a cost disadvantage 
compared to traditional vehicles but get as much as 50% better fuel economy and do not 
suffer the range problem associated with battery electric vehicles. Toyota has sold more 
than one million of the cars around the world and has rolled out its hybrid technology to 
an additional 5 models in its fleet (www.toyota.co.jp, accessed 18.5.2009), and its 
success has inspired hybrid programs in most manufacturers. 
 
Hybrid vehicles are designed with one of three architectures which determine how the 
internal combustion engine and the electric motors work with each other. One solution 
is to add an electric motor to the vehicle which can provide additional power to the 
transmission when needed. Another solution is called “power-split” in which either 
power plant or both can drive the wheels. A third solution is to have the engine act as a 
generator of electricity which can re-charge the battery and/or power the wheels. This is 
the idea behind the new Chevy Volt concept being developed by General Motors. 
 
At the heart of all types of hybrids is the control system which manages the flow of 
electrical energy to and from the wheels, and governs the use of the two power trains 
which are either linked in parallel or in series with each other. Table 5.32 shows 
examples the first two types of hybrids introduced to the market.  
 
Hybrid Architecture Car Models 
Pre-transmission electric motor hybrids Honda Accord, Honda Civic, Chevy Silverado, 
Saturn VUE 
Power-Split Hybrids Ford Escape, Ford Fusion, Mercury Mariner, 
Lexus RX 400h, Lexus GS 450h, Toyota 
Highlander, Toyota Prius 
 
Table 5.32 Hybrid Vehicles Architecture (Alexander, 2006) 
 
Other recent models use what is called a “two mode hybrid system” which operates in 
one way at low speeds or low torque requirements and another at higher loads. At the 
heart of the two mode system is a transmission which has two electric motors 
incorporated into it such that the motors can add power directly to the transmission and 
the car can run without the internal combustion engine, like power split hybrids, but can 
also add additional power to the gears while the engine is running, like pre-transmission 
hybrids. The control system is arguably even more complex as it must govern the 
electric motors, the internal combustion engine, and also the planetary gears which 
resemble an automatic transmission to some extent. Figure 5.22 shows a sketch of the 
Chrysler system which was introduced in the 2009 Chrysler Aspen and Dodge Durango. 
General Motors has developed a similar system for the 2008 Chevrolet Tahoe and GMC 
Yukon. 
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Figure 5.22 Two Mode Hybrid Transmission 
(from http://alternativefuels.about.com/od/hybridvehicles Accessed 24.6.09) 
 
Four issues came together to push hybrid technology to the forefront and required a 
fundamental re-think by the industry as a whole. One was the sudden emergence of a 
segment of the car-buying public which was genuinely interested in making a personal 
statement about environmental sustainability (Buss, 2000; Reinhardt, 2005). A second 
issue was the steady rise of oil prices from 2000, reaching a peak of $147 per barrel in 
the summer of 2008, which drove gasoline prices to record levels and improved the cost 
benefit analysis of buying a hybrid car. The third issue is the competitive dynamics of 
the car business which pushes each company to “keep up” with one another - a 
phenomenon known as “mimetic homogeneity”, which Van den Hoed (2004) put at the 
centre of his thesis explaining the high level of activity in fuel cell electric vehicles. As 
can be seen in Appendix C, Honda, Toyota, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler all have 
hybrid models on the market. The fourth issue is that the U.S. Presidential election of 
2008 changed the level of discourse concerning the environment, and eventually both 
John McCain and Barak Obama embraced the twin goals of reducing emissions and 
seeking energy independence. President Obama recently scrapped the Bush 
Administration’s Fuel Cell program in favour of more immediate focused support for 
hybrid vehicles which are perceived to offer a much faster implementation timetable 
(Roland, 2009). 
 
Hybrids today represent about 3% of the automotive market with some analysts 
projecting 17% by 2010 (Giliberti, 2008). 
 
One interesting development is the emergence of so called “plug-in hybrids”. Plug-in 
hybrids are designed to overcome the limited all electric range of many of the hybrid 
vehicles currently on the market, which is perceived as a major shortcoming. The 
battery pack of the Toyota Prius, for example, can only be charged by running its 
internal combustion engine and through regenerative braking. The car is programmed to 
run all electric only in parking and other limited applications such as stop and go traffic 
jams. In the last few years, enthusiasts and hobbyists began breaking into Toyota’s 
operating system and electrical hardware to allow for more use of the all electric option 
and also to allow for recharging of the battery directly from the power grid.  
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At the time of writing, a number of companies are working on the launch of plug-in 
hybrids which would have 10, 20 or even 40 km range when running on batteries, 
allowing for all-electric operation in some cases such as for commuters or to qualify for 
inner city smog abatement programs, which limit traffic within the city limits to all but 
zero emission vehicles. Duvall and Alexander (2005) affirm that the widespread use of 
plug-in hybrids will result in much lower greenhouse gas emissions than either 
conventional internal combustion engines or hybrid vehicles, and Alexander (2006) 
quantified that amount as ranging from a 40% to 65% improvement over the 
conventional vehicle to a 7% to 46% improvement over the hybrid electric vehicle. 
Duvall (2004) quantifies the willingness to pay of American consumers for different 
types of electric vehicles, and shows in Table 5.33 that consumers who are interested in 
the technology will pay more for a similarly equipped vehicle, and that the amount 
increases with vehicle size and with all electric capability. The expectation that 
consumers are willing to pay more for hybrid technology is the basis of the 
development of hybrid vehicles, as the vehicle manufacturers simply do not yet enjoy 
sufficient margins to be able to absorb the extra cost inherent in hybrids. 
 
Vehicle Type Incremental price vs. conventional model 
Midsize Hybrid Electric $2,250 
Full size or SUV Hybrid Electric $3,000 
Mid Size Plug-in Hybrid with 20 Miles electric 
range 
$3,600 – $4,000 
Full Size / SUV Plug-in Hybrid with 20 Miles 
electric range 
$5,500 
 
Table 5.33 Willingness to pay for electric vehicles in the United States 
 
o Technology pathway analysis 
 
The trajectory of hybrids and plug-in hybrids appear to be following the re-
configuration pathway. In the first place, there is moderate environmental pressure in 
terms of fuel price. Secondly, hybrids have not yet reached the 5% level as established 
by Geels and Schot (2007) to consider a niche segment fully developed, and, despite its 
best efforts, Toyota has not managed to make its Hybrid Synergy Drive the dominant 
design which is another indication of the niche market not reaching sufficient readiness. 
Hybrids are, however, complementary to the current socio-technological system and can 
run on ubiquitous gasoline and even plug-ins are being designed to take advantage of 
the electrical infrastructure and suburban nature of many American households. 
 
o Empirical data 
 
Table 5.34 shows the differences in the hybrid programs of the four manufacturers 
where Toyota’s lead is again apparent in terms of the number of models and percentage 
of models in their fleet as detailed in Appendix C3 and shows not only Toyota’s leading 
position but Nissan’s apparent lack of interest in the technology. General Motors and 
Ford have both made important efforts in Hybrids with General Motors having 10 
models on the market in the 2010 model year. 
 152 
 
Technology GM Ford Toyota Nissan 
1st Model 2003 2004 1997 2007 
Number of models (2010) 10 4 7 1 
% Hybridization 23% 17% 29% 5% 
 
Table 5.34 Summary of hybrid deployment 
 
According to interview subject number 3, the General Motors percentage is overstated 
and hybridization should be calculated on sales and not model line-up. The model 
calculation is used because it is a measure of the manufacturer’s intention and reflects 
development commitments. Ford reaches four models due to counting the Mercury 
Mariner and Milan as separate vehicles, but this could also be challenged as the vehicles 
are actually very similar to the Ford Fusion and Escape. Removing the two models and 
changing Ford’s overall number of models by removing the Mercury nameplate would 
give Ford 10% hybridization.  
 
Table 5.35 shows the total U.S. patents for hybrids up to 2006 for the four firms in the 
sample and shows the very large number of patents filed by Toyota and Ford with 
significantly less effort on the part of General Motors and Nissan. In relative terms the 
efforts of Toyota and Ford appear even greater with even Nissan filing more patents as a 
percentage of its total than General Motors.  
 
Hybrids Total U.S. 
patents 
Hybrid 
Patents 
% of each 
firm 
% of four 
firms 
General Motors 13,078 66 0.50% 15% 
Ford 10,238 142 1.39% 32% 
Toyota 10,588 145 1.37% 33% 
Nissan 8,519 84 0.99% 19% 
Total 42,423 437 1.03% 100% 
 
Table 5.35 Total hybrid patents by manufacturer 
 
Table 5.36 gives the salient features of the Themescape maps generated for the U.S. 
hybrid patents of General Motors, Ford, Toyota and Nissan shown in Figures 5.2c, 5.6c, 
5.9c, and 5.13c and Figure 5.23 for convenience. Again Toyota and Ford show very 
broad patterns spread out over a wide area and General Motors and Nissan appear to 
have much more focused programs. 
 
Feature GM Ford Toyota Nissan 
Overall Size Medium Large Medium Very Small 
Landmass Contiguous with 
one Peninsula 
Spread out with 
two lagoons  
Archipelago Contiguous with 
two Peninsula 
Islands 0 4 7 2 
Peaks 8 6 4 3 
 
Table 5.36 Major features in hybrid patent visualization 
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Figure 5.23 Hybrid patent visualisation 
 
Toyota is the undisputed leader in hybrid vehicles at the time of writing and had 
pursued a broad deployment strategy pursuing both Prius and other technologies in 
Japan until focusing on Prius after its runaway success. Toyota is now rolling out the 
same technology across its fleet and its patents pattern resembles an archipelago of 
islands in the Themescape representation, indicating that its research efforts dealt with a 
number of issues related to hybrid vehicles.  
 
Ford’s approach most resembles Toyota’s and has a similar number of patents and also 
has them in a wider pattern. Ford, however, shows a different deployment pattern and 
based its hybrid strategy on the early introduction of a hybrid version of its Escape 
SUV, rather than a specially designed vehicle such as the Prius or Honda’s Insight. 
 
According to Geels and Schot (2002), one of the features of the re-configuration 
pathway ought to be a large degree of technological variation, and this can be seen in 
the case of hybrids with the different companies following heterogeneous strategies not 
only in terms of their deployment and patent pattern but also in the technologies being 
pursued. General Motors is, for example, promoting its Chevy Volt range extension 
vehicle, while Toyota continues to develop the Hybrid Synergy drive which is at the 
heart of the Prius, and Ford is in the process of moving away from Toyota technology to 
its own hybrid solution. 
 
Toyota 
 
Nissan 
 
Toyota 
 
Nissan 
 
General Motors 
 
Ford 
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Figure 5.24 Conceptual view of empirical results 
 
Figure 5.24 gives a conceptual view of the results presented in Chapter 5 and shows 
how the thesis approached the two sub-objectives and thus informed the research 
question. In terms of the manufacturer’s strategies, General Motors and Ford showed 
heterogeneity in their strategies in the different technologies, while Toyota and Nissan 
appear to be somewhat more consistent. General Motors’ response appears to indicate a 
tremendous capability to invest resources if and when it chooses to do so and this can be 
seen in their very large fuel cell program, pioneering work in seat belts and airbag 
technology, and their response in deploying rear seat belts and hybrid technology. Ford 
appears to pick its battles very carefully either as the result of in-depth analysis or 
political issues and is, for example, making a major effort in developing its own hybrid 
technology but has not appeared to make the same level of commitment to the other 
technologies in the sample. Toyota appears to follow a very consistent and focused 
technological deployment strategy and also has relatively concentrated pattern patterns 
in all cases other than in hybrids, in which it is said (interview subjects #1,3) to have 
developed a leadership position in the technology and which is protected by its patents 
although is also over-engineered (interview subjects #6,7). In all cases Nissan appears 
to follow a focused strategy consistent with the idea of being a fast follower in the 
market and it appears that, in hybrids, Nissan chose not to try and catch up and this 
might explain its recent commitment to the battery electric Nissan Leaf. 
5.4 Chapter summary  
 
The purpose of Chapter 5 was to review the empirical data in order to inform the 
research question and sub-objectives presented in Section 1.1 and reproduced below:  
 
Research Question: What strategies do automotive companies follow with respect to 
the investigation and deployment of discontinuous technologies? 
 
Sub-objective 1: Explore how companies approach the development of different 
technologies  
Sub-objective 2: Assess how different companies develop the same technologies  
Seat Belt 
strategies 
Seat Belts 
Nissan Toyota Ford GM 
Airbags 
Fuel Cells 
Hybrids 
Airbag 
strategies 
Fuel cell 
strategies 
Hybrid 
strategies 
Seat Belt 
strategies 
Seat Belts 
Nissan Toyota Ford GM 
Airbags 
Fuel Cells 
Hybrids 
Airbag 
strategies 
Fuel cell 
strategies 
Hybrid 
strategies 
GM 
strategies 
Ford 
strategies 
Toyota 
strategies 
Nissan 
strategies 
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With respect to the analysis of the data by technology, Sub-section 5.3.1 introduced 
Geels and Schot’s (2007) technology pathway framework which was used to position 
each technology along one of the pathways in the hope of gaining additional insight into 
the strategies pursued by the manufacturers. The results of the pathway analysis is 
summarized in Table 5.37 and shows how each technology can be positioned along a 
different one of the four pathways. This result was serendipitous as the pathways were 
not part of the technology selection criteria discussed in Sub-section 3.4.2. 
 
 
 
Seat Belts Airbags Hybrid 
Vehicles 
Fuel Cell 
Vehicles 
Environmental 
Pressure 
Moderate 
pressure building 
up to federal 
legislation 
Sudden landscape 
change due to 
legislation (1973) 
Moderate 
pressure for fuel 
efficiency and 
sustainability  
Moderate 
pressure for 
medium term 
sustainability  
“Readiness” at 
the Niche level 
• 3 point system 
already 
common 
• Active supply 
base and 
adoption by 
Daimler Benz 
• Clearly 
defined niche 
market 
• No dominant 
design  
• No powerful 
actors 
• No penetration 
in niche 
markets 
• No dominant 
design  
• Toyota first 
powerful 
player 
• Prius and 
Insight define 
new market 
niche 
• No dominant 
design  
• GM, Daimler, 
and Toyota 
establish 
apparent 
consensus 
• Slow 
development 
of niche 
markets 
Degree to which 
new technology 
is 
Complementary 
Seat belts 
required little 
technical 
adjustment but 
fundamental 
behavioural 
change 
At the time the 
technological 
complexity and 
cost were seen as 
insurmountable 
Potentially 
complementary to 
ICE engines but at 
high cost 
Not 
complimentary 
(unless reformer 
solution is 
pursued) 
Pathway Technological 
substitution 
De-alignment, re-
alignment 
Re-Configuration Transformation 
 
Table 5.37 Summary of technology pathway analysis 
 
With respect to seatbelts, its position on the technological substitution pathway is based 
on the development of a niche market by Volvo and Saab, which first developed and 
deployed the technologies, and a segment of consumers who appear to value safety and 
in some cases are willing to pay for it. The case study on seat belts also shows the 
impact of the supply base as well as path dependency in technology deployment as 
Toyota and Nissan were able to catch up to General Motors in seat belts despite its very 
large and multifaceted research program, and Toyota was able to do so without much of 
its own research as shown in the patent counts. The pretensioner data, while incomplete, 
does give an indication of the role of path dependencies by limiting the ability or 
perhaps the necessity of both General Motors and Ford in deploying the technology due 
to the design of their current models. The seat belt data also shows co-evolution in the 
industry as Volvo and Saab’s early introduction of seat belts gave the technology 
legitimacy at the niche level and, much later, General Motor’s decision to install rear 
seat belts in advance of legislation made them standard. 
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Air bags are positioned along the de-alignment, re-alignment pathway mainly due to the 
high degree of technological and legislative turmoil which existed around passive 
restraint technology during the late 1970s and 1980s. General Motors again invested 
heavily in the technology but then seemed to slow down in its deployment while Ford, 
Toyota and Nissan all accelerated their airbag deployments once the technological 
paradigm became clear in the early 1990s. The role of the supply base appears to have 
been critical as well as the early investment of Volvo and Chrysler’s decision, discussed 
in Sub-section 5.3.2, to deploy the airbags again demonstrating co-evolution. 
 
Fuel cells are considered to be on the transformation pathway and the main finding 
from the data is that while General Motors did appear to make a very large investment 
in the technology it other manufacturers such as Nissan did very little demonstrating 
heterogeneity in response as to the homogeneity found by Van den Hoed (2004). Three 
possible explanations for this heterogeneity emerge from the data. One is that the 
different manufacturers came to different conclusions as to the scope of the 
transformation required and time frame needed for it and that in hindsight General 
Motors either wasted effort doing too much or perhaps did not invest enough to actually 
produce the transformation it was betting on. Had its efforts been successful, General 
Motors would have changed its competitive environment through its technology 
development. A different explanation has to do with the non market hypothesis that 
General Motors and Ford were well compensated by their investment in fuel cell 
technology by the Bush administration’s inaction on CAFÉ standards (interview 
subjects #3, 6, and 7). A third possible explanation is political and has to do with the 
reported political infighting at General Motors (interview subject #6), Ford’s leadership 
crisis (discussed in Sub-section 4.4), Toyota’s commitment to its earth charter 
(discussed in Sub-section 5.2.3), and the opposition of Nissan’s president Carlos Ghosn 
to alternative power train technology (discussed in Sub-section 5.2.4). 
 
Hybrid vehicles are considered to be on the re-Configuration pathway primarily 
because of their compatibility with the socio-technological regime which has been built 
around the internal combustion engine. Toyota’s leadership position in hybrids is clear 
in the data and appears to show the success of Toyota’s apparent hedging strategy 
(Avadikyan and Llerena, 2010) based on its “earth charter”, in which it made a 
corporate decision to make considerable investments in a number of alternatives in 
parallel to the internal combustion engine. Ahman (2006) describes the support of the 
Japanese Government for the development of hybrid technology, and it is also 
interesting to note that while Toyota and Honda did take advantage of that support, 
Nissan did not. Hybrids have also benefited from increasing changes in the overall 
socio-technical landscape both in the spike in fuel prices which occurred over the 
summer of 2009 as well as the changing political agenda in the United States in favour 
of the twin goals of energy security and a reduction in CO2. Hybrids also show that the 
actions of Toyota and Honda helped create the climate in which they were successful 
again demonstrating co-evolution. In the case of hybrid technology mimetic 
homogeneity (Van den Hoed, 2004) can be seen in the response of General Motors and 
Ford with Nissan being the only major company to limit its hybrid program. At the time 
of writing no dominant design has emerged and, in this period, Nissan appears to be 
attempting to leapfrog the technology with its battery electric vehicle while General 
Motors attempts to change the game with its Chevy Volt range extension programme. 
 157 
CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 5 gives the empirical evidence of the thesis and looks at the deployment data 
and patent pattern for each of the four companies in the sample as well as the four 
technologies under investigation. The purpose of this chapter is to synthesise and 
discuss the findings from the data, show how the findings relate to the literature and 
explore different explanations of those findings. 
 
This chapter will first explore what appears to be a consistent pattern in the data and use 
the ideas of depth and breadth, first introduced in Sub-section 3.3.3, to perform cross-
case analysis of the case studies presented in Chapter 5. This discussion will be 
presented in Section 6.2. The terms depth and breadth have been used by several 
researchers to illustrate issues of scope at a number of levels, and Sub-section 6.2.1 will 
review that literature and discuss those definitions which are the most relevant to the 
thesis. Sub-section 6.2.2 will put forward a definition of depth and breadth and this 
definition will then be applied to the data in Chapter 5 and discussed in Sub-section 
6.2.3. Sub-section 6.2.4 will put forward a construct relating the deployment data and 
patent data sets refining the ideas originally put forward in Sub-section 3.3.3.  
 
Section 6.3 will discuss the implications of the ideas of depth and breadth with Sub-
section 6.3.1 focussing on the company case studies and Sub-section 6.3.2 giving a 
consolidated view of the case studies incorporating the concepts of depth and breadth as 
well as Geels and Schot’s (2007) technology pathways, which were discussed for each 
technology under consideration in Chapter 5. Sub-section 6.3.3 will then take the 
empirical data one step further and explore what could be some implications for practice 
based on the research.  
 
Section 6.4 will look at how these findings can be related to the innovation management 
literature discussed in Sub-section 2.2.1; Section 6.5 will position the findings in light 
of the current debate concerning the evolution of automotive power train technology 
discussed in Sub-section 2.2.2; and Section 6.6 will summarize the Chapter. 
 
6.2 Depth and breadth  
 
The ideas of depth and breadth are first introduced in the thesis in Sub-section 3.3.3 as 
what Eisenhardt (1989) refers to as an a priori construct. The original construct is 
shown in Figure 3.2 and explores the degree to which a firm’s technology development 
path as shown in its patent record might be linked to its technology deployment strategy 
as shown in the introduction of a specific new technology across its product line. The 
limitations of both sets of data are explored in Sections 3.5 and 3.6 respectively and the 
terms depth and breadth are used to develop two aspects of scope. In order to be more 
precise in their use the following will first review how the literature uses these terms 
and then offer a definition of depth and breadth for the thesis. 
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6.2.1 Depth and breadth in the literature 
 
Teece et al. (1997) use the concepts of depth and width in their dynamic capabilities 
framework to qualify the set of technology opportunities that a firm might have based 
on its research and development path. Teece et al. argue that if there are technologies 
with market potential “in the neighbourhood of a firm’s prior research activities” (p. 
524) then firms are more likely to work on them than other subjects.   
 
Granstrand et al. (1997) discuss the importance of firms having a technological base 
that is broader than the product line, challenging Prahalad and Hamel’s (1990) concept 
of core competencies. For Granstrand et al. “management in large firms needs to sustain 
a broader (if less deep) set of technological competencies” (p. 18). Broader appears to 
refer to the 34 technological classifications used in the research and, while “less deep” 
is not explicitly defined, it appears to refer to the range of technological competence 
discussed in the paper, running from full design capability to systems integration, 
applied research, and exploratory research. 
 
Prencipe (2000) uses depth and breadth in his work which applies the dynamic 
capabilities framework to describe the different positions that different aircraft engine 
manufacturers enjoy with respect to engine control systems. Prencipe (2000) shows how 
one competitor re-configures its technological capabilities to manage the transition from 
electromechanical to digital control systems and uses the concepts of breadth and depth 
to discuss the technological abilities of the engine manufacturers. For Prencipe, breadth 
is defined as the number of different technologies possessed, such as incorporating 
digital electronics and software development to what had formerly been hydro-
mechanical control systems. By depth, Prencipe means different levels of knowledge 
such as components or systems architecture. Depth is also used to describe the level of 
knowledge a firm has concerning a particular component or system, including the 
ability to define requirements, do the design work, manufacture the part or parts, 
perform different levels of testing, and integrate the component or system into 
increasingly larger and complex assemblies and devices. One of the main findings of 
Prencipe’s work is that, in the particular case of control systems for aircraft engines, one 
manufacturer, Rolls Royce, enjoyed a much broader and deeper set of technological 
capabilities than was strictly needed in its primary role of systems integrator and that 
this “boundary overlap”, as he calls it, has been a source of competitive advantage.  
 
Cusumano and Nobeoka (1997) look at similar concepts in their study of 210 product 
launches in the automotive industry between 1980 and 1991. Looking at the total 
vehicle level, Cusumano and Nobeoka were interested in exploring the degree and 
speed of new technology transfer across new project launches and determined that firms 
which engaged in what they called rapid design transfer were able to introduce more 
new models faster than those which took a more step by step approach. In many ways 
the concepts of depth and breadth mirror Cusumano and Nobeoka’s typology of new 
design, and rapid design transfer mirrors the concepts of depth and breadth as used by 
Prencipe. 
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Wang and Von Tunzelmann (2000) also used the terms breadth and depth to describe 
the complexity with which firms are faced. For Wang and Von Tunzelmann, breadth is 
the range of areas that have to be investigated while depth is the analytical 
sophistication of the subject. They also introduce the idea that specific processes can be 
coactive or conflicting in terms of adding complexity to one or both dimensions. 
Conflicting processes reinforce the idea that there is a trade-off between depth and 
breadth, while coactive processes are ones that actually allow processes to add 
complexity in both directions. 
 
Brusoni et al. (2005) build on Prencipe’s work and attempt to operationalize Wang and 
von Tunzelmann’s concepts in such a way as to look broadly over a firm’s knowledge 
base using patents and bibliometric data, rather than the detailed case study approach 
followed by Prencipe. For Brusoni et al., breadth for firms is defined as the “range of 
scientific and technological knowledge that impinge upon the development of the 
specific product market in which they compete” and depth as the degree of “integration 
across different typologies of research (i.e., basic, applied and development oriented)” 
(p. 397). While useful in characterizing the overall knowledge base, Brusoni et al. 
(2005) appear to lift the vantage point quite high, making it difficult to see clearly how 
firms actually go about diversifying the knowledge base itself. 
 
6.2.2 Definition of depth and breadth 
 
While Brusoni et al. attempt to expand the concepts of depth and breadth in a firm’s 
knowledge base so that they can be more readily investigated with the data intensive 
bibliometric methodology they employ, the thesis uses the terms to reach a finer level of 
granularity and explore the technology level as it relates to specific products, features 
and components. Thus the focus of the thesis is not on a firm’s knowledge base, as in 
the work cited above, but on its product program - specifically in the context of 
developing and deploying new technology. 
 
For the thesis, a broad strategy is defined as: pursuing a number of parallel projects 
looking at different aspects of the new technology and/or seeking to implement the 
technology in a wide variety of applications. A deep technological strategy, on the other 
hand, is defined as: focusing efforts on developing the technology in a single or limited 
number of applications prior to a potential or eventual roll out across the product line. 
 
These definitions of depth and breadth are a logical extension of the use of the concepts 
by other researchers to the higher level of granularity that is of interest, i.e., specific 
technologies. 
 
Research Level of Analysis 
Brusoni et al. (2005) Knowledge base at the firm level 
Wang and Von Tunzelmann (2000) Technological complexity 
Prencipe (2000) Technological capabilities in specific field 
Cusumano and Nobeoka (1997) Complex product level (vehicles) 
Thesis Technology level 
 
Table 6.1 Levels of analysis for breadth and depth in the literature  
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6.2.3 Application of depth and breadth 
 
The following section will review the case study data presented in Chapter 5 in light of 
the concepts of depth and breadth defined in Sub-section 6.2.2. These concepts appear 
to manifest themselves both in the patent data and the deployment data as shown in 
Table 6.2 which gives a framework for application of the concepts. 
 
Concept Patent Data Deployment Data 
Depth • Patents are grouped around a 
relatively small number of key 
concepts 
• Relatively large numbers of 
patents are found on the same 
topics 
• New technology is seen first in a 
limited part of the product line 
and only deployed in a wider 
application after a time delay 
• Alternate technical solutions are 
pursued in sequence 
Breadth • Patents are seen on a large 
number of topics 
• Relatively few patents are found 
on the same topics 
• New technology appears 
simultaneously across the 
product line 
• Alternate technological solutions 
are pursued in parallel 
 
Table 6.2 Depth and breadth framework 
 
In the patent data, it is necessary to interpret the Themescape maps in order to see the 
patterns of depth and breadth. In this interpretation one must take care to control for the 
particular problems associated with the algorithm discussed in Section 3.5 which 
primarily have to do with correctly interpreting the scale of the maps and controlling for 
the overall number of patents when analyzing them. Nevertheless, the topographic 
metaphor introduced in Section 3.5 and used in Chapter 5 can help in identifying depth 
and breadth as shown in the analysis guidelines shown in Table 6.3. 
 
Feature Indicator(s) of depth Indicator(s) of breadth 
Overall Size • Smaller area • Larger Area 
Landmass • Contiguous with few inlets or 
lagoons 
• Non-contiguous showing an 
Archipelago and/or deep inlets 
and lagoons 
Islands • Fewer islands 
• Smaller islands 
• More islands 
• Larger islands 
 
Peaks • Fewer peaks 
• Peaks grouped together 
• Higher peaks and generally 
higher topography 
• More peaks 
• Peaks located apart from each 
other 
• Lower peaks and generally lower 
topography 
 
Table 6.3 Analysis guidelines for depth and breadth in Themescape maps 
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Thus an extremely deep strategy would appear in the Themescape maps as an isolated 
mountain rising up from the sea like a volcanic island in the South Pacific. It would 
have a small area and consist of one land mass rising up to a single high peak. An 
extremely broad strategy would resemble an archipelago and consist of a number of 
low-lying islands spread out over a wide area. As the actual representations discussed in 
Chapter 5 rarely conform to these two simplistic ideals, it is necessary to interpret the 
patterns and also to evaluate them with respect to each other indicating that the concepts 
of depth and breadth are not black and white extremes but ends of a continuum along 
which strategies can be found. With respect to the deployment data discussed in the case 
studies in Chapter 5, depth and breadth would manifest themselves directly in the 
timing and characteristics of the seat belts, airbags, fuel cell vehicles, and hybrid 
vehicles deployed by the manufacturers. As this data also requires interpretation the 
same concept of a continuum will be applied and is shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
Deep Partially deep Indeterminate Partially broad Broad  
Dominance of 
deep 
characteristics 
More attributes 
indicating depth 
than breadth 
Pattern is 
intermediate or 
unclear 
More attributes 
indicating breadth 
than depth 
Dominance of 
broad 
characteristics 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Classification scale for depth and breadth  
 
o General Motors 
 
Figure 5.2a shows the cumulative seat belt patents of General Motors using the 
Themescape representation. The pattern shows a single, large, contiguous land mass 
with no islands and 11 peaks located on three distinct ridge lines. Applying the 
guidelines in Table 6.3 would thus classify the pattern as broad, based on the number of 
peaks and overall size of the pattern, but also as deep, since there is only one land mass 
and no islands. GM has 116 patents in seat belts so one could interpret the pattern as 
being fundamentally broad but the sheer volume of patents acts to raise the elevation of 
the entire land mass essentially connecting the disparate peaks which might have shown 
up as islands with a lower overall elevation. Using the classification scale in Figure 6.1, 
GM’s seat belt patents appear partially broad. 
 
GM’s airbag pattern shown in Figure 5.2b has a much smaller land mass and two very 
high adjacent peaks. Using the guidelines in Table 6.3, this pattern should be 
characterized as deep especially considering the GM has 139 airbag patents or 20% 
more patents than in seat belts. 
 
GM’s hybrid patent pattern, shown in Figure 5.2c, also appears to cover a relative small 
area and has no islands but does have seven separate peaks one of which is located on a 
small peninsula indicating a broader approach than in airbags. With only 66 hybrid 
patents, the large number of peaks appears to indicate a relatively concentrated pattern 
of discovery which would lead to classification of the pattern as deep. 
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GM’s fuel cell patents, shown in Figure 5.2d depicts an eleven island archipelago 
spread out over a wide area with only one small peak and, given the fact that GM had 
205 fuel cell patents, such a spread out pattern should be classified as broad using the 
guidelines in Table 6.3. 
 
Table 5.4 gives the rear seat and pretensioner penetration in GM over time and shows 
how GM rolled out rear seat belts in one wave between 1988 and 1999 but took seven 
years to gradually increase the penetration of pretensioners from 13% of its fleet in 2001 
to 96% in 2007. Using the definition of depth and breadth given in Sub-section 6.2.2 
and the framework provided in Table 6.2, it would appear that the rear seat belt data 
indicates a broad strategy as GM endeavoured to implement the technology across its 
product line very quickly while the pretensioner data would indicate a deep strategy. 
The explanations offered for the pretensioner roll out in Sub-section 5.2.1, however, 
suggests that the timing had little to do with the technology itself and more to do with 
the safety system in which it is embedded. Using the classification scale in Figure 6.1, 
the deployment data for seat belts should be classified as indeterminate. 
 
In airbags, General Motors’ deployment shows features associated with a deep strategy 
in Table 6.2. GM introduced new generations of airbag technology in selected models 
and then, after several years, rolled the technology out to more models in the fleet. 
 
GM’s hybrid vehicles program is summarized in Table 5.5 and shows GM developing 
four hybrid systems sequentially and perfecting the technology in one model before 
rolling it out to others during a major restyling or model change. Applying the 
framework in Table 6.2, GM’s hybrid deployment could be characterized as deep. 
 
GM’s fuel cell program is summarized in Table 5.6 and shows how GM pursued several 
technologies in parallel which is a characteristic of a broad program as defined in Sub-
section 6.2.2 and elaborated in Table 6.2. The problem with GM’s fuel cell program is 
the sheer size of the effort which naturally produced a large number of prototypes. 
Rather than consider it a broad strategy, interview subject number 7 characterized GM’s 
fuel cell program as a series of deep deployments and see the entire program as 
evidence of what this expert called General Motor’s “technological arrogance”. While 
this idea has some validity, the definition provided considers parallel activities as 
aspects of broad strategy regardless of the funding level. 
 
Table 6.4 shows a summary chart for GM indicating how the ideas of depth and breadth 
apply to the case study developed in Sub-section 5.2.1 based on the definition provided 
in Sub-section 6.2.2 and developed further in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 and then classified 
according to the scale put forward in Figure 6.1. 
 
 
Deep Partially Deep Indeterminate Partially 
broad 
Broad  
Patent 
Analyses 
o Airbags 
o Hybrids 
  o Seat belts o Fuel cells 
Deployment 
Data Analysis 
o Airbags 
o Hybrids 
 o Seat belts  o Fuel cells 
 
Table 6.4 Summary chart for General Motors 
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There does not seem to be evidence of path dependence in the GM data as it appears to 
follow deep strategies in airbags and hybrids and a broad strategy in fuel cells as well as 
pursuing different strategies in different aspects of seat belt deployment. What does 
come across, especially in the interviews, is the idea mentioned above of “technological 
arrogance”. This view is characterised by a quote attributed to a GM executive 
concerning airbags, given by interview subject 8, that “there is not a problem we can’t 
solve. The only question is which problems to solve”. According to subject number 7, 
General Motors’ managers and executives had a firm belief in their role as the largest 
car company in the world, with the most resources and the highest economies of scale. 
GM would naturally do whatever it felt like and would be successful as soon as the 
volume kicked in. 
 
Such an attitude appears to have resulted in large, well-funded, game-changing 
programs which can then be classified as deep or broad depending on the factors listed 
in Table 6.2. In the case of rear seat belts and fuel cells it appears that political 
considerations led GM to deploy the rear seats quickly and initiate a parallel set of fuel 
cell activities which the thesis classifies as broad. In the case of airbags and hybrids GM 
appears to have sought to perfect the technology in one application before rolling it out 
to more vehicles in its fleet. As discussed in Sub-section 5.2.1, interview subject 
number 6 pointed out how new technologies would often be first developed for GM’s 
Cadillac division, as Cadillac was one of the only divisions with sufficient financial 
resources to pay for new technology, and then rolled out across the wider fleet 
following what the thesis refers to as a deep strategy.  
 
GM’s choice of depth or breadth appears, in summary, to be the result of cultural and 
political factors and the way the managerial accounts were managed as much as 
anything else. 
 
o Ford 
 
Applying the analysis guidelines shown in Table 6.3 to Ford’s patent data shown in 
Figures 5.6a - 5.6d yields the following conclusions. Ford’s 63 seat belt patents appear 
on the Themescape representation as a low-lying land mass of medium size with one 
peak and one small island. While there does appear to be a broad valley separating the 
land mass, the overall pattern should be classified as deep using the guidelines shown in 
Table 6.3. The seat belt pattern does have several different contour lines separated by 
valleys but only one peak and one small island. Using the classification scale shown in 
Figure 6.1, it appears that the best characterization of Ford’s airbag patents would be 
partially deep. 
 
The more focused airbag representation has three separate peaks, a much smaller land 
mass and no islands. Ford does, however, have fewer airbag patents than seat belts (46 
vs. 63) so one would expect the land mass to be smaller. The fact that it is also higher 
implies a deeper technology deployment strategy and it should be classified as deep. 
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Ford’s relatively large number of hybrid patents (Table 5.7) and the Themescape 
representation shown in Figure 5.6c yield a large land mass with four separate peaks, a 
deep lagoon and four islands. This pattern should be characterized as broad using the 
guidelines in Table 6.3 and the classification scale shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
In fuel cells, Ford has only 40 patents which is the lowest number of fuel cell patents of 
any of the manufacturers and also the lowest percentage of its own patents in fuel cells 
(Table 5.7). The possible reasons for this are discussed in Sub-section 5.2.2 and might 
be linked to Ford’s investment in Bollard as its fuel cell supplier. As discussed this 
would logically lead Ford to only develop its own technology in specific areas where it 
thought it needed to complement Bollard’s. Figure 5.6d shows a medium sized land 
mass with two deep lagoons and a large island and three widely separated peaks and 
should be characterized as broad. 
 
The data on Ford’s rear seat belt deployment is shown in Table 5.9 and indicates a deep 
pattern, as Ford appears to have deployed the seat belts on just five models in 1988 and 
1989 and then another 10 models in 1990. It is, however, possible that Ford’s back seat 
program was simply slower than GMs and that the deployment strategy was 
fundamentally the same. The fact that Ford uncoupled the deployment of rear seat belts 
from major re-styling, however, supports the hypothesis that Ford engineers and product 
planners chose to wait and evaluate the deployment on the first few vehicles before 
committing to the entire fleet. This kind of trial-and error approach is consistent with 
the idea that the deployment strategy was fundamentally deep. 
 
The pretensioner data for Ford is less clear, as Ford had already installed the devices on 
70% of its models prior to 2001. Ford did, however, take an additional five years to 
reach full deployment and appeared to place the pretensioners on models at the time of 
major re-styling efforts, echoing GM’s very slow deployment. Taken together one could 
argue for characterizing the seat belt deployment as partially deep using the scale given 
in Figure 6.1, although the case could also be made for indeterminate due to the 
pretensioner data. 
 
Ford’s airbag deployment shown in Figure 5.7 was introduced in waves. Ford, for 
example wait for 2-7 years between installing second generation airbags on the first 9 
models and then rolling out the technology across the rest of the fleet. This type of 
pattern is consistent with a deep strategy as shown in Table 6.2. 
 
Ford’s hybrid program is shown in Table 5.10 and can be interpreted in different ways. 
On the one hand Ford has been dividing its efforts between two technological solutions 
in its effort to develop an alternative to its reliance on Toyota’s technology, as discussed 
by interview subject 7, and this kind of parallel effort would be considered as broad 
using the definition in Sub-section 6.2.2. In addition Ford has been pursuing hybrids on 
multiple body styles since 2006 and this type of diversification would be classified as a 
feature of a broad strategy. One could also argue that the program is still not that broad 
and, although Ford has 4 hybrid models on the market, it has essentially developed only 
two hybrid vehicles (Fusion/Milan, Escape/Mariner each of which are badged for both 
the Ford and Mercury brands). On balance, Ford’s hybrid program is classified as 
partially broad using the scale in Figure 6.1. 
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Ford’s fuel cell program (Table 5.11) has largely been focused on using Ballard’s 
compressed hydrogen fuel cell stacks although there have been exceptions to this idea, 
such as the Mazda Premacy project which used reformatted methane as the feed stock 
and, while the technology platform has been stable, Ford has experimented with a larger 
number of body styles and configurations. In terms of body styles Ford has put fuel 
cells in sedans, sub-compacts, compacts, and SUVs and, in terms of configuration, is 
developing the Edge HySeries hybrid fuel cell/plug-in vehicle and supported the high 
speed Fusion 999 prototype. Considering the range of the relatively small program, 
Ford’s fuel cells could be characterized as partially broad using the scale put forward in 
Figure 6.1, although one could argue for its placement as indeterminate as well. 
 
Table 6.5 shows a summary of the classification applied to the patent representations 
and deployment data for Ford. 
 
 Deep Partially deep Indeterminate Partially 
broad 
Broad  
Patent 
Analyses 
o Airbags o Seat belts   o Hybrids 
o Fuel cells 
Deployment 
Data Analysis 
o Airbags o Seat belts 
 
 o Hybrids 
o Fuel cells 
 
 
Table 6.5 Summary chart for Ford 
 
In terms of path dependence it is difficult to draw a conclusion from the Ford data, 
although the seat belts and airbags would lead one to assume that, at least at one point in 
time, Ford favoured deep strategies. While interview subject number 1 recognized a 
tendency in both General Motors and Ford for deep strategies that represented a “silver 
bullet” to solve particular problems, subject number 7 felt that the CEO plays a pivotal 
role in technology strategy and that Ford “lurches back and forth” according to the 
personality and agenda of the CEO at the time. 
 
The Ford data also makes clear that there are a large number of variables that affect 
what a company will do concerning new technology at a given point in time including 
its overall economic situation and the management issue mentioned above. Ford’s 
hybrid and fuel cell deployment clearly appear to have been heavily influenced by the 
fortunes of Bill Ford, an environmental enthusiast, and by the economic difficulties the 
company faced in the early 2000’s which appear to have led it to scale back its efforts 
on fuel cells. 
 
o Toyota 
 
Toyota has 60 patents in seat belts as shown in Table 5.12 and the Themescape 
representation of them (Figure 5.9a) , shows features associated with deep and broad 
strategies. There is a central core area with two large, contiguous peaks but this is 
surrounded by hills spread out across the landmass. The two peaks could be used to 
classify the strategy as deep while the large peninsulas and two small islands would be 
an indication of a broader strategy. A balanced application of the guidelines shown in 
Table 6.3 and the classification scale in Figure 6.1 places the pattern as partially deep. 
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In the Themescape representation shown in Figure 5.9b, Toyota’s airbag patents also 
have both broad and deep characteristics. The main land mass has a total of six peaks 
but the two largest are adjacent to each other and form the central feature of the 
representation. There are also four small islands. In airbags, Toyota filed 90 patents 
(Table 5.12) which gives the representation a generally higher elevation than in the case 
of the seat belt representation. Overall the pattern again appears to be partially deep 
using the classification scale in Figure 6.1. 
 
In Hybrids Toyota has filed 145 patents through 2006, as shown in Table 5.12, and 
these patents are shown as an eight island archipelago in the Themescape representation 
shown in Figure 5.9c. While there are four peaks and two are adjacent to each other, the 
pattern should be classified as broad using the classification scale. 
 
The representation of Toyota’s fuel cell patents shown in Figure 5.9d shows a medium 
size land mass with a small island, a large peninsula and only one peak. While some of 
these features would appear to indicate breadth, most of the patents appear to fall along 
a central ridge line in the representation and the relatively high elevation of this ridge 
could be interpreted as a sign of depth as would the overall smaller area of the 
representation. Using the classification scale in Figure 6.1 it would appear that the best 
classification would be partially deep. 
 
Toyota’s rear seat belt deployment is shown in Table 5.14; Toyota deployed the 
technology across its fleet in two years. Toyota had only 6 models with rear seats in its 
U.S. fleet in 1989 and one could argue that the pattern was either broad or deep 
depending on the interpretation. GM’s deployment over its much larger fleet over two 
years was considered, as shown in Sub-section 6.3.1, as a very fast, broad deployment, 
yet one could also argue that Toyota perfected the deployment on one model in 1988 
and then deployed to the other 5 following the deep deployment pattern shown in Table 
6.2. Because Toyota had already equipped its entire fleet with pretensioners by 2001, 
the pretensioner data is not useful. On balance the deployment data for seat belts is 
considered indeterminate. 
 
In airbags, Toyota’s deployment is presented in Figure 5.10 and shows elements of both 
a deep and a broad strategy. As discussed in Sub-section 5.3.3, Toyota appears to bring 
out the new technology in selected models and deploys to the rest of its vehicles after a 
time delay in line with a deep strategy. On the other hand, Toyota deployed different 
generation technologies at the same time in 2004. This second trend, however, appears 
to have more to do with the increased pace of technological change, and in fact Toyota 
finds itself deploying smart airbags to selected models while still bringing the last 
models up to second generation airbags. In an effort to account for both ideas, Toyota 
can be classified as partially deep using the scale shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
Toyota’s hybrid program is summarized in Table 5.15 and again requires interpretation. 
While the U.S. data presented shows Toyota pursuing a deep strategy focused around 
the Prius and its hybrid synergy drive, interview subject number 3 placed the Prius 
program in context and maintained that Toyota pursued different electric vehicles and 
also launched a minivan hybrid called the Estima in Japan in 2001 and only increasingly 
centred its efforts on Prius as it became a runaway success. 
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What does characterize Toyota’s hybrid program is the large number of variants and 
body styles currently in development and production. This deployment, however, only 
occurred after three generations of the Toyota Prius were developed and the technology 
refined; such a program is classified as deep using the definition in Sub-section 6.2.2. 
Finally there is evidence of Toyota pursuing parallel tracks both at the vehicle level, 
such as offering electric running mode in Japan but not in the United States, and in 
developing multiple battery technologies. On balance it would appear that Toyota’s 
program is more deep than broad due to its reliance on the hybrid synergy drive and the 
way it first developed the technology for the Prius. 
 
Toyota’s fuel cell program, appears to fall in the more deep than broad classification as 
most of its efforts, shown in Table 5.16, have been focused around the continuous 
development of its proprietary fuel cell technology and the FCV series of vehicles, but it 
has also developed the FINE-S and FINE-N vehicles which use radical vehicle 
architectures. 
  
Table 6.6 presents a summary of the analysis of the Toyota patent and deployment data 
using the classification scale shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
 Deep Partially deep Indeterminate Partially 
broad 
Broad  
Patent 
Analyses 
 o Seat belts 
o Airbags 
o Fuel cells 
 
  
 
o Hybrids 
 
Deployment 
Data Analysis 
 o Airbags 
o Hybrids 
o Fuel cells 
 
o Seat belts 
 
  
 
Table 6.6 Summary chart for Toyota 
 
In terms of path dependence, Toyota appears to favour deeper strategies but the 
evidence is not compelling. Interview subject number 2 felt that “fast follower” was a 
more accurate description of Toyota’s technology strategy and that he did not see a 
tendency towards depth or breadth. Insisting on the strength of Toyota in the safety 
area, subject number 8 remarked on its ability to mobilise its people and said that “once 
in motion, everyone gets on board”. 
 
Toyota’s culture of continuous improvement and the managerial processes discussed in 
Sub-section 5.2.3 appear to allow it to place relatively large bets on technology and then 
push for rapid roll out when a decision is finally taken. This idea is consistent with the 
literature on automotive product development, discussed in Sub-section 2.2.1, including 
Clark and Fujimoto (1989,1991) on Japanese new product development in general and 
also Coup’s (1999) account of the history of Toyota’s developments of alternative 
power train technology. 
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o Nissan 
 
The Themescape representation of Nissan’s seat belt patents are shown in Figure 5.13a 
and show a single, small land mass with four peaks, two of which are adjacent and form 
a central massif. The pattern also has two small inlets. Nissan filed 103 seat belt patents 
(Table 5.17) and this gives the small land mass a high elevation. It appears that the 
pattern can be characterized as deep using the classification scale shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
The airbag representation shows a similar pattern, although it covers an even smaller 
area; this is probably due to Nissan having only 47 patents in airbags, as shown in Table 
5.17. The representation has one large peak and three smaller peaks and a large 
peninsula but should be classified as deep to its overall elevation and small size. 
 
The representation of the Nissan’s hybrid patents shown in Figure 5.13c has three 
contiguous peaks rising out of a small central land mass which has three islands and two 
peninsulas. Table 5.17 shows Nissan with 84 patents, giving the land mass a relatively 
high elevation. On balance it appears that Nissan’s hybrid pattern is partially deep using 
the classification scale in Figure 6.1. 
 
The representation of Nissan’s fuel cell patents is shown in Figure 5.13d and, while the 
large land mass only has one island, it does have two deep lagoons and three peaks 
spread out along a central ridge line. Broad characteristics include the overall size of the 
land mass and the lagoons and island while deep characteristics include the peaks and 
the ridge line. As seen in Table 5.17, however, Nissan has close to the same number of 
patents as for hybrids (82 vs. 84) and the overall elevation of the pattern is much lower 
leading to a characterization of the pattern as partially broad. 
 
Nissan’s deployment of rear seat belts matches that of Toyota and can also be 
characterized as deep using the framework put forward in Table 6.2, because the rear 
seat belts were placed on one of the six models with rear seats in 1988 and then 
deployed to two others in 1989 and the remaining four in 1990.  
 
Nissan’s airbag deployment is depicted in Figure 5.14 and shows a deep pattern in the 
deployment of second generation airbag technology. Four models were fitted with this 
technology in 1995, and then Nissan waited between 4 and 9 years to deploy the airbags 
to the rest of its fleet. Nissan also appears to show the simultaneous introduction of 
different systems in different models which would normally indicate a broad strategy. 
As in the case of Toyota, the most likely explanation is that Nissan was again 
introducing smart and advanced systems in selected models and will eventually deploy 
them across the fleet in another wave. 
 
Table 5.20 shows Nissan’s one hybrid vehicle. As discussed in Sub-section 6.3.1, at 
issue is not the size of the program but its degree of focus. Nissan has invested only on 
the Altima hybrid program and has now, according to interview subject number 4, 
committed all available funds to the battery electric Nissan Leaf. Despite its investment 
in lithium ion battery technology for the Leaf, it appears that Nissan is still using nickel 
metal hydride battery in the Altima Hybrid. 
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Table 5.21 shows Nissan’s fuel cell program, which produced a series of prototypes 
based on the X trail SUV after developing two prototypes using reformed methane and 
a small city car for the 2003 Tokyo auto show. With the exception of the show car 
Nissan worked on the two technologies sequentially and thus, using the framework 
shown in Figure 6.1, its fuel cell strategy can also be classified as deep. 
 
Table 6.7 shows a summary chart for Nissan’s patent analysis based on the Themescape 
representations and the deployment data discussed in Sub-section 5.2.4. Alone among 
the manufacturers, Nissan offers evidence of path dependence with all of its deployment 
data showing deep strategies and only its fuel cell patents being classified as broad. 
Interview subject number 4 confirmed that, in his opinion, Nissan consistently worked 
on large, game-changing programs and would perfect a technology before deploying it. 
 
 Deep Partially deep Indeterminate Partially 
broad 
Broad  
Patent 
Analyses 
o Seat belts 
o Airbags 
 
o Hybrids 
 
 o Fuel cells 
 
 
 
Deployment 
Data Analysis 
o Seat belts 
o Airbags 
o Hybrids 
o Fuel cells 
 
    
 
Table 6.7 Summary chart for Nissan 
 
o Summary 
 
The purpose of this section was to apply the ideas of depth and breadth, introduced in 
Section 6.3 to the empirical data in Chapter 5 using a clear definition of depth and 
breadth as a framework for its application. Table 6.8 shows the results for all four 
manufacturers and all four technologies.  
 
 GM Ford Toyota Nissan 
Seat 
belts 
Patent pattern:  
Partially broad 
Deployment data: 
Indeterminate 
Patent pattern:  
Partially deep 
Deployment data: 
Partially deep 
Patent pattern:  
Partially deep 
Deployment data: 
Indeterminate 
Patent pattern:  
Deep 
Deployment data: 
Deep 
Airbags Patent pattern:  
Deep 
Deployment data: 
Deep  
Patent pattern:  
Deep 
Deployment data: 
Deep 
Patent pattern:  
Partially deep 
Deployment data: 
Partially deep 
Patent pattern:  
Deep 
Deployment data: 
Deep 
Hybrids  Patent pattern:  
Deep 
Deployment data: 
Deep 
Patent pattern:  
Broad  
Deployment data: 
Partially broad 
Patent pattern:  
Broad 
Deployment data: 
Partially deep 
Patent pattern:  
Partially deep 
Deployment data: 
Deep 
Fuel 
Cells  
Patent pattern:  
Broad  
Deployment data: 
Broad 
Patent pattern:  
Broad  
Deployment data: 
Partially broad 
Patent pattern:  
Partially deep 
Deployment data: 
Partially deep 
Patent pattern:  
Partially broad  
Deployment data: 
Deep 
 
Table 6.8 Summary of strategies in terms of depth and breadth 
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As the conclusions for each company case study were discussed in Sub-sections 6.3.1-
6.3.4, the following will discuss the analysis summarized in Table 6.8 for each of the 
four technology case studies. 
 
In seat belts, the patent patters for Ford, Toyota and Nissan are classified as partially 
deep or deep and only GM has a partially broad pattern, perhaps reflecting some of 
GM’s early work on seat belts and the idea, discussed in Sub-section 5.3.1, that these 
vehicle manufacturers pursued relatively focused programs for seat belt development. 
The deployment data for seat belts shows no evident pattern; the deployment data only 
shows a relatively narrow part of the overall seat belt strategy of the firms involved and 
could be considered inconclusive. 
 
In the case of airbags all patent patterns are deep, with the exception of Toyota which 
was considered partially deep, indicating a somewhat focused research program in all of 
the manufacturers. The deployment pattern appears to be similar with GM, Ford and 
Nissan, following what is characterized as deep strategies while Toyota’s deployment is 
only classified as partially deep. 
 
With respect to Hybrid vehicles the patent patterns show heterogeneity across the 
sample, with Ford and Toyota pursuing what appear to be broad strategies and GM and 
Nissan pursuing deep and partially deep strategies respectively. The deployment data 
shows all manufacturers pursuing deep or partially deep strategies. While apparently 
homogenous, the actual pattern of deployment of the different manufactures discussed 
in section 5.2 and Sub-section 5.3.3 is actually quite different and care should be taken 
to calibrate the findings for the very different size of the hybrid programs at the 
different manufacturers. These differences come out strongly in the patent 
representations while all manufactures appear to be following essentially deep strategies 
for deployment, although of course Toyota is leading the industry and Nissan is doing 
very little. 
 
With respect to fuel cell electric vehicles, all of the manufacturers, with the exception of 
Toyota, appear to follow broad strategies based on the patent representations. In the 
deployment data there appears to be a split between GM and Ford, which appear to be 
pursuing broad and partially broad deployments respectively, and Toyota and Nissan, 
which appear to be on a deep and partially deep track. 
 
Overall, the analysis summarized in Table 6.8 appears to indicate that there is both 
heterogeneity and homogeneity in approach in terms of the ideas of depth and breadth 
across the sample. In the case of the company analysis, only Nissan shows signs of 
homogeneity which could be interpreted as path dependence (Teece et al., 1997). In the 
case of the technologies, only airbags gave consistent results across both data sets and 
all four vehicle manufacturers. What does appear to emerge in Table 6.8, however, is a 
certain relationship between the two data sets which will be discussed in Sub-section 
6.2.4. 
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6.2.4 A construct relating patents and technology deployment  
 
In looking across the 16 data points shown in Table 6.6, the classification made through 
interpretation of the patent pattern appears to match that made in looking at the 
deployment data in 9 of the 16 cases (56%), indicating the possibility of a causal 
relationship between them. If one collapses the partially broad and partially deep 
classifications into deep and broad, the correlation goes up to 75 % with the two 
indeterminate cases. Table 6.9 shows this correlation. 
 
Deep and partially deep Broad and partially broad 
• Ford and Nissan in seat belts 
• All manufactures in airbags 
• GM and Nissan in hybrids 
• Toyota in fuel cells 
• Ford in hybrids 
• GM, Ford, and Nissan in fuel 
cells 
 
 
Table 6.9 Instances supporting the depth and breadth construct 
 
While the correlation shown above does appear compelling, inductive research of the 
type pursued by the thesis carries with it the danger of finding those patterns one is 
looking for and, due to the qualitative nature of the cross-case analysis presented in 
Section 6.3, the correlation between the two data sets must be qualified to some extent. 
To address this possible bias, the construct shown in Figure 6.2 attempts to explain 
these results by taking the position, supported by Leonard-Burton (1995), that there is a 
constant process of two-way technology transfer between research and development 
activities which would result in patents and product development directed at deploying 
new technology in products and services. 
 
As stated in Sub-section 6.2.2, a broad strategy is defined as pursuing a number of 
parallel projects looking at different aspects of the new technology and/or seeking to 
implement the technology in a wide variety of applications. Assuming some constant 
level of two-way technology transfer, such a strategy ought to lead to a broad range of 
scientific and engineering discoveries which in turn ought to lead to a wide distribution 
of patents. The mechanism at work is that, since engineers are doing more different 
things, they will logically find a diverse range of potentially patentable innovations. A 
broad strategy also ought to lead to incremental improvements in a number of 
applications, products and services. 
 
A deep technological strategy is defined as focusing efforts on developing the 
technology in a single or limited number of applications prior to a potential or eventual 
roll out across the product line. In this case the scientists and engineers involved with 
the effort will all be working on tasks related to achieving a smaller number of projects’ 
stated objectives. Patents resulting from such efforts ought to be more related to each 
other. A deep strategy would also be more likely to produce major leaps of innovation, 
perhaps from one product generation to the next, with little or no incremental 
improvement. Major new platforms would be added as a block to products or services 
once they were fully ready and the improvement in performance would be significant.  
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Figure 6.2 Revised construct for depth and breadth  
 
Parsing the data in Table 6.8 allows for additional exploration of the depth and breadth 
construct shown in Figure 6.2. In looking at the different vehicle manufacturers, the 
construct holds up in 3 of 4 cases in the GM and Nissan data, and 2 out 4 cases for Ford 
and Toyota. In terms of the technologies, the construct hold up in 2 out of 4 cases in 
seat belts and fuel cells, in all cases in airbags, and in only 1 out of 4 cases in hybrids. 
 
As stated above, if one takes out the indeterminate cases, the construct holds up in 9 out 
of 14 cases. With the exception of the Nissan hybrid program, which is classified as 
having deep deployment with partially broad patents, the other four occasions when the 
strategies did not match showed a deeper deployment strategy coupled with a broader 
patent pattern. One way of making sense of this data would be that a firm which had 
undertaken a broad program of technological development which resulted in a broad 
patent pattern could, for other reasons, choose to focus its deployment, but that a firm 
which had only developed a limited technological base, which is reflected in a deep 
patent pattern, might not have the technological capabilities needed for a broader 
program. The outlying case of Nissan’s hybrid program can be explained by the 
program’s extremely limited deployment. 
 
Broad range of discovery 
Many small parallel projectsBrod Strategy 
Broad range of patents with few patents on each 
subject 
Incremental Improvem nts in
many products 
 
Narrow range of discovery 
Few Very large projects 
Narrow range of patents with many patents on related 
subjects 
Deep Strategy 
Broad range of discovery 
Many small parallel projects Broad Strategy 
Broad range of patents with few patents on each 
subject 
Incremental Improvements in 
many products 
 
Narrow range of discovery 
Few Very large projects 
Narrow range of patents with many patents on related 
subjects 
Step change improvement 
in few products followed 
by roll out to other products 
Deep Strategy 
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o Path dependence 
6.3 Implications of depth and breadth 
 
Section 6.3 will discuss the implications of the ideas of depth and breadth within the 
empirical data, combine the results of the cross-case analysis in Section 6.2 with the 
technology pathways discussed for each technology under consideration in Chapter 5, 
and explore what could be some implications for practice based on the research.  
 
6.3.1 Implications within the data set 
 
Having classified the strategies employed by the four vehicle manufactures under 
consideration in each of the four technologies in the sample, and also explored the 
degree to which the patent data and deployment data can be related in terms of depth 
and breadth, the next step in the analysis is to attempt to determine what, if any, 
generalizations can be drawn regarding the application of depth and breadth within the 
data set. The three areas where generalizations might be found using the data in the case 
studies are path dependence within the manufacturers, medium-term penetration or 
adoption, and impact on technical performance. Other issues which would be of interest 
but are beyond the scope of this analysis would be the total program cost of choosing 
different strategies, the unit cost of the solutions deployed, and the profitability of that 
deployment, taking into account any ability for margin improvement and the impact on 
market share.  
 
 
While there is some evidence to suggest that Nissan and Toyota favoured deep and 
partially deep strategies, the GM and Ford data do not support such a conclusion. 
Toyota appears to favour partially deep strategies although it does have a broad 
patenting pattern in fuel cells, and the deployment data in seat belt is classified as 
indeterminate. Nissan appears to use deep strategies, with the exception of its patent 
pattern in fuel cells which was classified as partially broad. General Motors had deep 
strategies in airbags and hybrids, a broad strategy in fuel cells, and, as stated above, the 
data for seat belts is somewhat contradictory but, whether the product deployment data 
is considered deep (rear seat belts) or broad (pretensioners), there is little to indicate a 
preferred path for GM. Although Ford appeared to have a deep or partially deep strategy 
in seat belts and airbags, there is also no evidence of a favoured path. 
 
There was also no clear consensus concerning path dependency amongst the industry 
experts. According to interview subject number 2, the issue was being a technology 
leader or a follower, and suggested that there might be a clearer distinction in those 
terms. Subject number 1 felt that Nissan always pursued a deep strategy and pointed to 
Nissan’s Leaf battery electric vehicle as an example. For this expert the idea of there 
being a “silver bullet” which would solve all problems is also very much an American 
concept and he could also see evidence that Ford and GM also tended to deep strategies. 
Subject number 5 maintained that each technology was different and that the different 
manufacturers will pursue different patterns based on the imperatives of the technology, 
which in turn are driven by issues of price and consumer value. According to interview 
subject number 7 Ford “lurches back and forth” depending on its CEO.  
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o Medium-term deployment 
 
As stated in Sub-section 6.2.2, a broad strategy is defined as pursuing a number of 
parallel projects looking at different aspects of the new technology and/or seeking to 
implement the technology in a wide variety of applications. Thus, one would expect 
deployment to be faster in broad strategies than deep strategies. Over time, however, 
deep strategies ought to result in a technology’s rollout and an interesting question is 
therefore which type of strategy will result in increased deployment over the medium 
term. Taking out the 3 instances in which the deployment data does not match the patent 
pattern leaves 13 samples, of which 9 are classified as deep strategies and 4 as broad. 
 
Comparing the three broad programs in the fuel cell area, with that of Toyota, which 
was classified as deep, the data is inconclusive. In the first place all fuel cell vehicles 
are, for these manufacturers, still in the prototype phase so that all that can be done is to 
count the number of prototypes - an incomplete measure of deployment at best. In any 
case, GM’s program produced 16 fuel cell prototypes followed by Ford and Toyota with 
9 each and Nissan with 7. Assuming that the overall size of the program would be 
proportional to the number of patents as well as the total number of prototypes, one 
would expect a rough correlation to exist between the two measures of innovative 
output. In fact such a correlation does exist between the programs of GM, Toyota and 
Nissan but breaks down in the case of Ford (Table 6.10). As mentioned in Sub-section 
5.2.2, a likely explanation for Ford’s low volume of patents is its link with Ballard 
Power Systems through the Automotive Fuel Cell Cooperation Corp (AFCC). For the 
purposes of the exploration of depth and breadth, however, no appreciable difference is 
found between Toyota’s deep program and the broad programs of the other 
manufacturers. 
 
 Number of fuel 
cell prototypes 
(See Tables 5.6, 
5.11, 5.16, 5.21) 
Number of fuel 
cell patents 
(See Table 3.2) 
Ratio of 
patents to 
prototypes 
GM 16 205 12.8 
Ford 9 40 4.4 
Toyota 9 109 12.1 
Nissan 7 82 11.7 
 
Table 6.10 Ratio of patents to prototypes 
 
In the case of hybrids, Toyota’s program achieved the highest fleet coverage, 30%, but 
does not match the depth and breadth construct, as its patent pattern appears to be broad 
while its deployment is classified as partially deep. A comparison can be made between 
GM and Ford which did pursue deep and partially broad strategies respectively. As 
shown in Appendix C3, General Motors had achieved 23% coverage by model year 
2009/2010 and Ford has only achieved 16% which would indicate that its deep strategy 
had paid off. Interview subject number 3 felt, however, that this data point was 
misleading and suggested that, if one were to look at the percentage of hybrid in terms 
of sales, rather than models, the Ford number would be higher. In any case the data 
appears inconclusive in linking depth or breadth with medium term deployment. 
o  
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o Impact on technical performance 
 
In fuel cells, the differences between broad and deep strategies could be explored by 
contrasting the results of Toyota’s apparently deeper strategies with those of the other 
manufacturers. The problem with the fuel cell performance data is that, according to the 
manufacturers as well as the industry experts interviewed for the thesis, the technology 
is still in flux and commercialisation is still at least 10 to 20 years distant. Moreover, the 
data set on fuel cells gives only range and top speed; more technical data such as the 
fuel cell output characteristics, cost data and fuel consumption are either not available, 
difficult to compare or both. The problem with range and top speed is that they are 
inputs into the design process rather than outputs, and manufacturers have been 
designing their vehicles for a range of approximately 500 km and a top speed of 150-
160 km/hr. Of these, Toyota’s new FCHV prototype might achieve a range of 830 km 
because it was designed to do so, but the trade-offs made to reach that target in terms of 
cost, for example, are not known. In this sense, fuel cell data will only be robust once 
vehicles are in the market and real design tradeoffs are made. 
 
The hybrid programs of Ford and GM offer a more robust comparison as Ford’s 
partially broad pattern appears to achieve better performance than GM’s deeper strategy 
in fuel economy. Table 6.9 shows a comparison of fuel economy in the hybrid programs 
of GM and Ford. One can compare, for example, the Escape hybrid with front wheel 
drive to the similar Chevrolet Tahoe in the 2007 model year. Ford’s Escape achieved 
fuel economy of 12.8 km/l while Tahoe managed only 8.9 km/l. GM’s passenger cars 
are achieving 11.9 – 12.4 km/l while Ford’s Fusion/Milan is rated at 16.2 km/l. This 
data is, however, considered far from conclusive as it deals with only one aspect of 
performance and represents only one data point. 
 
General 
Motors 
Year Fuel 
Economy 
(km/l) 
Ford Year Fuel 
Economy 
(km/l) 
Chevrolet 
Silverado FWD 
2003 
2005 
2009 
7.1 
7.3 
8.9 
Escape 4WD 2005 
2007 
2008 
11.5 
11.6 
11.9 
Chevrolet 
Silverado 4WD 
2003 
2004 
2008 
6.8 
6.8 
8.5 
Escape FWD 2005 
2007 
2008 
12.4 
12.8 
13.5 
GMC Sierra 2003 
2009 
7.3 
8.9 
Mariner 2006 
2007 
2010 
11.5 
11.5 
11.9 
Saturn Vue Green 
Line 
2005 
2008 
11.1 
11.9 
Fusion/Milan 2008 16.2 
Saturn AURA 
Green Line 
2006 11.5    
Chevrolet Tahoe 
2WD 
2007 8.9    
Chevrolet Malibu 2007 
2009 
11.5 
12.4 
   
Chevy Volt 
E Flex 
2011
? 
21.3    
 
Table 6.11 Hybrid fuel economy of GM and Ford 
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6.3.2 Depth and breadth and technology trajectories 
  
As discussed in Section 5.3, the different technologies under consideration have been or 
are part of different pathways of technological change using the framework put forward 
by Geels and Schot (2007). The emergence of seat belts could be considered an example 
of what Geels and Schot called technological substitution. Although there were early 
adopters of airbag technology, the early devices were rather crude, and a number of 
serious safety issues both at the manufacturing and usage level needed to be ironed out 
before the technology became acceptable. Geels and Schot’s de-alignment, re-alignment 
might therefore be considered as an adequate choice for airbags. Electric vehicle 
technology including fuel cell powered vehicles appear to be following the 
transformation pathway and is still very much underway and finally hybrid vehicles 
were thought to be best described by the re-configuration pathway. 
 
Geels and Schot (2007) applied the pathways to higher level artefacts and entire socio-
technological regimes yet the approach, described in Sub-section 5.3.1, appears robust 
at the level of component and drive train technology. Table 6.12 adds the depth and 
breadth discussion from Section 6.2 and maps it onto the technological pathways 
analysis developed in Section 5.3 and shown in Figure 5.25 
 
Technological 
Pathway 
Technological 
substitution 
De-alignment, 
re-alignment 
Re-
Configuration 
Transformation 
Technology Seat Belts Airbags Hybrid 
Vehicles 
Fuel Cells  
Broad 
Strategies 
na na Ford 
 
GM 
Deep 
Strategies 
Ford 
Nissan 
GM 
Ford 
Toyota 
Nissan 
GM 
Nissan 
 
Toyota 
 
 
Table 6.12 Manufacturers strategies by technology pathway  
 
While the implications for theory will be discussed in Section 6.4, some comments can 
be made from the data about what appears to be critical in each of the technology 
pathways represented in the sample.  
 
The most important aspects of product deployment in the technological substitution 
pathway appear to be deploying quickly and having sufficient marketing resources and 
capabilities to take advantage of that deployment in the market. As the data only gives 
clear evidence of two manufacturers pursuing deep strategies, it is difficult to make a 
comparison with the results of a broad strategy. Examples of making such commitments 
and also marketing them are found in GM’s back seat program and in Toyota and 
Nissan pretensioners’ deployment. 
 
Airbags followed the de-alignment, re-alignment pathway and it appears that Toyota’s 
broad strategy proved to be the most effective, although it might also be that Ford and 
GM simply lacked the commitment to pursue the technology across its product line. 
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The electric vehicle situation is still very fluid but, according to sales data and the expert 
interviews, hybrids are gaining ground and fuel cell research is sharply reduced. In both 
hybrids and fuel cells it appears that broad strategies have done better than deep 
strategies as they have given a better chance of achieving technological leadership and 
this can be seen both in Toyota’s hybrid program and in GM’s fuel cell program. In 
hybrids, it appears that it was also important to be in the right place at the right time or 
have the ability to see where the market is going in advance. Toyota appears to have 
been right to bet on hybrids, and today they have become a corporate priority, although 
it appears that their original intention was to only invest in hybrids as a bridge to fuel 
cells. The main advantage of hybrids is that their sales do not require any fundamental 
change in the infrastructure or any other part of the socio-technical regime. With GM’s 
financial collapse and the change of administration in Washington, GM no longer can 
stop the electric tide turning and is being directed by its new owners to join the hybrid 
bandwagon. 
 
6.3.3 Implications for practice 
 
Managers of technology-based firms might find this combination of depth and breadth 
with technology pathways useful in reviewing their current portfolio of technological 
development. The following summarizes the apparent advantages and disadvantages of 
choosing either depth or breadth in the different technology pathways based on the data 
presented in Chapter 5 and discussed in Section 6.2. Inconclusive examples, including 
Toyota’s seat belt deployment and Nissan’s and Ford’s fuel cell program, were not 
included. 
 
o Technological substitution 
 
According to Geels and Schot (2007) both threads in the innovation literature dealing 
with discontinuous and potentially disruptive technology are largely dealing with the 
technological substitution pathway. One of the salient characteristics of the disruptive 
literature also discussed in Sub-section 2.2.2 is that most of it is retrospective in nature 
and disruptions which seem obvious in hindsight often do not look so clear to industry 
actors in the years leading up to such transitions. 
 
While the thesis has no clear examples of companies pursuing a broad technological 
strategy in the face of technological substitution, such a strategy could consist of 
monitoring developments in a number of different possibilities in the way that Roussel 
et al. (1991) described as pacing technologies. Such a strategy might have three 
advantages. First, from a political point of view, the strategy would not require forging a 
clear consensus - something which might be difficult depending on the cognitive bias of 
specific executives and perhaps a lack of compelling evidence from the market. The 
second advantage is that not all expected transitions do, in fact, occur and the level of 
expenditure for a broad exploratory strategy could be contained. The third advantage is 
that if the transition does occur, at least the firm will have acquired some knowledge of 
the strategy. The disadvantage of pursuing a broad strategy could be that a competitor 
pursues a deep strategy and develops technology with superior performance, a lower 
cost, or both. The role of marketing in such a situation could be key in order to at least 
publicize those actions taken in order to buy time for the product groups to catch up. 
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Ford and Nissan’s seat belts programs appear to be deep strategies and the advantage of 
pursing such a strategy in the technological substitution is that, if sufficient resources 
are put into place soon enough, the firm may have the potential to develop competitive 
advantage in the technology versus its rivals. The disadvantage is financial, as the return 
on investment for such a strategy is extremely difficult to estimate in advance and even 
with clear hindsight it is often difficult to calculate what the impact of not doing 
something would have been. It appears that the key aspect of pursuing such a strategy 
will be to have a clear political consensus or direction from the top to pursue such a 
strategy or to wait until the direction of change is clear, in which case there is a risk of 
starting out behind the competition.  
 
o De-alignment, re-alignment 
 
As shown in Sub-section 5.3.3, airbags appear to follow the de-alignment, re-alignment 
pathway and none of the four manufacturers studied followed a broad strategy. Such a 
strategy could be understood as pursuing different and even mutually exclusive 
technologies in parallel and the advantage would be to improve the chances of having a 
competitive solution when a new dominant design emerges. The disadvantage is that 
such a strategy can be expensive depending on the total amount spent on the different 
possibilities and also runs the risk of being far behind a competitor who has placed all 
their bets on one outcome and been either prescient or lucky or both. Critical to the 
success of such a strategy would be to cover all of the possibilities and then maintain 
the commitment to the technology and follow through on its deployment once the 
direction comes clear. 
 
A deep strategy in the face of such a fluid situation ought to give a much higher return 
as long as the bet is placed on the right combination. The risk is, of course, to simply 
not cover the breadth of potential outcomes and end up with a solution which is of no 
use. At this point commitment can be a double-edged sword as a firm might in fact hold 
on too long to a solution which is headed for a dead end. 
 
o Re-configuration 
 
Sub-section 5.3.4 identifies hybrid vehicles as being on the re-configuration path and 
the thesis identifies Ford as pursuing a broad strategy with General Motors and Nissan 
pursuing a deep strategy. A broad program like Ford’s appears to require making 
significant investments in multiple technologies and the advantage is that if true 
technological leadership can be achieved, the advantages can be very large. The 
disadvantage is that the financial return of such a strategy might be negative. Nissan and 
General Motors appear to both follow deep strategies but Nissan’s is extremely limited 
and General Motors appears committed to catching up with Toyota, implying that a 
deep strategy could be useful for either objective. The risk in either pursuing a broad or 
a deep strategy in re-configuration is that the landscape pressure never reaches a critical 
point and “business as usual” can continue for a long periods of time rendering 
investments superfluous and perhaps leading to underinvestment in more immediate 
competitive issues. 
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The leader in hybrids, Toyota, appears to have pursued several different types of 
hybrids early on before focusing its attention on its hybrid synergy drive and this 
approach of starting out broad and then switching to a deep strategy might have validity 
for a larger sample of innovations on the re-configuration pathway. General Motors’ 
deep strategy is based on the Chevy Volt which combines a small efficient internal 
combustion engine which acts as an electricity generator. While clearly a hybrid from a 
technical sense, GM takes great pains to describe the vehicle as a “range extended 
electric vehicle” as it hopes to jump past Toyota’s hybrid technology. The advantage is 
that, if successful, the new technology can bring potentially superior performance at a 
more reasonable cost than making multiple commitments across a range of 
technologies. 
 
o Transformation 
 
Sub-section 5.3.5 identifies fuel cell vehicles as being on the transformation pathway 
and Section 6.2 classifies General Motors’s fuel cell program as broad and Toyota’s 
program as deep. Pursuing a broad program in the face of such a change involves 
spending very significant amounts of resources on multiple solutions and appears to 
justify the expenditure by having a clear idea that such a change will come about. The 
advantage of such a strategy is that it is the most likely to result in an incumbent 
influencing the transformation in such a way as to not only be able to survive but also to 
prosper in the new socio-technical regime from a strategic and technological basis. The 
disadvantage is that it requires tremendous financial resources and might not prove 
successful as such transformation depends on a variety of factors, many of which will 
always be beyond the control of even the most powerful corporations. General Motors 
fuel cell program is characterized as broad in Section 6.2 and has been thought of as 
making a serious effort on the technology, as discussed in Sub-section 2.2.3.  
 
As not many firms have the financial resources to pursue such a broad strategy, a deep 
strategy represents another choice; Toyota’s fuel cell strategy is an example. For a deep 
strategy to be successful a scenario is required for the outcome of the transformation, 
both in terms of technological architecture and timing, and for adequate resources to be 
put into place to realize that strategy. If the vision is correct and the execution is sound, 
then the firm has a real opportunity to enjoy superior performance and/or lower cost in 
the transformed socio-technical regime. If the technical solution or the timing is off by a 
large factor or if the program does not deliver, then the investment will be lost. One of 
the advantages of the strategy is that the financial cost could be contained such that the 
firm can continue to be competitive within the existing socio-technical regime. A very 
recent example of this strategy is Nissan’s Battery Electric vehicle program which has 
been described by one of the interview panel as “a throw of the dice” and has reportedly 
taken up much of Nissan’s advanced engineering budget over the last 18-24 months. 
Nissan is, as discussed in the thesis, behind in hybrids and will fall even further behind 
as the industry moves toward greater hybridization. If Nissan can, however, 
demonstrate the commercial viability of battery electric vehicles with lithium-ion 
batteries then there is a chance that they can limit the appeal of hybrids and be 
competitive in a very different game. Nissan has not, however, stopped investing in its 
traditional models during this time and would most likely survive whatever happens to 
the battery electric Nissan Leaf. 
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o The origin of discontinuous innovation 
6.4 Discussion of theory 
 
With regards to theory, Section 2.3 identifies a gap in the literature concerning how 
firms in general, and vehicle manufacturers in particular, manage technological 
development that is discontinuous and potentially disruptive. Section 2.3 reviews two 
threads in the literature which deal with such change and four approaches which are 
discussed but maintains that, in the implementation phase of technology development, 
using Tidd et al.’s (1997) framework, there is very little theory available. Section 5.1 
applies Geels and Schot’s (2007) technology pathways to the empirical data and Section 
6.2 introduces the concepts of depth and breadth which can be used to inform decisions 
about what to do in the face of such technological change. Section 6.3 discusses the 
implications of applying these two concepts. The purpose of this section is to discuss 
the implications for theory and is focused on potential additions to Granstrand’s (1998) 
theory of the technology-based firm which is reviewed in Sub-section 2.3.3. The thesis 
suggests that that the technological development mechanism that Granstrand’s theory of 
the technology-based firm describes be expanded, that the theory be explicitly linked to 
the co-evolutionary literature and multi-level perspective as well as that dealing with 
dynamic capabilities, and that its definition be tightened.  
 
 
Granstrand (1998) discusses a source of innovation in which the market will first 
encourage a firm to develop new technology which he calls “pull” (p.473). At some 
point the firm might use that technology in other applications or for additional segments 
creating technology “push” (p.473). Granstrand does not, however, mention the 
opposite case where a firm develops new technology and then, because of its 
introduction, creates demand. In the literature discussed in Sub-section 2.3.1, 
discontinuous technological innovation follows this second route and if the theory of 
technology-based firm is to be completed it appears that it must be expanded in this 
direction. For Tushman and Anderson (1986) the source of discontinuous innovation 
“are relatively rare and driven by individual genius” (p.440), while for Christensen and 
Bower (1996) it often comes from engineers who are not able to get adequate resources 
allocated to their ideas in one firm and go off to found new ones. In both cases, 
however, discontinuities do not normally come from market forces but from invention.  
 
In the automotive industry many innovations are driven by regulation. As discussed in 
Sub-section 5.3.3, airbags are an example as it was government regulation which 
required vehicle manufacturers to develop passive safety technology. The general public 
eventually latched on to the idea that airbags made a car safer and demand increased. In 
the case of seat belt technology (Sub-section 5.3.2), the impetus appears to have shifted 
back and forth several times, much like the “pushmi-pullyu” creature in Lofting’s 1920 
book The Story of Doctor Dolittle. Public pressure and the example of Volvo and Saab 
pushing the technology led the U.S. government to legislate the incorporation of 
restraint systems on passenger cars. Manufacturers then chose to go beyond compliance 
(Reinhardt, 2005) and to offer more than was actually required. This was the case with 
GM’s announcement on rear seat belts and later on Toyota’s and Nissan’s decisions to 
place pyrotechnic pretensioners on their entire fleet. The public now demands a certain 
level of safety equipment, going back to market pull. 
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Thus the first recommendation is to expand the mechanism for technology development 
and explicitly add the mechanism where technology push is followed by market pull to 
the theory of the technology-based firm.  
 
o The theory of the technology-based firm and the co-evolutionary perspective 
 
In his analysis, reviewed in Sub-section 2.3.3, Granstrand makes the case that other 
theories of the firm including neo-classical economics, agency theory, evolutionary 
theory or the resource-based view, do not address in a compelling way the co-
evolutionary process between firms which develop technology and the environment in 
which those firms operate and compete. This is the primary reason he puts forward the 
theory of the technology-based firm. It appears, however, that neither Granstrand nor 
subsequent researchers who employed the theory of the technology-based firm or 
aspects of it made significant efforts to explicitly link the theory to the co-evolutionary 
perspective championed by Lewin and Volberda (1999). Of course, because of the 
timing of the different publications, Granstrand could not have cited Lewin and 
Volberda’s 1999 prolegomena in his 1998 paper and it is also reasonable that they 
would not cite his paper as it had only just been published. The two literatures, 
however, have largely stayed separate over the last 10 years. While it is true that the co-
evolutionary perspective deals more with strategy and Granstrand is better known to 
scholars interested in technology management, the explicit aim of both the theory of the 
technology-based firm and the co-evolutionary perspective was to transcend such 
functional boundaries and move toward more integrative research. 
 
The thesis also draws on the multi-level perspective as this is yet another separate thread 
which can be woven together with co-evolution to make the fabric of the technology-
based firm theory more robust. This thread was also first published in the late 1990’s 
and shares many of the same principals of the co-evolutionary perspective and the 
theory of the technology-based firm. The multi-level perspective appears to fit into the 
co-evolutionary perspective as all five properties defined by Lewin and Volberda (1999) 
apply. By definition the perspective has Multi-levelness as it looks at the landscape, 
socio-technical regime, and niche level. Multi-directional causalities are clear in the 
perspective as there is pressure from both the landscape and niches on the regime and 
the regime itself affects the landscape and the process of niche formation and collapse. 
The pressures discussed above can have non-linear impacts, and the mechanism of 
explosive growth occurring in a specific niche is an example. Positive feedback is also 
clearly part of the model and is talked about in terms of technologies being potentially 
complementary or disruptive. Finally, Path and history dependence is also implicit in 
the model, and the discussion of different types of change patterns adapted from Suarez 
and Olivia’s (2005) typology is evidence of this. 
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The thesis links these literatures by going through a rigorous application of Geels’ seven 
aspects of a socio-technical regime to the automotive industry, placing cars and light 
trucks powered by internal combustion engines at the centre of the regime. It then uses 
Lewin and Volberda’s (1999) five properties of a co-evolutionary system to show that 
the socio-technical regime described could be considered co-evolutionary. Finally, as 
stated above, the thesis uses Geels and Schot’s (2007) technological pathways, which 
were derived for the multi-level perspective, to add depth to the theory of the 
technology-based firm.  
 
o The theory of the technology-based firm and dynamic capabilities 
 
Teece et al.’s (1997) dynamic capabilities framework sits clearly within the resource-
based view and builds on the earlier work done in that area (Wernerfelt 1984, 1995; 
Barney 1991; Rumelt, 1991). Teece et al. consider that there have been three distinct 
threads in the strategy literature, and offer the dynamic capabilities framework as a 
fourth thread which they feel is particularly relevant to complex situations undergoing 
rapid change. In addition to the industrial organization and resource-based view threads, 
Teece et al. look at the strategic conflict thread, and while acknowledging the 
contribution of this approach, Teece et al. question its application to practice as the 
results of any given study depend largely on the game selected and the assumptions 
made in building the models. For Teece et al., one of the biggest differences between 
looking at things from the resource-based view as opposed to the industrial organization 
or competitive forces thread is the way one would approach high level strategic 
decisions such as market entry. From a competitive forces approach one would first 
pick an attractive industry, develop a competitive strategy to be successful in it, and 
then set out to secure the assets needed to compete through internal development, 
licensing, acquisition, etc. The resource-based view, on the other hand, suggests that a 
firm should first understand its unique assets, find markets in which those assets have 
value, and finally choose how to best capture the value that is available. Value might be 
captured by entering the business directly, becoming a supplier, or selling or licensing 
the capability. 
 
One implication of the resource-based view is that developing new capabilities becomes 
a strategic issue. This is where the dynamic capabilities model comes in. Dynamic 
capabilities are defined as “as the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure 
internal and external competences to address rapidly changing environments” (Teece et 
al. 1987, p.516). Teece et al. thus provide a framework which adds to the resource view 
by allowing resources to evolve over time rather than being taken as a given. At the 
heart of the dynamic capabilities framework is the idea that a firm is much more than 
the sum of the items on its balance sheet and much of what is distinctive or strategic 
cannot, in fact, be purchased or acquired easily. For Teece et al. competences and 
capabilities are embedded in organisational processes and shaped by a firm’s assets and 
historical paths and the terms processes, positions and paths are used to describe them. 
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Processes are considered for coordination and integration, learning, and reconfiguration 
and transformation of the business itself. Within the concept of coordination and 
integration, Teece et al. discuss the importance of a firm’s processes having “a certain 
rationality or coherence” (p. 520) with each other as well as the criticality of a firm 
being able to combine and configure different capabilities in the face of environmental 
and technological change. Learning in the dynamic capabilities framework has to do 
with “common codes of communication and coordinated search procedures” (p. 520) 
and can be found in “patterns of activity” (p. 520) inside the firm. The final role of 
processes is to enable a firm to re-configure or transform in order to adapt to changes in 
its environment. Teece et al. discuss “organizational and managerial processes” (p. 518) 
which appear to be quite close to Granstrand’s concept of management, and have three 
roles including coordination/integration, learning, and, reconfiguration. 
 
In terms of positions, Teece et al. (1997) list eight categories of assets in which a firm 
might take positions and the first one is technology, with which Granstrand would 
concur, and the second one is complementary assets, echoing Teece (1993) in his 
seminal paper on profiting from innovation, in which he highlighted the importance of a 
firm having assets to complement its technology such as manufacturing capabilities or 
distribution networks. Teece et al. also include financial assets, reputation, structural 
assets, institutional assets, market assets and organisational boundaries in the model. 
 
The third component of the dynamic capabilities model is to look at path dependencies 
or the history of a firm’s investments and the sum total of its operational routines. For 
Teece et al., history matters and a firm’s future development is constrained by its 
history (Barney, 1991). Related to this is the idea that a firm’s technological 
opportunities at any given point in time is not completely exogenous, and that the actual 
state of a firm’s processes, positions and paths will influence the set of opportunities 
that it can successfully explore.  
 
Teece et al. also go into detail on how firms replicate capabilities and imitate their 
competitors. These two concepts are key to the dynamic capabilities framework, as it is 
the difficulty in acquiring or copying a full set of capabilities which is, in their view, the 
primary source of competitive advantage.  
 
The only place that Granstrand and Teece et al. diverge sharply is that the dynamic 
capabilities model does not explicitly embrace the idea of co-evolution. Easterby-Smith 
et al. (2009) reflect on the ten years since the publication of the dynamic capabilities 
framework and conclude that the popularity of the concept has to do with its allowing 
researchers to use the resource-based view without considering the environment as 
static and allowing capabilities to evolve over time in response to those environmental 
changes. Several papers were also included in this review, which took a longitudinal 
view of the changing nature of capabilities, and Easterby-Smith et al. talk about the 
“growing interest in a co-evolutionary view which links the firm to the environment in 
which it is competing”, but in fact the papers included all look at the mode in which the 
firm responds to its environment and not the other way around (McKelvie and 
Davidsson, 2009; Narayanan, et al., 2009; Bruni and Verona, 2009).  
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This gap is filled by Prencipe (2000) whose main focus was to add to the dynamic 
capabilities literature in his work on the different positions that different aircraft engine 
manufacturers enjoy with respect to engine control systems. Prencipe demonstrates the 
co-evolutionary process at work in his sample of manufacturers of aircraft engines 
which pass the three tests proposed above for technology-based firms. In the first place, 
there is a co-evolutionary process going on between manufacturers of airplanes and 
their key components, such as engines, and the rest of the aviation industry. The 
electronic control systems researched by Prencipe allowed engine manufacturers to 
improve fuel consumption giving aircraft greater range. This, in turn, changed route 
patterns for the airlines which then stimulated changes in engine specifications. Second, 
as there are only three major competitors in the industry, it is safe to say that each one 
has the ability to influence the industry as a whole. The third test was that one would 
put the artefact, in this case the aircraft engine, at the heart of the socio-technological 
regime under discussion and, again, it appears that this is the case, although a more in-
depth analysis would be valuable. Prencipe also shows in his account of the shift from 
electromechanical control systems to digital control systems that the firms themselves 
made a huge impact on the rate and direction at which that shift happened. In other 
words, the companies themselves affected their environment in a co-evolutionary way 
and, as soon as the digital control systems were able to offer their customers superior 
performance such as enhanced fuel economy, then they became part of the new 
environment. For Prencipe, the important aspect was the way one of the firms in his 
study developed its competence in the new technology and he showed that it was a 
dynamic capability. He also, however, demonstrated that the dynamic capabilities 
framework is suitable for the analysis of technology-based firms. 
 
The importance in linking these literatures lies in opening up an avenue to further 
develop the theory of the technology-based firm by incorporating into it findings 
derived in the co-evolutionary literature, the multi-level perspective, and dynamic 
capabilities. This idea has to do with breaking into what Granstrand calls the “dark box” 
(p.486) of management which is a key part of the theory of technology-based firm. 
There are dozens of threads in the literature discussing different aspect of management 
using these other perspectives, and by linking the perspectives it becomes possible to 
use this deep and growing body of knowledge to build on the theory of the technology-
based firm. 
  
o The definition of what is and what is not a technology-based firm 
 
The theory of the technology-based firm has not been widely influential in terms of 
citations, and a reasonable question is why? One possible answer is that Granstrand 
took a very broad view of what a technology-based firm is and perhaps attempted to 
apply the theory too widely. In Granstrand’s view, firms are made up of: dynamic and 
heterogeneous resources, an environment, an institutional setting, internal and external 
interactions, business ideas, goal structure and management. Firms require management 
and a business idea and the net management cost must be lower on average than the net 
transaction cost. For Granstrand “A technology-based firm is then a firm for which each 
of these firm-characterizing elements contains or is influenced by technology and 
technical artefacts in a vital way in some sense.” (Granstrand, 1998, p. 487) 
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The problem with Granstrand’s definition is that, in today’s technologically advanced 
society, any firm has some of its characteristics “vitally” affected by technology. If, as 
suggested, literature from other perspectives can be used to complement the theory of 
the technology-based firm, a tighter definition could be useful in determining which 
studies are applicable and which are not. At the root of Granstrand’s logic in putting 
forth a new theory of the firm was his belief that existing theories did not adequately 
capture the co-evolutionary nature of the technology development by the firms and the 
environment in which they participate, i.e., in those cases where the co-evolutionary 
dynamic mentioned above is more critical than other aspects of the firm. The three tests 
are thus derived from this idea and are: 
 
1. That the firm must compete in a socio-technological regime which possesses the 
five properties of a co-evolutionary system (Lewin and Volberda, 1999). The 
thesis performs this analysis for the automotive industry in Section 4.2.  
 
2. That the firm in question has the requisite level of influence to affect its 
environment at the niche, regime, or landscape level. Defining the idea of 
requisite level of influence opens up an interesting question as to what metrics to 
consider and if market share at the niche, regime, or landscape level is sufficient 
or if other factors such as brand recognition, reputation, technological assets or 
links to the public administration can play a critical role in allowing a firm to 
affect its environment in terms of technological adoption.  
 
3. That the firm is primarily concerned with the development of technological 
artefacts or services, as opposed to marketing concepts, retail networks, etc. 
Prencipe (2000) affirms that the concept of core competences has been 
misapplied in many cases and that such competencies ought to deal only with 
what is at the heart of firm, and the thesis suggests that the theory of the 
technology-based firm should only be applied to firms for which engineering 
and technological development of a technological artefact or service lies at its 
core. Geels (2002) discusses socio-technological regimes in which an artefact 
such as a car or steamship is at the centre of the nexus and this idea could be the 
starting point for such a definition.  
 
6.5 Alternative power train technology 
 
Sub-section 2.3.2 reviewed the automotive literature dealing with the possible transition 
to alternatives to the dominant design in automotive power train technology based on 
the internal combustion engine and presents a typology for this literature which groups 
the research into six categories as follows: 
 
1. History / Current Status 
2. In Depth Modelling 
3. Technical Performance  
4. Supplier Involvement 
5. Clearly Favourable 
6. Clearly Sceptical 
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As discussed in Sub-section 2.3.2, apparently unbiased studies are quite rare and the 
literature does not only provide limited insight into the history of the technological 
developments to date but is not helpful in looking ahead as many studies seem to take it 
for granted that the transition will happen sooner or later while others are highly 
sceptical. 
 
The theory of the technology-based firm together with Baron’s (1995) non-market 
strategy concept and Reinhardt’s (2005) framework concerning how “it pays to be 
green” can yield additional insight into the history of these technologies and, when 
combined with the concept of depth and breadth as applied to the technological 
trajectories in Section 6,3, some speculation as to the future of the technologies 
becomes possible. 
 
o Non-market strategy and the automotive industry 
 
Baron (1995) asserts that the role of non-market strategy becomes increasingly 
important in line with the government’s role in regulating an industry, as well as the 
level and tone of consumer groups’ and activists’ responses to the industry’s activities. 
The modern automotive industry has a very high exposure to both government 
regulations and other interests and thus is an industry where the importance of non-
market strategy could be considered as very high. Section 5.3 reviews the history of the 
four technologies under consideration in the thesis and supports this idea. The 
automotive industry has been under increasing pressure to sharply reduce the emission 
of greenhouse gasses and other pollutants (Doyle, 2000; Nederveen et al., 2003). Doyle 
(2000) provides an account of interest in and legislation concerning automotive 
pollution since the 1970’s and the industry’s response over the years. Ealey and Mercer 
(2002) argue that the industry’s response has centred on slowly improving the emissions 
performance and lobbying regulatory agencies to minimise or slow down the pace of 
legislation. Regardless of one’s opinion about such findings, the landmark legislation 
leading to the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) regulations in the United 
States in 1975 had a huge impact on the industry. Halberstam (1986) argues that interest 
in smaller, more fuel efficient cars during the 1970’s arose due to the rise in gasoline 
prices, and Detroit’s inability to produce such cars paved the way for the success of 
Nissan, Honda and Toyota in the U.S. market.  
 
Baron discusses an industry’s relationship with the larger environment and highlights 
four aspects of that relationship: issues, institutions, interests and information. All four 
parts of Baron’s framework are important in automotive as follows: 
 
1. Issues The automotive industry has had a major impact on society’s 
development throughout the world. While the details might differ in different 
places, a partial list of pressing issues would include economic impact, fuel 
economy, pollution, safety, alternative energy, labour relations, health care, 
drunk driving and protectionism. 
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2. Institutions Public institutions are normally aligned around the issues mentioned 
above in the way that the NHTSA is responsible for enforcing automotive 
safety, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets the pollution 
standards in the United States. There are also different levels of government 
distinguishing between rules in cities or towns, regions or states, countries and 
groups of countries such as the European Union or NAFTA. 
 
3. Interests Besides the car companies and their suppliers and dealers, there are 
consumer groups involved in the industry such as drivers’ clubs, consumer 
rights organisations and special interest groups such as Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving, Greenpeace and the Sierra Club. An additional interest in electric 
vehicles is the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) which is a consortium 
of the major U.S. electric companies. For EPRI, electric vehicles offer an 
opportunity as they would not only consume a huge amount of electricity but 
also, if charged at night, allow the electric companies to produce that power with 
no investment in new generation capacity.  
 
4. Information Many of the policy debates concerning the automotive industry 
involve complex technical data which is often subject to detailed and even more 
complex statistical analysis. NHTSA, for example, produces its annual report on 
automotive safety in which accidents in the United States are tracked, 
categorised, and analysed determining things like the estimated number of lives 
saved by airbags, referred to in Sub-section 4.3.2 above. Firms in the industry 
undertake exhaustive testing procedures to demonstrate the safety and 
environmental performance of their vehicles, and magazines and web sites 
routinely publish the results of automotive crash tests and other technical data. 
 
Another important part of the fuel cell story is the non-market aspects of the strategy of 
specific players such as General Motors. Hoed placed great emphasis on the fact that 
9% of all industry patents were made in the alternative power train area, which he takes 
as proof that the programs were more than window dressing. Most of the patents were, 
however, filed by GM, Daimler, Toyota and, to a lesser extent, Ford, while most other 
manufacturers did very little. If one accepts interview subject number 6’s account that 
an explicit agreement was made between regulators and GM and Ford on their 
committing to fuel cell technology in exchange for relief from further fuel economy 
standards, the scope of both companies programs comes into a different focus. GM had 
the most to lose from increased requirements and therefore led the way while Ford did 
invested $420 million in Ballard Power Systems in 1997.  
 
o Beyond compliance in automotive 
 
Reinhardt (2005) explores three reasons why a firm would go beyond compliance in 
terms of environmentally sustainable actions. As the thesis deals with technologies 
related to both safety and the environment, Reinhardt’s ideas will be expanded to 
include automotive safety. At the microeconomic level, Reinhardt sees three reasons to 
move in the direction of environmental engagement; increasing willingness to pay 
through differentiation, reducing costs and managing risks. The following discussion 
will look at each of these areas in turn in the context of the automotive industry: 
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1. Differentiation 
 
As discussed in Sub-section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, Volvo has led the industry in safety related 
technologies, firmly associating their brand with safety and appears to have 
demonstrated the existence of a market segment that will pay more money for safer 
cars. Toyota’s success with the Prius appears to indicate that there might also be a 
segment of environmentally conscious consumers who will pay more for 
environmentally benign cars. The problem with hybrid vehicles is that the addition of 
the electric motors and battery packs adds cost and weight to the vehicle and takes away 
space which could otherwise be used for trunk space, the passenger compartment or 
both. The resulting vehicles have a somewhat smaller package or interior space than a 
similarly equipped vehicle with a standard drive train and are more expensive. Table 
6.13 shows three comparisons taken from Appendix D of vehicles currently on sale in 
the U.S. market, and one can see that the hybrids are at a disadvantage in terms of cost, 
interior space and weight.  
 
Hybrid Model ICE Model Price Difference Weight 
Difference 
Space Difference 
Ford Escape Ford Escape 
Limited 2.5L 
4WD 
21% higher price 
($7,080) 
142 Kg more 
weight 
8 litres less cargo 
space 
Honda Civic 
Hybrid CVT 4dr 
Honda Civic LX 
4dr 
19% higher price 
($4,048) 
86 Kg more 
weight 
Smaller passenger 
compartment 
Toyota 
Highlander 
Hybrid 4X4  
Toyota 
Highlander 4x4 
V6 4dr 
15% higher price 
($5,315) 
150 Kg more 
weight 
Less headroom 
and 2 fewer seats 
(back row) 
 
Table 6.13 Selected Comparison of Hybrid and ICE vehicles 
(from Jato Search engine, Automotive News Website, accessed 11.5.09) 
 
Another argument for investing in safety and environmental technologies is to increase 
traffic in a brand’s showrooms even if consumers will finally buy more inexpensive 
models without the new technology. This so-called “halo effect” is well known in the 
industry, although it is normally achieved with powerful cars such as the Dodge Viper 
rather than safer or more sustainable cars. 
 
2. Cost reduction 
 
Much of the debate cited by Reinhardt (2005) concerning cost reduction has to do with 
the efforts of industry to lower their costs at the same time as adopting environmentally 
friendly technologies such as increasing energy efficiency in factories and offices. The 
efforts of auto makers to lower their environmental footprint or increase worker safety 
are outside the scope of this thesis, although both are potentially a source of cost 
reduction. What is more central to understanding the evolution of hybrid cars is the cost 
benefit analysis discussed above, which is of course more compelling when gasoline 
prices are higher. U.S. gasoline prices reached $4.16 per gallon in the first two weeks of 
July, 2008 (U.S. Energy Information Agency) and, at this level, the total operational 
cost of hybrid vehicles becomes competitive with the internal combustion engine. 
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3. Risk management 
 
Reinhardt’s idea is that firms might engage in environmentally friendly technologies in 
order to be prepared for eventual changes in consumer behaviour or regulation which 
will require such changes. In this context there is always talk about increased 
environmental and safety standards by the different regulatory authorities, and an 
argument can be made defending the expense to stay ahead of legislation at least with 
some models and or options packages. 
 
o Mimetic homogeneity and going beyond compliance 
 
As discussed in Sub-section 2.3,2, Van den Hoed (2004) has documented how the 
automotive industry between 1996 and 2003 came to regard the fuel cell vehicle as the 
primary sustainable alternative to the internal combustion engine. Hoed chose 
Institutional Theory as his primary lens and argues that the rise of fuel cells is evidence 
of mimetic homogeneity. He uses the fact that so many of the industry players pursued 
the technology to prove his thesis. He also explores the role of legislation in the process 
as well as DaimlerChrysler’s initial moves on the technology, granting it institutional 
legitimacy. What Hoed also acknowledges is the heterogeneity in the response that 
different companies have made. Using his own data, he showed that GM, Daimler, 
Toyota and, to a lesser extent, Honda dominated the fuel cell research agenda with 2-4 
times as many demonstration vehicles any other manufacturer and being awarded 2-40 
times as many patents. The data developed for the thesis gives similar findings with 
both GM and Toyota investing heavily and Ford and Nissan doing substantially less. In 
terms of the strategies of depth and breadth, the differences shown in the case studies in 
Chapter 5 give a deeper level of meaning to the data. Hoed links the heterogeneity in the 
manufacturers’ responses to the relative importance of California to them as well as 
other factors. The problem is that one of the leading players, Daimler, does not have 
vital interests in California and, in order to explain its interest in the technology, Hoed 
looks at Daimler as an institutional entrepreneur and discuses its ownership of Dornier 
giving it access to fuel cell technology and its tendency to stay ahead of technological 
development in the industry. 
 
Considering all the major automotive manufacturers as technology-based firms explains 
the heterogeneity in a more compelling way because it places technology and 
management at the centre, rather than at the periphery, of how the firm behaves. First, 
Daimler’s behaviour is consistent when seen as a technology-based firm as one would 
expect its technological asset base and management preference to trump other factors. 
Second, by applying the tests of level of influence would also explain how GM and 
Toyota, the world’s 1st and 3rd largest manufacturers, could believe that they can drive 
the agenda of the industry, and would also explain why Nissan would not even try given 
its position at that time of being relatively small and financially weak. Third, Ford’s 
relatively modest program can be explained by the management problems occurring in 
Ford in the wake of the Firestone Tyre tragedy and the subsequent departure of Jacques 
Nasser, discussed in Sub-section 4.2.2. Finally, using Reinhardt’s (2005) framework, 
Toyota’s parallel commitment to hybrids and fuel cells can be understood by their 
conviction, later proved correct, that there was a market segment which would reward 
Toyota for being perceived as environmentally friendly. 
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Reinhardt’s framework also explains the activities of smaller manufacturers who built a 
few demonstration vehicles and funded relatively modest programs during this time 
period, if one considers their activities as risk-mitigation strategies. As well documented 
by Doyle (2000) and Hoed (2004), it was not evident that CARB would relax its zero 
emissions mandate and there was, for a time, a real possibility that it would be extended 
to other states such as Massachusetts and New York, making investments on the order 
of tens of millions of dollars a small price to pay not to be left too far behind. 
 
o Looking ahead 
 
While it is not within the scope of the thesis, a degree of speculation as to the future of 
alternative power trains is possible with the theoretical frameworks applied and is 
therefore provided at a very conceptual level. 
 
The clear advantage of hybrid vehicles is their compatibility with the current socio-
technological regime which has been built around the internal combustion engine and it 
appears that hybrids, in different forms, will continue to be a feature of the automotive 
market for some time to come. At issue is which hybrid architecture or architectures 
will emerge as the dominant design if in fact any one solution does emerge. Toyota is 
now in the process of expanding its use of its hybrid synergy drive architecture in an 
effort to make it the industry standard, and it appears that both Ford and General Motors 
are determined to challenge Toyota albeit with very different technological solutions. 
As the hybrid idea appears to be gaining consumer acceptance, it appears that this 
competition will take place in fairly standard automotive terms with the bulk of the 
business going to the firm whose technology gives customers the best balance between 
fuel economy and total cost without sacrificing other performance attributes such as 
power, comfort, quality and, of course, safety. Toyota’s safety problems in the winter of 
2010 were clearly a public relations crisis but, at the time of this writing, it is too early 
to tell if the overall image of hybrid vehicles will be damaged to the extent that diesel 
powered cars were badly perceived by American consumers for a generation. 
 
With respect to fuel cell and battery electric vehicles, the main lesson from the 
empirical data in the thesis is that not even General Motors had the ability to initiate the 
transformation of the overall socio-technological regime in the late 1990’s and, without 
a massive degree of increased environmental pressure or perhaps a sudden shock at the 
landscape level, such as a dramatic and lasting increase in the price of oil, it is difficult 
to see a major shift in the foreseeable future. What appears far more likely is the 
emergence of electric vehicles at the niche level and it appears that battery electric 
vehicles based on lithium-ion batteries are the first option that are currently being 
developed by companies such as Tesla Motors, Bright Automotive, and others for 
segments such as performance speedsters and delivery vans. The two question marks as 
to whether a more profound transformation might be possible are the Nissan/Renault 
electric vehicle program and developments in China. Nissan is, apparently, making a 
serious effort to develop a viable electric vehicle and the program would probably be 
sold under a Renault badge. At the same time, according to interview subject number 6, 
a number of Chinese vehicle manufacturers and component suppliers are investing in 
battery electric vehicle technology, and a scenario might emerge where regional sales of 
the vehicles take off in-line with local infrastructure development. 
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6.6 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter has presented a definition of the ideas of depth and breadth at the level of 
technology deployment, grounded that definition in the literature, and explored to what 
extent the empirical data used in the thesis can be interpreted using these concepts. The 
discussion indicates that not only are the concepts applicable to the data but also a fairly 
robust correlation is found between the observation of depth and breadth in the 
representations of the patent data and the interpretation of the deployment data 
indicating a relationship between the two data sets. This relationship is then explored 
and a construct developed linking the two ideas. The implications of the concept have 
been explored around the issues of path dependence, medium-term deployment and 
technical performance, and the ideas of depth and breadth have been combined with 
Geels and Schot’s (2007) technological pathways to develop a set of first ideas which 
might have use for practice in terms of which strategy might make the most sense in 
each of the four pathways explored. This chapter also discussed possible additions to 
Granstrand’s theory of the technology-based firm derived in part from the thesis, 
reference was made to the literature on the possible evolution of automotive power train 
technology, and finally the theory of the technology-based firm was used together with 
Baron’s (1995) non-market strategy concept and Reinhardt’s (2005) framework 
concerning how “it pays to be green” to yield additional insights into the history of the 
technology and to even offer some limited ideas on its possible evolution. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Section 2.2 identifies a gap in the literature concerning how firms in general, and 
vehicle manufacturers in particular, manage the implementation phase of technology 
development, using Tidd et al.’s (1997) framework, for technology that is discontinuous 
and potentially disruptive. The thesis set out to make a contribution on this question 
and, after analyzing four companies and four technologies, the thesis found 
heterogeneity in their responses. Chapter 6 discusses the nature of that heterogeneity in 
terms of the ideas of depth and breadth and also the sources of this heterogeneity by 
considering both firm- and technology specific factors. Chapter 7 considers how these 
findings make a contribution to knowledge, discuss its limitations and consider several 
lines for additional research. 
 
o Contribution to theory 
7.2 Contribution to knowledge 
 
The thesis makes contributions to theory, practice, and method as follows: 
 
 
With regards to theory, the main contribution of the thesis is to add to Granstrand’s 
(1998) theory of the technology-based firm. In his 1998 introduction Granstrand lays 
out the major elements of the theory and maintains that at issue is the management of 
scale, scope, time and space, and the thesis goes further on the issue of scope by 
introducing the concepts of depth and breadth as a contingent model of strategic choice. 
It also applies Geels and Schot’s (2007) technological pathway levels at the technology 
to produce a much clearer picture of how new technology is deployed. 
 
A second area of insight is to makes three suggestions to augment Granstrand’s theory 
of the technology-based firm. One is to explicitly link the theory with the co-
evolutionary perspective, a second is to tighten the definition of what is and what is not 
a technology-based firm, and the third is to link the theory to the dynamic capabilities 
literature.  
 
A third idea is to suggest that institutional theory alone (Hoed, 2004) only goes so far in 
describing the evolution of fuel cell and electric vehicles, and that using the theory of 
the technology-based firm, as well as Baron’s (1995) non-market strategy concept and 
Reinhardt’s (2005) framework concerning how “it pays to be green”, yields additional 
insight as discussed in Section 6.5. 
 
o Contribution to method 
 
The major conclusion with respect to method is in the area of what Trippe (2003) has 
called patent informatics and Gray (2007) referred to as the fourth paradigm of 
scientific endeavour. As discussed at length in Section 2.3, the last twenty years have 
seen researchers using patents at increasingly fine levels of granularity, and this trend 
will certainly continue. 
 193 
The problem of the new tools is that they produce tremendous amounts of data which in 
turn require new ways to interpret and visualize that data; the use of Themescape maps 
in the thesis should be considered as a first step in the application of this type of tool. 
Prencipe (2000), Wang and Von Tunzelmann (2000) and Brusoni et al. (2005), 
reviewed in Section 2.5, were all interested in using patents as a way to better 
understand a firms’ technological asset base, to use Granstrand’s nomenclature, but 
such research is often limited to a patent’s title and abstract and requires the researcher 
to classify patents using some classification scale. One problem that such research has 
to manage is the trade-off of increasing sample size to increase validity with increasing 
complexity to an unmanageable level. 
 
The thesis provides one way of dealing with the trade-off by sidestepping the subjective 
process of classifying patents into technological sub-groups in a pioneering application 
of a probabilistic word-matching algorithm and mapping tool, described in Section 3.6, 
which allows for conceptual interpretation of the data. The tool, however, creates its 
own problems as described in detail in Section 3.6 and the use of the visual 
representation of patents for academic research should be considered very much in its 
infancy. The contribution of the thesis is to introduce the idea of using this approach 
into the academic tool kit although clearly much work remains to be done. 
 
o Contribution to practice 
 
By combining the ideas of depth and breadth with Geels and Schot’s (2007) 
technological pathways, the thesis creates a framework shown in Sub-section 6.3.3 
which might be of interest to practitioners in thinking through which strategies they 
might choose to consider when considering how to implement development in 
discontinuous and potentially disruptive technology. 
 
Comment [A6]: please check sense - is 
this the correct interpretation? 
7.3 Limitations and Ideas for future work 
 
This section reviews the weaknesses in the thesis and explores areas for further 
research. Four specific weaknesses will be discussed which give rise to seven ideas.  
 
The thesis reviews the limitations to using patents, deployment data and interviews in 
Sub-sections 3.5.2, 3.6.2, and 3.7.2 respectively. With respect to method, a first area of 
research would be to go deeper into the use of Aureka and other patent analysis and 
mapping tools in order to further develop the use of these tools to inform innovation 
theory. One direction for such research would be to apply the tools to data sets which 
have been studied using other methods and contrast results. The objective would be to 
fully explore the methodological issues involved in using such tools and derive 
constructs which would give more meaning to the different aspects of the topographical 
metaphor used in such maps, such as scale, height, types of land mass, etc. Part of that 
effort could be to build on Blanchard’s (2007) work on the use of “stop words” in this 
type of software and develop guidelines on their use. The interview program for the 
thesis is limited and a second line of research would be to attempt to generalize the 
findings of the thesis by surveying a larger group of industry executives. Such a survey 
could be developed on the basis of the thesis and attempt to confirm the ideas related to 
depth and breadth. 
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In addition to these issues of method and data sources, the thesis suffers from three 
major limitations, each of which gives rise to ideas for further research. In the first 
place, the thesis is limited by its scope, which only looks at the automotive industry and 
a sample of four manufacturers and four technologies. Thus the generality of the thesis 
findings is limited. Within the automotive industry, the selection of different 
manufacturers and/or different technologies could yield potentially different results. 
Also, the applicability to other industries and the technology-based firms within them is 
not established. A third line of research would thus be to extend the investigation to 
additional automotive technologies and additional manufacturers in order to test the 
validity of the findings with more automotive data points. A fourth would be to look at 
other industries in which technological artefacts lie at the nexus of the socio-technical 
regime and investigate to what degree similar results are found. Whether significant 
homogeneity or heterogeneity across industries was revealed, this approach could yield 
interesting findings. 
 
The second major limitation to the research is that it was based almost exclusively on 
publicly available data and expert opinion, without access to detailed data sets from the 
manufacturers themselves, and relies on the depth and breadth construct to infer what 
the strategies were based on available data. Such inference is always prone to error and, 
while the thesis relies on expert interviews to confirm the findings, there might be 
additional factors which drove the firm’s decisions. Thus a fifth line of research would 
involve gaining access to a number of vehicle manufacturers and developing a 
methodology similar to that described in Sub-section 3.3.1, although the problems of 
data acquisition found in the Pilot site for that approach will need to be overcome. 
 
The third major limitation to the thesis is that its objective was to add to the theory of 
the technology-based firm and not to develop a view as to what will happen in the 
unfolding story of electric vehicles, as it is always challenging to study a phenomenon 
while it is still going on. The thesis does, however, provide some ideas on the evolution 
of these technologies in Section 6.5, such that that a sixth line of research would be to 
apply Geels and Schot’s pathways in a more rigorous way, in order to predict the 
outcome of the electric vehicle story. This idea could be broadened to include looking at 
a number of different technologies which all appeared to follow one or other of the 
pathways and looking for evidence to expand on the ideas shown in Figure 5.23 on the 
advantages of pursuing depth or breadth in the different pathways. 
 
A seventh area of research which might be of interest is in working further with the 
concepts of co-evolution and the dynamics of socio-technological regimes in order to 
operationalize the three tests put forward for a technology-based firm. Such a study 
could focus on looking at different regimes and determining the degree to which the co-
evolutionary process occurs, perhaps by developing a classification scale based on 
Lewin and Volberda’s five properties. Also of interest would be to operationalize the 
idea of industry influence and determine to what extent it is, in fact, driven by market 
share, and to what extent other factors become important and in what cases. Finally the 
idea of limiting the theory to those firms where technology or a technological artefact is 
at the heart of the firm, could also be made more robust and could be part of this 
seventh idea for further research. 
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Level Of 
Analysis 
Appendix A. Citations of papers using patents in Research Policy  
 
Author(s) and Year of Publication # Citations 
(Science 
Direct) 
Global Schiffel, D. and Kitti, C. (1978) 13 
 Macioti, M. (1980) 0 
 Pavitt, K. (1982) 30 
 Fagerberg, J. (1987) 25 
 Patel, P. and Pavitt, K. (1987) 17 
 Soete, L. (1987) 34 
 Frame, J. D. and Narin, F. (1990) 6 
 Archibugi, D. and Pianta, M. (1992) 11 
 Daniels, P. (1993) 4 
 Tong, X. and Frame, J. D. (1994) 11 
 Malerba, F. and Orsenigo, L. (1996) 20 
 Radosevic, S. and Auriol, L. (1999) 1 
 Guellec, D. and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B. 
(2001) 
7 
 Varsakelis, N. C. (2001) 5 
 Cohen, W. M., et. al. (2002) 23 
 Furman, J. L., et al. (2002) 31 
 Mahmood, I. P. and Singh, J. (2003) 5 
 Cantwell, J. and Vertova, G. (2004) 7 
 Faber, J. and Hesen, A. B. (2004) 2 
 Furman, J. L. and Hayes, R. (2004) 5 
 Hu, M. and Mathews, J. A. (2005) 7 
 Waguespack, D. et al. (2005) 0 
 Baudry, M. and Dumont, B. (2006) 0 
 Wang, E. C. and Huang, W. (2007) 0 
 Quintana-García, C. and Benavides-Velasco, C. A. 
(2008) 
0 
   
Country Blumenthal, T. (1978) 0 
 Basberg, B. L. (1983) 13 
 Horn, E. (1983) 1 
 Bosworth, D. L. (1984) 7 
 da Motta e Albuquerque, Eduardo (2000) 0 
 Hicks, D., et. al. (2001) 15 
 Trajtenberg, M. (2001) 6 
 Álvarez, I. and Molero, J. (2005) 2 
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Level Of 
Analysis 
Author(s) and Year of Publication # Citations 
(Science 
Direct) 
Regional Noyons, E. et al. (1998) 2 
 Zitt, M., et al. (1999) 3 
 Acs, Z. J., et al. (2002) 13 
 Acosta, M. and Coronado, D. (2003) 1 
 Deyle, H. and Grupp, H. (2005) 1 
 Ejermo, O. and Karlsson, C. (2006) 0 
 Mainwaring, L. et al. (2007) 0 
 Zucker, L. G., et. al. (2007) 1 
 Mulas-Granados, C. and Sanz, I. (2008) 0 
 Tappeiner, G., et al. (2008) 0 
   
Industry Reekie, W. D. (1973) 4 
 Rothwell, R. (1981) 3 
 Basberg, B. L. (1982) 3 
 Palda, K. S. and Pazderka, B. (1982) 2 
 Achilladelis, B. et al. (1987) 7 
 Jaffe, A. B. (1989) 13 
 Achilladelis, B.,et al. (1990) 9 
 Arora, A. (1997) 10 
 Arundel, A. and Kabla, I. (1998) 26 
 Bergeron, S. et al. (1998) 4 
 Kondo, M. (1999) 6 
 Kumaresan, N. and Miyazaki, K. (1999) 5 
 Malerba, F. and Orsenigo, L. (1999) 16 
 Bekkers, R. et al. (2002) 10 
 Giarratana, M. S. (2004) 1 
 Greenhalgh, C. and Rogers, M. (2006) 3 
 Corrocher, N. et al. (2007) 1 
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(Science 
Direct) 
Firm Narin, F. et al. (1987) 7 
 Frumau, C. C. F. (1992) 1 
 Gambardella, A. (1992) 20 
 Geroski, P. A. et al. (1997) 7 
 Ernst, H. (1998) 7 
 Gambardella, A. And Torrisi, S. (1998) 14 
 Mowery, D. C. et al. (1998) 42 
 Brouwer, E. and Kleinknecht, A. (1999) 12 
 Cantwell, J. and Janne, O. (1999) 25 
 Santangelo, G. D. (2000) 0 
 Belderbos, R. (2001) 14 
 Cefis, E. and Orsenigo, L. (2001) 8 
 Ernst, H. (2001) 9 
 Kumar, N. (2001) 13 
 Pitkethly, R. H. (2001) 5 
 Bas, C. L. and Sierra, C. (2002) 3 
 Breschi, S. et al. (2003) 10 
 Katila, R. and Mang, P. Y. (2003) 4 
 Bergek, A. and Berggren, C. (2004) 0 
 Blind, K. and Thumm, N. (2004) 3 
 Iwasa, T. and Odagiri, H. (2004) 7 
 Mariani, M. (2004) 1 
 Suzuki, J. and Kodama, F. (2004) 3 
 Hicks, D. and Hegde, D. (2005) 2 
 Beneito, P. (2006) 2 
 Blind, K., et al. (2006) 2 
 Colombo, et al. (2006) 3 
 Garcia-Vega, M. (2006) 3 
 He, Z., et al. (2006) 1 
 Avenel, E., et. Al. (2007) 2 
 Mann, R. J. and Sager, T. W. (2007) 0 
 Rodríguez-Duarte, A., et. al. (2007) 0 
 Rothaermel, F. T. and Thursby, M. (2007) 1 
 Coad, A. and Rao, R. (2008) 0 
 Quintana-García, C. and Benavides-Velasco, C. A. 
(2008) 
0 
 Roper, S. and Hewitt-Dundas, N. (2008) 0 
 Singh, J. (2008) 0 
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Author(s) and Year of Publication # Citations 
(Science 
Direct) 
Product Penan, H. (1996) 5 
 Príncipe, A. (1997) 8 
 Wiseman, P. (1983) 2 
 Patel, P. and Pavitt, K. (1994) 15 
 Lanjouw, J. O. and Mody, A. (1996) 23 
 Tijssen, R. J. W. and Korevaar, J. C. (1997) 6 
 Murray, F. (2002) 14 
 Nameroff, T. J. et al. (2004) 6 
 Dahlin, K. B. and Behrens, D. M. (2005) 4 
 von Wartburg, I. et al. (2005) 5 
 Haupt, R. et al. (2007) 0 
 Mina, A., et. al. (2007) 0 
 Wagner, M. (2007) 0 
 Liu, K., et al. (2008) 0 
   
Inventor Sirilli, G. (1984) 0 
 Macdonald, S. (1986) 5 
 Sirilli, G. (1987) 7 
 Amesse, F., et. al. (1991) 3 
 Noyons, E. C. M., et. al. (1994) 8 
 Narin, F. and Breitzman, A. (1995) 8 
 Fleming, L. and Sorenson, O. (2001) 16 
 Tijssen, R. J. W. (2001) 12 
 Stolpe, M. (2002) 4 
 Tijssen, R. J. W. (2002) 10 
 Balconi, M. et al. (2004) 14 
 Dahlin, K., et al. (2004) 2 
 Dietz, J. S. and Bozeman, B. (2005) 4 
 Furukawa, R. and Goto, A. (2006) 2 
 Meyer, M. (2006) 3 
 Sorenson, O.,et al. (2006) 5 
 Bettencourt, L. , et al. (2007) 3 
 Bonaccorsi, A. and Thoma, G. (2007) 2 
 Giuri, P, et. al. (2007) 1 
 Hoisl, K. (2007) 1 
 Mariani, M. and Romanelli, M. (2007) 1 
 Weck, M. and Blomqvist, K. (2008) 0 
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1. Interview guides 
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3. Interview notes 
 Andy Egglestone  
 Jan Olssen   
 Marc Wiseman  
 Steve Parker   
 Lou Bailoni    
 Cuneyt Oge     
 Glen Mercer     
 Donald Struble   
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Appendix B1. Interview Guides 
 
Interview Guide 
-Firm level 
 
• Company situation and strategy 
 
o Today 
o Last 20 -25 years 
 
 
• Technological assets and situation 
 
o Location and capabilities of major technological resources 
o Location and capabilities of specialized resources in safety and 
alternative power train areas 
 
 
• Technology strategy 
 
o Areas where firm looks for competitive advantage 
o Areas were firm seeks to have differential level of technological 
capabilities 
 
 
• Deployment Strategies 
 
o Pattern(s) of technological deployment across product line 
o Regularity of different patterns (existence of path) 
 
 
• Review of data 
 
o Reaction to data generated 
o Reaction to hypothetical path (depth or breadth) as found in the data 
 
 
• Thoughts on any link between the two deployment strategies to learning and 
performance 
 
o Learning 
o Technical superiority 
o Vehicle sales 
o Profits 
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Interview Guide 
-Technology focus 
 
• Understanding of the technology 
 
o Current situation in terms development 
o Future outlook 
o Historical perspective 
 
• Firm-level competencies 
 
o Identification of leading firms 
o Discussion of specific capabilities of those leaders 
o Relative position of GM, Ford, Toyota, and Nissan with respect to 
leading firms 
 
• Deployment Strategies 
 
o Pattern(s) of technological deployment across technology 
o Existences of specific technological advantages between different 
deployment strategies, i.e., scale economies. 
o Differences between firms 
 
• Review of data 
 
o Reaction to data generated 
o Reaction to hypothetical path (depth or breadth) as found in the data 
 
• Thoughts on any link between the two deployment strategies to learning and 
performance 
 
o Learning 
o Technical superiority 
o Vehicle sales 
o Profits 
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Appendix B2. List of Interviews 
 
1. Andy Egglestone 45 minutes, 13/8/09, Ford, Fuel Cells, Hybrids 
2. Jan Olssen  25 minutes, 17/8/09, Seat Belts, Airbags 
3. Marc Wiseman 40 minutes, 17/8/09, Fuel Cells, Hybrids 
4. Steve Parker  60 minutes, 17/8/09, Nissan 
5. Lou Bailoni   75 minutes, 25/8/09, Seat Belts, Fuel Cells, Hybrids 
6. Cuneyt Oge    90 minutes, 1/9/09, GM, Toyota, Electric Vehicles 
7. Glen Mercer    60 minutes, 1/9/09, Ford, Fuel Cells, Hybrids, 
8. Donald Struble  50 minutes, 1/9/09, Seat Belts, Airbags 
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Appendix B3. Interview Notes 
 
Interview:  1 
Interviewee: Andy Eggleston 
Position:  Independent Consultant,  
  Formerly Marketing Director, Europe, Ford 
  Program Leader for fuel cell electric motorcycle, Intelligent Energy 
Date:  August 13, 2009, 45 minutes 
Type:  Technology Focus – Hybrids and fuel cells 
  Firm level – Ford 
Page:  1 of 3 
 
Hybrids and fuel cells  
 
• Understanding of the technology  
Eggleston feels that Hydrogen is clearly the best hope for the future of mobility in a 
sustainable planet. He also believes, however, that there is a huge chasm between 
the current hydrocarbon economy and what has been called the hydrogen economy, 
and that hybrid technology appears to offer a bridge over that chasm. It might take 
15-20 years to see hydrogen fuel cells with significant penetration in the market but 
they might in fact never become widespread. This depends mainly on battery 
development as the battery electric vehicle together with nuclear energy already 
offers a carbon-free personal transportation model with existing technology. 
 
One thing which is clear for Eggleston is that the wind is shifting towards hybrids in 
the United States. He cites film stars and other opinion leaders as driving us toward 
an attitudinal change about who we are and how we impact the environment. 
Toyota’s hybrid luxury SUV, for example, is striking a chord with people who want 
a vehicle that can give them great performance and also allows them to make a 
statement about themselves. The new US president, Barak Obama, will also push a 
more environmentally friendly agenda both for environmental reasons and also to 
foster the country’s energy security, as the US cannot depend on unfriendly 
governments for its energy security. Hybrids could easily reach 20% penetration in 
markets like the US and Germany but probably not in China and India where the 
primary goal is economic development, and carbon limitations will perhaps not be 
in place for some time. 
 
• Firm-level competencies 
Toyota is clearly the leader in Hybrid technology. Ford, for instance, made the 
decision to acquire Toyota technology for its Escape Hybrid. Honda appears to be 
strong in advanced fuel cells but Eggleston is unsure of whether this will pay off.  
 
He feels that Nissan’s recent announcement to pursue battery electric is a bold 
move but that it might be a mistake; coming out “too soon” with a competitive, all-
electric solution might put them in a situation with a vehicle in place but insufficient 
infrastructure. Paris and London, for example, would be great places to have 
electric cars but Eggleston wonders how one would charge vehicles of people who 
live in apartment buildings? 
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Interviewee: Andy Eggleston 
Page:  2 of 3 
 
• Deployment Strategies 
Eggleston feels that reality is a “bit messier” than the simple choice highlighted by 
the depth and breadth framework. Central to his view is the sometimes tenuous link 
between R&D and marketing and he feels that many of the projects particularly on 
the fuel cell side are disconnected from any clear marketing goal. 
 
There is an R&D budget that gets allocated to different projects and it is hard for 
Eggleston to credit the manufacturers with having a strategy, with respect to how 
they plan to deploy new technology, as clear as that illustrated by the depth and 
breadth construct. 
 
• Review of data 
When presented with the initial finding from the empirical data, however, Eggleston 
felt that “it made perfect sense” and that he recognized what he sees depth as the 
very American “big idea” or “silver bullet” that would somehow change the game 
and restore Detroit’s competitiveness. He sees this in GM’s autonomy concept car 
and also in the new Chevy Volt idea which he thinks has “a lot of merit”. 
 
He contrasts this approach with the “Toyota” way which is to think things through, 
make some bets, and delivers. 
 
• Thoughts on any link between the two deployment strategies to learning 
and performance 
Eggleston does not see any inherent advantage between the two implicit strategies 
of depth and breadth as he feels that what is really important is not what you set out 
to do but how well it actually gets done. For him, success is all about the quality of 
the execution and that learning, sales and profits will all flow from that. This, for 
him, is the lesson from Toyota’s hybrid program. 
 
Ford Motor Company 
 
• Company situation and strategy 
Eggleston was one of the new generation of Ford managers who was forced out 
after Jacques Nasser left, but insists that, while he is not biased, he thinks the firm is 
doing “wonderfully”. Eggleston feels that the new CEO is finally putting to rest 
Ford’s North American myopia, lowering their reliance on SUVs and trucks and 
bringing successful European small cars to the US market. For Eggleston the 
question has always been that if Toyota, VW, Nissan, BMW, etc., can successfully 
design cars for the whole world, why can’t Ford, GM, etc. 
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Interviewee: Andy Eggleston 
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With GM in government hands and sorting out their brands; and Chrysler going 
through its final “death throes”; Eggleston sees Ford as being positioned to be the 
leading US company with small cars, hybrids, and a solid fleet of trucks. He feels 
there will always be a segment of consumers who prefer to buy American made cars 
and that Ford will be able to take this market share. 
 
• Technological assets and situation 
Not covered to save time 
 
• Technology strategy 
When he was marketing Director for Ford of Europe, Eggleston brought about a 
change in the fundamental brand architecture of the company stressing three 
aspects: 1) dependable 2) contemporary 3) driving quality. He sees Ford’s 
technology strategy over the last years as being driven from that change.  
 
Part of dependability was safety and one of the major efforts done at the time was to 
reposition Ford’s Mondeo vehicle as a “safe” vehicle because their consumer 
analysis showed that Mondeo buyers tended to have families and were increasingly 
concerned about automotive safety. The solution was to put airbags “all over the 
car” and to develop safety related ad campaigns such as the little girl who runs out 
to the car during a thunderstorm because she feels safe in it. 
 
• Deployment Strategies 
Eggleston was not able to characterize Ford using the breadth and depth framework 
but told the story of its launch of diesel engines in Europe which does appear to 
match the characteristics of a deep strategy. 
 
In the rebranding exercise above it was detected that Ford had no diesel engines in 
its fleet and that Diesel was gaining in market share year by year. The solution was 
to buy an engine from VW and to put into the entire fleet over a few years. The 
engine was almost immediately put onto the Ford Galaxy minivan since it shared a 
platform with VW and much of the engineering work had already been done. This 
was followed sequentially with a version of the Mondeo and finally made available 
on the Focus. Eggleston feels that the hybrid program followed exactly the same 
pattern and was done for the same reasons. 
 
• Review of data 
Eggleston can confirm the idea that Ford tends more toward deep strategies than 
broad ones but sees Ford more in a reactive mode, doing what it has to as a 
reaction to years of complacency in Detroit. 
 
• Thoughts on any link between the two deployment strategies to learning 
and performance 
As above. Results depend on the quality of execution more than the strategy, 
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Interviewee: Jan Olssen 
Position:  Director, Research & Development, Autoliv  
Date:  August 17, 2009, 25 minutes 
Type:  Technology Focus 
Page:  1 of 2 
 
Seat Belts and Airbags 
 
• Understanding of the technology  
According to Olssen, the advent of new sensing devices such as radar and machine 
vision will enable more pre-crash sensing which gives the opportunity to greatly 
improve the performance of seat belts and, to a lesser extent, airbags. The next 
major innovation will be a device on an electric motor which he calls a pre-
pretensioner, which will tighten the seatbelts in case there is a possibility of a crash 
and, of course, loosen them again if the crash is avoided. 
 
In terms of penetration, both front and back seat belts are pretty much standard 
everywhere but load limiters and pretensioners still have some way to go. 
 
In airbags, Olssen feels that the front airbag systems are fairly ubiquitous in the 
west and that the major challenge will be to take the cost down sufficiently for their 
deployment in less-developed countries such as China and India where some local 
models are still not equipped with the devices. He expects this to occur sooner 
rather than later. 
 
For Olssen and Autoliv, the biggest challenge for airbags is to increase the 
penetration of side airbags and the inflatable curtain which are still far below their 
potential. 
 
• Firm-level competencies 
Mercedes and Volvo are the leaders in safety systems and Autoliv has a long 
relationship with Volvo which has proved mutually beneficial over the years.  
 
Olssen believes that Ford was very quick to install front airbags and sees the 
Japanese as having decided to push safety in order to develop competitive 
advantage in the US market. 
 
In terms of research, Olssen has great respect for both Ford and GM’s R&D people 
but is not sure to what degree they are connected to the platform engineering teams. 
 
The US manufacturers, for example, define the safety system and select its 
components quite early in their product development process, thus locking in their 
capabilities years before product launch. The Japanese, on the other hand, leave 
space for the system components and then choose them as late as possible in order 
to have the best technology on the vehicle. 
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• Deployment Strategies 
Olssen did not recognize the patterns of depth and breadth in his customers and 
preferred to think of technology leaders who would do expensive original research 
and strive to be first on the market and others who would be happy to be fast 
followers and would implement proven technology across the vehicle fleet in a 
broad way once someone else had developed it. Although Olssen was careful not to 
name any manufacturer, it appeared that he would put Mercedes and Volvo into the 
first category and Nissan and Toyota in the second. When asked if there was a third 
category of slow followers and if GM and Ford could be characterized as such, Mr. 
Olssen demurred although it appeared that he agreed. 
 
In terms of deployment rates, however, Olssen felt that the safety rating done by 
NHTSA and others in the US and equivalent organizations in Europe play a huge 
role in the choices the manufacturers make. In the case of the inflatable curtain, for 
example, he understands that the European and Japanese testing protocols make it 
more important for vehicles to have them than their American counterparts and that 
this is the primary reason for low penetration. 
 
For Olssen the technical specifications of a seat belt or an airbag are not as 
important as how these components behave in the entire safety system. In fact the 
overall safety of a vehicle depends on the seat belts and airbags interacting with 
each other and the rest of the system which includes sensors, seats, instrument 
panel, other key components and the structure of the car itself. 
 
• Review of data 
When some of the high level conclusions of the deployment data were shared with 
Mr. Olssen he found them to be correct, confirming the behaviour of the four 
companies. 
 
 
• Thoughts on any link between the two deployment strategies to learning 
and performance 
Olssen feels the issue is to lead or to follow and did not dwell on depth and breadth 
although one could argue that, by his definition, a technological leader would have 
to follow a deep strategy while a follower might follow a broad one in terms of 
deployment, and that a leader would engage in a large volume of R&D work while a 
follower would do much less. 
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Interview:  3 
Interviewee: Mark Wiseman 
Position:  Director, Alternative Powertrain, Ricardo  
Date:  August 17, 2009, 45 minutes 
Type:  Technology Focus 
Page:  1 of 2 
   
Hybrids and Fuel Cells 
 
• Understanding of the technology  
Wiseman gives a US perspective to the situation of hybrids and feels that it is a 
challenging area. His firm, Ricardo, is an engineering company that actually 
developed some of the first hybrid vehicles under contract to the OEMs and had 
argued for a gradual, cost-driven process which would start with mild hybrids and 
then slowly improve in fuel economy and the degree of hybridization. In fact, many 
companies are pursuing much stronger hybrid technologies led, of course, by 
Toyota.  
 
One aspect of the hybrid situation that Wiseman focused on was the debate about 
whether the technology was better for light trucks or passenger cars, and he 
maintains that GM led the discussion on the side of trucks and that Toyota argued 
that all of the arguments for trucks can also be made for cars. In his view both GM 
and Ford used hybrid versions of their trucks and SUVs to make the case to the 
public that these vehicles were not so bad for the environment and that the 
programs needed to be seen in marketing light. 
 
Another aspect that is important for Wiseman is the current political situation in the 
United States. The Obama administration has publicly challenged the auto industry 
to reach fleet average of 35.5 miles per gallon and is ready to write that figure into 
the next round of CAFE legislation driven by the dual goals of energy independence 
and CO2 emissions. Clearly hybrids and electric vehicles will play a role in 
achieving those targets with people predicting 1 million new plug-in hybrid cars per 
year. 
 
In his view, GM’s fuel cell program was due to the conviction of Larry Burns, 
former head of R&D, as well as the Bush administration which spent $1 billion to 
promote the technology. Wiseman understood that Detroit had made a deal with 
Washington to spend significantly on fuel cells in exchange for no increase in the 
federal CAFE fuel economy legislation. GM and Ford were reportedly spending 
$300 million and $150 million respectively on fuel cells every year but that this was 
nothing compared to the cost of increasing average fuel economy which might have 
been on the order of $500 per car. 
 
What happened in Wiseman’s view is that the “bubble” burst and that the realities 
of fuel cells never came close to the political hype. On a well-to-wheel basis, the fuel 
cell becomes uncompetitive against hybrids and even if one could make hydrogen 
from renewable electricity, then it seems more logical to go straight to electric 
vehicles. 
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Wiseman does not really buy the “who killed the electric car” story and sees it 
coming from a very narrow viewpoint. In his view, there are different paths to 
sustainable transportation and when the electric vehicle was launched in the 1990s, 
there were serious problems with battery technology and infrastructure which were 
simply not well worked out.  
 
He knew people personally involved with GMs Impact program and he insists that 
they were trying to make it successful but that GM’s PR group bungled the recall 
which eventually killed the program.  
 
At one time politics and technology put fuel cells out in front and today it’s all about 
hybrids and plug-in hybrids. Wiseman sees the plug-in hybrid offering the 
cleanliness of an electric car without the problem of range or infrastructure and 
sees this as the most likely path although he does not rule out a fuel cell comeback 
or the ability of someone like Nissan to leapfrog the technology with an all-electric 
solution. 
 
• Firm-level competencies 
Toyota is clearly the leader but Wiseman’s view is that one needs to go a bit deeper 
in looking at each OEM. 
 
In his view, Toyota actually pursued a broad strategy and developed several hybrid 
technologies in parallel with the Prius program, including a 42-volt vehicle and a 
panel truck in Japan, and that they only focused their efforts on the synergy drive 
system when the Prius started to take off.  
 
Wiseman also feels that GM’s fleet coverage is overstated and that, to get a better 
idea of relative commitment, the fleet coverage should be calculated on the basis of 
sales volumes, not models. 
 
Wiseman’s view of Ford is that it was well advanced with a dedicated electric car 
group, a fuel cell group and the investment in TH!NK and mentioned its 
groundbreaking joint venture with Bollard and Daimler as an example of its 
position. 
 
What happened is that Ford came under financial constraints and was not able to 
justify the business case for these investments and scaled back their efforts to a 
much more limited and practical program but that they are still pursuing their own 
technology. 
 
Nissan also had started down its own path and Wiseman places some importance of 
the Tino hybrid program which went on the market in Japan before being wound 
down in favour of licensing technology from Toyota. 
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• Deployment Strategies 
Wiseman felt that the depth and breadth construct had some merit and felt that what 
would be most interesting would be to calculate the relative cost of pursuing one 
strategy or another; the engineering expense, for example, of putting a tested hybrid 
drive onto a new model would cost from $25-50 million and after that there would 
be much larger costs of tooling and manufacturing for both the OEM and its 
suppliers. 
 
• Review of data 
As stated above, Wiseman thought that Toyota had clearly pursued a broad 
program on hybrids.  
 
He also urged caution in looking at the patent data as he believes that much of the 
patenting done in automotive is defensive in nature and that the OEMs strive to 
protect themselves from legal challenges by first patenting what they can and 
second making cross licensing agreements with each other. 
 
 He did accept the data on the number of patents and felt that their relative number 
did broadly reflect the OEMs priorities.  
 
• Thoughts on any link between the two deployment strategies to learning 
and performance 
Wiseman feels that the manufacturers are simply not interested in learning and that 
their primary focus was in the cost benefit of different options. 
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Interviewee: Stephan Parker  
Position:  Independent Consultant,  
Formerly Managing Director, Ricardo Strategic Consulting and 
advisor to Nissan  
Date:  August 18, 2009, 60 minutes 
Type:  Firm level – Nissan 
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• Company situation and strategy 
Ever since Carlos Ghosn took Nissan through its recovery plan, Nissan has been in 
turnaround mode. The recovery plan, of course, put Nissan into a very profitable 
position and Nissan has managed to continue to do fairly well until the current 
downturn. 
 
According to Parker, who is a close advisor to one of the members of Nissan’s 
management board, the company has followed a three-part strategy over the last 
few years which has gotten mixed results. The first part of the strategy was a 
massive product offensive which has generally been well received by the public due 
to attractive styling and competitive pricing.  
 
The second element has been internationalization which also seems to be 
proceeding well. 
 
The third element has been continuous cost reduction which has reduced some costs 
both in the supply base and in Nissan’s internal operation. What Nissan has not 
managed to do, however, is to realize economies of scale across the different 
markets and model range or be able to charge premium prices and this is, 
according to Parker, the strategic priority at the moment. 
 
In Parker’s view the key to success in automotive is to be able to monetize 
technology investments and he sees that Volkswagen. Mercedes and BMW do a 
much better job at that than most others, including Nissan. 
 
• Technological assets and situation 
Parker could not think of an area where Nissan has technological advantage 
although he does have hope for its major bet on battery electric vehicles which was 
made 18 – 24 months ago. 
 
• Technology strategy 
The electric vehicle program is reportedly thought of inside Nissan as “one big roll 
of the dice” and Parker understands that they have put virtually all of their 
development money into the program at the exclusion of everything else. 
 
Parker supports the view that Nissan was so far behind Toyota and the US firms in 
hybrids that it had to bet on a game-changing play or would certainly lose if the 
market really does turn “green”. 
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He is a bit sceptical about how the hybrid and electric vehicle story will play out as 
he accepts the view given by Neville Jackson, the chief scientist at his old firm, that 
the economics and environmental science still puts diesel technology as the best bet 
for sustainable transportation. Parker contrasts Nissan’s strategy with 
Volkswagen’s which he feels is much broader and touches on different power train 
technologies based on different fuel types and is all being marketed under the “Blue 
Motion” campaign. 
 
BMW has a similar program called “Efficient Dynamics” and Parker feels that this 
kind of clear technological leadership program coupled with savvy marketing is the 
key to success and sees Nissan failing at both. 
 
• Deployment Strategies 
Parker felt that the depth and breadth concepts were useful characterizations of the 
way the different OEMs behaved and saw Nissan as pursuing deep strategies again 
and again. The electric vehicle program mentioned above is a perfect example of 
depth and Nissan has just announced building two European plants to manufacture 
the cars.  
 
He sees VW as pursuing a broad strategy and made an interesting point that Ford, 
as recently as 2002, was pursuing 600 different research initiatives in Europe alone 
while VW was only looking at 5-6 major research areas. While these areas might be 
further broken down into 50-60 projects, one gets the sense that if VW’s strategy is 
broad then Ford’s was simply a mess. That said, Parker felt that Ford tended to 
broader, rather than deeper deployment strategies. 
 
With respect to Toyota, Parker did not feel he had enough of a sense of their path 
but was aware that Toyota was engaged in a major re-think of the way they do 
business and that Toyota had come to the conclusion that they were a “boring” 
company and would need to become more interesting both as individuals and as a 
firm to succeed in the future. 
 
In his view, GM is such a mess that there is no benefit to looking for any pattern in 
the GM data. 
 
• Thoughts on any link between the two deployment strategies to learning 
and performance 
Parker sees deep strategies as what an OEM should use in a turnaround situation 
and cites two examples where this worked well. 
 
One was Audi’s “Quattro”4X4 power train which it developed over several years, 
perfected and then launched across the product line. He sees the “Quattro” as 
being fundamental in re-positioning the brand. 
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Another example is VW’s 10 year program to develop exciting and efficient diesel 
engines which he sees has been one of the key reasons for their market success over 
the last 3-4 years. 
 
Broad strategies are what is called for to leverage a strong brand and, as stated 
above, Parker sees this behaviour in Volkswagen and BMW. 
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• Company situation and strategy 
Speaking about the automotive industry in general, Bailoni feels we are in a time of 
uncertainty and change. GM, for example is “all over the map” and has recently 
expressed an interest in keeping its Opel subsidiary which has been for sale for the 
last few months.  
 
Another surprising announcement by GM was to bring some aspects of airbag 
technology back in house after years of relying on companies such as Autoliv. 
Bailoni feels that this is part of a trend in the supplier strategies of the OEMs. In 
recent years the major OEMs have increasingly given their suppliers more 
responsibilities and at the same time decreased their in-house capabilities closing 
down engineering departments, spinning off internal suppliers, etc. 
 
What Bailoni sees is that the increases in advanced safety systems and electric cars 
has brought a number of new technologies and new suppliers into the automotive 
industry and left the OEMs without the same level of knowledge as they had with 
more “traditional” automotive technologies. He expects we will see them bringing 
more of these exotic technologies in house at least to some degree in order to build 
their own competence in these areas. 
 
• Technological assets and situation 
Car companies are still focused on the same thing and this does not change. It’s all 
about developing and delivering products which live up to the brand promise. This 
will delight customers and make them loyal, creating the possibility of earning 
money. 
 
• Technology strategy 
Bailoni spoke at length about electric vehicle technology and the limits he sees for 
electric cars. One of the reasons for speaking to Bailoni was that in 2005 he 
conducted a survey of the leading power train managers at all of the major OEMS 
as well as their key suppliers in order to understand their view of the future of 
electric vehicles. 
 
According to him, the key issue in the possible switch from internal combustion 
engines to some other technology is consumer economics. The consensus view of the 
power train managers was that consumers would change their behaviour only if 
gasoline prices reached $4-5 per gallon AND it was perceived that this situation 
would last for a significant time. 
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Bailoni cites the hybrid sales during the summer of 1998 which peaked when 
gasoline reached $4 per gallon but then dropped back down as soon as it fell below 
$3 a few months later. 
 
Bailoni admits that there is a segment of the population who has the extra money to 
purchase more expensive environmentally friendly vehicles but they are a minority 
and he does not expect electric vehicles to reach more than 2-3 % market 
penetration in five years and perhaps 10% in ten. 
 
• Understanding of the technology  
With his focus on consumer cost drivers, it is difficult for Bailoni to see how electric 
vehicles will ever be competitive. 
 
He understands that the Chevy Volt will have a list price on the order of $40,000, 
which is about double the cost of a similar size hybrid like the Prius and perhaps 3 
or even 4 times the price of a similarly equipped traditional vehicle. The high price 
is driven by having all of the costs associated with a 1.1 litre engine as well as the 
entire electric vehicle system, including a battery pack which might cost up to 
$15,000. To this one has to amortize high development and tooling costs and divide 
them by relatively low expected sales volumes. A final cost which is an interesting 
area for study is the prevision for warranty costs that must be included as there is 
very little data to use in calculating this. 
 
According to Bailoni, Nissan seems to understand this and has committed itself to 
holding the purchase price of the Nissan Leaf to a level comparable to its 
traditional competitors. The plan appears to be to lease the battery separately and 
have the battery and all of its associated warranty and replacement issues as the 
responsibility of Nissan or a third party. This way the consumer economics will be 
to buy a car (or lease one) and then pay a battery charge which will be equivalent 
conceptually to the cost of filling the gas tank. 
 
One point to make about advanced batteries is that the current Lithium Ion battery 
concepts are in fact thousands of individual cells literally wired together and there 
are a lot of things that can go wrong with these devices. 
 
Another critical issue for Bailoni is that electric vehicle technology does not stand 
alone but needs to be constantly evaluated against the alternatives and he feels 
there is at least an additional 20% of improvement potential for gasoline powered 
internal combustion engines using technology which has already been developed 
and tested. Internal combustion engines have been around for a long time and are 
very reliable. In Bailoni’s view, if the world were serious about reducing CO2 and 
decreasing reliance on oil then compressed natural gas offers the best alternative as 
it again uses proven technology with a 20-25% cost disadvantage. The problem with 
CNG of course is building the requisite infrastructure. 
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• Deployment Strategies 
Bailoni felt that the basic concepts of depth and breadth made sense but that the key 
to technological introduction was cost and perceived value. 
 
Taking a traditional automotive view on new technology, what one sees is that new 
features are first seen on very high-end cars such as Porsche and Mercedes Benz 
and only trickle down to the mass market as the cost comes down or because 
regulations change requiring the new devices. Bailoni gives the example of tyre 
pressure sensors which in 2000 were only available on selected models of the most 
expensive cars. In the aftermath of Ford’s Firestone tyre tragedy, it was found that 
underinflated tyres were a direct cause of the deadly rollovers and this resulted in 
new laws requiring the devices. In 5 years virtually every new car sold in the US 
was equipped with the pressure sensor and Bailoni feels that a normal roll out 
would have taken 15 to 20 years. 
 
• Review of data 
On the pretensioner data set which shows Nissan and Toyota moving quickly and 
GM moving very slowly, Bailoni felt strongly that the data can be misleading. At 
issue is not incorporating pretensioners but achieving 5-star safety ratings from the 
government testing agency, NHTSA. Dynamic crash protection depends on a myriad 
of factors including seat belts but also including the design of interior components 
and most of all the structural integrity of the cars. In Bailoni’s view the most likely 
explanation for GM’s slow deployment of pretensioners was that they simply did not 
need them to get the 5-star rating due to having a heavier steel structure. 
 
In some technologies the general public might come to demand a particular device 
or feature but in those cases where the public is unaware of the details one would 
need to look at the whole system. 
 
• Thoughts on any link between the two deployment strategies to learning 
and performance 
Bailoni felt that the specific technology would drive these issues more than the 
generic strategy and each case might be different. 
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Electric Vehicles 
 
•  Understanding of the technology 
Oge feels it is important to distinguish between fundamental system changes such as 
fuel cells and hybrids and more component level changes such as seat belts and 
airbags. 
Oge is of the firm conviction that the electric vehicle is the future of automotive and 
in fact projects that 30% of vehicles will have some kind of electric drive train by 
2030. 
Oge is currently working with both Nissan and Toyota on a project related to this 
area and believes that sufficient momentum is already in place to bring about the 
change, at least for some applications. 
 
He is also convinced that China’s decision to push electric technology will have a 
tremendous impact. In his view China might in fact place as many as 30 million 
vehicles on the road in the next three years and that such a huge amount of 
component production will allow costs to drop on critical components such as 
electric motors, batteries and power electronics. For Oge, what is key is not the 
quality of the cars that Chinese OEMs produce, as such cars will probably not meet 
western safety standards or be exported, but the volume of components which will 
certainly be exported to the West. 
 
One aspect of technological development in automotive that is very important for 
Oge is that over the last 30 years virtually all technological advancement has been 
driven by emissions and safety regulation rather than market demands and 
technological push. The only exception to this is perhaps some comfort features and 
telematics or infotainment. 
 
He cites Ted Levitt and Kim Clark as writing about the last true automotive 
innovation which he feels was the V8 engine. He also recommends the biography of 
Kettering, an automotive pioneer who invented many of the key systems in the 
modern vehicle in the last century. 
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• Firm-level competencies 
Oge feels that Toyota has a big problem. In his view they have overcommitted to 
hybrid technology and that, while some aspects of their technology might be 
applicable to electric vehicles, he sees them falling behind Nissan and GM. To 
compound the problem further, he sees Toyota’s consensus based management style 
unable to cope with the present global downturn in the industry and that senior 
management is not ready to start making tough decisions. 
 
Oge also thinks it is important to recognize the role of the Japanese government’s 
research arm, MITI, in encouraging Toyota to invest in hybrid technology and 
giving it $1.5 billion for the purpose. 
 
Oge applauds Nissan’s crash electric program which he sees as leapfrogging 
Toyota’s lead in hybrids. Nissan has assembled a multicultural team which is 
“pragmatic and determined to succeed”. He sees the Nissan guys as having “the 
guts” to make this work and while he acknowledges that it might be a kind of “Hail 
Mary” strategy, he is convinced it will pay off. He does not see the same level of 
courage to make decisions in the Toyota camp. 
 
Oge did not comment on Ford as much of the conversation centred on General 
Motors. 
 
On electric vehicles Oge discussed the Chevy Volt and points out that the design of 
its battery configuration is the same as GM’s EV1 vehicle from the 1990s. In Oge’s 
view, GM was years ahead of the rest of the industry but allowed that lead to 
evaporate due to a political battles inside GM. 
 
Oge dismisses hybrid technology as not being truly revolutionary because the 
internal combustion engine still drives the wheels and that the electric motor just 
adds limited torque. Oge also concurred with the characterization of many twomode 
hybrids as being simply motorized automatic gearboxes. 
 
•  Deployment Strategies 
Oge felt that the characterization of depth and breadth “made sense” but felt 
strongly that the choice of which path to follow was driven more by the specific 
technology than the idea of path dependencies by company. 
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•  General Motors 
With respect to General Motors and its repeated failure to capitalize on its broad 
technological leadership, Oge cites four areas which he sees as fundamental. 
 
The first has to do with the internal accounting rules of the OEMs. In GM and Ford, 
for example, if a specific model or platform is the first to be equipped with a new 
component or system then that program needs to pay for its development cost as 
well as its industrialization both at the OEM and its suppliers. Thus, if the first 
application of airbags goes onto a Cadillac, then the Cadillac division must bear all 
of the development costs. This is the reason that expensive technology is often seen 
on the most expensive models first as they are the only ones with enough 
profitability to absorb these costs. 
 
Oge understands that Toyota and Honda, for instance, do not do this and instead 
spread the costs for new technology or classify it in a different way, since once the 
decision is made to develop something then they see no reason to penalize a specific 
platform or product group. 
 
He feels that these companies have done a much better job of systematically 
managing their technology portfolio than the American firms. What is key for such a 
process, in Oge’s view, is to have the discipline to stick to your ideas. 
 
The second critical factor is the “make or buy” decision process and here Oge 
seems to think that, in new technology, it might be better to develop things in-house, 
and he cites the clean diesel programs at major heavy duty engine manufacturers as 
an example. For clean diesels it seems the fuel injection and turbo chargers need to 
be very different and according to Oge these two technologies are each dominated 
by two companies - Bosch/Siemens in fuel injection and Honeywell/Borg Warner in 
fuel injection. It seems that Navistar relied upon its suppliers and was not able to 
meet Ford’s cost targets and quality requirements while Cummins chose to build 
these key components in-house and has been able to do much better. 
 
The third factor is how the technology development portfolio fits into the product 
development process and vehicle cycle plan. 
 
In the product development process, for example, Honda and Toyota will only use 
proven technology at the component and systems level in order to avoid major 
launch problems. In terms of cycle planning, Toyota does not replace major power 
train systems when it launches a new model but instead does so at a model’s 2-year 
re-styling. 
 
According to Oge this policy reduces the risks involved in launching a new model 
considerably and is in contrast to GM’s normal practice of changing everything at 
model change; a practice which just makes it more likely that something will go 
wrong either at the component, system or systems integration level. 
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The final and most damaging problem that General Motors has had is internal 
politics, as discussed above. 
 
In Oge’s view, there are always intense politics in any organization but it is the 
absence of sound and disciplined processes, such as Toyota’s technological 
portfolio, which allows such politics to drive the technology strategy. 
 
•  Company situation and strategy (GM) 
Oge does believe that President Obama’s task force “has some smart people” on it 
and thinks they will try to push the company in the right direction. 
 
• Technology strategy (GM) 
In terms of fuel cells, Oge supports the idea that there was an implicit or explicit 
arrangement with the Bush administration on fuel cells in exchange for a limit to 
increased CAFE legislation and estimates that they spent no more than $300 million 
per year on the program. While that is a large dollar amount, Oge insists that such 
money is a relatively small price to pay for relief from CAFE legislation. 
 
As mentioned above, the new bet at GM is on electric vehicles and Oge agrees with 
GM that the Chevy Volt is unlike the hybrid vehicles on the market as the internal 
combustion engine can only drive the wheels via the electric motors. 
 
•  Deployment Strategies & Review of data (GM) __ 
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• Industry overview 
Mercer began by giving an overview of where he sees the four companies in the 
sample. In 1985, Mercer determined that three best OEMs in the world was BMW 
for brand management, Toyota for its production system, and Honda for its engine 
technology, and he sees no reason to change his mind today. 
 
According to Mercer, Toyota’s problems with its Tundra pick up and closing its 
famed joint venture with General Motors, NUMI, are only “chinks in the armour” 
and that its manufacturing prowess still sets it ahead of the other OEMs. Toyota is 
its own worst enemy but that they have correctly developed technology for whatever 
power train scenarios develop. Whether this strategy, which dates from the early 
1990s, was exceptionally smart or just turned out to be right, is difficult to say but in 
any case Mercer feels Toyota is on the right track. 
 
Mercer feels that Nissan is trying to figure out what it is and will be. He sees several 
distinct phases in Nissan’s development over the last years. Nissan had originally 
been very close to the Japanese government. Then it went through a “copy Toyota” 
phase which led to its profound crisis in the 1990s. After the alliance with Renault 
was formed, Nissan began its recovery plan under Carlos Ghosn and has been in 
“turnaround” mode ever since. For Mercer, Nissan still has not developed a clear 
view of where it is going and has been “thrashing around” looking for something 
new. 
 
Mercer confirms that the latest idea, to be the electric vehicle company, is a “hail 
Mary” play. 
 
Mercer’s view is that perhaps GM emerged from bankruptcy too quickly and there 
is a feeling in the company that they are “done” and can now move on. On the 
positive side he feels that GM has shed a lot of costs but he is not sure if the board 
was too quick to confirm Fritz Henderson as CEO as it is unclear to him how 
‘lifetime’ GM people can save the company. 
 
GM’s strategy today is to launch a “model onslaught” and what surprises Mercer is 
that the US government obliged GM to reduce its brands from 6 to 4. The company 
is now simply putting out more models under the remaining brands but has not 
really changed its way of thinking. 
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For Mercer, General Motors has always believed in its tremendous scale as the 
answer to all of its problems. If you believe in economies of scale and are the 
biggest player, then it is logical to assume you will always have the ability to do 
anything. In the case of fuel cells he believes you can see this pattern of behaviour 
and the only problem was that “the laws of physics” did not agree. 
 
Mercer feels that General Motors was incredibly consistent pouring money into fuel 
cells but did not show the same level of consistency in the EV-1. 
 
According to Mercer, it was Bob Lutz, a legendary industry executive, who returned 
from retirement to GM on the condition that the Chevy Volt project be fully funded, 
as his conviction is also that the electric vehicle with different potential sources for 
electricity, i.e., batteries, generators, fuel cells, etc,. is clearly the future. 
 
Mercer says that the culture at GM would “polish the hairs off a doorknob” 
meaning that the engineers would do whatever it takes to get the best solution and 
that this was partly driven by a degree of “technological arrogance” and partly by 
being “deeply risk-averse” and afraid of the costly implications of recalls. 
 
• Company situation and strategy (Ford) 
According to Mercer, who has recently written a book chapter on Ford, the 
company “lurches” back and forth per the thinking of the current CEO and 
understands that the current CEO of Ford, Alan Mulally, is a “good guy”.  
 
Ford went from Alex Trottman’s global vision to Nasser’s downstream idea to 
environmentalism and then a return to basics under Bill Ford. Mulally has now 
focused Ford on profit and consistency and saved the company by taking steps to 
correct its direction before the current crisis hit.  
 
• Technology strategy 
In Mercer’s view, Ford has finally worked out how to bring its European designs, 
technology and thinking to the US and feels this is the best way to get affordable 
small cars on the market. GM’s approach, in contrast, is to “de-content” its larger 
vehicles and import small substandard cars from its Daewoo subsidiary. 
 
In terms of power train technology Mercer quotes a presentation recently given at 
the University of Michigan which places accelerated incremental improvement of 
the internal combustion engine at the heart of Ford’s strategy. 
 
Mercer says that Ford is also “pedalling very quickly” to get its own non-Toyota 
hybrid system up to speed. Toyota’s system, according to Mercer, is over-
engineered and Ford has an opportunity and also runs a risk by designing its system 
“closer to the ragged edge”. 
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• Deployment Strategies 
Mercer thought that the characterization of depth and breadth was correct but saw 
it play out in cultural terms. He felt that the German manufacturers, i.e., Mercedes, 
BMW and Volkswagen, typically pursued deep strategies and that the Japanese 
would pursue broad strategies. This applies to Honda and Toyota and to Nissan 
prior to Carlos Ghosn’s leadership. In his view, US companies go back and forth 
between the two. 
 
He also feels there is much variance between technologies as one of the critical 
issues is the size of the technological bet and the sensitivity of the system or 
component. A recall of a million hybrid vehicles with a $5,000 cost per vehicle 
could sink a company while fixing a few hundred thousand DVD players would be 
manageable, and he felt this issue is at the heart of many such discussions. 
 
• Understanding of the technology (Alternative Power Train) 
Mercer takes exception to what he calls “the grand equation” which, in his view, is 
deeply embedded in the minds of industry executives. 
 
The idea is that there is a rational calculation one could make between the 
additional cost of a hybrid or a battery electric vehicle and the net present value of 
the savings on gasoline or diesel fuel which will result. 
 
Mercer cites a University of California study which found that only 3% of Toyota 
Prius buyers actually “did the math” and that most people buy such cars for an 
emotional reason or as a political statement. 
 
In his view anyone who chooses to buy a new car is by definition not being rational 
as the most cost effective transportation option is a five-year-old Honda. 
 
The current trend to hybrids is like the emergence of safety as an issue back in the 
1990s. Mercer clearly remembers when seat belts were considered superfluous and 
how the car-buying public changed their perceptions very quickly. Whether we are 
coming close to the “inflection point” is difficult for him to say. 
 
In terms of the future he shares the view often called “horses for courses” in which 
different technologies will be most popular in certain applications and with certain 
types of consumers. The biggest barrier to higher penetration of all types of 
alternative power train vehicles in his view is the current state of “sectarian 
violence” existing between proponents of different systems. 
 
All electric proponents, for example, argue that hybrids lose money, clean diesel 
people talk about the toxic nature of a used lithium ion battery, etc., fuel cells are 
always 10 years away and clean gasoline is catching up. Mercer feels that the 
average consumer is simply confused by the virulent tone of debate. 
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Seat Belts and Airbags 
 
• Understanding of the technology  
Don Struble was a member of the design team of the minicars RSV, one of the first 
prototypes of a modern airbag system in 1979 and authored the definitive history of 
airbag development SAE paper 980648. His company investigates crash dynamics 
for OEMs including Toyota and Nissan and has followed the development of 
airbags and seatbelts throughout his career. 
 
Struble believes we are reaching a level of airbag deployment where the 
incremental cost might not be really justified by an increase in safety and used the 
phrase “diminishing returns” to describe the current situation. Side airbags, for 
example, came out in the late 1980s before there were any clear test protocols, 
metrics or dummy telemetry and he finds the cost benefit data is not compelling. In 
his view most of the latest developments have been market led. 
 
• Firm-level competencies 
Struble credits General Motors with the development of the modern airbag and feels 
that the company has always enjoyed vast amounts of talent and capability. He 
recalls GM’s Dave Potter who ran its Environmental Activities lab in the 1970s as 
saying “there is not a problem we can’t solve. The only question is which problems 
to solve”. 
 
With respect to Ford, Struble believes the legacy of Robert McNamara and the 
“whiz kids” has permanently left its imprint on the organisation and would sum up 
Ford’s attitude as “there is nothing that can’t be analysed”. According to Struble, 
Ford developed a very complex model to estimate the costs and benefits of safety 
technology early on and still prefers analysis to testing. He does see the recruitment 
of Boeing’s Mullaly as a “brilliant move” and believes Ford has a bright future. 
 
Struble underscores the fact the safety technology in general and airbags in 
particular required a completely new set of technologies for the OEMs and cites this 
fact as the reason that the technology has been led by suppliers since the early days. 
 
Cars had virtually no electronics in them before the 1970s and thus the suppliers 
ended up doing much of the basic research and providing complete systems when 
they were available. Sensor technology and the microprocessors needed for 
actuation were particularly new for the industry, to say nothing of the pyrotechnic 
fuel. 
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According to Struble, it was Chrysler, not GM, who really brought airbags into the 
mainstream in the United States. He recalls that Chrysler’s flamboyant CEO, Lee 
Iacocca, told President Richard Nixon that the cost of developing airbag technology 
would bankrupt Detroit. What happened later was that when he saw how expensive 
and problematic the automatic 3-point seat belts would be he changed his mind and 
began to lobby for airbags. By that time Chrysler had “hollowed itself out”, laying 
off most of its engineers and thus had to completely rely on suppliers to develop the 
systems. GM did play a leading role in recognizing the tragic issue of children and 
front seat airbags and in taking steps to protect them. 
 
Looking ahead Struble sees more computers, more advanced sensors, fewer 
mechanical components and more complexity in airbag systems but maintains that 
we have reached or are reaching the limit of the technology in terms of saving lives 
at a reasonable cost. 
 
• Deployment Strategies 
With respect to the deployment data observed for both airbags and seat belts Struble 
is not surprised that the Japanese companies appear to be faster than Ford and GM. 
The reaction of the Japanese to changing US regulation has been, in his view, to 
accept the changes and figure out what they have to do. US firms, on the other hand, 
would send their lawyers and lobbyists to Washington and try to “lower the bar”. 
 
With respect to airbags, it made sense to proceed incrementally rather than all at 
once due to the nature of the technology. One reason is the fact, stated above, that 
airbags were “foreign technology”.  
 
Another is that supply chain reliability was a major factor and, in the early days, a 
fire at a Morton Thikol plant actually stopped the Lincoln Continental production 
line. It simply was not evident that the manufacturers of sensors and actuators could 
ramp up production to the volumes required by the automotive industry and meet its 
quality and price requirements. 
 
A third reason to go slowly in the case of GM is its basic nature to be cautious. Part 
of GM’s history is to do things in “fits and start” and this reflects the competing 
political agendas of different people and groups within the company. On the specific 
issue of pretensioners, Struble suspects that it is likely that GM felt that the devices 
were simply not needed and only became convinced over time. An interesting 
question for the future is whether the “new GM” will do anything differently. 
 
In contrast with GM, Toyota takes the long view and when they do get “in motion” 
everyone in the company from “top to bottom” is “on board”. Toyota also has its 
product cycles “all figured out” and thus is able to plan its technology deployment 
very well. 
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 247 
 
Appendix C1. Full list of models offered  
(Jato Search engine, Automotive News Website, accessed 5/11/09) 
 
 
Honda Insight LX PZEV 5dr 
hatchback '10 
$ 19,800  
 
 
Honda Insight LX 5dr hatchback 
'10 
$ 19,800  
 
 
Toyota Prius I 4dr hatchback '10 $ 21,000  
 
 
Honda Insight EX PZEV 5dr 
hatchback '10 
$ 21,300  
 
 
Honda Insight EX 5dr hatchback 
'10 
$ 21,300  
 
 
Toyota Prius II 4dr hatchback '10 $ 22,000  
 
 
Toyota Prius III 4dr hatchback '10 $ 23,000  
 
 
Honda Insight EX with Navigation 
PZEV 5dr hatchback '10 
$ 23,100  
 
 
Honda Insight EX with Navigation 
5dr hatchback '10 
$ 23,100  
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Honda Civic Hybrid CVT 4dr 
sedan '09 
$ 23,650  
 
 
Honda Civic Hybrid CVT 
W/Leather 4dr sedan '09 
$ 24,850  
 
 
Chevrolet Malibu Hybrid 1HY 4dr 
sedan '09 
$ 25,555  
 
 
Honda Civic Hybrid CVT w/Navi 
4dr sedan '09 
$ 25,650  
 
 
Toyota Prius IV 4dr hatchback '10 $ 25,800  
 
 
Toyota Camry 2.4 Auto Hybrid 4dr 
sedan '10 
$ 26,150  
 
 
Saturn Aura 2.4 Hybrid 4dr sedan 
'09 
$ 26,325  
 
 
Nissan Altima 2.5 HEV Auto 4dr 
sedan '09 
$ 26,650  
 
 
Honda Civic Hybrid CVT Leather 
w/Navi 4dr sedan '09 
$ 26,850  
 
 
Toyota Prius V 4dr hatchback '10 $ 27,270  
 
 
Ford Fusion Hybrid 4dr sedan '10 $ 27,270  
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Mercury Milan I4 Hybrid 4dr sedan 
'10 
$ 27,500  
 
 
Saturn VUE Hybrid FWD 4dr sport 
utility vehicle '09 
$ 28,160  
 
 
Mazda Tribute 2.5 Auto Touring 
HEV 4dr sport utility vehicle '09 
$ 28,175  
 
 
Ford Escape Hybrid 2.5L 4dr sport 
utility vehicle '09 
$ 29,645  
 
 
Mazda Tribute 2.5 Auto Touring 
4wd HEV 4dr sport utility vehicle 
'09 
$ 29,925  
 
 
Mercury Mariner Hybrid FWD 4dr 
sport utility vehicle '09 
$ 30,090  
 
 
Mazda Tribute 2.5 Auto Grand 
Touring HEV 4dr sport utility 
vehicle '09 
$ 30,695  
 
 
Ford Escape Hybrid 2.5L 4WD 4dr 
sport utility vehicle '09 
$ 31,395  
 
 
Mercury Mariner Hybrid 4WD 4dr 
sport utility vehicle '09 
$ 31,840  
 
 
Ford Escape Hybrid Limited 2.5L 
4dr sport utility vehicle '09 
$ 31,975  
 
 
Mazda Tribute 2.5 Auto Grand 
Touring 4wd HEV 4dr sport utility 
vehicle '09 
$ 32,445  
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Ford Escape Hybrid Limited 2.5L 
4WD 4dr sport utility vehicle '09 
$ 33,725  
 
 
Toyota Highlander Hybrid 4x4 4dr 
sport utility vehicle '09 
$ 34,700  
 
 
Chevrolet Silverado 1500 1HY 
Hybrid Crew Cab 4dr pickup '09 
$ 38,020  
 
 
GMC Sierra 1500 2WD Hybrid 
Crew Cab 3HA 4dr pickup '09 
$ 38,390  
 
 
Toyota Highlander Limited Hybrid 
w/3rd Row Seat 4x4 4dr sport 
utility vehicle '09 
$ 41,020  
 
 
Chevrolet Silverado 1500 1HY 
4X4 Hybrid Crew Cab 4dr pickup 
'09 
$ 41,170  
 
 
GMC Sierra 1500 4WD Hybrid 
Crew Cab 3HA 4dr pickup '09 
$ 41,540  
 
 
Lexus RX 400h Hybrid 4dr sport 
utility vehicle '08 
$ 42,080  
 
 
Lexus RX 400h Hybrid AWD 4dr 
sport utility vehicle '08 
$ 43,480  
 
 
Chevrolet Silverado 1500 2HY 
Hybrid Crew Cab 4dr pickup '09 
$ 44,155  
 
 
GMC Sierra 1500 2WD Hybrid 
Crew Cab 3HB 4dr pickup '09 
$ 44,525  
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Dodge Durango Limited HEV 4X4 
4dr sport utility vehicle '09 
$ 45,040  
 
 
Chrysler Aspen Limited HEV 4x4 
4dr sport utility vehicle '09 
$ 45,270  
 
 
Chevrolet Silverado 1500 2HY 
4X4 Hybrid Crew Cab 4dr pickup 
'09 
$ 47,305  
 
 
GMC Sierra 1500 4WD Hybrid 
Crew Cab 3HB 4dr pickup '09 
$ 47,675  
 
 
Chevrolet Tahoe 2WD Hybrid 4dr 
sport utility vehicle '09 
$ 50,455  
 
 
GMC Yukon 2WD Hybrid 4dr 
sport utility vehicle '09 
$ 50,920  
 
 
Chevrolet Tahoe 4WD Hybrid 4dr 
sport utility vehicle '09 
$ 53,260  
 
 
GMC Yukon 4WD Hybrid 4dr 
sport utility vehicle '09 
$ 53,730  
 
 
Lexus GS 450h Hybrid 4dr sedan 
'09 
$ 56,550  
 
 
Cadillac Escalade 2WD Hybrid 4dr 
sport utility vehicle '09 
$ 73,135  
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Cadillac Escalade AWD Hybrid 
4dr sport utility vehicle '09 
$ 75,685  
 
 
Cadillac Escalade 2WD Platinum 
Hybrid 4dr sport utility vehicle '09 
$ 84,935  
 
 
Cadillac Escalade 4WD Platinum 
Hybrid 4dr sport utility vehicle '09 
$ 87,435  
 
 
Lexus LS 5.0 AUTO 600h L 4dr 
sedan '09 
$ 106,035  
 
 
Tesla Roadster 2dr roadster '09 $ 109,000  
 
 
Tesla Roadster Sport 2dr roadster 
'09 
$ 128,500  
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Appendix C2. Selected comparisons of hybrids and conventional vehicles 
(Jato Search engine, Automotive News Website, accessed 5/11/09) 
 
 
Ford Escape Comparison 
 
 
 
Ford Escape Hybrid Limited 2.5L 4WD 4dr sport utility vehicle '09 
$ 33,725 MSRP  
 
Ford Escape Limited 2.5L 4WD 4dr sport utility vehicle '09 
$ 26,670 MSRP  
 
The Ford Escape Hybrid Limited 2.5L 4WD 4dr sport utility vehicle '09 
has the following advantages over the Ford Escape Limited 2.5L 4WD 
4dr sport utility vehicle '09:  
The Ford Escape Limited 2.5L 4WD 4dr sport utility vehicle '09 has the 
following advantages over the Ford Escape Hybrid Limited 2.5L 4WD 
4dr sport utility vehicle '09:  
Comfort 
Climate control [Ford ] 
Electric Sunroof [Ford ] 
Audio system includes single CD [Ford ] 
Heated driver's seat [Ford ] 
Heated passenger seat [Ford ] 
Safety 
Parking distance sensors [Ford ] 
Engine / Suspension 
5 more horsepower 
4 more kW 
Number of speeds: variable 
Dimensions 
2 mm lower 
0.1 in lower 
 
Key Differences 
$ 7,055 lower price 
Comfort 
Audio system Disc Autochanger [Ford ] 
Disc autochanger capacity 
Exterior 
Wheel opening moldings 
Engine / Suspension 
35 lb ft more torque 
48 Nm more torque 
5 l larger fuel tank 
1.4 gal larger fuel tank 
Dimensions 
142kg lower curb weight 
16kg greater payload allowance 
314 lb lower curb weight (lbs) 
680kg higher braked gross trailer weight 
1,500 lb higher braked gross trailer weight 
8 l greater load area, seats down, to roof 
0.3 cu ft greater load area, seats down, to roof 
160 mm longer cargo area 
213 mm wider cargo area 
99 mm taller cargo area 
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Honda Civic Comparison 
 
Honda Civic Hybrid CVT 4dr sedan '09 
$ 23,650 MSRP   
 
Honda Civic LX 4dr sedan '09 
$ 19,062 ($ 1,607 of Options included)MSRP   
 
Added as Option 
Deck Lid Spoiler (Dealer) $ 387  
16" Alloy Wheels (Dealer) $ 1,220  
 
The Honda Civic Hybrid CVT 4dr sedan '09 has the following 
advantages over the Honda Civic LX 4dr sedan '09:  
The Honda Civic LX 4dr sedan '09 has the following advantages over 
the Honda Civic Hybrid CVT 4dr sedan '09:  
Comfort 
Climate control 
Steering wheel mounted Remote audio controls 
6 Speakers 
External temperature 
Automatic drive indicator on dashboard 
Computer 
Safety 
Electronic traction control 
Brake assist system 
Stability control 
4 Disc brakes 
Power locks includes trunk/hatch 
Variable intermittent wipe Windshield wipers 
Engine / Suspension 
Number of speeds: variable 
Dimensions 
5 mm lower 
0.2 in lower 
183 mm smaller curb to curb turning circle 
0.6 in smaller curb to curb turning circle (ft) 
 
Key Differences 
$ 4,588 lower price 
Exterior 
16 in Wheels 
10 mm wider Tires 
10% lower profile Tires 
H tyre rating Tires 
0.5 in wider wheel rims 
Engine / Suspension 
0.5 l larger engine 
4 valves per cylinder 
30 more horsepower 
22 more kW 
5 lb ft more torque 
7 Nm more torque 
3 l larger fuel tank 
0.9 gal larger fuel tank 
Dimensions 
3 mm more shoulder room in front 
0.1 in more shoulder room in front 
3 mm more shoulder room in rear 
0.1 in more shoulder room in rear 
86kg lower curb weight 
190 lb lower curb weight (lbs) 
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Toyota Highlander Comparison 
 
Toyota Highlander Hybrid 4x4 4dr sport utility vehicle '09 
$ 34,920 ($ 220 of Options included)MSRP   
 
Added as Option 
Special Color $ 220  
 
Toyota Highlander w/3rd Row Seat 4x4 V6 4dr sport utility vehicle '09 
$ 29,605 ($ 555 of Options included)MSRP   
 
Added as Option 
Tow Package $ 220  
Molded Dash Applique (PIO) $ 275  
Immobilizer $ 60  
 
The Toyota Highlander Hybrid 4x4 4dr sport utility vehicle '09 has the 
following advantages over the Toyota Highlander w/3rd Row Seat 4x4 
V6 4dr sport utility vehicle '09:  
The Toyota Highlander w/3rd Row Seat 4x4 V6 4dr sport utility vehicle 
'09 has the following advantages over the Toyota Highlander Hybrid 
4x4 4dr sport utility vehicle '09:  
Comfort 
Heated Door mirrors 
External temperature 
Computer 
Wood/woodgrain Luxury trim on doors 
Safety 
Front and rear Roof airbag 
Card key Power locks 
Engine / Suspension 
Number of speeds: variable 
Comfort (Options) 
Climate control 
Electric trunk/hatch pull down 
Rear Reading lights 
 
Key Differences 
$ 5,315 lower price 
7 seating capacity 
Comfort 
Tachometer 
Engine / Suspension 
0.2 l larger engine 
8 l larger fuel tank 
2.0 gal larger fuel tank 
Automatic transmission with multiple modes 
Manual mode (auto only) Transmission 
Full-time four wheel drive type 
Dimensions 
91 mm smaller curb to curb turning circle 
0.3 in smaller curb to curb turning circle (ft) 
8 mm greater headroom in rear 
0.3 in greater headroom in rear 
5 mm more hip room in rear 
0.2 in more hip room in rear 
5 mm more shoulder room in rear 
0.2 in more shoulder room in rear 
150kg lower curb weight 
179kg greater payload allowance 
330 lb lower curb weight (lbs) 
680kg higher braked gross trailer weight 
1,500 lb higher braked gross trailer weight 
36 l greater load area, seats down, to roof 
1.3 cu ft greater load area, seats down, to roof 
Comfort (Options) 
Rear air conditioner [Toyota ] 
Electric Sunroof 
Audio system Disc Autochanger [Toyota ] 
Driver's seat with adjustable lumbar support [Toyota ] 
Electrically adjustable driver's seat [Toyota ] 
Exterior (Options) 
Roof rails [Toyota ] 
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Saturn Aura Comparison 
 
Saturn Aura 2.4 Hybrid 4dr sedan '09 
$ 26,325 MSRP   
 
Saturn Aura 2.4 XE 4dr sedan '09 
$ 22,655 MSRP   
 
The Saturn Aura 2.4 Hybrid 4dr sedan '09 has the following advantages 
over the Saturn Aura 2.4 XE 4dr sedan '09:  
The Saturn Aura 2.4 XE 4dr sedan '09 has the following advantages 
over the Saturn Aura 2.4 Hybrid 4dr sedan '09:  
Comfort 
Climate control 
Exterior 
Alloy Wheels 
Dimensions 
427 mm smaller curb to curb turning circle 
1.4 in smaller curb to curb turning circle (ft) 
Comfort (Options) 
Leather Seat upholstery 
 
Key Differences 
$ 3,670 lower price 
Exterior 
Spacesaver Spare wheel 
Engine / Suspension 
5 more horsepower 
4 more kW 
1 lb ft more torque 
1 Nm more torque 
Number of speeds: 6 
Manual mode (auto only) Transmission 
Dimensions 
39kg lower curb weight 
87 lb lower curb weight (lbs) 
Comfort (Options) 
Heated driver's seat [Saturn ] 
Heated passenger seat [Saturn ] 
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Lexus RS400Comparison 
 
Lexus RX 400h Hybrid AWD 4dr sport utility vehicle '08 
$ 43,480 MSRP  
 
Lexus RX 350 AWD 4dr sport utility vehicle '10 
$ 38,200 MSRP  
 
The Lexus RX 400h Hybrid AWD 4dr sport utility vehicle '08 has the 
following advantages over the Lexus RX 350 AWD 4dr sport utility 
vehicle '10:  
The Lexus RX 350 AWD 4dr sport utility vehicle '10 has the following 
advantages over the Lexus RX 400h Hybrid AWD 4dr sport utility 
vehicle '08:  
Exterior 
Projector beam Headlights [Lexus ] 
Engine / Suspension 
Number of speeds: variable 
Dimensions 
795 mm smaller curb to curb turning circle 
2.6 in smaller curb to curb turning circle (ft) 
8 mm greater headroom in front 
0.3 in greater headroom in front 
66kg lower curb weight 
7kg greater payload allowance 
145 lb lower curb weight (lbs) 
681kg higher braked gross trailer weight 
1,500 lb higher braked gross trailer weight 
124 l greater load area, seats down, to roof 
4.4 cu ft greater load area, seats down, to roof 
Comfort (Options) 
Leather Seat upholstery [Lexus ] 
DVD/VCD [Lexus ] 
Door mirror position Memorized adjustment [Lexus ] 
Steering wheel position Memorized adjustment [Lexus ] 
Wood/woodgrain Luxury trim on instrument panel 
Safety (Options) 
Rain sensor Windshield wipers [Lexus ] 
 
Key Differences 
$ 5,280 lower price 
Comfort 
Telescopic adjustment Steering wheel [Lexus ] 
9 Speakers 
Rear Reading lights 
Tachometer 
Wood/woodgrain Luxury trim on doors 
Electric adjustment Steering wheel [Lexus ] 
Safety 
Card key Power locks 
Exterior 
18 in Wheels [Lexus ] 
10 mm wider Tires 
5% lower profile Tires [Lexus ] 
1.0 in wider wheel rims 
Engine / Suspension 
0.2 l larger engine 
7 more horsepower 
5 more kW 
8 l larger fuel tank 
2.0 gal larger fuel tank 
Automatic transmission with multiple modes 
Dimensions 
15 mm longer 
0.6 in longer 
41 mm wider 
1.6 in wider 
3 mm lower 
0.1 in lower 
26 mm longer wheelbase 
1.0 in longer wheelbase 
5 mm greater headroom in rear 
0.2 in greater headroom in rear 
18 mm more hip room in front 
0.7 in more hip room in front 
15 mm greater leg room in front 
0.6 in greater leg room in front 
10 mm greater leg room in rear 
0.4 in greater leg room in rear 
2 mm more shoulder room in front 
0.1 in more shoulder room in front 
13 mm more shoulder room in rear 
0.5 in more shoulder room in rear 
Comfort (Options) 
Heated driver's seat [Lexus ] 
Heated passenger seat [Lexus ] 
Navigational systems [Lexus ] 
Exterior (Options) 
Roof rails [Lexus ] 
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Appendix C3. Model range analysis  
 
To compare the hybrid coverage of the fleet of each manufacturer, the manufacturer’s 
web sites were consulted (17/8/09) and then the data had to be processed to be sure of 
comparing like with like. First, only principal vehicles were included and these were 
taken from the web sites requesting “all vehicles”. This step, for example, merges the 
front wheel and four wheel drive models of Ford’s Escape into one model. Next, 
multiple body styles such as 4-and 5-door versions, coupes and convertibles were 
collapsed into one model as such modifications do not affect the power train. This step, 
for example, collapsed 4 versions of the Chevrolet Corvette into one model. Finally, the 
largest vehicles in GM’s line-up, which includes vehicles such as two 15 passenger 
buses, were taken out as these vehicles go beyond the common definition of cars and 
light trucks used in the industry. The table below shows the models considered for each 
manufacturer with the actual number of hybrid and total models and the resulting 
percentage. 
 
Manufacturer 2009/10 Conventional models 2009/10 Hybrid Models 
GM 
 
8/34 
23.5 % 
Chevrolet Aveo, Camaro, Cobalt, 
Colorado, Corvette, Equinox, HHR, 
Impala, Malibu, Silverado, Surburban, 
Tahoe, Traverse, Avalanche 
Buick Enclave, Lucerne, LaCrosse 
Cadillac CTS, STS, DTS, Escalade, 
Escalade EXT, SRX, XLR 
Saturn Aura, Sky, Astra, Vue, Outlook 
GMC Acadia, Sierra, Canyon, Envoy, 
Yukon 
Malibu, Silverado 1500, 
Tahoe, Escalade, Saturn 
Vue, Saturn Aura, GMC 
Sierra, GMC Yukon 
Ford 
 
4/25 
16.0% 
Ford Focus, Fusion, Mustang, Taurus, 
Edge, Flex, Escape, Sport Trac, Explorer, 
Expedition, Ranger, F-150. Super Duty, E-
Series 
Lincoln MKS, MKZ, MKX, MKT, 
Navigator, Town car 
Mercury Milan, Mariner, Sable, 
Mountaineer, Grand Marquis 
Fusion, Escape, Mercury 
Milan, Mercury Mariner 
Toyota 
 
7/23 
30.4% 
Toyota Yaris, Corolla, Matrix, Camry, 
Pirus, Venza, Avalon, Tacoma, Tundra, 
Rav 4, FJ Cruiser, Highlander, 4Runner, 
Sequoia, Land Cruiser, Sienna 
Lexus, LS, IS, ES, GS GX, RX, LX 
Prius, Camry, 
Highlander. Lexus LS, 
Lexus GS, Lexus HS, 
Lexus RX 
Nissan 
 
1/18 
5.6 % 
Nissan Cube, Versa, Sentra, Altima, 
Maxima, Z, GT-R, Quest, Rouge, Murano, 
Xterra, pathfinder, Armada, Frontier, Titan 
Infiniti G, M, FX, QX 
Altima 
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 Appendix D Seat Belt Data  
 
1. Time line for major innovation and US regulations in Seat Belts 
2.  NHTSA Data set for rear seat belts  
3.  NHTSA Data set for pretensioners  
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Appendix D1 Time line for major innovation and US regulations in Seat Belts 
(from http://www.andoauto.com accessed 6.6.09) 
 
Seat belts were invented by George Cayley in the 1800s.  
Seat belts were introduced in aircraft in 1913 by Adolphe Pegoud, the first man to fly a 
plane upside-down.  
Edward J. Claghorn was granted U.S. Patent 312,085 on February 10, 1885 for a safety 
belt providing protection for a person ascending or descending a ladder or pole.  
Edward J. Hock invented the safety belt first used by the Ford Motor Company as 
standard equipment. In 1955 his idea was accepted by the naval authorities. He was 
awarded $20.50 for his invention. He never received anything other than the $20.50, a 
letter of recognition and a newspaper article to his credit.  
 
1930's 
Several U.S. physicians equip their own cars with lap seat belts.  
 
1954 
Sports Car Club of America requires that competing drivers to wear lap seat belts.  
 
1955 
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) appoints Motor Vehicle Seat Belt Committee. 
 
1956 
Ford and Chrysler offer lap seat belts in front as an option on some models.  
 
1958 
Nils Bohlin, a design engineer with Volvo in Sweden, patents the "Basics of Proper 
Restraint Systems for Car Occupants," better known as a three-point safety belt. U.S. 
patent 3,043,625.  
 
Volvo provides anchors for two-point diagonal belts in rear.  
 
1959 
Volvo offers three-point seat belts as a standard.  
New York considers and rejects a bill to require seat belts in new cars sold in the State.  
 
1961 
SAE issues standard for U.S. seat belts. 
New York and Wisconsin require seat belt anchors at front outboard seat positions. 
 
1962 
U.S. manufacturers provide seat belt anchors in front outboard positions as standard.  
 
1963 
Volvo introduces 3-point belt in front as standard in the USA.  
Some U.S. manufacturers provide lap seat belts in front outboard positions.  
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1964 
About half the U.S. States require seat belt anchorages at front outboard.  
 
Most U.S. manufactures provide lap belts at front outboard seat positions.  
 
1965 
U.S. Commerce Department issues first seat belt standard.  
 
All U.S. manufacturers providing lap belts in front outboard positions by this time.  
 
Some U.S. manufacturers provide automatic locking retractors (ALRs) in front seat 
belts.  
 
1966 
U.S. Congress passes P.L. 89-593, establishing National Highway Safety Bureau, 
NHTSA.  
The Sports Car Club of America requires competing drivers to wear a shoulder harness 
as well as a lap belt.  
 
1967 
U.S. manufacturers provide lap seat belts at rear outboard positions.  
 
NHSB issues initial Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards 208, 209 setting standards 
for lap and shoulder seat belts in front outboard positions and lap seat belts in all other 
positions.  
 
1971 
NHTSA amends FMVSS 208 to require passive restraints in the front.  
 
1972 
NHTSA requires anchorages for detachable shoulder straps for rear outboard (FMVSS 
210). 
 
1974 
NHTSA requires 3-point belt non-detachable shoulder straps in front outboard 
positions.  
U.S. cars provide "vehicle-sensitive" ELRs in front outboard shoulder belts. The lap belt 
portion has ALR.  
 
1985 
New York makes belt use mandatory in front and rear (rear for persons 10 years or 
older).  
 
1986 
General Motors started installing lap seat belts with shoulder harness straps for rear 
outer seats (this data contradicts NHTSA data and the GM web site which says that GM 
only announced its plans in 1986). 
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1987 
New York becomes the first state to require seat belts on large school buses.  
 
1996 
Seat belts required on minibuses and coaches carrying groups of children on organized 
trips.  
 
2001 
The state of California extends implementation of AB 15 that required lap/shoulder 
belts on all new school buses purchased after January 1, 2002. Retrofitting would not be 
permitted.  
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Appendix D2. NHTSA Data set for rear seat belts (1999) 
 
Data taken from appendix A of DOT HS 808 945, NHTSA Technical Report 
Effectiveness of Lap/Shoulder Belts, dated June 1999 
 
Data key: 
 
• bkls MY first Model Year (MY) with standard back seat outboard lap/shoulder 
belts first MY first MY that this car or light truck existed 
• last MY last MY that this car or light truck existed 
• ABS MY first MY that Antilock Brake Systems (ABS) was standard or was sold 
on over 50 percent of cars 
• airbag MY first MY that airbags were present on 50 percent or more of this 
make/model 
• remod MY1 first major remodeling 
• remod MY2 second major remodeling 
• TY Transition Year (TY) to back seat lap/shoulder belts (usually same as bkls 
MY) 
• YT± number of matching model years available before and after TY 
• EXPLANATION OF CODES 
• a always had back seat outboard lap/shoulder belts, ABS, or airbags depending 
on which 
• column 
• x in bkls MY column - never had back seat outboard lap/shoulder belts. 
• x in TY, YT± column - excluded from “matching make/models” 
• N/A excluded from analysis 
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  bkls first last ABS airbag remod remod   
make-model  MY MY MY MY MY MY1 MY2 TY YT± 
GENERAL MOTORS          
Buick Regal 89 <85 >95 93 94 88  89 3 
Buick LeSabre 88 <85 >95 94 92 86  88 3 
Buick Estate Wagon 89 <85 91 91 91   89 2 
Buick Electra 89 <85 >95 91 91   89 2 
Buick Roadmaster a 92 >95 a a   x x 
Buick Riviera 88 <85 >95 91 90 86 95 88 3 
Buick Skylark x <85 85     x x 
Buick Skyhawk 89 <85 89     89 1 
Buick Century 89 <85 >95 94 93   89 3 
Buick Somerset/Skylark 89 85 >95 92 94   89 3 
Buick Reatta N/A 88 91 a 90   x x 
Cadillac DeVille 89 <85 >95 91 90 90 94 89 2 
Fleetwood D’Elegance 89 <85 >95 89 90 90 94 x(ABS.) x 
Fleetwood Brougham 88 <85 >95 90/91? 93   88 2 
Cadillac Eldorado 88 <85 >95 91 90 86  88 3 
Cadillac Allante N/A 87 93 a 90   x x 
Cadillac Seville 88 <85 >95 91 90 86 92 88 3 
Cadillac Cimarron x <85 88     x x 
Chevrolet Caprice 89 <85 95 91 91   89 2 
Chevrolet Corvette N/A <85 >95 86 90   x x 
Chevrolet Camaro 89 <85 >95 93 90   89 3 
Chevrolet Monte Carlo x <85 88 88    x x 
Chevrolet Chevette x <85 87     x x 
Chevrolet Citation x <85 85     x x 
Chevrolet Cavalier 89 <85 >95 92 95 95  89 3 
Chevrolet Celebrity 89 <85 90     89 2 
Beretta/Corsica  88 87 >95 92 91   88 1 
Chevrolet Lumina a 90 92 95    x x 
Chevrolet Spectrum 89 85 89     89 1 
Nova/Prizm  88 85 >95  93 89 93 88 3 
Sprint/Metro  89 <85 >95  95 89  89 3 
Geo Storm a 90 93  a   x x 
Chevrolet Monte Carlo a 95 >95 a a   x x 
Cutlass Supreme 89 <85 >95 93 94 88  89 3 
Olds Delta 88 88 <85 >95 94 92 86  88 3 
Olds Custom Cruiser 89 <85 91 91 91   89 2 
Olds 98 89 <85 >95 91 91   89 2 
Oldsmobile Toronado 88 <85 92 91 90 86  88 3 
Olds Firenza x <85 88     x x 
Olds Ciera 89 <85 >95 94 93   89 3 
Olds Calais 89 85 91     89 3 
Olds Achieva a 92 95 a 94   x x 
Oldsmobile Aurora a 95 >95 a a   x x 
Pontiac Bonneville 88 85 >95 92 92 87  88 3 
Parisienne/Safari 89 <85 89     89 1 
Pontiac Fiero N/A <85 88     x x 
Pontiac Firebird 89 <85 >95 93 90   89 3 
Pontiac Grand Prix 89 <85 >95 93 94 88  89 3 
Pontiac T1000 x <85 87     x x 
Pontiac Sunbird/Sunfire 89 <85 >95 92 95 95  89 3 
Pontiac 6000 89 <85 91     89 3 
Pontiac Grand Am 89 85 >95 92 94   89 3 
Pontiac LeMans a 88 93     x x 
Saturn SL sedan a 91 >95 93    x x 
Saturn SC coupe a 91 >95 93    x x 
Saturn SW wagon a 93 >95 a    x X 
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  bkls first last ABS airbag remod remod   
make-model  MY MY MY MY MY MY1 MY2 TY YT± 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY          
Ford Mustang 90 <85 >95  90 94  90 3 
Ford Thunderbird 89 <85 >95  94 89  89 3 
Ford LTD x <85 86     x x 
Ford Escort 91 <85 >95  94 90  91 3 
Ford EXP x <85 88     x x 
Ford Tempo 90 <85 94     90 3 
Ford Crown Victoria 90 <85 >95  90   90 3 
Ford Taurus 88 86 >95  90   88 2 
Ford Probe 90 89 >95  93 93  90 1 
Ford Festiva 90 88 93     90 2 
Ford Contour a 95 >95  a   x x 
Ford Aspire a 94 95  a   x x 
Lincoln Town car 90 <85 >95 90 90   x(ABS.) x 
Lincoln Mark7/8 90 <85 >95 86 90 93  90 3 
Lincoln Continental 88 <85 >95 86 89 88  88 2 
Mercury Capri x <85 86     x x 
Mercury Cougar 89 <85 >95 94 89 89 3   
Mercury Marquis x <85 86     x x 
Mercury Lynx x <85 87     x x 
Mercury Topaz 90 <85 94     90 3 
Mercury Grand Marquis 90 <85 >95  90   90 3 
Mercury Sable 88 86 >95  90   88 2 
Mercury Capri XR2 a 89 94  91   x x 
Mercury Tracer 90 88 >95  94 91  90 3 
Mercury Mystique a 95 >95  a   x x 
NISSAN           
Nissan 200-240SX 89 <85 >95  95 89 95 89 3 
Nissan 300ZX 90 <85 >95 90 91 90  x(ABS.) x 
Nissan Maxima 87 <85 >95  92 89 95 87 2 
Nissan Stanza 89 <85 92   86-87  89 3 
Nissan Sentra 90 <85 >95  93 87  90 3 
Nissan Pulsar/NX 90 <85 93  90 87 91 90 3 
Nissan Altima a 93 >95  a   x x 
Nissan Axxess a 90 91     x x 
TOYOTA           
Toyota Corolla 89 <85 >95  93 93  89 3 
Toyota Celica 89 <85 >95 90 87 94  89 3 
Toyota Supra 89 <85 >95 ? 90 86 93 x(ABS.) x 
Toyota Cressida 88 <85 92 ?  86  88? 3? 
Toyota Tercel 89 <85 >95  94 87  89 3 
Toyota Camry 88 <85 >95  92 92  88 3 
Toyota MR-2 N/A <85 >95  91 91  x x 
Toyota Paseo a 92 >95  94   x x 
Toyota Avalon a 95 >95  a   x x 
Lexus ES-250/300 a 90 >95 a a 92  x x 
Lexus LS-400 a 90 >95 a a 95  x x 
Lexus SC-300/400 a 92 >95 a a   x x 
Lexus GS-300 a 93 >95 a a   x x 
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Appendix D2. NHTSA Data set for rear seat belts (2001-2010) 
 
2001 
 
Make 2001 Model Pre. Make 2001 Model Pre. Make 2001 Model Pre. 
01 Buick Regal   Ford F-150 S Nissan Maxima S 
Buick Park Avenue   Ford Club Wagon S Nissan Quest S 
Buick LeSabre   Ford Crown Victoria S Nissan Sentra S 
Buick Century   Ford Mustang   Nissan Pathfinder S 
Cadillac Deville   Ford EV Ranger S Nissan Pathfinder S 
Chevrolet Monte Carlo   Ford Econoline S Nissan Frontier S 
Chevrolet Cavalier   Ford Windstar S Nissan Xterra S 
Chevrolet Impala   Ford Explorer   Nissan Altima S 
Chevrolet Tahoe   Ford Expedition S Nissan Frontier S 
Chevrolet S-10   Ford Ranger S Nissan Maxima S 
Chevrolet Prizm S Ford Focus S Infiniti I30 S 
Chevrolet Suburban   Ford Taurus S Infiniti QX4 S 
Chevrolet Cavalier   Ford Escape S    
Chevrolet Prizm S Ford Escort      
Chevrolet Tracker   Ford Taurus S Toyota Tacoma S 
Chevrolet Silverado   Ford Ranger S Toyota Avalon S 
Chevrolet Venture S Lincoln LS S Toyota Solara S 
Chevrolet Malibu   Lincoln Town Car S Toyota Camry S 
Chevrolet Blazer   Lincoln Navigator S Toyota 4Runner S 
Chevrolet Impala   Mercury Sable S Toyota Echo S 
Chevrolet Astro   Mercury Mountaineer   Toyota Sienna S 
Chevrolet Camaro   Mercury Grand Marquis S Toyota Corolla S 
Chevrolet Lumina   Mercury Mountaineer   Toyota Prius S 
GMC Safari   Mercury Sable S Toyota Corolla S 
GMC Sonoma   Mercury Cougar   Toyota Tundra S 
GMC Jimmy   Mercury Villager S Toyota RAV4 S 
GMC Yukon      Toyota Celica S 
GMC Sonoma      Lexus RX300 S 
GMC Sierra      Lexus IS300 S 
Oldsmobile Bravada      Lexus ES300 S 
Oldsmobile Silhouette S       
Oldsmobile Alero         
Oldsmobile Intrigue         
Oldsmobile Aurora         
Plymouth Neon         
Pontiac Grand Prix         
Pontiac Montana S       
Pontiac Grand Am         
Pontiac Firebird         
Pontiac Bonneville         
Pontiac Sunfire         
Pontiac Grand Am         
Pontiac Aztek S       
Pontiac Sunfire         
Saturn L         
Saturn SL         
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2002 
 
Make 2002 Model Pre. Make 2002 Model Pre. Make 2002 Model Pre. 
Buick Regal   Ford Explorer S Nissan Frontier S 
Buick Century   Ford Mustang   Nissan Quest S 
Buick LeSabre   Ford EV Ranger S Nissan Maxima S 
Buick Century   Ford Explorer Sport   Nissan Pathfinder S 
Buick Rendezvous   Ford Thunderbird S Nissan Xterra S 
Buick Park Avenue   Ford Expedition S Nissan Pathfinder S 
Cadillac Deville   Ford F-150 S Nissan Sentra S 
Cadillac Eldorado   Ford F-150 S Nissan Altima S 
Cadillac Seville   Ford Focus S Nissan Altra EV   
Cadillac Escalade   Ford Econoline S Infiniti QX4 S 
Chevrolet Avalanche   Ford Escort   Infiniti Q45 S 
Chevrolet Cavalier   Ford F-150 S Infiniti I35 S 
Chevrolet Express   Ford Taurus S Infiniti G20 S 
Chevrolet S-10   Ford Escape S    
Chevrolet Blazer   Ford Ranger S Toyota Corolla S 
Chevrolet Tahoe   Ford ZX2   Toyota RAV4 S 
Chevrolet Suburban   Ford Crown Victoria S Toyota Prius S 
Chevrolet Prizm S Ford Focus S Toyota Celica S 
Chevrolet Cavalier   Ford Windstar S Toyota RAV4 EV S 
Chevrolet Monte Carlo   Ford Taurus S Toyota Sequoia S 
Chevrolet Trailblazer   Ford Ranger S Toyota Tundra S 
Chevrolet Blazer   Ford Focus S Toyota Echo S 
Chevrolet Malibu   Ford Windstar S Toyota Solara S 
Chevrolet Impala   Ford Excursion S Toyota MR2 S 
Chevrolet S-10   Ford Continental   Toyota Highlander S 
Chevrolet Astro   Ford LS S Toyota Sienna S 
Chevrolet Venture S Ford Town Car S Toyota Tacoma S 
Chevrolet Tracker   Lincoln Blackwood S Toyota Avalon S 
Chevrolet Camaro   Lincoln Navigator S Toyota Tundra S 
Chevrolet Tracker   Lincoln Cougar S Toyota Camry S 
Chevrolet Corvette   Lincoln Sable S Toyota 4Runner S 
Chevrolet Prizm S Lincoln Mountaineer S Toyota Solara S 
Chevrolet Impala   Mercury Sable S Toyota Landcruiser S 
Chevrolet Silverado   Mercury Villager S Lexus IS300 S 
GMC Yukon   Mercury Grand Marquis S Lexus GS300 S 
GMC Sierra   Mercury   Lexus SC430 S 
GMC Safari   Mercury   Lexus IS300 S 
GMC Savana   Mercury   Lexus ES300 S 
GMC Envoy   Mercury     Lexus LS430 S 
GMC Sonoma      Lexus LX470 S 
Oldsmobile Bravada   Saturn VUE  Lexus RX300 S 
Oldsmobile Intrigue   Saturn L-Series     
Oldsmobile Alero   Saturn SL     
Oldsmobile Silhouette S       
Oldsmobile Aurora         
Pontiac Bonneville         
Pontiac Firebird         
Pontiac Aztek         
Pontiac Grand Am         
Pontiac Sunfire         
Pontiac Grand Prix         
Pontiac Montana S       
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2003 
 
Make 2003 Model Pre. Make 2003 Model Pre. Make 2003 Model Pre. 
Buick LeSabre   Ford Explorer S Nissan Maxima S 
Buick Regal   Ford Taurus S Nissan Altima S 
Buick Century   Ford Econoline S Nissan Maxima S 
Buick Regal   Ford Ranger S Nissan Pathfinder S 
Buick Century   Ford Windstar S Nissan Murano S 
Buick Park Avenue   Ford Focus S Nissan Frontier S 
Buick Rendezvous   Ford Explorer Sport S Nissan Xterra S 
Cadillac Seville S Ford Focus S Nissan Frontier S 
Cadillac Escalade   Ford Mustang   Nissan 350Z S 
Cadillac Deville   Ford Crown Victoria S Nissan Pathfinder S 
Cadillac CTS S Ford Excursion S Nissan Sentra S 
Chevrolet Tracker S Ford Mustang   Infiniti QX4 S 
Chevrolet Venture S Ford Ranger S Infiniti FX45 S 
Chevrolet Corvette   Ford Taurus S Infiniti G35 S 
Chevrolet SSR   Ford F-150 S Infiniti Q45 S 
Chevrolet Impala   Ford Expedition S Infiniti M45 S 
Chevrolet Blazer   Ford ZX2   Infiniti I35 S 
Chevrolet Silverado   Ford Thunderbird S    
Chevrolet Tahoe   Ford Escape S Toyota 4Runner S 
Chevrolet Express   Ford Taurus S Toyota Matrix S 
Chevrolet Impala   Lincoln Navigator S Toyota Corolla S 
Chevrolet Cavalier   Lincoln Blackwood S Toyota Avalon S 
Chevrolet Trailblazer   Lincoln Aviator S Toyota Sienna S 
Chevrolet Astro   Lincoln LS S Toyota Echo S 
Chevrolet Tracker S Lincoln Town Car S Toyota Echo S 
Chevrolet Malibu   Mercury Sable S Toyota Tundra S 
Chevrolet Avalanche   Mercury Mountaineer S Toyota Matrix S 
Chevrolet S-10   Mercury Grand Marquis S Toyota Prius S 
Chevrolet Suburban   Mercury Marauder   Toyota MR2 S 
GMC Yukon      Toyota Landcruiser S 
GMC Savana   Pontiac Vibe S Toyota Highlander S 
GMC Sierra   Pontiac Sunfire   Toyota RAV4 S 
GMC Sonoma   Pontiac Grand Prix   Toyota Solara S 
GMC Safari   Pontiac Montana S Toyota Solara S 
GMC Envoy   Pontiac Aztek   Toyota Camry S 
GMC Sonoma   Pontiac Grand Am   Toyota Celica S 
Oldsmobile Alero   Pontiac Bonneville   Lexus LS430 S 
Oldsmobile Silhouette S    Lexus SC430 S 
Oldsmobile Aurora      Lexus LX470 S 
Oldsmobile Bravada   Toyota Tacoma S Lexus ES300 S 
Saturn L-Series   Toyota Tundra S Lexus GX470 S 
Saturn VUE   Toyota RAV4 EV S Lexus IS300 S 
Saturn Ion S Toyota Sequoia S Lexus GS300 S 
   Toyota Tacoma S Lexus RX300 S 
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2004 
 
Make 2004 Model Pre. Make 2004 Model Pre. Make 2004 Model Pre. 
04 Buick Regal   Ford F-150 S Nissan Altima S 
Buick Rendezvous S Ford Crown Victoria S Nissan Quest S 
Buick Rainier   Ford Explorer S Nissan Sentra S 
Buick Century   Ford Mustang   Nissan Xterra S 
Buick Park Avenue   Ford Focus S Nissan Frontier S 
Buick LeSabre   Ford Freestar S Nissan Murano S 
Cadillac CTS S Ford Explorer Sport Trac S Nissan Titan S 
Cadillac Escalade   Ford Ranger S Nissan Pathfinder S 
Cadillac Deville   Ford Taurus S Nissan Maxima S 
Cadillac XLR S Ford Expedition S Nissan 350Z S 
Cadillac Seville   Ford Escape S Nissan Frontier S 
Cadillac SRX S Ford Econoline S Nissan Titan S 
Chevrolet Silverado   Ford Crown Victoria S Nissan Armada S 
Chevrolet Monte Carlo   Ford Thunderbird S Infiniti FX35/45 S 
Chevrolet Blazer   Lincoln Aviator S Infiniti Q45 S 
Chevrolet Cavalier   Lincoln Town Car S Infiniti M45 S 
Chevrolet SSR S Lincoln Navigator S Infiniti I35 S 
Chevrolet Suburban SF Lincoln LS S Infiniti G35 S 
Chevrolet Tracker   Mercury Grand Marquis S    
Chevrolet Colorado S Mercury Mountaineer S Toyota 4Runner S 
Chevrolet Classic   Mercury Sable S Toyota Tundra S 
Chevrolet Impala   Mercury Monterey S Toyota Tacoma S 
Chevrolet Malibu S Mercury Grand Marquis S Toyota RAV4 S 
Chevrolet Tahoe   Mercury Marauder S Toyota Prius S 
Chevrolet Astro      Toyota Sequoia S 
Chevrolet Avalanche   Pontiac Bonneville   Toyota Scion xA S 
Chevrolet Express   Pontiac Sunfire   Toyota Sienna S 
Chevrolet Trailblazer EXT   Pontiac Aztek   Toyota Landcruiser S 
Chevrolet Corvette   Pontiac Grand Am   Toyota Corolla S 
Chevrolet Impala   Pontiac Vibe S Toyota Celica S 
Chevrolet Trailblazer   Pontiac Grand Prix S Toyota Solara S 
Chevrolet Venture S Pontiac GTO S Toyota Camry S 
Chevrolet Aveo S Pontiac Montana S Toyota Tacoma S 
GMC Sierra      Toyota Tacoma S 
GMC Envoy      Toyota Solara S 
GMC Canyon S    Toyota Scion xB S 
GMC Sonoma      Lexus IS300 S 
GMC Yukon   Toyota Tundra S Lexus IS300 Sportcross S 
GMC Safari   Toyota Avalon S Lexus RX330 S 
GMC Savana   Toyota Highlander S Lexus GX470 S 
Oldsmobile Bravada   Toyota Echo S Lexus GS300 S 
Oldsmobile Silhouette S Toyota Echo S Lexus LX470 S 
Oldsmobile Bravada   Toyota MR2 S Lexus LS430 S 
Oldsmobile Alero   Toyota Matrix S Lexus ES330 S 
Saturn VUE S Toyota Tundra S Lexus SC430 S 
Saturn L-Series         
Saturn Ion S       
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2005 
 
Make 2005 Model Pre. Make 2005 Model Pre. Make 2005 Model Pre. 
Buick Terraza SF Ford Explorer SF Nissan 350Z SF 
Buick Century   Ford F-150 SF Nissan Altima SF 
Buick Rainier SF Ford Escape Hybrid SF Nissan Armada SF 
Buick Park Avenue   Ford Mustang SF Nissan Maxima SF 
Buick Rendezvous SF Ford Thunderbird SF Nissan Frontier S 
Buick LeSabre   Ford Taurus SF Nissan Titan S 
Buick LaCrosse SF Ford Crown Victoria SF Nissan Pathfinder SF 
Buick Terraza SF Ford Focus SF Nissan Murano SF 
Cadillac SRX SF Ford Escape   Nissan Quest S 
Cadillac STS SF Ford Crown Victoria SF Nissan Sentra SF 
Cadillac Deville   Ford Taurus SF Nissan Xterra SF 
Cadillac XLR SF Ford Focus SF Infiniti G35 Coupe SF 
Cadillac Escalade   Ford Mustang SF Infiniti G35 Sedan SF 
Cadillac CTS SF Ford Expedition SF Infiniti Q45 SF 
Chevrolet Tahoe   Ford Ranger SF Infiniti QX56 SF 
Chevrolet Cobalt   Ford Freestar SF Infiniti FX35/45 SF 
Chevrolet Trailblazer SF Ford GT SF    
Chevrolet Tahoe   Ford Excursion   Toyota Highlander SF 
Chevrolet Malibu SF Ford Five Hundred SF Toyota Tacoma SF 
Chevrolet Uplander SF Ford Freestyle   Toyota Scion tC SF 
Chevrolet Classic   Ford LS SF Toyota Scion xA SF 
Chevrolet Cavalier   Ford Town Car SF Toyota 4Runner SF 
Chevrolet Silverado   Ford Navigator SF Toyota Scion xB SF 
Chevrolet Avalanche   Ford Aviator  SF Toyota Sequoia SF 
Chevrolet Uplander SF Ford Mountaineer SF Toyota Celica SF 
Chevrolet Colorado SF Lincoln Montego   Toyota Landcruiser SF 
Chevrolet Silverado   Lincoln Grand Marquis SF Toyota Corolla SF 
Chevrolet SSR   Lincoln Sable SF Toyota Echo SF 
Chevrolet Corvette SF Lincoln Monterey SF Toyota Tundra SF 
Chevrolet Express   Mercury Mariner   Toyota Avalon SF 
Chevrolet Impala   Mercury Sable SF Toyota Tundra SF 
Chevrolet Aveo SF Mercury   Toyota Matrix SF 
Chevrolet Cobalt   Mercury   Toyota MR2 SF 
Chevrolet Astro   Mercury   Toyota Solara SF 
Chevrolet Equinox SF Mercury   Toyota Prius SF 
Chevrolet Impala   Mercury   Toyota RAV4 SF 
Chevrolet Monte Carlo   Mercury   Toyota Sienna SF 
Chevrolet 
Express 3500 15 
Passenger      Toyota Tacoma SF 
Chevrolet Suburban   Pontiac Grand Prix SF Toyota Camry SF 
Chevrolet Venture SF Pontiac Montana SF Toyota Tundra SF 
Chevrolet Blazer   Pontiac Sunfire   Lexus GS300/430 SF 
GMC Yukon   Pontiac G6 SF Lexus GX470 SF 
GMC Safari   Pontiac Aztek   Lexus RX400h SF 
GMC Envoy SF Pontiac Bonneville   Lexus RX330 SF 
GMC Sierra   Pontiac Grand Am   Lexus LX470 SF 
GMC Canyon SF Pontiac Vibe SF Lexus LS430 SF 
GMC Savana   Pontiac Montana SV6 SF Lexus ES330 SF 
Saturn Relay SF Pontiac GTO SF Lexus IS300 Sportcross SF 
Saturn VUE SF Pontiac G6 SF Lexus SC430 SF 
Saturn L-Series   Pontiac Montana SV6 SF Lexus IS300 SF 
Saturn Ion SF       
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2006 
 
Make 2006 Model Pre. Make 2006 Model Pre. Make 2006 Model Pre. 
Buick LaCrosse SF Ford Fusion SF Nissan Murano SF 
Buick Terraza SF Ford F-150 SF Nissan Titan SF 
Buick Lucerne SF Ford Five Hundred SF Nissan Frontier SF 
Buick Rendezvous SF Ford Crown Victoria SF Nissan Armada SF 
Buick Rainier SF Ford Crown Victoria SF Nissan 350Z SF 
Cadillac DTS SF Ford Ranger SF Nissan Titan SF 
Cadillac XLR SF Ford Mustang SF Nissan Maxima SF 
Cadillac CTS SF Ford Five Hundred SF Nissan Frontier SF 
Cadillac Escalade   Ford Ranger SF Nissan Pathfinder SF 
Cadillac STS SF Ford Taurus SF Nissan Altima SF 
Cadillac SRX SF Ford 
E-350 15 
Passenger SF Nissan Quest SF 
Chevrolet Colorado SF Ford Focus SF Nissan Xterra SF 
Chevrolet Uplander SF Ford Focus SF Nissan Sentra SF 
Chevrolet 
Express 3500 15 
Passenger SF Ford Taurus SF Infiniti QX56 SF 
Chevrolet Aveo SF Ford Freestyle SF Infiniti FX35/45 SF 
Chevrolet Tahoe   Ford Escape Hybrid SF Infiniti M35/45 SF 
Chevrolet Trailblazer SF Ford F-150 SF Infiniti G35 Coupe SF 
Chevrolet Malibu SF Ford Freestar SF Infiniti Q45 SF 
Chevrolet Express SF Ford E-150 SF Infiniti G35 Sedan SF 
Chevrolet Silverado   Ford F-150 SF Toyota Tacoma SF 
Chevrolet Suburban   Ford Explorer SF Toyota Solara SF 
Chevrolet HHR SF Ford Freestyle SF Toyota Tundra SF 
Chevrolet Equinox SF Ford Escape SF Toyota RAV4 SF 
Chevrolet SSR SF Ford Expedition SF Toyota Scion xB SF 
Chevrolet Corvette SF Ford GT SF Toyota Sequoia SF 
Chevrolet Monte Carlo SF Lincoln LX470 SF Toyota Tacoma SF 
Chevrolet Cobalt SF Lincoln Mark LT SF Toyota 4Runner SF 
Chevrolet Monte Carlo SF Lincoln LS SF Toyota Landcruiser SF 
Chevrolet Impala SF Lincoln Navigator SF Toyota Scion tC SF 
Chevrolet Colorado SF Lincoln Zephyr SF Toyota Scion xA SF 
Chevrolet Avalanche   Mercury Grand Marquis SF Toyota Sienna SF 
GMC Fusion SF Mercury Grand Marquis SF Toyota Tacoma SF 
GMC Savana SF Mercury Mariner Hybrid SF Toyota Tundra SF 
GMC Canyon SF Mercury Mountaineer SF Toyota Matrix SF 
GMC Sierra   Mercury Milan SF Toyota Prerunner SF 
GMC Yukon   Mercury Mariner SF Toyota Prius SF 
GMC Envoy XL SF Mercury Montego SF Toyota Tundra SF 
Pontiac G6 SF Mercury Montego SF Toyota RAV4 SF 
Pontiac Grand Prix SF Mercury Milan SF Toyota Avalon SF 
Pontiac Solstice SF Mercury Monterey SF Toyota Camry SF 
Pontiac G6 SF    Toyota Corolla SF 
Pontiac GTO SF    Toyota Highlander SF 
Pontiac Torrent SF    Toyota Prerunner SF 
Pontiac Montana SV6 SF    Toyota Highlander Hybrid SF 
Pontiac Vibe SF    Lexus Envoy SF 
Saturn VUE SF    Lexus IS250/350 SF/SR 
Saturn Ion SF    Lexus RX400h SF 
Saturn Relay SF    Lexus GS300/430 SF/SR 
Saturn Ion SF       Lexus GX470 SF 
         Lexus RX330 SF 
        Lexus LS430 SF/SR 
      Lexus ES330 SF/SR 
      Lexus SC430 SF 
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2007 
 
Make 2007 Model Pre. Make 2007 Model Pre. Make 2007 Model Pre. 
Buick Lucerne SF Ford F-150 SF Nissan Sentra SF 
Buick Terraza SF Ford Freestar SF Nissan Pathfinder SF 
Buick Rendezvous SF Ford Focus SF Nissan Frontier SF 
Buick Rainier SF Ford E-150 SF Nissan Maxima SF 
Buick LaCrosse SF Ford Focus SF Nissan Titan SF 
Cadillac Escalade SF Ford Ranger SF Nissan Frontier SF 
Cadillac STS SF Ford Taurus SF Nissan Versa SF 
Cadillac CTS SF Ford Freestyle SF Nissan Altima SF 
Cadillac DTS SF Ford Edge SF Nissan Quest SF 
Cadillac XLR SF Ford Five Hundred SF Nissan 350Z Roadster SF 
Cadillac STS SF Ford Fusion SF Nissan Versa SF 
Cadillac SRX SF Ford Freestyle SF Nissan Murano SF 
Chevrolet Trailblazer SF Ford Crown Victoria SF Nissan Xterra SF 
Chevrolet Equinox SF Ford 
E-350 15 
Passenger SF Nissan Titan SF 
Chevrolet Monte Carlo SF Ford Escape SF Nissan Armada SF 
Chevrolet Cobalt SF Ford Mustang SF Nissan 350Z SF 
Chevrolet Tahoe SF Ford Explorer SF Infiniti M35/45 SF 
Chevrolet Avalanche SF Ford Ranger SF Infiniti G35 Coupe SF 
Chevrolet Malibu SF Ford Expedition SF Infiniti QX56 SF 
Chevrolet Cobalt SF Ford Escape Hybrid SF Infiniti FX35/45 SF 
Chevrolet 
Express 3500 15 
Passenger   Ford Crown Victoria SF Infiniti G35 Sedan SF 
Chevrolet Corvette SF Ford Taurus SF    
Chevrolet Suburban SF Lincoln MKX SF    
Chevrolet Silverado SF Lincoln Mark LT SF    
Chevrolet Monte Carlo SF Lincoln Town Car SF    
Chevrolet Aveo SF Lincoln MKZ SF    
Chevrolet Impala SF Lincoln Navigator SF    
Chevrolet Malibu Maxx SF Mercury Mariner Hybrid SF Toyota Tacoma SF 
Chevrolet HHR SF Mercury Grand Marquis SF Toyota 4Runner SF 
Chevrolet Silverado SF Mercury Milan SF Toyota Scion tC SF 
Chevrolet Express SF Mercury Monterey SF Toyota Solara SF 
Chevrolet Uplander SF Mercury Montego SF Toyota Yaris SF 
Chevrolet Colorado SF Mercury Mountaineer SF Toyota Sienna SF 
GMC Envoy SF Mercury Mariner SF Toyota Camry SF 
GMC Savana SF Mercury Grand Marquis SF Toyota RAV4 SF 
GMC Sierra SF    Toyota Corolla SF 
GMC Canyon SF Saturn Outlook SF Toyota Highlander SF 
GMC Yukon SF Saturn Relay SF Toyota FJ Cruiser SF 
GMC Sierra SF Saturn Aura SF Toyota Matrix SF 
GMC Acadia SF Saturn Ion SF Toyota Matrix SF 
GMC 
Savana 3500 15 
Passenger   Saturn Sky SF Toyota Tundra SF 
Pontiac G5 SF Saturn VUE SF Lexus GS350/430 SF 
Pontiac G6 SF    Lexus RX400h SF 
Pontiac Vibe SF Toyota Prius SF Lexus SC430 SF 
Pontiac Grand Prix SF Toyota Tundra SF Lexus LX470 SF 
Pontiac G5 SF Toyota Avalon SF Lexus IS250/350 SF/SR 
Pontiac Torrent SF Toyota Camry Hybrid SF Lexus RX350 SF 
Pontiac Vibe SF Toyota Landcruiser SF Lexus GX470 SF 
Pontiac Solstice SF Toyota Sequoia SF Lexus GS450h SF 
Pontiac G6 SF Toyota Highlander Hybrid SF Lexus LS460/460L SF 
      Toyota Tacoma SF Lexus ES350 SF 
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2008 
Make 2008 Model Pre. Make 2008 Model Pre. Make 2008 Model Pre. 
Buick Lucerne SF Ford Expedition SF Nissan Rogue SF 
Buick Enclave SF Ford Escape SF Nissan Versa Hatchback SF 
Buick LaCrosse SF Ford F-150 SF Nissan Altima Hybrid SF 
Cadillac CTS SF Ford Crown Victoria SF Nissan Altima SF 
Cadillac XLR SF Ford 
E-350 12 
Passenger SF Nissan 350Z Roadster SF 
Cadillac SRX SF Ford Ranger SF Nissan Sentra SF 
Cadillac DTS SF Ford Escape Hybrid SF Nissan 350Z SF 
Cadillac Escalade SF Ford Taurus X SF Nissan Altima SF 
Cadillac STS SF Ford Edge SF Nissan Quest SF 
Chevrolet Colorado SF Ford F-350 SF Nissan Titan SF 
Chevrolet Tahoe Hybrid SF Ford Taurus SF Nissan Maxima SF 
Chevrolet Tahoe SF Ford Focus SF Nissan Frontier SF 
Chevrolet Silverado  SF Ford F-250 SF Nissan Versa SF 
Chevrolet Malibu Hybrid SF Ford Explorer SF Nissan Armada SF 
Chevrolet Malibu SF Ford Mustang SF Nissan Frontier SF 
Chevrolet Trailblazer SF Ford Fusion SF Nissan Xterra SF 
Chevrolet Uplander SF Ford F-250 SF Nissan Titan SF 
Chevrolet Express  Cargo   Ford Crown Victoria SF Nissan Pathfinder SF 
Chevrolet 
Express 1500 
Cargo SF Ford F-350 SF Infiniti G35 SF 
Chevrolet Avalanche SF Lincoln MKX SF Infiniti FX35/45 SF 
Chevrolet HHR  SF Lincoln MKZ SF Infiniti M35/45 SF 
Chevrolet Impala SF Lincoln Navigator SF Infiniti QX56 SF 
Chevrolet Suburban SF Lincoln MKZ SF Infiniti G37 SF 
Chevrolet 
Express 3500 15 
Passenger SF Lincoln Mark LT SF Infiniti EX35 SF 
Chevrolet Aveo SF Lincoln Town Car SF    
Chevrolet Cobalt SF Lincoln Navigator SF Toyota Camry SF 
Chevrolet Equinox SF Mercury Mariner Hybrid SF Toyota Tacoma SF 
Chevrolet Corvette SF Mercury Sable SF Toyota Sienna SF 
GMC Sierra SF Mercury Mountaineer SF Toyota RAV4 SF 
GMC Yukon Hybrid SF Mercury Milan SF Toyota Prius SF 
GMC Yukon SF Mercury Mariner SF Toyota Matrix SF 
GMC 
Savana Cargo 
3500   Mercury Grand Marquis SF Toyota Scion xB SF 
GMC 
Savana Passenger 
1500 SF Mercury Mariner Hybrid SF Toyota Matrix SF 
GMC 
Savana Cargo 
2500      Toyota Scion xD SF 
GMC 
Savana Cargo 
1500 SF Saturn VUE SF Toyota Corolla SF 
GMC Acadia SF Saturn Aura SF Toyota Scion tC SF 
GMC Canyon SF Saturn Outlook SF Toyota Landcruiser SF/SR 
GMC Sierra SF Saturn Sky SF Toyota Sequoia SF 
GMC Envoy SF Saturn Astra SF Toyota Yaris Liftback SF 
Pontiac Vibe SF Saturn VUE Hybrid SF Toyota Highlander Hybrid SF 
Pontiac G6 SF Saturn Aura Hybrid SF Toyota Solara SF 
Pontiac G5 SF    Lexus IS250/350 SF/SR 
Pontiac G6 SF    Lexus LS460/460L SF/SR 
Pontiac G8 SF Toyota Tacoma SF Lexus LS600hL SF/SR 
Pontiac Torrent SF Toyota Tundra SF Lexus ES350 SF/SR 
Pontiac Solstice SF Toyota Avalon SF Lexus IS F SF/SR 
Pontiac Vibe SF Toyota Highlander SF Lexus SC430 SF 
Pontiac Grand Prix SF Toyota Yaris SF Lexus GS450h SF/SR 
   Toyota Camry Hybrid SF Lexus GX470 SF 
   Toyota FJ Cruiser SF Lexus RX400h SF 
      Toyota Tundra SF Lexus RX350 SF 
   Toyota 4Runner SF Lexus GS350/460 SF/SR 
      Toyota Tundra SF Lexus LX570 SF/SR 
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2009 
 
Make 2009 Model Pre. Make 2009 Model Pre. Make 2009 Model Pre. 
09 Buick Lucerne SF Ford Fusion SF Nissan Sentra SF 
Buick LaCrosse SF Ford Crown Victoria SF Nissan Titan SF 
Buick Enclave SF Ford Mustang SF Nissan Versa SF 
Cadillac CTS SF Ford Escape Hybrid SF Nissan Murano SF 
Cadillac STS SF Ford Expedition SF Nissan Pathfinder SF 
Cadillac CTS - V SF Ford E-150 SF Nissan Armada SF 
Cadillac DTS SF Ford 
E-350 15 
Passenger SF Nissan Rogue SF 
Cadillac Escalade SF Ford F-250   Nissan 350Z Roadster SF 
Cadillac XLR SF Ford Edge SF Nissan Xterra SF 
Cadillac SRX SF Ford Escape SF Nissan Altima SF 
Chevrolet Malibu SF Ford Focus SF Nissan GT-R SF 
Chevrolet Aveo SF Ford Taurus SF Nissan Altima SF 
Chevrolet Cobalt SF Ford Taurus X SF Nissan Altima Hybrid SF 
Chevrolet Traverse SF Ford Ranger SF Nissan Maxima SF 
Chevrolet Silverado SF Ford Explorer SF Nissan Cube SF 
Chevrolet 
Express 1500 
Cargo SF Ford 
Explorer Sport 
Trac SF Nissan Frontier SF 
Chevrolet Malibu Hybrid SF Ford 
E-350 12 
Passenger SF Nissan 370Z SF 
Chevrolet Trailblazer SF Ford Expedition SF Nissan Quest SF 
Chevrolet Corvette SF Ford F-350   Infiniti FX35/50 SF 
Chevrolet 
Express 3500 12 
Passenger   Ford Flex SF Infiniti EX35 SF 
Chevrolet 
Express 2500 12 
Passenger   Lincoln MKX SF Infiniti QX56 SF 
Chevrolet Silverado SF Lincoln Navigator SF Infiniti G37 SF 
Chevrolet Suburban SF Lincoln MKS SF Infiniti M35/45 SF 
Chevrolet Avalanche SF Lincoln Town Car SF    
Chevrolet Silverado Hybrid SF Lincoln Navigator SF    
Chevrolet Colorado SF Lincoln MKS SF     
Chevrolet Equinox SF Lincoln MKZ SF    
Chevrolet 
Express 1500 
Passenger SF Mercury Mountaineer SF    
Chevrolet Tahoe SF Mercury Milan SF    
Chevrolet Tahoe Hybrid SF Mercury Sable SF    
Chevrolet HHR SF Mercury Mariner SF Toyota Tacoma SF 
Chevrolet Impala SF Mercury Mariner Hybrid SF Toyota Camry SF 
GMC Envoy SF Mercury Grand Marquis SF Toyota Sienna SF 
GMC Sierra Hybrid SF    Toyota Sequoia SF 
GMC Sierra SF Saturn Astra SF Toyota Scion xD SF 
GMC Acadia SF Saturn VUE Hybrid SF Toyota RAV4 SF 
GMC 
Savana Cargo 
1500 SF Saturn Aura SF Toyota Prius SF 
GMC 
Savana 3500 15 
Passenger   Saturn Sky SF Toyota Landcruiser SF/SR 
GMC 
Savana 
Passenger 1500 SF Saturn VUE SF Toyota Highlander SF 
GMC Yukon SF Saturn Outlook SF Toyota Camry Hybrid SF 
GMC Sierra Hybrid SF Saturn Aura Hybrid SF Toyota Tacoma SF 
GMC Canyon SF    Lexus SC430 SF 
GMC Yukon Hybrid SF Toyota Avalon SF Lexus IS F SF/SR 
GMC 
Savana 2500 12 
Passenger   Toyota 
Highlander 
Hybrid SF Lexus IS250/350 SF/SR 
Pontiac Vibe SF Toyota 4Runner SF Lexus GS350/460 SF/SR 
Pontiac Torrent SF Toyota Tacoma SF Lexus LS460/460L SF/SR 
Pontiac G8 SF Toyota Corolla SF Lexus LS600hL Hybrid SF/SR 
Pontiac G5 SF Toyota Matrix SF Lexus LX570 SF/SR 
Pontiac Solstice SF Toyota Venza SF Lexus RX350 SF 
Pontiac G6 SF Toyota Yaris SF Lexus ES350 SF/SR 
Pontiac G3 SF Toyota Tundra SF Lexus GS450h Hybrid SF/SR 
      Toyota FJ Cruiser SF Lexus GX470 SF 
 275 
2010 
 
Make 2010 Model Pre. Make 2010 Model Pre. Make 2010 Model Pre. 
2010Buick LaCrosse SF Ford Escape SF Nissan Pathfinder SF 
Buick Lucerne SF Ford Mustang SF Nissan Xterra SF 
Buick Enclave SF Ford Fusion Hybrid SF Nissan Titan SF 
Cadillac DTS SF Ford F-150 SF Nissan Rogue SF 
Cadillac SRX SF Ford Ranger SF Nissan Sentra SF 
Cadillac CTS SF Ford 
E-350 12 
Passenger SF Nissan Versa Hatchback SF 
Cadillac Escalade SF Ford F-350   Nissan Titan SF 
Cadillac Escalade Hybrid SF Ford Edge SF Nissan Murano SF 
Cadillac STS SF Ford Taurus SF Nissan Armada SF 
Chevrolet 
Express 2500 12 
Passenger   Ford Mustang SF Nissan Versa SF 
Chevrolet 
Express 1500 
Passenger SF Ford Escape Hybrid SF Nissan Altima Hybrid SF 
Chevrolet Corvette SF Ford Expedition SF Nissan Altima SF 
Chevrolet Equinox SF Ford Focus SF Nissan 370Z Roadster SF 
Chevrolet 
Express 1500 
Cargo O Ford Flex SF Nissan Altima SF 
Chevrolet Silverado  SF Ford Ranger SF Nissan 370Z SF 
Chevrolet Camaro SF Ford F-250   Nissan Frontier Crew SF 
Chevrolet Traverse SF Ford Fusion SF Nissan Frontier King SF 
Chevrolet Tahoe Hybrid SF Ford F-150 SF Nissan GT-R SF 
Chevrolet Tahoe SF Ford Transit Connect SF Nissan Maxima SF 
Chevrolet Suburban  SF Ford Crown Victoria SF Infiniti QX56 SF 
Chevrolet 
Express 3500 12 
Passenger   Ford Explorer SF Infiniti M35/45 SF 
Chevrolet Malibu SF Lincoln MKS SF Infiniti G37 SF 
Chevrolet Impala SF Lincoln MKZ SF Infiniti FX35/50 SF 
Chevrolet HHR SF Lincoln Town Car SF Infiniti EX35 SF 
Chevrolet 
Express 3500 15 
Passenger   Lincoln Navigator SF    
Chevrolet Silverado 1500 SF Lincoln MKX SF Toyota Venza SF 
Chevrolet Avalanche SF Lincoln MKT SF Toyota Scion tC SF 
Chevrolet Colorado SF Lincoln Navigator SF Toyota RAV4 SF 
Chevrolet Cobalt SF Mercury Milan SF Toyota Prius SF 
Chevrolet Aveo SF Mercury Mariner SF Toyota Avalon SF 
GMC Sierra SF Mercury Mariner Hybrid SF Toyota Yaris SF 
GMC Savana Passenger   Mercury Milan Hybrid SF Toyota Tundra SF 
GMC Yukon  SF Mercury Mariner SF Toyota Corolla SF 
GMC Yukon Hybrid SF Mercury Grand Marquis SF Toyota Scion xB SF 
GMC Terrain SF Mercury Mountaineer SF Toyota Tacoma SF 
GMC 
Savana 1500 
Cargo O    Toyota Matrix SF 
GMC Acadia SF    Lexus GS350/460 SF/SR 
GMC Canyon SF    Lexus LS460/460L SF/SR 
Pontiac G6 SF Toyota Sequoia SF Lexus RX350 SF/SR 
Pontiac Vibe SF Toyota Tacoma SF Lexus GX460 SF 
Saturn VUE SF Toyota Camry SF Lexus IS250/350 SF/SR 
Saturn Outlook SF Toyota Camry Hybrid SF Lexus LS600hL Hybrid SF/SR 
Saturn Aura SF Toyota 4Runner SF Lexus LX570 SF/SR 
   Toyota Scion xD SF Lexus SC430 SF 
      Toyota Highlander Hybrid SF Lexus IS250C/350C SF 
      Toyota FJ Cruiser SF Lexus RX450h Hybrid SF/SR 
   Toyota Landcruiser SF/SR Lexus HS250h Hybrid SF/SR 
      Toyota Highlander SF Lexus ES350 SF/SR 
   Toyota Tacoma SF Lexus IS F SF/SR 
      Toyota Sienna SF Lexus GS450h Hybrid SF/SR 
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Appendix E Airbag Data
 
    
 
The following table gives airbag characteristics by model type and year for models for 
sales in the United States (1995-2006)  
TOYOTA 
Model Year Notes Number and type 
of airbags 
Camry 2005 • Driver front airbag intelligent, passenger 
front airbag with occupant sensors 
intelligent 
2, advanced  
4 Runner 1996 -1998 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation  
4 Runner 1999-2004 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
intelligent 
2, 2nd generation, 
smart 
4 Runner 
 
2005 • Driver front airbag intelligent, passenger 
front airbag with occupant sensors 
intelligent. 
2, advanced 
Avalon 1995-1997 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 1nd generation 
Avalon 1998-2003 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
•  Front side airbag 
3, 2nd generation  
Avalon 2005 • Driver front airbag intelligent, passenger 
front airbag with occupant sensors 
intelligent. 
• Front and rear roof airbag 
• Front side airbag 
5, advanced  
Camry Solara 1999-2003 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
intelligent 
2, 2nd generation, 
smart 
Camry Solara 2004- 2005 • Driver front airbag intelligent, passenger 
front airbag with occupant sensors 
intelligent 
• Front side airbag 
3, advanced  
Celica 1995-2004 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
 
2, 2nd generation 
Corolla 1995-1998 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
Corolla 1999-2004 
 
• Driver and passenger front airbag 
intelligent 
2, 2nd generation,  
Corolla 2005 • Driver front airbag intelligent, passenger 
front airbag with occupant sensors 
intelligent 
2, advanced 
ECHO 2000-2005 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation,  
Highlander 2001-2003 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation,  
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TOYOTA (continued) 
Model Year Notes Number and type 
of airbags 
Highlander 2004-2005 • Driver front airbag intelligent, passenger 
front airbag with occupant sensors 
intelligent 
2, advanced 
Landcruiser 1995 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
Landcruiser 2004-2005 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
intelligent 
2, 2nd generation, 
smart 
Toyota Matrix 2003 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
Matrix 2004 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
intelligent 
2, 2nd generation, 
smart 
MR2 1995 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
MR2 Spyder 2000-2005 • Driver front airbag, passenger front 
airbag with occupant switch off 
2, 2nd generation 
Prius 2001-2003 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
Prius 2004-2005 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
intelligent 
2, 2nd generation, 
smart 
RAV4 1996-2003 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
RAV4 2004-2005 • Driver front airbag intelligent, passenger 
front airbag with occupant sensors 
intelligent 
2, advanced 
Sequoia 2001-2004 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
Sequoia 2005 • Driver and passenger front airbag with 
occupant sensors intelligent 
2, 2nd generation, 
smart 
T-100 1995-1998 • Driver front airbag 1, 1st generation 
Tacoma 1995-1997 • Driver front airbag 1, 1st generation 
Tacoma 1998 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
Tacoma 2004 • Driver front airbag , passenger front 
airbag with occupant switch off 
2, 2nd generation 
Tacoma 2005 • Driver front airbag intelligent , passenger 
front airbag with occupant switch off 
intelligent 
2, advanced 
 
Supra 1995-1998 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd gen. 
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FORD 
Model Year Notes Number and 
type of airbag 
Aerostar 1996-1997 • Driver front airbag 1, 1st generation 
Aspire 1995-1997 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation  
Bronco 1995-1996 • Driver front airbag 1, 1st generation 
Contour 1995-2000 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation  
Crown Victoria 1995-2003 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
Crown Victoria 2004-2005 • Driver and passenger front airbag intelligent 2, 2nd generation, 
smart 
Ford E-150 2002-2005 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
E-150 
Econoline 
1997-2001 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
E-250 2002-2004 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
E-250 
Econoline 
1997-1999, 
2001 
• Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
E-250 
Econoline  
2000 • Driver front airbag 1, 1st generation 
E-350 
Econoline 
1997-1998 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
 
2, 1st generation 
E-350 
Econoline 
1999-2000 • Driver front airbag 1, 2nd 
generation 
E-350 
Econoline 
2001 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
Escape 2001-2003 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
Escape 2004 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
Escape 2005 • Driver front airbag with occupant switch off 
intelligent , passenger front airbag with 
occupant sensors intelligent 
2, advanced 
Excursion 2000-2005 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
Explorer 1995-2003 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
Explorer 2004-2005 • Driver and passenger front airbag with 
occupant sensors intelligent 
2, advanced 
F-150 1995-1996 • Driver front airbag 1, 1st generation 
F-150 1997-2000 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd gen 
F-150 2007 • Driver front airbag with occupant sensors 
and multi-stage deployment , passenger 
front airbag with occupant sensors, 
occupant switch off and multi-stage 
deployment 
3rd generation or 
multistage 
airbag  
F-150 2001 • Driver front airbag , passenger front airbag 
with occupant switch off 
2, 2nd generation,  
F-150 2004-2005 • Driver front airbag with occupant sensors 
intelligent , passenger front airbag with 
occupant sensors and occupant switch off 
intelligent 
2, advanced 
F-250 1995-1997 • Driver front airbag 1, 1st generation 
F-250 1998-2000 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
F-250 2001-2005 • Driver front airbag , passenger front airbag 
with occupant switch off 
2, 2nd generation,  
F-350 1995-1998 • Driver front airbag 1, 1st generation 
F-350 1999-2000 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
F-350 2001-2005 • Driver front airbag , passenger front airbag 
with occupant switch off 
2, 2nd generation  
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FORD (Continued) 
Model Year Notes Number and type 
of airbag 
Ford ZX2 2002-2003 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
Ford GT 2005 • Driver front airbag , passenger front airbag 
with occupant switch off 
2, 2nd generation,  
Taurus 1995-1997 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
Taurus 2002-2003 • Driver and passenger front airbag with 
occupant sensors 
2, 2nd generation,  
Taurus 2004-2005 • Driver and passenger front airbag with 
occupant sensors intelligent 
2, advanced 
Probe 1995-1997 • Driver and passenger front airbag with 
occupant sensors 
2, 2nd generation, 
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Nissan 
Model Year Notes Number and type 
of airbag 
1995-1998 200SX • Driver and passenger front airbag 
 
2, 1st generation 
1995-1998 240SX • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 1st generation 
1995-1996 300ZX • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 1st generation 
2003 350Z • Driver front airbag with occupant sensors , 
passenger front airbag with occupant 
sensors and occupant switch off 
2, 2nd generation 
2004-2006 350Z • Driver and passenger front airbag with 
occupant sensors 
2, 2nd generation 
Altima 1995-1999 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
Altima 2000-2001 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
• Front side airbag 
3, 2nd generation 
Altima 2002 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
 
2, 2nd generation 
Altima 2003, 2005, 
2006 
• Driver and passenger front airbag with 
occupant sensors 
2, 2nd generation 
Altima 2004 • Driver and passenger front airbag with 
occupant sensors intelligent 
2, 2nd generation, 
smart 
Armada 2004-2006 • Driver and passenger front airbag with 
occupant sensors 
2, 2nd generation 
Frontier 1998-2000, 
2006 
• Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
Frontier 2001-2002, 
2004 
• Driver front airbag , passenger front airbag 
with occupant switch off 
2, 2nd generation 
Frontier 2003 • Driver front airbag , passenger front airbag 
with occupant switch off intelligent 
2, 2nd generation, 
smart 
Frontier 2005 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
intelligent 
 
2, 2nd generation, 
smart 
 
Maxima 1995-1997, 
2000-2002 
• Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation, 
Maxima 1999, 2003 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
• Front side airbag 
3, 2nd generation 
Maxima 2004-2006 • Driver and passenger front airbag with 
occupant sensors 
• Front and rear roof airbag 
• Front side airbag 
5, advanced 
Murano 2003-2006 • Driver and passenger front airbag with 
occupant sensors 
• Front and rear roof airbag 
• Front side airbag 
5, advanced 
Xterra 2000-2002 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
Xterra 2003 • Driver and passenger front airbag with 
occupant sensors 
2, 2nd generation 
Xterra 2005 • Driver and passenger front airbag with 
occupant sensors intelligent 
2, 2nd generation, 
smart 
Xterra 2006 • Driver and passenger front airbag with 
occupant sensors and multi-stage 
deployment 
2, advanced, 
multistage airbag 
Sentro 1995-2001, 
2003-2006 
• Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
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GENERAL MOTORS (GM) 
Model Year Notes Number and 
type of airbag 
GMC C1500 1995-1996 • Driver front airbag 1, 1st generation  
GMC C1500 1997-1998 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2 
GMC C2500 1998-2000 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
GMC C3500 1995-1997 • No   
GMC C3500 1998-2000 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
GMC Envoy 1998-2001 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
GMC Envoy 2002-2003 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
• Front side airbag 
3, 2nd generation 
GMC Envoy 2004 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
intelligent 
2, smart 
GMC Envoy 2005-2006 • Driver front airbag intelligent , passenger 
front airbag with occupant sensors 
intelligent 
2, smart 
GMC ENVOY 
XL 
2002 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
• Front side airbag 
3, 2nd generation 
GMC ENVOY 
XL 
2003 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
GMC ENVOY 
XL 
2004 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
intelligent 
2, smart 
GMC ENVOY 
XL 
2005 • Driver front airbag intelligent , passenger 
front airbag with occupant sensors 
intelligent 
2, smart 
GMC ENVOY 
XUV 
2004 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
intelligent 
2, smart 
GMC ENVOY 
XUV 
2005 • Driver front airbag intelligent , passenger 
front airbag with occupant sensors 
intelligent 
2, smart 
GMC G1500 1996 • Driver front airbag 1, 1st generation  
GMC G1500 1997-1998 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2 
GMC K2500 1995-1997 • No  
GMC K2500 1998-2000 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
GMC Yukon XL 2000-2002 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
• Front side airbag 
3, 2nd generation 
GMC Yukon XL 2003, 2005-
2006 
• Driver front airbag , passenger front 
airbag with occupant sensors 
2, 2nd generation 
GMC Yukon XL 2004 • Driver front airbag intelligent , passenger 
front airbag with occupant sensors 
intelligent 
2, smart 
GMC Yukon 1995-1996 • Driver front airbag 1, 1st generation 
GMC Yukon 1997-2001 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2 
GMC Yukon 2002 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
• Front side airbag 
3, 2nd generation 
GMC Yukon 2003 • Driver front airbag , passenger front 
airbag with occupant sensors 
2, 2nd generation 
GMC Yukon 2004-2006 • Driver front airbag intelligent , passenger 
front airbag with occupant sensors 
intelligent 
2, smart 
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BUICK 
Buick Century 1995-1996 • Driver front airbag 1, 1st generation 
Buick Century 1997-2004 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2 
Buick Century 2005 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
intelligent 
2, smart 
Buick LaCrosse 2005 • Driver front airbag intelligent , passenger 
front airbag with occupant sensors 
intelligent 
2, smart 
Buick LaCrosse 2006 • Driver front airbag intelligent , passenger 
front airbag with occupant sensors  
• Front and rear roof airbag 
4, smart 
Buick Lesabre 1995-1999 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2 
Buick Lesabre 2000-2002 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
• Front side airbag 
3, 2nd generation 
Buick Lesabre 2003 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
Buick Lesabre 2004-2005 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
intelligent 
2, smart 
Buick Lucerne 2006 • Driver and passenger front airbag with 
occupant sensors intelligent 
• Front and rear roof airbag 
• Front side airbag 
5, smart 
Buick Park Av.  1995-1999 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
Buick Park Av.  2000-2004 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
• Front side airbag 
3, 2nd generation 
Buick Park Av. 2005 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
intelligent  
• Front side airbag 
2, smart 
CADILLAC 
Cadilac Catera 1997, 2000-
2001 
• Driver and passenger front airbag 
• Front side airbag 
3, 2nd generation  
Cadilac Catera 1998-1999 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 2nd generation 
Cadilac CTS  2003 • Driver and passenger front airbag with 
occupant sensors 
• Front roof airbag 
• Front side airbag 
4, 2nd generation 
Cadilac CTS 2004 • Driver and passenger front airbag with 
occupant sensors intelligent 
• Front roof airbag 
• Front side airbag 
4, smart 
Cadilac CTS 2005 • Driver front airbag intelligent , passenger 
front airbag with occupant sensors 
intelligent 
• Front and rear roof airbag 
• Front side airbag 
5, smart 
Cadillac Deville 1995-1996 • Driver and passenger front airbag 2, 1st generation 
Cadillac Deville 1997-2002 • Driver and passenger front airbag 
• Front side airbag 
3, 2nd generation 
Cadillac Deville 2003-2004 • Driver and passenger front airbag with 
occupant sensors  
• Front side airbag 
3, 2nd generation 
Cadillac Deville 2005 • Driver and passenger front airbag with 
occupant sensors intelligent 
• Front side airbag 
3, smart 
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Appendix F Search strings for 1st systematic review 
 
 
 
 
 
• Scenario Planning 
• Resource Allocation 
• Strategic Planning 
Process 
• Dealing with 
Uncertainty 
• Corporate governance 
• National Culture 
• Non-market strategy 
• Comparative 
advantage of nations 
• Long view 
• Resource based view 
• Futuring 
• Charismatic leaders 
• Disruptive technology 
• Disruptive innovation 
• Discontinuous 
technology 
• Discontinuous 
Innovation 
• Innovator’s dilemma 
• 3rd generation R & D 
• Resource allocation 
•  Agile business model 
• Technological 
innovation 
• Emerging technologies 
 
 
• Global warming 
• Climate change 
• Hydrogen economy 
• Oil reserves 
• Middle East stability 
• Natural gas reserves 
• Alternative Energy 
• Fuel cells 
• Hybrid vehicles 
Long Term 
Strategy 
Disruptive 
Technologies 
Energy 
Availability & 
Climate Change 
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Appendix G Examiners comments and corrections made to thesis 
 
Task Concept Examiners Comments Action Taken 
1 Abstract Should not have references in it 
– will need to be rewritten to 
reflect changes in the rest of the 
thesis 
Abstract rewritten to reflect new 
approach and references removed. 
2 Opening paragraphs The opening paragraph (pg 1) 
starts with disruptive innovation 
– but this theme is not picked up 
later in the thesis and does not 
appear to be central to the 
research.  It would be better to 
open the document with 
something that is central to the 
thesis – like technology 
management strategy, the 
automotive sector or patents. 
Opening paragraphs rewritten and 
thesis adapted to focus on 
disruptive innovation which was 
original theme of research. 
3 Compelling reason The first section should provide 
a more compelling reason or 
justification for the research – 
why this work is important and 
worthy of PhD study – both 
theoretically and practically 
Compelling reason clearly stated 
around the idea of building theory 
which would better inform practice 
about what to do in the face of 
potentially disruptive change. 
4 Origin of Research 
Question 
Page 2 – need to explain where 
the research question (RQ) 
comes from – show how it is 
derived from the literature and is 
therefore theoretically relevant 
to be studied.   
Research Question now fully 
embedded in literature Gap in the 
area of informing practice about 
what to do. 
5 Research Question The RQ needs to be 
reformulated – it is currently 
narrow and closed.   It is 
currently not clear how the RQ 
relates to Granstrand, Geels, 
Lewin and Volberda etc – link 
back to clarifying the 
contribution to knowledge and 
make sure that the two are 
coherent.  
New Research question formulated 
in more open way i.e. "What 
strategies do automotive companies 
follow with respect to the 
investigation and deployment of 
discontinuous technologies?" and 
linked to gap identified in the 
literature. 
6 Literature review Re-
focus 
The literature review feels 
disjointed and covers many 
different topics – it is hard to 
work out what is central to the 
thesis.  A deeper review of less 
topics would help to clarify the 
focus of the thesis.  Link to 
research question(s) as the 
literature review should help to 
justify your RQ. 
Literature review re-written in 
more focused way with strategy 
literature being removed and 
automotive literature dealing with 
alternative vehicles, a potentially 
disruptive technology being added. 
Focus is on identifying gaps and 
linking literature to the Research 
Question. 
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Task Concept Examiners Comments Action Taken 
7 Critical tone of review The literature review is not 
particularly critical – it is more 
of a summary of key papers.  For 
example, pg 7 – could cite 
Souitaris (2002) Research Policy 
paper that critiques Pavitt’s 
trajectories for not considering 
managerial and organisational 
factors and for being essentially 
a firm level analysis.  Or pg 14 – 
critique of Geels and Schot – 
depends on perspective of the 
analyst and/or actors and point in 
time of the analysis because 
radical system change is the 
result of multiple incremental 
changes.  You need to clearly 
highlight the key debates in your 
field.  
Additional nuance has been 
introduced in looking at the key 
concepts where a gap has been 
identified introducing criticisms of 
the threads in the literature 
discussed. 
8  Automotive literature There has been quite a bit of 
research on the automotive 
sector (technology management, 
product development, supplier 
management etc) – some of this 
research must be included in the 
lit review and can be used to 
show gaps. 
Automotive literature has been 
reviewed and that dealing with 
potentially disruptive technology 
added to the literature review. 
9 Automotive 
discussion in 
Literature Review 
Page 8 – the discussion of the 
automotive sector, though good, 
does not belong in the literature 
review chapter 
Discussion moved to Chapter 4 
together with review of Pavitt's 5 
trajectories. 
10 Definition of Depth 
and Breadth 
The depth and breadth concept is 
central to this research – but the 
words are generic and used in 
many different ways.  As this is 
central to your research, the 
definitions used by others need 
to be discussed and compared 
and critiqued.  This will help to 
justify your definitions and why 
and how they are different. 
New chapter created to discuss 
Depth and Breadth (Chapter 6) in 
line with examiners 
recommendation. Definitions 
provided in this chapter as well as 
contrast with other researcher's 
uses of the terms in related 
contexts. 
11 Gaps in literature Page 27 – Need to clearly 
summarise the key gaps and/or 
debates and inconsistencies in 
the literature to help to show 
how your work will address 
these 
Literature review re-written and 
focused clearly on gaps. 
12 Conclusion to patent 
review 
Page 43 – Need to summarize 
the conclusions having reviewed 
the patent literature.  Use this to 
lead to the justification for your 
approach to patent analysis. 
Conclusion added and shown in 
Sub-section 2.3.6. 
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Task Concept Examiners Comments Action Taken 
13 Methodology chapter Throughout this chapter it is 
essential to argue for your choice 
in a transparent and balanced 
manner. This means presenting 
alternative options available to 
you, discussing the strengths and 
weaknesses of each alternative 
and explaining why you chose 
the one alternative and how you 
plan to deal with any 
weaknesses. 
Chapter rewritten and discussion of 
research choices and blind alleys 
added including strengths and 
weaknesses of current approach. 
14 Philosophy/ 
epistemology  
Page 44 – 
Philosophy/epistemology 
sections – these need developing 
further.  Explain the positivist-
realist debate and the different 
research philosophies (strengths 
and weaknesses) to clearly 
justify your approach and why it 
is the most relevant for your RQ 
and why you did not take other 
approaches. 
Philosophy section expanded to 
discuss major threads in the 
philosophy of science, and resons 
for choosing critical realist 
ontology and inductive 
epistemology given and tied back 
to Research Question. 
15 Thesis purpose in 
chapter 3 
Page 45 – The purpose of the 
thesis is presented as adding to 
Granstrand’s theory – if so, this 
needs to be an explicit part of the 
RQ in Ch 1 or it needs to be 
clearer how answering the RQ 
will help to add to Granstrand’s 
theory.   
Purpose of the thesis has been 
modified along the lines of the new 
Research Question and text edited 
to reflect new focus and can be 
found in Sub-section 3.2.2. 
16 Case study references No description of case studies 
method is given, but these is 
central to your approach (Fig 
3.1) – should look at and draw 
on e.g Yin and Eisenhardt and 
other authors that have applied a 
case study approach to their 
research. 
Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin(1994) 
are referenced to explain choice of 
using cases and Eisenhardt's 
roadmap explicitly used to discuss 
thesis content. 
17 Selection of cases Page 46 – selection of cases 
needs to be more thoroughly 
described at all levels –  
automotive sector, companies, 
technologies.  Clearly explain 
the criteria for 
selection/exclusion at each level. 
This justification of cases needs 
to explicitly link back to the RQ. 
Site selection discussion has been 
expanded and criteria clearly 
explained in light of the new 
Research Question. 
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Task Concept Examiners Comments Action Taken 
18 Themescape maps 
method 
The process for patent analysis 
needs to be more thoroughly and 
explicitly described.  As the 
algorithm for producing the 
maps is not available, you need 
to find a way to check that the 
maps do show what you say they 
show.  This data is central to the 
thesis and so needs to be robust. 
In particular height, land mass, 
scale and the meaning of 
distance are all critical to the 
utility of the map metaphor and 
need to be fully discussed.  
The themescape validity has been 
checked with Thompson Scientific 
as well as checked by manually 
coding two sets of patents as 
discussed in Sub-section 3.5.3. 
Section 5.2 is clearer on how the 
maps are analyzed and Chapter 6 
uses a much more rigorous 
definition of depth and breadth and 
guidelines for the analysis to draw 
conclusions from the maps. 
19 Interview method The interview analysis needs 
more explanation – how were 
questions designed, how was the 
data analysed.  Need to reference 
key qualitative data analysis 
texts e.g Miles and Huberman, 
Strauss and Corbin, Silverman 
etc 
The interview methodology 
outlined in section 3.7 has been 
expanded based on ideas in Miles 
and Huberman (1994) and 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) and 
choices made in terms of recording 
and coding explained. 
20 Chapter 4 Need to explain the purpose of 
this chapter – clarify whether it 
is to give a description of the 
cases or to test/apply key 
theories.  It could be written as 
either a case description using 
frameworks from literature to 
give it more structure or a test of 
the theories by applying them in 
this context.  If the latter, then 
you would need to critique the 
theories having applied them and 
make this an explicit purpose of 
the research and reflect it in the 
RQ. Chapter moves between 
firm level and technology level, 
which is confusing. 
Purpose of Chapter 4 defined as 
rigorously defining context in order 
to better understand boundary 
between context and phenomena 
(Yin, 1994), demonstrate examples 
of co-evolution in automotive, and 
make explicit prior knowledge in 
order to control for bias. Chapter 4 
re-focused at industry level with 
detailed technology discussion 
moved to aument technology case 
studies in Chapter 5.  
21 Chapter 5 - general Needs to be much more precise 
in how you are using the 
maps/patent analysis, 
deployment data and interview 
data to conclude that strategies 
are deep or broad 
Chapter 5 focused on presenting 
the case studies with discussion of 
depth and breadth moved to 
Chapter 6 in line with examiners 
recommendation. That chapter uses 
clear definitions and a construct to 
make distinction between depth 
and breadth. 
22 Table 5.31 Page 137 – Table 5.31 – this 
needs much more 
description/analysis – it is 
central to what you have found 
and should be further explored 
and explained.   
Summary of depth and breadth 
observations, formerly Table 5.31 
is now shown in Table 6.6 and 
fully discussed in sections 6.4, and 
6.5. 
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Task Concept Examiners Comments Action Taken 
23 Competitive 
Advantage ? 
Page 139 –mixing competitive 
advantage (firm level – hard to 
attribute to a single technology 
in a complex product such as a 
car) with technical performance 
of the technology. This also 
applies to other parts of thesis 
where competitive advantage 
used.   
References to competitive 
advantage removed and discussion 
focused on technical performance 
in for example Table 6.9 and the 
discussion of implications for 
practice in Sub-section 6.3.3. 
24 Fig 5.23  Page 141 – Fig 5.23 mixes lots 
of concepts which are not fully 
described.   
Figure 5.23 removed and replaced 
with Figures 6.3 and Figure 6.4 
each of which is explained in detail 
and then enriched with the 
discussion in Sub-section 6.3.3. 
25 Conclusion Chapter 5 Chapter 5 needs a clear 
conclusions section at the end 
Conclusions given in Chapter 
summary found in Section 5.4. 
26 New Discussion 
Chapter (6) 
Need to insert a new chapter 
between the current Chapters 5 
and 6 – Discussion -  which 
synthesises and discusses 
findings from data. Plus how the 
findings relate to the literature 
and exploring different 
explanations and some of the 
key literature around these 
different explanations.   This 
will involve moving conclusions 
part from Chapter 5 and section 
6.2 into this new chapter.   
New discussion chapter created in 
whch the idea of depth and breadth 
is connected to the literature, 
defined, and applied. This chapter 
also includes new sections on the 
implications for practice, what the 
thesis says about alternative power 
trains and includes the discussion 
of theory.  
27 Chapter 7 The new Chapter 7 Conclusions 
would then briefly summarize 
the thesis, clearly state the 
substantive contribution to 
knowledge, limitations and 
further research.   
New Chapter 7 created. 
28 Dark Box ? Page 143 – need to be more 
explicit about how this research 
has added to our understanding 
of the “dark box”.  Refer back to 
findings to illustrate this.   
Addition to idea of "dark box" 
moved to discussion in Chapter and 
more fully described in sections 6.3 
and 6.4 
29 Push/Pull Fig 6.1  - 3 of your cases are 
from push/pull – discuss how 
this might have affected your 
findings and how it is different 
to the cases used by Granstrand.   
The idea that the theory of the 
technology-based firm be expanded 
to include technology push 
followed by market pull is made 
explicit. 
30 Comment on two 
threads 
Page 144 – need to explain how 
your findings could add to 2 
threads (Christensen and 
Bower/Tushman and Anderson) 
or remove this comment 
Discussion of theory given in 
Section 6.4 centered on additions to 
Granstrand’s theory of the 
technology-abased firm and 
comment removed. 
31 Themescape maps  Patent diagrams need to be 
larger in the main text so they 
can be more easily read (and can 
then be removed from the 
appendix) 
Diagrams enlarged and moved to 
company case studies in Chapter 5 
and removed form appendix. 
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Task Concept Examiners Comments Action Taken 
32 Referencing Inconsistent referencing in main 
text – sometimes three authors 
named, sometimes et al – should 
be consistent throughout the 
document 
Referencing made consistent citing 
up to two authors and then 
applying et al. 
33 Typos Marked typos throughout the 
thesis documents and additional 
specific comments to consider 
Typos corrected and thesis 
reviewed by two external editors. 
34 Quotes All direct quotes should have 
page numbers (p17, 18, 22, 29, 
30, 34, 45, 60, 145, 146) 
Page numbers added to all direct 
quotes. 
 
 
 
